Ilya V. Gaiduk, a research scholar at the Institute MICHALOWSKI continued from page 241 Dee, forthcoming). A recipient of fellowships Operation Lumbago this article. RESEARCH IN MOSCOW Scholars needing research performed in the Russian archives may contract with scholars at the Russian Center "Archival Conversation at the Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow. For further information please direct inquiries to: Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov Moscow, Russian Federation Fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 9643534 Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or (7-095) 925-5019 Scholars may also address inquiries regarding possible collaboration for research in Russian archives to: Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian Director Institute of Universal History Leninsky prospekt 32a 117334 Moscow, Russian Federation In the early morning of 29 December 1965, Jerzy Michalowski was awakened by Polish military authorities, who informed him that U.S. Air Force One, with ambassador Averell Harriman on board, was requesting permission to land in Warsaw. Harriman's peace mission was part of a broad diplomatic Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnamese would eventually express a willingness to negotiate. After returning to Warsaw, Michalowski joined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts to persuade the Vietnamese that a positive signal of some kind was in their best interests. Working through U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski, they made it clear that a resumption of bombing raids in the North would eliminate any chance for peace. Norman Cousins, a personal friend of Lyndon Johnson, tried to play the role of intermediary in this process, but to no avail. To the dismay of the Polish diplomats, the United States resumed bombing raids on January 31, and Operation Lumbago came to an unsuccessful end. offensive that coincided with the Christmas In Moscow, Michalowski met with For- This was another attempt to bring the United States and North Vietnam together in secrecy and with a minimum of preconditions. This time, Polish diplomats worked closely with their colleagues from Italy. Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end of the operation. Poland's representative to the International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski, Italy's ambassador to South Vietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the main protagonists in Saigon. Phase I of Marigold developed from a discussion between Lewandowski and Premier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 in Hanoi. Lewandowski learned that the North Vietnamese would be willing to begin peace negotiations, provided the U.S. suspended the bombing campaign. He relayed this information to Orlandi who, in turn, notified U.S. ambassador Lodge. The American side was anxious to know whether Hanoi would make any overt sign of accommodation (such as refraining from offensive military operations in the South, or reducing traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bombing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polish diplomats could obtain no assurances from Hanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries. Phase II was a lengthier and more complex operation that began when ambassador Lodge requested that Lewandowski present a 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnamese. This time, an unconditional bombing halt would precede the substantive negotiations. Rapacki and Michalowski under stood the importance of this new development, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid Brezhnev, who encouraged them to proceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went to Beijing at about the same time, where he received contradictory advice from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Phan Van Dong's reply to Lewandowski generated considerable excitement since it contained a request to arrange an unprecedented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw, between the Americans and the North Vietnamese. Rapacki and Michalowski began a series of consultations with John Gronouski, to set the stage for these critical talks. From the beginning, however, difficulties emerged. First, the American side began to express doubts about certain unspecified details of the 10-point plan as it had been recorded by Lewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese government, opposed to any talks, increased its pressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all, the tempo and brutality of American bombing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up. On December 13 and 14, the center of the city was hit for the first time. Stunned by these attacks, the North Vietnamese withdrew their offer to meet. In a dramatic confrontation on December 19, when Gronouski accused the Poles of acting in bad faith, Rapacki's frustration overflowed: he smashed his glasses down on the table, and they flew into the American ambassador's face. Operation Marigold appeared to be dead. The Poles continued to hope that a basis for face-to-face talks still existed, however. They briefed UN General Secretary U Thant, who promised to do whatever he could. They also contacted Pope Paul VI (using Italian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary). The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and to Washington, begging both sides to save the peace process. Gronouski left Warsaw to consult with President Johnson, while Rapacki drafted an urgent appeal from members of the Polish Politburo to their counterparts in Hanoi, calling for a reconsideration of the American proposals. As snowstorms closed down airports all over Europe, Gronouski returned to Warsaw unexpectedly, and requested a meeting with Rapacki on Christmas Eve. He announced that all bombing with 10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended, and that he was ready to meet with a Vietnamese representative in Warsaw. This message was promptly conveyed to Phan Van Dong by Poland's ambassador Siedlecki. The Vietnamese, still smarting from the bombing raids of early December, and under intense pressure from