absolus de Kuropatkin." As for Nanshan, everybody has laughed over the statement that it was only a "big demonstration"; but absurd as this may seem in Europe, it has a great deal of truth from the Russian point of view. The Russian Intelligence Department had already received news from Shanghai that a third Japanese army had left Japan, and it was felt that, had the Russians held Nanshan at a terrible sacrifice, another army would have cut them off from Port Arthur, and thus left the fortress with but ten thousand defenders instead of nearly fifty thousand, and made the defenders of Nanshan and Kiuchau isthmus prisoners. Nanshan Hill and the Kiuchau isthmus are nearly fifty miles from Port Arthur. June found the Russians in Manchuria, therefore, not unsatisfied. July found them almost happy, although they distinguished themselves by singular incompetence in all the small engagements against the trio of Japanese generals who were slowly but surely closing round Liaoyang. By August, when it was learnt by junk that Port Arthur was holding its own against Nogi, a jubilant feeling was in the air. The Japanese had displayed such caution and "irresolution," that the old feeling that the little islanders were certainly going to be all eaten up after all was beginning to return. Even after Liaoyang, everybody said it was the Intelligence Department which had destroyed Kuropatkin's sense of judgment. From every bureau in the Far East warnings of Kuroki's much-advertised turning-movement were ticked by the telegraphs into Kuropatkin's ears. "Beware of Kuroki! Beware of Kuroki!" had been the burden of their song, and Kuropatkin massed a huge force on his left to trap Kuroki-a trap which some competent judges believe would have been disastrous for the Japanese right wing, had orders not been disobeyed in such a flagrant manner. The battle of Shaho was the natural spring-like rebound of forces which had not been thoroughly strained at Liaoyang. It may be said, without discourtesy to the brave Japanese, that had the Russian fierceness at the Shaho been shown at Liaoyang, and a better distribution of forces made, Oku's frontal attacks would have been shattered, and the steel claws of the Japanese thoroughly blunted in their desperate attempts to press to pieces a series of magnificent positions. And at Port Arthur, the autumn of 1904 found the Japanese position very unenviable. The story of the series of grand attacks delivered towards the end of August was well known in all its details by Kuropatkin at the beginning of September, and cipher despatches brought by junk estimated that Port Arthur could hold out for many months to come. The news of the capitulation of the fortress on the 1st January was the most terrible blow the Russians received, and with it the impression deepened that a long and weary "wasting" war was the only thing which would finally retrieve their fortunes. These few remarks give some indi cation of the Russian feeling in Manchuria during the first half year of war. Turning now to the Japanese side of the question, it is with extreme diffidence that I venture to criticise a nation in arms which on land as well as on sea has given countless proofs of a heroism and a calm disregard for death, and shown a fixity of purpose and an unruffled patience that have seldom been equalled and certainly never surpassed in the entire course of the world's history. But in order to see as clearly into the future as possible, and to realise thoroughly every point of value, no examination which is not impartial can be counted of value. Japan had confessedly been preparing for nearly ten long years for the present war. Mortified in 1895 by the unconditional retreat from the Liaotung, forced on her by a triplicate of Powers, of which Russia was the leading spirit; irritated to an extent which has been seldom understood by the diplomacy of Li Hung Chang, which secured the concession of the complete Manchurian railway and the lease of Port Arthur and the adjoining territory; and tortured by the spectacle of the invasion of Manchuria under cover of the Boxer outbreak in 1900 by 50,000 Russian troops-Japan was only temporarily appeased by the Manchurian Evacuation Protocol of 8th April, 1902. The failure of Russia to observe the second evacuation period which fell due on the 8th April, 1903, aroused Japanese suspicions, and the activity of Russian diplomacy in Korea confirmed her worst forebodings. Foreseeing that once more |