longer. All that has been written about the futility of making a useless sacrifice of Russian lives has been penned by those who have not yet realised that the surrender of Port Arthur made the partial destruction of Kuropatkin's armies inevitable. Had Port Arthur held out but for ten weeks longeruntil the middle of March-the Japanese advance of 450,000 men against Kuropatkin's strongly fortified Moukden positions could only have been partially successful. That after some weeks' fighting Kuropatkin might have been forced to retreat is possible, but he would have only retreated a step to Tiehling. Here a Russian army of half a million men would have been a terrible force for the Japanese to attempt to break, for the country in these regions. was created for defence. By May, the reinforcements now joining Linevitch would have been with Kuropatkin and made him impregnable. But although the Russian Government offered inducements to the defenders of Port Arthur to keep up their defence those inducements were too small. The most lavish rewards should have been offered to everyone-since this is a method which appeals to Russians-to keep up the defence until the last fort was captured. Ten million pounds, if necessary, should have been spent in rushing steamers at the entrance laden with stores. If one steamer in ten had got in it would have been a cheap price to have paid; for the holding of Port Arthur until the very last foot of ground had been lost might have irrevocably ruined the whole Japanese plan of campaign. But there were no signs that the Russian Government realised fully that everything in southern Manchuria depended on Port Arthur. The various attempts Kuropatkin made in the winter of 1904-1905 did nothing to enhance his reputation. The battles of Newchwang and Heikoutai were both foolish-the first because it was only accomplished by violating neutral territory and inviting the Japanese to do the same; the second because it cost 15,000 invaluable men who were needed for the Russian right. The result of the battle of Moukden was inevitable, for 580,000 Japanese will always beat 388,000 Russians; and with the Moukden collapse the fate of southern Manchuria was definitely decided. It is useless wasting any words about the Russian fleet. If, as has been suggested by the greatest naval critic in the world, the Baltic fleet had left Russian waters in May and arrived off China in July, a very serious situation for the Japanese would have arisen and the entire campaign on land been stopped. But Russians cannot act quickly. Finally, the culminating folly of the Baltic fleet steaming straight for the Tsushima Straits, instead of going to the Gulf of Pechili and interrupting Japanese communications, cannot be excused. Coal and provisions could have been taken forcibly, if necessary, from China ports, and the seizing of the Miaotiao islands would have provided the necessary base. Even if such an enterprise had finally ended in disaster it would have much embarrassed Japan for the time being, and placed Manchurian armies in an awkward position. Summing up rapidly, it may be said that the great Japanese mistakes have been the loss of the first three months of the war, the advance from Korea, the delaying of the Port Arthur attack, and the miscalculation of the capacity of the Siberian railway. Of course there are many minor mistakes, such as the weak nature of the attempts made to destroy the railway, the ineffective torpedo-boat attacks, and the non-recognition of the necessity for laying railways behind each army. Against this, however, it may be said that the supplying of modern armies is a terrible task which has surprised everyone, and that no Japanese in the first instance imagined that the Russian fleet could be so mishandled. But this second point, the mishandling of the fleet, should have been put to the Japanese advantage immediately it was discovered and made speedier landing-operations possible. On the Russian side everything excepting the Siberian railway has been a mistake-a terrible series of mistakes. From start to finish everything has gone wrong, everything has been confused and muddled, everything has miscarried. Yalu, Nanshan, Telissu, Motienling, Tashihchido, Liaoyang, Shaho, Port Arthur, Heikoutai, and Moukden-all are full of errors. Everywhere there are signs that Russian strength, which in German hands might dominate the whole world, is always foolishly dissipated. Russian generals refusing to co-operate |