China, refused to discuss the matter any further. Operation Marigold had failed. The great hopes that were raised by Marigold, and its dramatic collapse, gave rise to many commentaries, explanations, and to some finger-pointing. In his report, Jerzy Michalowski provides a detailed rebuttal of certain claims made by Henry Cabot Lodge in his memoirs. Michalowski had the opportunity to discuss Marigold with President Johnson in September of 1967. LBJ did not accept Michalowski's interpretation of the events, nor would he acknowledge the continuing determination of the North Vietnamese to keep fighting. In time, he would change his views. After personally witnessing some of the unsuccessful attempts to end America's entanglement in Vietnam, after discussing the events with many of the participants, and after studying many of the relevant documents, Michalowski closes his report with a strong indictment of U.S. policy. He is convinced that Lyndon Johnson and his circle of hawkish advisors never understood how diplomatic efforts could lead to the resolution of what they saw as an essentially military crisis. Thus, the President's half-hearted attempts to seek non-military solutions (such as Marigold) were doomed, mocking the hard work and good will of dozens of committed professional diplomats all around the world. building. Following the toasts and sentimental speeches I was preparing to leave, when Dean Rusk's secretary informed me that he would like to have a few words with me in private. Rusk was subdued as he spoke at length about his upcoming academic work, and his retirement plans. Then he said: "During my long tenure as Secretary of State, I'm sure I made many erroneous judgments and bad decisions. But my intentions were always pure, and I acted according to the dictates of my conscience. Thus, I have no regrets. Except for one thing—that in 1966 we did not take advantage of the opportunities and your role as go-between. We should have begun a negotiating process that, with your help, could have ended a conflict that has cost us so much blood and treasure, and that now has cost us the election. I wanted to say this to you today, to thank you for your efforts, and to ask that you convey my words to Minister Rapacki." 1. [Ed. note: For the declassified U.S. account of Operation Marigold, see George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), 209-370.] CAMBODIA AND THE COLD WAR 1 THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL by Kenton J. Clymer SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS: [Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the Executive Summary On a graceful boulevard radiating out from Wat Phnom in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly renovated National Library of Cambodia. Built by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24 December 1924), the library also housed the country's archives. A separate archives building, located directly behind the National Library (and thus not visible from the street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library, it still awaits renovation. Designed with high ceilings, large windows, and electric ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated the best available technology for preserving 1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress books and manuscripts in tropical climates. During the French colonial period and after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in 1975, the library and archives were administered jointly. In 1986, however, following the Vietnamese model, they were separated. The library is controlled by the Ministry of Information and Culture, while the archives reports to the Council of Ministries.1 During the terrible period of the Khmer Rouge (1975-78), the library and archives were home to pig keepers, who served the Chinese advisers living in the hotel next door. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gardens. All of the staff from the library and archives, about forty people, fled. Only a handful survived the Khmer Rouge regime, and only two or three returned to work in the library once the Khmer Rouge were driven out in 1979. The library's holdings today are only a fraction of what they were in 1975. But contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge may not have systematically destroyed books and documents.2 To be sure many books were ruined, some simply pushed off the shelves to make room for cooking pots, others used for cooking fires or for cigarette papers.3 Subsequent neglect and mismanagement made matters worse, arguably much worse. Many books that did survive the Khmer Rouge years were improperly stored and soon succumbed to insects and the elements. Two Australians archivists, Helen continued on page 265 The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement "the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979.” [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit: Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime's crimes. The Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference, chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in Cambodia. Cambodia's two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others, including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers. 2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot's 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages on the Pol Pot regime. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking. 3. Recreating Lost Histories Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge 1 regime had been contemplated. The Cambodian Genocide Program has nine new histories already underway, comprising detailed and original research on the fates of various regions and population groups into which Pol Pot's regime divided Cambodia. In the process, Cambodian scholars are being trained in both social science methods and computer documentation. In addition to these nine separate studies in preparation, others are in the planning stage. The first volume of these studies is to be published in 1997. 