I think you will also hear the argument that there is a risk of conveying information to an enemy if Congress is in a position of insisting upon the kind of information that would be necessary to give the President his authorizing resolution. I think that is very much less of a risk than the very real one which I know is with us right now of dividing our country because of unilateral judgments in the use of military force.

We have succeeded in surviving many situations in which information was leaked to an enemy, but I doubt whether we can survive the kind of massive disillusionment that is now setting in our society. Finally, the argument that it is hazardous to distract the President by forcing him to defend his position against skeptical judgment strikes me as being totally invalid within the context of our times. No policy can be any stronger than its resources. And when we are discussing foreign policy and discussing military policy, the most important of all resources is that of the people, of the will of the people, and I think the will of the people is something that is being sapped very rapidly.

I find when I talk to students that it is almost impossible to get a sensible discussion on a long list of issues which are not directly pertaining to Vietnam but which are related to Vietnam. I think that we are in great danger of adopting some military manpower policies which we will regret simply because the preoccupation with the war is overshadowing everything else. It has thrust a tone of emotional hysteria in the country which makes rational debate almost impossible. I think there is only one way to handle such things in a democracy and that is to somehow bring back the concept that the Nation is not going to launch into one of these tremendous ventures again without having Congress, which is after all the expression of the people's will, having a say in it and retaining some possibility of bringing it under control.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Mr. Reedy's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY MR. GEORGE E. REEDY, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REGARDING S. 731, S.J. RES. 18, S.J. RES. 59

For purposes of the record, my views are individual and do not reflect in any manner the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of which I am a Fellow. My comments are directed solely to the impact I believe the bills would have on the Presidential decision making process in military operations short of a formal declaration of war and I do not presume to address myself to the legal issues as this is a field in which I have no special training.

Within that context, it is my judgment that the sponsors of all three measures have focused on the one area in which it is possible to introduce a reasonable measure of legislative control over the power of the Executive to commit American armed forces to combat without a formal war declaration. Short of attempting to eliminate Presidential control over the armed forces or going to a parliamentary form of government-futile, impractical and dangerous endeavors there is no effective way in which the Presidential capacity to initiate hostilities can be brought within bounds. But it is conceivable that after a reasonable period of time, he can be called upon for an accounting and forced to defend his position as the price of continuing that which he has started. All three measures before this Committee propose machinery to accomplish that purpose and I believe they are important not only as they address themselves to the problem of war but in that their adoption would have a salutary effect upon Presidential thinking and decision making.

The crucial factor which, in my judgment, would make futile any effort to place bounds upon the Presidential initiative is his position in our political and governmental structure. The realities of the world situation compel the United States to maintain a sizable military force. Of necessity, ultimate control over this force in its day-to-day disposition must be lodged in the President. There are obviously legitimate reasons why this force must be committed to hostilities upon some occasions without enough time to consult another branch of the government. If such reasons do not exist, the Executive branch, which has a structure that does not necessarily foster wisdom but which always fosters ingenuity, will devise them and convince even itself that they are valid. And finally, the necessary political background for launching hostilities is a crisis in which legal principles become blurred if they are noticed at all.

Two examples which are in the memories of the Committee members will serve to illustrate the point above. Without passing judgment upon the validity of either action, it is inconceivable to me that Congress as a body would have rejected under any circumstances either a resolution approving President Truman's original commitment of forces to Korea or the Tonkin Gulf resolution. In both instances there was an overwhelming desire to back the President and under similar circumstances, the same reaction can be anticipated in the future. The dissatisfaction did not arise until a later date and there was no Congressional machinery to translate the dissatisfaction into effective action. Therefore, the Executive was able to dismiss the questions that were raised as mere "second guessing." This is a phase which has a strong impact upon most Americans and frequently inhibits sensible discussion of policy. It is generally conIcluded that arguing over an event that has already taken place cannot change that event. This conclusion is correct but it overlooks the fact that "second guessing" could prevent a serious mistake from becoming a disaster and could also produce principles that will prevent a repetition of the mistake.

The fact that in a crisis we are dependent upon a President's judgment does not mean that we should avoid questioning that judgment as soon as possible or, even more important, that we should avoid questioning the factors that go into that judgment and the context within which it is made. There is a widely accepted body of thought which ascribes a certain sanctity to the Presidential decision making process and equates questioning of his decisions with presumptuous arrogance in the field of foreign policy. (For some reason, this same line is rarely advanced in the field of domestic policy where the President is assumed to be a human being liable, like the rest of us, to normal mistakes.) It is held that only the President "knows all the facts;" that only the massive information gathering machinery of the Executive branch is adequate to gather all of the relevant data; that the heavy concentration of "experts" within the Executive branch will inevitably produce better judgments than those which come from the outside. From direct observation and subsequent study, I believe there is good reason to question all of these assumptions. I also believe that they do a personal disservice to the President himself in terms of history. When things go wrong, they foster a psychological disposition to assume that the President deliberately made incorrect decisions out of venal or corrupt motives rather than a realization that he just made some tragic mistakes. In discussions with young people opposed to the Vietnamese war, I usually find that they are absolutely convinced that we are in it for motives either of economic imperialism or blatant racism and they cannot be argued out of these conclusions even though they have been reached on the basis of highly questionable evidence or no evidence at all. This has an unfortunate effect. A man who is assailed by charges which he regards as unfair is quite likely to become even more stubborn about a course he is following. I have every reason to believe that Presidents are no exception to this rule.

