officer in Korea will soon have disappeared; and, if in his place came one of those polished Japanese military attachés from a European capital, accustomed to the diplomatic world, who would soon fit himself into the peculiar Korean scheme of things, it would be found that more progress would be made than is possible under a bluff soldier with a reputation.

And although no change is necessary or advisable at the Japanese Legation-I have already stated my opinion very definitely on this matter-a change of title or, perhaps more correctly, an addition to the present title of the Japanese Plenipotentiary would be a wise move. Mr. Hayashi since the war is not only an Envoy Extraordinary but an AgentGeneral of a special and peculiar type, assisting to some extent in the government of the country to which he is accredited. He occupies a very delicate post, but the time has come when the Japanese Government should speak frankly and firmly, and define more clearly his present ambiguous position, which is already the source of some trouble.

Until now Seoul and Korea generally have been held tight in leading-strings by Tokyo, and no liberty of action whatsoever has been allowed the men on the spot. On every possible occasion they are compelled to return to Tokyo "for instructions," and have "to consult " about matters which any official gifted with very ordinary abilities should be able and authorised to decide himself. An absurd but significant little thing may be mentioned in this connection as an illustration that the broad

mindedness of English administrations has not yet been attained. On the Seoul-Fusan railway trains running South, i.e. from the capital of the country to the end of the Korean peninsula, are termed uptrains because they go towards Tokyo; whilst trains running up to Seoul are called down-trains because they run in connection with Japanese trains starting from Tokyo! It is difficult to understand why such an absurd nomenclature should have been sanctioned in independent Korea.

All this, however, springs from the fact that Tokyo cannot disabuse itself of the idea that it is unwise and unsafe to leave Korea alone for any length of time; and that indeed everything must be personally overseen. To such a view I take the strongest exception, and I venture to think that if Lord Cromer and his officials had been crippled in this way they would never have made Egypt what it is to-day. Unless Korea is governed from Seoul, as it must be unless Korean independence and sovereignty are mere diplomatic expressions, the strong undercurrents of discontent still observable in all classes of the population will tend to grow and not to diminish; and it is not impossible, if the idea that Korea is simply being "exploited" is allowed to gain ground, that riots may take place which will do Japan much harm abroad.

As I have already shown, there are now five high non-Korean officials who may be counted on to work in the interests of the country, but who are now not combined as they should be and consequently can do

but little good. It is high time these officials were grouped together as an Administrative Council under the presidency of the Japanese Agent-General (now the Minister Plenipotentiary), and that five Korean Ministers, the chiefs of such Departments as the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Finance Department, the War Office, and the Imperial Household Department, were added to this number. This Administrative Council would thus number three Japanese high officials-the Agent-General, the Commandant of the Occupation Corps, and the Financial Adviser; one American, as the Diplomatic Adviser, and five Korean officials. Such a Council possessing supreme control would be able to frame a yearly budget and provide fixed amounts for each department, placing everything on the equitable basis that now does not exist.

At present General Hasagawa is merely labouring to induce the invertebrate Korean Court and Government to reduce the Korean army (which numbers about twelve thousand bayonets and swords and nothing else); the Financial Adviser is striving to grasp hold of something tangible and possess himself of some liquid asset with ill-success; the Japanese Minister is acrimoniously disputing on the Audience question and his right to see the Emperor whenever such a course is necessary; the Chief Commissioner cannot find time to pay attention to the important question of the re-organisation of the Customs and its complete separation from the Chinese Customs Service, because counter-attacking intrigue-move

ments is more necessary for his welfare than anything else; the Diplomatic Adviser has discovered that certain Continental Powers will not take away their Legations from Seoul without exacting some compensation and a pound of flesh elsewhere-all of which is a wonderful state of affairs, but not a good one. And whilst this is going on, Korean Ministers are running round the Palace enclosures like chickens with their heads cut off, knowing not where to turn to gain a dishonest penny, knowing not what the inquisitive Japanese will next ask.

Until, therefore, something akin to the establishment of this Administrative Council is ordered there will be the same recurring troubles. And the decreeing of such a body would allow Japanese advisers for education, &c., to take their places too; thus making it possible to begin something solid and lasting in the matter of teaching the populace that the Japanese are not man-eaters.

Meanwhile, apart from these diplomatico-financial difficulties, the country gives every evidence of going ahead. There are now no less than 46,500 Japanese in Korea distributed as follows: Chemulpo, 10,000; Seoul, 8,000; Kunsan, 2,000; Mokpo, 1,500; Wonsan, 2,000; Chinnampo, 2,5c0; Pingyang, 1,000; Masampo, 500; Fusan, 12,000; Taiko and other railway settlements, 2,000; floating population, 5,000. From observations it would appear that the net gain per month in this population is about two thousand for the whole peninsula, and that therefore by the year 1907 or 1908 there

should be a resident Japanese population of 100,000 souls.

In this connection it is important to note that the prevailing idea in Europe that the Japanese immigrants become permanent settlers and acquire land for agricultural purposes is entirely erroneous. The Japanese have all the Frenchman's aversion to settling permanently abroad, and the so-called Japanese colonist goes to Korea for as few years as possible. Once there, he settles only in towns and is not a colonist properly speaking; and indeed in the presence of the Korean and Chinaman of the lower classes, he feels nearly all the white man's aversion to perform unskilled manual labour. Such agricultural land as has been bought-you will see Japanese boundary stones in many parts of the country-has been acquired because it is cheap, and, leased to Korean farmers, brings in an exorbitant rate of interest which may be anything from 15 to 30 per cent. In no case have I heard that Japanese have been seen tilling the land. This is an important conclusion.

But it is undoubtedly necessary for Japan to increase the production of Korean foodstuffs, and therefore the Japanese Government might try the experiment of establishing model colonies on some of the unoccupied land in Central and Northern Korea. Seeing, however, the ill-success which such colonies had in Hokaido (Yeso), the authorities have been, and probably still are, loth to order such dubious experiments. Why Nagamori