Manchus to gain access to the Amur, Russia was indeed forced to content herself with a frontier-line roughly drawn from Nerchinsk to Okhotsk—that is, from a hundred odd miles east of Lake Baikal to a point on the frozen shores of the Sea of Okhotsk. For one hundred and fifty years she remained content with this imaginary frontier-line, but no sooner had a man appeared-the resolute Muravief -who could see and understand things, than the journey towards the south-eastern coasts began anew. Profiting by the embarrassment occasioned to the decadent Manchu rulers by the presence of the Anglo-French Allies in Peking in 1860, Muravief's arrangements (already entered into in 1858 on the Amur with the Chinese frontier officials) were not only not only ratified by the special Russian Ambassador who arrived most opportunely in Peking, but in addition that portion of Manchuria which faces the Sea of Japan was ceded unconditionally to Russia; and thus several hundred thousand square miles of territory were won without a blow being struck. In the 'seventies the Japanese claim to the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalien was disposed of, and the chief Russian Pacific port became Vladivostok in place of Nicolaevsk, which is eight hundred miles to the north. Once more nothing happened for a number of years, and it was not until 1900 that the Boxer outbreak allowed the post-Chino-Japanese-war arrangements-made on paper-to be realised partially. All that was adventurous in Eastern

Siberia was then emptied into Manchuria in the wake of the Czar's avenging troops. Mr. Hawes, in his admirable book In the Uttermost East, has told us clearly how greatly the movement into Manchuria affected the Russian towns on the Amur. Everybody who had any roubles had rushed off to golden Manchuria, where it was fondly believed vast fortunes were easily to be made; many had abandoned positions won years ago. The Russian Government had behaved in the same way as its people. At last it seemed to them there was a possibility of occupying territories that adjoined the warm seas, and of making definite plans for the absorption of such territories when the propitious moment arrived. By 1902 the Manchurian railways were completed, and although an Evacuation Protocol had been signed in Peking, it was thought that by skilful manœuvring its provisions might be ignored. The one great thing was to gain time, appease the public, and let things "solidify." Thus, on the 8th of October, 1902, the country west of the Liao river (which was really useless to Russia) and the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang railway were handed back to China, and it was hoped that these acts would satisfy the British Press and public, and cause them to cease their unending bickerings, as the interests of the British railway bondholders had been safeguarded by the rendition of the railway aforesaid.

Unfortunately, when the second evacuation period came, the 8th of April, 1903, it was found that it

would be impossible to hand back Newchwang and the whole of the Fengtien and Kirin provinces without making the Russian position so weak that an unconditional retreat from Manchuria would have to follow as a matter of course. Consequently the

usual Russian policy was followed. Moukden, the most important provincial capital, being "masked " by Newchwang, Port Arthur, Dalny, and the railway garrisons, was evacuated nominally and nothing but Cossack guards were left for the protection of the various Russian officials having dealings with the Manchu Governor-General. But apart from this and a great deal of marching to and fro of troops, the terms of the Evacuation Agreement were cynically ignored. This double-dealing aroused everyone's suspicions, but principally those of the Japanese; for the outwardly strong position of Russia in Manchuria had already been ominously reflected in the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Czar's Plenipotentiary in Seoul.

It requires but a short study of the map to understand the reasons for this most thoroughly. As has been already written, the three most important harbours on the Manchurian seaboard were held fast in Russian hands. Two were leased to her, and the third-Newchwang-could be retained by adroit juggling. It remained therefore only to secure the Yalu estuary, by the lease or seizure of a district on the Korean side commanding the mouth of the waterway, to serve a double object. Both Antung and Tatung on the Manchurian side had been

opened to foreign trade by the American and Japanese Treaties with China of October, 1903. Although the Treaties remained inoperative for the time being, both the ports named were commercially opened, as Russia felt sure, merely to weaken the Russian position in Manchuria, and to infringe on Russian rights, acquired both by diplomacy and force of arms. Consequently, if Yongampho could be obtained by Russia, it would simply require the spending of a few million roubles to attract all the Yalu trade there and make both Antung and Tatung valueless from the foreign commercial standpoint. And, besides this, the Yongampho hinterland could be easily converted into an armed camp, making it impossible for any Japanese army to attempt the passage of the Yalu without the most extraordinary efforts. All the tremendous industry which had formerly been lavished on the obtaining of a coaling-station in Southern Korea was consequently diverted to the Yalu question, and day after day, week after week, and even month after month, the wiles of Russian diplomacy were exhausted in fruitless efforts to obtain the Yongampho lease.

The Russian attitude from their own point of view is therefore quite clear. They were dealing with territories and districts belonging to the two Eastern Powers, China and Korea, and how much or how little progress they made in their arrangements was their own business and that of nobody else. China and Korea alone had the right to reject or accept their demands, and other countries

could protect their interests as best they might by bringing to bear all the resources of their diplomacy at the Courts of China and Korea to defeat the machinations of their rivals; that is, they could act indirectly against Russia by counter-attacking through diplomatic channels, but they could do nothing else. This is nothing more or less than a true analysis of the Russian point of view.

For Japan, therefore, in the summer of 1903 to step boldly out of the ranks and say, "I constitute myself champion for these powerless and helpless countries, China and Korea, and it is with me that you must make your settlement," was from the Russian point of view a piece of insufferable insolence. Japan had been put in her right place but eight years before when she had been forced out of the Liaotung; and to see her act as if she were ready to repay her great rival in the same coin made Muscovite blood boil. All through the long-winded negotiations three things stood out clearly-that Russia wished to gain time at all cost; that she continued to maintain her own point of view, namely, that China and Korea were the countries really concerned and nobody else; yet that, as a concession to Japan, she was willing to allow the Tokyo Government to do as it pleased in Southern Korea. As for there being any question of fighting, it was really absurd to talk of such things, because it takes two to make a fight, and when one of the two is standing outside the arena with his arms folded, it is impossible