It is interesting to think through the point that only the President "knows all the facts." In a certain sense this is true, even though no human being can possibly know everything that is happening even in matters of direct concern. But there is another side to this coin. The converse is that no one else can really be certain that he knows what the President knows. There is no manner in which even persons close to him, including members of the Presidential staff, can judge whether he is acting on information, misinformation, verified data, questionable data or just plain hunch. If he is questioned on such matters, he can always fall back upon the flat statement that he has sources which are personal to him alone. In practice, those close to him are not going to raise such questions anyway and those who are not under his direct influence are in no position to compel answers to their questions. In either case, the point is moot. Presidents have sufficient

authority to act without defending their position against adversary debate (at least until the next election) and men in such a position are unlikely to make what they regard as unnecessary explanations.

Another interesting field for analysis lies in the thought that only the massive information gathering machinery of the Federal Government is adequate for gathering relevant data. Again, there is a sense in which this is true. But it overlooks the rather obvious point that the data might not be valid-that massive information gathering machinery is a device which multiplies misinformation as well as information and that colossal mistakes can be virtually compelled in the decison makng process by the presentation of invalid "facts" in a most beguiling form. When I was in the White House, I was highly impressed by the "pacification" figures which arrived with regularity demonstrating that substantial areas of Vietnam were completely under the control of the Republic of Vietnam. No matter how I analyzed the statistics, allowing for normal margins of error, appeared valid. It was not until I had left the White House that I came to the realization that they could be entirely meaningless. This happened when I encountered an old friend who had been engaged in gathering the basic statistics in the villages themselves. The picture that he painted shed quite a different light. It was that of an American speaking little or no Vietnamese, standing in the middle of a village which he could visit for only a few hours every month, talking to people who wanted to get rid of him because they were vulnerable to Viet Cong retribution by his very presence and well aware of the fact that the easiest way to get rid of him was to tell him what they sensed he wanted to know. The figures so gathered would be combined with other figures similarly gathered and forwarded to Saigon; then to appropriate agencies in Washington and then to the White House itself. At every step of the journey, the figures would be evaluated and reevaluated and by the time they reached the National Security Council staff, they would carry the same weight as the Sermon on the Mount. I have never had the resources to check further into this matter but I do not believe that it is necessary. The most elementary common sense should have warned all of us that computers cannot render valid data which ultimately depends upon questioning people of a different culture; a different language; a different experience of life; and a burning desire that we go away. It obviously is not possible to do so but there would be immeasurable value in anlyzing all of the data upon which Executive decisions are based from the standpoint of the sources themselves. Unfortunately, by the time that I received a flash of insight from my friend, it was too late to do anything about it. The pacification figures had become accepted gospel in the White House-an atmosphere in which a questioning of accepted gospel arouses only a vague wonderment as to "what has gone wrong" with whoever does the questioning.

Finally, it is not only legitimate but absolutely essential to question the assumption that the heavy concentration of experts in the Executive branch assures sounder decisions than can be made on the outside. This is an assertion which should undergo the most rigorous challenge-not because there is reason to doubt either the skill or the integrity of the experts but because of the use to which they are put. It takes very little service in the White House, and only a minimum of perception, to learn that the role of the expert is to tell the President how best to accomplish his purposes-not to question policies already made. At the very start, an individual may have an impact upon a Presidential decision. But once the commitment is made, the whole machinery of the Federal Government is geared to defending the commitment and those individuals with second thoughts are lost in the shuffle. I have been quite startled since leaving the White House at the number of second level, sub-Cabinet officials who had strong reservations about the Vietnam policy during the period that the decisions were made. Perhaps some of them are only now revealing those reservations because the war has become unpopular and it is safe to do so. But I doubt it because many of them strike me as men who would always make their feelings known at least to their superiors. Perhaps other White House assistants with direct responsibilities in foreign affairs knew about the reservations at the time as one of the factors of life in the Executive Mansion is that assistants rarely know what other assistants know and do not want to ask (and would not get an answer if they did ask) out of fear of betraying their ignorance and therefore their lack of status. Perhaps these reservations were made known to the President at meetings attended only by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the CIA-meetings which were not attended by any assistant. I do not know. But I do know that such matters were never raised in the Cabinet or the National

Security Council meetings-theoretically the Presidential mechanisms for obtaining collective judgment. From time to time there would be a "Devil's Advocate" type of discussion but the "Devil's Advocate" is always anticipated and people listen to him with at best tolerance. It is no substitiute for a genuine adversary discussion-the only kind which I believe ever produces a reasoned judgement. From the type of discussion I heard in such meetings in 1964 and 1965, I do not see how the President could have reached decisions other than he made. The tragedy is that the skepticism which existed in many areas could not have penetrated the walls and really have been debated.