4. Training Cambodian Lawyers Until now, the legal expertise did not exist in Cambodia to support a trial of Khmer Rouge leaders utilizing due process guarantees and unimpeachable evidentiary standards. The Cambodian Genocide Program has just graduated the first class of seventeen Cambodian legal professionals, government officials, and human rights workers from CGP's nine-week intensive summer school on international criminal law and international human rights law. The school was held in Phnom Penh from June to August 1995, with the participation of the Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights at the Yale Law School. A second summer school will be held in Cambodia in mid-1996. The individuals trained in the CGP program will be able to staff a domestic or international tribunal. 5. Creating a Permanent Cambodian Documentation Center Until now, no "center of gravity" existed in Cambodia to provide a spark for the serious study of what happened to Cambodian society during the Khmer Rouge regime. The Cambodian Genocide Program has established an international non-governmental organization in Phnom Penh, known as the Documentation Center of Cambodia. The Documentation Center is facilitating the field operations of the CGP, training Cambodians in research and investigative techniques, and will enable an indigenous organization to continue the work of the program after the conclusion of the CGP mandate in January 1997. Introduction In Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the world witnessed one of the worst cases of genocide and crimes against humanity ever perpetrated. While those responsible for the Nazi Holocaust in the first half of the 20th century were punished, there has been little effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice for the atrocities they committed. In 1994, the U.S. Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. A team of world-class Cambodia scholars based at Yale was chosen to receive funding from the U.S. Department of State, and subsequently, by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. That team has now, in three quarters of a year, made tremendous progress in remedying this omission of justice and accountability. Four major problems face accountability. Four major problems face any effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice: 1) a paucity of specific documen- 2) insufficient training of Cambo- 3) insufficient awareness among 4) the lack of a permanent, indig- Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program is making excellent progress toward solution of these four problems. That progress is described in this First Interim Progress Report of the Cambodian Genocide Program. Identifying Legal Options for Redress. Until now, no conference of Cambodian and international observers has examined specific legal options for redress of Cambodia's genocide. On 21 and 22 August 1995, the Cambodian Genocide Program hosted an international conference under the banner, "Striving for Justice: International Criminal Law in the Cambodian Context." The Striving for Justice Conference brought together a wide range of interested observers and decisionmakers for discussions with two international criminal law experts. Under a contract with the U.S. Department of State, Mr. Jason Abrams of the Open Society Institute and Professor Steven Ratner of the University of Texas are now completing a study of options for legal redress of criminal human rights violations during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979. When it is completed, the study will offer an analysis of the most probable cases of violations of criminal human rights laws under the DK regime, and the most likely avenues for redress. Abrams and Ratner have tentatively concluded that the Khmer Rouge are culpable on several counts of violating international criminal laws concerning genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They further have concluded that there are several possible avenues for legal redress of these criminal violations, including an ad hoc international tribunal, a domestic Cambodian tribunal, and/or some form of an international commission of inquiry. At the Striving for Justice Conference, Abrams and Ratner presented their draft conclusions to an invitation-only audience of nearly 100 distinguished guests. The audience consisted of representatives from the Offices of the Co-Prime Ministers, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, several key ministries including Interior and Justice, numerous Cambodian and international human rights organizations, members of the Cambodian National Assembly, a representative of the United Nations Secretary General, a member of the U.S. Congress, and others. The conference was also addressed by the First Prime Minister, His Royal Highness Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh, and the Second Prime Minister, His Excellency Samdech Hun Sen. The conference offered extensive opportunities for discussion and exchange of ideas among the participants. Conference participants reached a clear consensus on the need for accountability, and outlined important specific next steps to be taken to bring the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice. Documentation Databases. The Cambodian Genocide Program is assembling an elaborate family of databases collectively known as the Cambodian Genocide Data Base (CGDB). Using the Computerized Documentation System (CDS/ISIS) designed by UNESCO and modified to suit CGP's particular needs by our programmers, CGP is making rapid progress in the compilation of all known primary and secondary material relating to the Khmer Rouge regime. The Program has already obtained access to several little-known caches of documents, including a DK Foreign Ministry archive, archives of the DK Trade Ministry, the only known surviving archive from a DK regional prison, original maps of Khmer Rouge killing fields, and several collections of rare photographs taken by the DK regime itself. Another collection made available to the CGP includes a set of internal minutes of key meetings of the DK "Party Center" held in 1975 and 1976. CGP currently has two missions at work in Vietnam, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, searching for relevant documentation in state and private archives. These databases will bridge a huge gap in the case against the Khmer Rouge. Because these databases did not previously exist, policymakers could not precisely identify victims and perpetrators, nor could they establish empirical links between the two on a national scale. Yale's CGDB resolves this problem. When the databases are complete, an investigator using them could, for example, identify individual victims and perpetrators of a particular atrocity, perhaps with photographs and biographies of the individuals in question. