for the other to vault the ropes and force an

engagement.

Was it possible for Russia to maintain such a mental attitude up to the last days of the negotiations? Did not Japanese persistence and the perfection of the Island Empire's preparations finally make some impression on the Czar's high officers in the Far East? It is possible to deny that Russia was beginning to waken and realise the grim dangers of the situation, and it seems probable that could the Tokyo Cabinet have continued even nominal negotiations for another two or three weeks, seconded by a naval demonstration off the coasts of Korea, there might have been a Russian collapse. This opinion has been gained from one of the chief actors on the Russian side, and from a perusal of some of the papers on the disarmed Russian warships lying in Chinese waters. The Russian bluff reached its height with the departure of the Russian fleet from Port Arthur on the 3rd February, a departure which was just as sudden as the return forty-eight hours later, on the 5th.

Japanese patience, however, had reached its last limit, and it is highly doubtful whether even the populace would have been contented with anything but a trial of arms. All the immense sacrifices which had been made for years to provide a formidable modern armament-sacrifices which had been borne without a murmur, because it was understood that Japan must go through the fire to come out tempered steel-although they had strained every

one, would have been in vain according to the ideas of the masses, which, having a rare instinct when a psychological moment arrives, knew that never could a better time be chosen than the present.

On the 5th of January, the news of the departure of the Russian fleet from Port Arthur having reached Tokyo on the 4th, a communication was handed to the Russian Government notifying them of the rupture of negotiations. On the 6th the Japanese fleet left Sasebo; on the same day the first seizures of Russian merchant vessels were made. At daylight on the 8th, the combined Japanese fleet, having swept up the Korean coast and found no trace of the Russians, was anchored in a strongly protected base in the Elliot Islands, eighty miles from Port Arthur, and by nightfall the dim shadows of lank torpedo-craft were stealing noiselessly and swiftly down on the unsuspecting Russian fleet.

The famous surprise attack is so well known that there are but few details to dwell on. Drawn up in battle-line under the powerful Golden Hill sea-forts, the Russian fleet was an easy prey to the onslaught of the Japanese, and, under such circumstances, it is difficult to understand how what must be regarded from a naval standpoint as a failure could have taken place. Out of the Russian battleships and protected cruisers lying anchored only three were torpedoed, whilst some others were reported as damaged. Japanese apologists have not been slow to point out that, in spite of the general carelessness

of their attitude, the Russians were as fully prepared for the attack as they were ever likely to be, for within thirty minutes of the firing of the first torpedo, searchlights were being worked everywhere from both the shore forts and the ships, and a deafening big-gun and machine-gun fire was being poured on the devoted attacking force. This explanation, however, is not enough to account for the slight damage inflicted on the powerful Russian fleet so brilliantly surprised, and the real causes must be sought elsewhere.

As far as present investigations will permit, it would appear that two causes operated largely in favour of the Russians-first, an undue excitement on the part of the torpedo crews; and, second, an excessive timidity about throwing away torpedo craft and the lives of Japanese seamen. Regarding the first point, there has been ample proof that the Japanese torpedo crews were not as calm and collected as could have been wished. A certain number of torpedoes were actually fired with their safety-bolts unremoved, and were fished up subsequently by the Russians. The actual number so discovered is unascertainable, but a non-Russian engineer in the Port Arthur dockyard states that seven were brought ashore. Whether or not this figure has been purposely or carelessly exaggerated is not a matter of general importance; the fact remains that some undue haste and unnecessary excitement were undoubtedly exhibited at a time. when the utmost phlegm was a sine quâ non.

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The second fault is even more remarkable than the first. It is stated-and, as far as is ascertainable, is generally believed to be true-that the Japanese torpedo fleet escaped practically unscathed as soon as the Russian alarm showed itself in the raking fire poured from the quick-firers. Although this mosquito fleet returned in the night, it was powerless to continue the attack with the sea lit brilliantly by the unremitting play of searchlights. This is a heavy charge to bring against the section commanders of the torpedo flotilla. It was absolutely necessary at all costs to secure for Japan the command of the sea at the very outset of the war. Anything which removed the Russian preponderance of ships of the line (although they were individually inferior to the Japanese vessels in displacement) should have been purchased at no matter what cost, and to have sacrificed the entire torpedo flotilla engaged in the prosecution of this plan would have been paying none too dearly for a priceless thing. Apologists here again state that the Japanese flotilla was somewhat weakened by the diversion of a portion of the vessels to Dalny, where it was supposed some of the Russian fleet would be found. This excuse is hardly a valid one. The unexcelled intelligence arrangements Japan possessed at both Port Arthur and Dalny should have been sufficient to have avoided such a mistake being made. Finally, it may be remarked that not until nearly a

year later-i.e. in December

-were the attacks of torpedo craft pushed home

regardless of everything, as they should have been in the first instance. In the last act of the tragedy of the Russian Pacific fleet, the final torpedoing of the battleship Sebastopol, Japanese commanders exhibited a dash and a vigour of attack which crowned their efforts with such success that the last Russian ship, although surrounded by torpedo-nets, was crippled beyond all hope of repair. It is in this manner that the first attack should have been carried out.

The moral effect on Port Arthur of the Japanese surprise attack of the night of the 8th February was, however, immense, and destined never to disappear completely. Russian Port Arthur, though six years old, not yet out of its swaddling clothes, was disporting itself on the fatal night of the 8th in truly infantile fashion. Too much blame has been bestowed on Admiral Starck and his wife for the fact that a large portion of the high officers of the Russian fleet were amusing themselves at the house of the Commander-in-Chief when they should have been at their posts. This is foolish, for it shows an utter lack of appreciation of the life for which Port Arthur has been long celebrated in the Far East. It is necessary to illustrate this phrase, since other things should share the blame which has been lavished on Admiral Starck.

On the 8th the nocturnal attractions of Port Arthur were enhanced by a gala performance at Baroufsky's. Baroufsky was the Lord George Sanger of the East, and rejoiced in the possession