fore, it appeared in 1716, that the utmost to which the States-General and the Emperor could be brought, was a defensive alliance with England, in case of aggression from France or other powers; and such alliances were accordingly concluded with Holland on the 6th of February, and with the Emperor on the 25th of May, with a mutual guarantee of territory*; but these still left the desired removal of the Pretender and his adherents unaccomplished.

It became necessary, therefore, to consider the second plan for attaining this great object; namely, by treaty and friendly union with France herself. Nor were there wanting, since the death of Louis the Fourteenth, many circumstances highly favourable to such views. The Regent Duke of Orleans had, in nearly all respects, adopted a different political course. So long, indeed, as the Jacobites were in arms in Scotland, he clung to the hope of the restoration of the Stuarts; or, in other words, the establishment in England of an entirely French policy. But the suppression of the rebellion and the return of the Pretender having dissipated, or at least delayed, all such hopes, and the Regent considering the new Government of England as more firmly established, seriously turned his mind to the advantage which might arise to him from a friendly union with it. Besides the public interests of France, he had also personal objects at stake; and he looked to the chance of his own succession to the throne. Not that he had even for a single moment, or in the slightest degree, formed any design against the rights of Louis the Fifteenth; with all his failings (and he had very many) in private life, he was certainly a man of honour in public, and nothing could be more pure and above reproach than his care of his infant sovereign. But he might fairly and justly contemplate the possibility that the life of a sickly boy might prematurely end; on which event the Regent would have become the legitimate heir, since the birthright of Philip the Fifth of Spain had been solemnly renounced. It was, however, generally understood, that in such a case Philip was not "is in the wrong in almost everything he does." To Lord Sunder land, June 27. 1707.

*See Lamberty, Mem. vol. ix. p. 395. and p. 471.

1716.

THE REGENT ORLEANS.

217

disposed to be bound by his renunciation; and, in fact, in his position, he might disclaim it with some show of plausibility, since his own rights upon the Spanish Crown were only founded upon the invalidity of a renunciation precisely similar. His grandmother, 'the Infanta Maria Theresa, on her marriage with the King of France, had in the most solemn manner, for herself and her descendants, renounced all claim to the Crown of Spain. Yet her grandson was now reigning at Madrid. How could, then, that grandson be expected cordially to concur in the principle that renunciations are sacred and inviolable, and cheerfully forego the sceptre of France if once placed within his grasp?

Foreseeing this opposition, and not without apprehensions that the King of Spain might, meanwhile, attempt to wrest the Regency from his hands, the Duke of Orleans was anxious to provide himself with foreign support, and knew that none could be stronger than a guarantee from England of the succession to the House of Orleans. For this object he was willing, on the part of France, to make corresponding concessions. Such a guarantee would also, not merely thus indirectly, but in itself, be highly advantageous to England, as tending to prevent that great subject of apprehension, the union of the French and Spanish Crowns upon the same head. Thus, then, the Cabinet of St. James and the Palais Royal had, at this period, each a strong interest to enter into friendly and confidential relations with each other. This was first perceived and acted upon by the Regent. Townshend* and Stan

* Coxe tells us in his Memoirs of Walpole, that "Townshend was "the original adviser and promoter of the French treaty, and had ' gradually surmounted the indifference of the King, the opposition "of Sunderland, and the disapprobation of Stanhope." But this statement in his first volume (p. 98.) is disproved by the documents published by himself in the second. On Aug. 17. 1716, Old Style, Mr. Poyntz writes to Stanhope, "His Majesty knows that "Lord Townshend has long been of opinion that any further engagements with the Regent, particularly with respect to the suc❝cession, would only serve to strengthen the Regent, and to put it in "his power to do the King greater mischief." And Lord Townshend himself, in his letter to the King, of November 11. 1716, Old Style, expressly limits the period when he began to approve and forward this French treaty to the time when the Abbé Dubois was first sent by the Regent to the Hague.

hope were for some time reluctant to enter into a close alliance with their ancient enemies; but gradually saw its expediency, and without much difficulty prevailed upon the King, who, very soon, as we shall find in the sequel, became still more anxious for it than themselves.

Another matter of negotiation between France and England, which had commenced even under the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, was the question of Mardyke. By the treaty of Utrecht Louis had bound himself to demolish the port at Dunkirk. This he had accordingly performed; but, at the same time, he had begun a new canal at Mardyke, upon the same coast, which works produced a great ferment in England, and became the immediate subject of remonstrance with the Court of Versailles.* On the one hand, it was urged that such a construction was an evident breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty; and that the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, when they stipulated the demolition of Dunkirk, never could have intended that another and a better harbour should be opened in its neighbourhood. On the other side, it was answered that Mardyke was not Dunkirk; that the King of France had faithfully performed his agreement; and that, having done so, there was nothing in the Treaty of Utrecht to deprive him of the natural right of a sovereign to construct any works he pleased within his own dominions. Beyond such counter-statements very little progress was made in the negotiation; and it seemed probable that the French might be enabled to profit by the gross negligence of the British plenipotentiaries in not expressly guarding against such a contingency in a separate article. But when the Regent became anxious for the friendship of England, he saw the necessity of yielding much, if not all, of his pretensions at Mardyke. He withdrew the negotiation from the reluctant and unfriendly management of M. de Chateauneuf, the French Resident at the Hague, and he determined to intrust it to his own most confidential adviser, the Abbé† Dubois.

