necessary Japan was prepared to send 300,000 men to Manchuria. Three hundred thousand men! The Mikado's Rescripts and the Imperial Ordinance of the 29th September, 1904, showed that the Great War, hitherto confined to battles which were in the nature of preliminary fencings-important operations though they may have been-would soon commence. By the September Ordinance the strength of the Japanese army was immediately increased by four divisions of recruits called in to form the extraordinary corps newly-created, besides an addition of five divisions from the Army of the Second Reserve-to wit, a total of nine divisions numbering some 200,000 men. This new increase added to the existing thirteen divisions of the mobilised army gave a grand total of twenty-two divisions, the strength of each in the field would vary according to circumstances from 20,000 to 30,000 men. A grand Japanese army of from

five to six hundred thousand men was thus created which would be quite ready for the first or second month of 1905. Besides this, the new military law enabled a large draft to be made permanently from the depôt troops, while it was clear from the number of recruits joining the colours that the major portion of the 150,000 young men (selected carefully from the males yearly liable for military service) annually enlisted in the Japanese army (active or reserve the latter untrained) was to be trained immediately, each new year's contingent being called upon to take up arms.

These points are most important, for they show clearly that the Japanese Headquarters Staff at least accepted without questioning the lessons of seven months' warfare, and immediately prepared to face the new situation unflinchingly. The battle of the Shaho was without much consequence from a purely Japanese point of view-it was merely a gross Russian mistake. It cannot be denied that Oyama would have resumed the offensive had not Kuropatkin saved him the trouble by forestalling him; but Oyama was in no haste to move until a final decision could be arrived at regarding Port Arthur and its power of resistance.

Turning to the great fortress, it was plain by October that much progress had been made by the Japanese in their sapping and mining operations, and that the lines round the main enceinte were being steadily tightened. The enormous struggle which took place for the possession of 203-Metre Hill was made not so much for the ultimate destruction of the Russian fleet, as has been popularly supposed, but for the pulverising of all Russian resistance. That the great forts must be blown to pieces by the terrible indirect bombardment of the eleven-inch monsters was patent, for sapping and mining was a very slow process, and was destined to become every day slower as winter frost gripped the iron soil of Port Arthur more and more. It is impossible to suppose that Admiral Togo feared a fresh sortie of the Russian fleet after the disgraceful attempt of the 10th August, and the loss

by disarmament in neutral ports of one powerful battleship and three cruisers. With 300,000 men shivering on the Shaho, and the heavy guns hurling death and destruction into defiant Port Arthur, the old closed not too cheerfully for Japan.

year

CHAPTER XXVII

the great war. (B) FROM THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR

LIKE a thunder-clap the news crashed all over the Far East that General Stoessel had offered to surrender on the 1st of January, 1905. Fortyeight hours after his parlementaire rode into the Japanese lines, all the Far East knew what had happened. The fall of the Russian fortress brought very mixed feelings, varying from frantic joy to gloomy pessimism, over an enormous coastline which knew not what this meant for its future. It was an absolute surprise to everyone-of that there is no doubt; for in spite of the terrific bombardment of the main enceinte the fortress had only just been slightly broken into, and it was still a demon among strong places.

Under such circumstances it took some time for things to be placed in their proper perspective; but slowly and irresistibly one fact began to stand out more and more clearly. Already in August the torpedo-boat Reschitlni had brought news to Chefoo which a favoured few were able to appraise at its right value. Dissensions after three months' isola

tion were already rife in the fortress; the military and the naval people refused to co-operate; and whilst there were many fierce spirits among the garrison who favoured the vaunted Kruger policy of dying in the last trench, there were many others who desired to save their skins at any price. This much was even then quite clear. The curious mixture of the heroic and the despicable-which probably in the main is the natural disposition found among large numbers of men-was bound in the end to have unfortunate results for the Russians.

The arrival of the destroyer Rastoropny on the 15th of November at Chefoo confirmed the news which had already leaked out. General Smirnoff, the Commandant of the fortress, and his Chief of Staff, General Kondrachenko, were stated by the Russian officers and men of the torpedo-boat to be the leading spirits in the defence, fiercely advocating a fight to the death; whilst General Stoessel, the supreme Commander of all forces, whom the world had already baptised a hero of mediæval type, and his inner ring of Generals were already in favour of surrender. I state this on the authority of an officer of the Rastoropny, who left six weeks before the fall of the strong place. Then in forty-five days came the collapse.

At first the world wept to learn that but five thousand able-bodied men were left commanded by two or three score unscathed officers; that the hospitals were choked with untended wounded, who filled the air with their cries; that everything was