I do not believe there is any reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government which can alter the situation I have described. The only hope I can see is to introduce into the national scene an element of adversary discussion which can operate at a sufficiently early point that it will head off catastrophe. As I have already stated, I believe it is futile to attempt to do this at the point of crisis itself, and even if it were not futile, it would be a dangerous undertaking. But it is not futile for Congress to assume the power, after a reasonable period of time, to require the President to defend his position as the price for continuing whatever hostilities he has launched during the crisis. The 30-day period set in these resolutions strikes me as being a bit short but this is a question of practical judgment and I am not disposed to argue over such matters. And, I repeat, I am not in a position to discuss the legal issues but there is obviously enough experience on this Committee let alone the expertise available to you-to render sound judgment on such matters. The important thing to me is my belief that the principle behind these resolutions is valid and I hope they can be carried into effect.

In closing, I want to be clear on the point that I am well aware of the difficulties involved in translating this approach into a reality. It will be argued that Congress cannot "run" a war; that Congress cannot have information equal to that possessed by the Executive; that such a procedure runs the risk of conveying information to an enemy; and that it is hazardous to distract a President when he is directing American forces in armed combat. All of these are valid when made in a vacuum. I believe they are beside the point when considered within the context of our present national problem. To take them up on a point-by-point basis, I would like to submit the following considerations:

1. These resolutions do NOT seek to usurp the Presidential authority to run a war. They go instead to the proper prerogative of Congress-a determination of whether he has a right to wage a specific war in an age when most wars seem to be run without declarations and probably will be operated that way for some time to come.

2. Congress cannot possibly set up an information system equivalent to that possessed by the Executive. But what is needed is NOT alternate data gathering systems but the application of skeptical judgment to the data that already exists. It is not conceivable that such skeptical judgment can be brought to its most effective point within the Executive branch under a governmental system where all Executive powers are concentrated in the hands of one man and I doubt strongly that the system can be changed. Under these circumstances, the only hope for skeptical judgment comes from the Congress.

3. The risk of conveying information to an enemy is inherent in any system which brings skeptical judgment to bear upon a problem. But it is less of a risk than the very real hazard, which we know is with us now, of dividing our country because of unilateral judgments on the use of military force. We have succeeded in surviving many situations in which information "leaked" to an enemy. I doubt whether we can survive the kind of massive disillusionment that is now taking place in our society.

4. The argument that it is hazardous to distract a President by forcing him to defend his position against skeptical judgment strikes me as invalid within the context of our times. A nation cannot be any stronger than its resources and of those, the most important is the confidence of the people in their government. The skeptical judgments are not going to disappear from public debate just because there is no machinery for bringing them to a test of public will. All that is going to happen is that they will fester and undermine the consciousness of national unity. It is far better to bring such matters to a head at any early reasonable point and I know of no better place to do it than in the Congress. Perhaps the decisions that will be made will be wrong because there is no guarantee of rightness even in collective judgment. But at least they will be collective judgments and I believe that a free nation can survive even gross mistakes made

in that vein. And under any circumstances, collective judgment made in the wake of adversary debate has a far better chance of being right than the judgments we are living under now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reedy. That was a very thoughtful

statement.

NECESSITY OF ELEMENT OF ADVERSARY DISCUSSION

I would assume you think that an element of adversary discussion is essential to the proper function of our democratic system?

Mr. REEDY. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. The idea of partnership or being very nice to each other is not conducive to the public welfare; is that correct?

Mr. REEDY. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you wouldn't subscribe to the criticism that has been leveled at this committee so vigorously the last few years, because we have been accused of being uncooperative with the Executive?

Mr. REEDY. I would go further than that, Mr. Chairman. I think that the mere fact that this committee has been a place where the people who are so strongly opposed to this war could at least get a hearing, is one of the things that has sustained what confidence there is in our Government today.

I think one of the grave problems is that people come to Washington and they feel that the Executive is not listening to them-that if there is a tremendous demonstration, no one in the Executive comes out to hear their complaint. You know people are not going to be governed under such circumstances. There comes a certain point where they decide it is not their Government. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. You have touched a very responsive chord with that

statement.

Mr. REEDY. I have talked to enough young people to know what the reaction was to the demonstration after Cambodia and after Laos. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reedy, you don't have to talk to young people. There are a lot of old people in Congress who feel the same way. Mr. REEDY. Yes. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I referred to your book before, and I strongly recommend it again.

Mr. REEDY. Thank you, sir.

IMPRACTICALITY OF INITIATING PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. You seem to suggest there that this question of bringing about an adversary discussion for the purpose of refining the issues and for determining the wisest course, is built into the parliamentary system because a Prime Minister must daily, you might say, be confronted with the necessity of defending his action.

Mr. REEDY. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. But you say that this is not practical.

Mr. REEDY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no probability, I would say, of our having such a system. Therefore, we have to do with our system as best we can; is that right?