* See Lord Stair's Journal at Paris, in the Hardwicke State Papers, vol. ii. p. 528.

I used the word Abbé as most consistent with the present custom, although I believe that in sterling English writing the word Abbot

1716.

ABBÉ DUBOIS.

219

The Abbé Dubois, afterwards Cardinal and Prime Minister, was at this time sixty years of age. His father was a poor apothecary, near Limoges. Young Dubois came to Paris in hopes of a bursarship at a college; but failing in this object, he combined an opportunity for learning with the means of livelihood by acting as servant to the Principal. He afterwards became tutor in the family of a tradesman named Maroy; and it is a curious fact, that young Maroy, who in the days of his poverty had been his pupil, in the days of his greatness became one of his postilions. A more favourable turn of fortune afterwards assigned to Dubois a subaltern post in the education of the Duke of Chartres, and the prince and the preceptor soon became inseparable friends. A ready wit, undaunted assurance, and sagacious counsels, recommended Dubois, who, moreover, did not scruple to augment his favour by the most shameful services. His agency triumphed over the virtue of rustic beauties, and introduced them by stealth into the apartments of the young Duke, at the Palais Royal; and, unlike some other teachers, Dubois always followed in his own conduct the same maxims which he prescribed or permitted to his pupil. On completing this excellent education, the venerable ecclesiastic was for some time. attached to the embassy of Marshal Tallard in England, but he always continued his connection with the Palais Royal, and was looked upon by the Duke of Chartres, then of Orleans, as one of his surest and most steady counsellors. He adhered to that prince through good report and ill report; and, on returning, directed the political course of His Royal Highness with the highest degree of foresight and sagacity. His profligate character was, however, so notorious, that when Philip should be employed to denote not only the real superior of a monastery, but also the titular distinction common amongst the French clergy. I find it used in the latter sense by the best writers of the best times of our literature, in the lively letters of Lady M. W. Montagu (vol. i. p. 97, &c. ed. 1820), the grave despatches of Bolingbroke (To Lord Strafford, March 7. 1712), and the masterly memoirs of Clarendon (Life, vol. iii. p. 356, &c. Oxf. ed.). I take the liberty of mentioning these authorities, having formerly been termed "a bigoted purist" for my use of the word Abbot in the War of the Succession (Edin. Review, No. cxii. p. 499.).

became Regent, it was not without much opposition and clamour that he could appoint him a counsellor of state. The Regent's own words on that occasion show his true opinion of his favourite: "Let me beg of you, my dear "Abbé, to be a little honest!"*

The gross vices of Dubois, and his shamelessness in the high ecclesiastical dignities which he afterwards attained, have justly made his name infamous with later times. But they have also, less justly perhaps, dimmed his great reputation for talents. Where any one quality stands forth very prominently from a character either for good or evil, posterity in general confine their attention to that alone, and merge every other in it. We remember that Dubois was most unprincipled we forget that he was most able. It would be difficult to name another French statesman of the last century who more thoroughly understood at once the foreign relations and the domestic administration of his country, or who brought more skill, resolution, and activity to promote them, whenever they were combined with his own aggrandisement. We cannot but admire the vigour of an intellect which was never unnerved either by poverty in youth or by pleasure in old age; which triumphed over all his rivals for power; and raised him at length, a priest without religion and a politician without honour, to the highest pinnacles of the Church and of the State!

In explanation of this remarkable phenomenon, we may also observe, that even in the smallest trifles, this accomplished knave had trained every faculty to the purpose of penetrating the thoughts of others, and concealing his own. Thus, for example, he had accustomed himself to a slight stammer in conversation, with the view of never being discomposed by any sudden question, and of gaining a few moments for reflection without appearing to pause.† Let us observe, likewise, that, not

* 66 L'Abbé, un peu de droiture je t'en prie." (Sevelinges, Mémoires Sécrets du Cardinal Dubois, 2 vols. Paris, 1814.) This is a verv valuable work, compiled from the MS. correspondence of Dubois. I have found it particularly useful for the negotiations at Hanover and the Hague. It should be compared with the English documents printed in Coxe's Walpole.

† Mém. de St. Simon, vol. xii. p. 190. ed. 1829.