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archival studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking. The Bibliographic Databases. The bibliographic database will contain records on this new material and on all other known primary and secondary sources of information pertaining to the Khmer Rouge regime, including books, articles, monographs, documents, reports, interviews, tapes, films and videos, transcripts, and so forth. As noted, CGP research efforts have already led to a dramatic increase in existing documentary evidence through discovery of previously unknown archival sources. Rapid progress has been made with the design and establishment of this database. The initial program timelines projected the creation of some three hundred records in a bibliographic database by the end of December 1995. That milestone was achieved in February 1995. As of August 1995, approximately 1000 records representing some 50,000 pages of documentation had been entered into the bibliographical database. The Victim Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made arrangements to obtain and make electronically accessible to an international audience Dr. Justin Corfield's biographical database containing more than 40,000 entries on the Cambodian elite. We express our thanks to Dr. Corfield. We have plans to expand this database with additional information obtained as a result of our original research. Given the patterns of violence in Democratic Kampuchea, it is likely that a large number of the individuals listed in this database became victims of the Khmer Rouge. Thus this database may become useful for identifying and cross-referencing victims of genocide and crimes against humanity. The Photographic Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is preparing to scan several large collections of photographs into the CGDB. These collections contain a significant number of items which are likely to have a high degree of evidentiary value for the prosecution. Examples include a large number of photos of DK leaders, of forced labor brigades, and the entire collection of prisoner photographs from the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Most of the 4,000 prisoner mugshots are currently not accompanied by any identification of the prisoners. By making these photographs available on the internet, and adding to the database a special field for readers to key in suggested names for each photograph, we hope to obtain identities for many of the victims of the Khmer Rouge. The names could be used to prosecute perpetrators on charges of killing specific persons. The Khmer Rouge Biographical Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is assembling a second biographical database containing data on members of the Khmer Rouge organization between 1975 and 1979. This database will include both political and military leadership, down to the srok (district) level. Thus this database will be useful for identifying the chain of command in various regions at various times, and in establishing command responsibility for particular atrocities. The Imaging Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is in the process of scanning images of original DK documents scanning images of original DK documents into the database. We have already accomplished the scanning of several hundred rel evant documents, including a near-complete set of the records in Khmer from the 1979 in absentia genocide tribunal of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Using custom software already designed specifically for CGP, CGDB users will be able to browse through the bibliographic database and, upon finding a record of particular interest, "jump" to a full digital image of that specific document with the "click" of a mouse. This capability can considerably expedite the search for incriminating evidence of genocidal intent. The Geographic Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is also in the process of constructing an elaborate computer-based map showing the physical locations of facilities of the Khmer Rouge "internal security" apparatus, including prison and "killing field" sites. The Cambodian Mine Action Center established by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia has designed standardized software for mapping work in Cambodia, and CGP has obtained access to this system for our purposes. Utilizing the Global Positioning System to pinpoint the precise coordinates of locations identified by our researchers, CGP will accurately map the Khmer Rouge terror system and the resting places of its victims. The resulting display is likely to constitute an incriminating indictment of the scope of Khmer Rouge terror, providing strong evidence of widespread crimes against humanity. Disseminating the Databases. In addition to publishing analytical indexes of the databases, user access to the computer databases themselves will be enabled in several ways. First, physical copies of the database will be deposited at several locations in the United States and Cambodia. Second, we hope to make the entire database available on CD-ROM. Finally, through the Internet, the database will be made accessible to all interested parties worldwide. The projected implementation date for the online genocide database is early 1997. Collecting and compiling data on Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge will be one of the most significant contributions of the CGP, for both historical and legal reasons. Organizing this mass of new information into a structured whole will enable citizens to fully comprehend the nightmare of what happened in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. It will allow historians to compile a more compelling and accurate picture of the |