Such a scheme is very dangerous. Therefore we must counter their psywar activities permanently in order to maintain the morale of the troops, their combat spirit and their firm viewpoint.

Our cadres still underestimate the value of the enemy's propaganda. Our men still listen to the enemy broadcasts and read enemy magazines and newspapers. The political views of our troops are still insufficient and loose due to the ignorance of the enemy's cruelty. The enemy tries to increase the fear of sacrifice and encourages pacifism. As a result, a number of our soldiers have been influenced by the enemy's deceitful propaganda. . . .

Security maintenance is not properly observed by cadres and soldiers.

Defection occurs frequently in various armed forces. Many cases have resulted in diastrous consequences. Some have killed our cadres and soldiers, destroyed weapons and stolen secret documents before surrendering to the enemy.

Point out the danger of this scheme. Its influence is so bad that it weakens our ideology, impairs our combat spirit, and finally induces our cadres to side with the enemy and to become traitors.

The struggle against the psywar and Chieu hoi program is a class struggle. It is a long-range and complicated struggle during which we must increase indoctrination for class consciousness, lay bare the enemy's deceitful propaganda, and control our ideology and our organization closely.

To stop enemy influence, the first basic thing to do is to strengthen the personality of each of our cadres and fighters. . . . When one has a deep hatred of the enemy and a noble revolutionary ideal, one is immune to the threat of arms, the appeal of money and beautiful women, and the lure of deceitful tricks. Our cadres and soldiers must be taught how to make a distinction between right and wrong so that they will be able to help one another with the force of collectivity. This is the most revolutionary and effective way according to the Party line. When enemy propaganda reaches our units, we must on the one hand organize the collection of these documents, and on the other, proceed with the analysis of enemy materials with a view to unmasking his deceitful arguments in the eyes of the people. Do not underestimate enemy propaganda. Actually it does not affect anybody specifically. Its influence penetrates our minds day after day and will cause disastrous consequences. Therefore, we should heighten vigilance in order to expel it from our mind.

Provisions of the internal regulations must be strictly observed by cadres at committee levels. Listening to enemy broadcasts and reading enemy newspapers, magazines, and leaflets are forbidden. Provisions concerning the political administration in the unit and assignment of personnel to important units must be strictly observed.

Investigate the attitude of those influenced by enemy psywar operations and straighten it out in time.

Help and motivate families whose children joined the Revolution. We must make them believe in the revolutionary movement, take part in the resistance, and encourage their children to fulfill their duties. Point out the enemy's plot to bribe their children, induce them to side with them. This shows confusion and weakens our combat determination.

In a directive . . . from the Party Committee of Military Region I, entitled "Counter Chieu Hoi in the Armed Forces," the campaign to neutralize this dangerous GVN program is elaborated upon. There is no

attempt to minimize the impact of the political arm of the enemy's "twopronged attack," and severe countermeasures are directed.

In the psywar and “Open Arms" programs, due to our failing to pay attention to cope with the situation and provide correct guidance, the enemy has been positively active and has achieved certain definite results among the people and among our armed forces, especially the guerrilla forces and regional troops. In recent years, they have attached much importance to that attempt and have organized the psywar branch from highest to lowest level and placed that branch under military command. They have also organized the "Open Arms" branch from central to district level, formed and sent many "Open Arms" cadres to work in close coordination with pacification cadres, intelligence agents, spies, U.S. advisers and their vassels, namely the Formosans, South Koreans, Malayans, etc. . . . They have devoted to this task a great deal of money and reserved all available means for this task. . . .

Thus, it is obvious that the enemies have for a long time considered their attempts to induce our cadres and fighters to surrender and rally as a well-organized strategic plot, properly guided from top to bottom and involving the use of a great deal of money and means. All their attempts are directed toward the masses and especially toward our armed forces. At present, within the framework of their attempting to launch a two-pronged attack, the enemies are actively carrying out their effort to induce our people to rally in a well-organized manner and with more cruel and furtive plots. Concurrently, they also step up their fierce military activities.... a great majority of our cadres and fighters have proved themselves to be confident and have fought bravely to achieve greater and greater merits and feats of arms in really hard fighting situations which require them to surmount countless difficulties.

However, we must recognize that recently our enemies have achieved, through their "Open Arms" activities, certain definite results. This is because, on the one hand, they have been working actively and have resorted to many tricks and, on the other hand, because we really still have many shortcomings in our task of fighting against enemy attempts to induce us to surrender or rally through their "Open Arms" activities.

Generally speaking, our cadres and fighters still underestimate enemy tricks and "Open Arms" activities and have failed to follow closely their tricks and activities to educate and guide their units to fight against and defeat these enemy plots. . . . Cadres and fighters tune to various enemy radio stations, U.S. and British stations and the Saigon radio station, without regard to regulations prescribed by higher levels; listen to all kinds of news and "Open Arms" broadcasts through enemy programs of music and artisitic performances. People also read enemy reactionary newspapers and magazines.

People are allowed to read enemy leaflets freely. . . . Some people even bring these leaflets to their offices to serve as wrapping paper or envelopes.

...

Cadres and fighters who get in touch with their families often return with pictures of their family members. Among them are such people as puppet officers, GVN officials, security agents and policemen. They consider such pictures as free from all bad influence and keep them in their pockets.... Leading cadres are aware of this but have failed to take determined, constructive and adequate measures against such occurrences.

Leaders have not succeeded in controlling the state of mind and thoughts of each of the men in their units. . . .They have failed to follow closely and thoroughly understand the difficulties that must be overcome, so as to be able to prevent their men from being upset and pessimistic, thus vulnerable to enemy psywar.

Certain units have admitted many people into their ranks in a reckless manner and without regard to prescribed procedures and principles. They have freely accepted relatives and friends, whose "curriculum vitae" they do not thoroughly know about, into their ranks.

In certain units, cadres usually do not pay attention to the physical and spiritual life of their fighters. This is because they are inclined to think that it is taken for granted that their men will have to endure hardships, however great these hardships may be. Thus, they never pay attention to improving their fighters' way of living with means that are within their reach and capacity. Moreover, conditions in which cadres fail to share the sweet and the bitter with their fighters still exist at certain places.

Party commissars and leading cadres in units and organizations are to reinforce and increase education in current matters in a continuous manner, with a view to showing people clearly our advantageous position and the weak position of our enemy.

These cadres must also educate their men to closely and constantly follow enemy plots and "Open Arms" activities, so as to design proper measures to cope with

such situations in time.

Properly carry out regulations prescribed by the army concerning the question of listening to enemy radio broadcasts and reading enemy newspapers and magazines. Severely judge and exert disciplinarian measures against cadres and fighters who transgress such regulations. . .

Concerning the dissension between China and Russia, leaders must explain to cadres and fighters that these are only certain differences of concepts that can be smoothly settled. Leaders are to emphasize the fact that, at present, China and Russia are actively supporting our people in all fields to defeat the U.S. aggressors. Leaders must also tell those who listen to Chinese and Russian radio broadcasts not to discuss any sensitive news before receiving official explanations emanating from the Party.

Party chapters, organization and unit commanders are to maintain firmly all activities of such organizations as the three-men cells in their units, pay attention to isolated elements operating in weak areas, assign hard-core cadres to keep well in hand the daily routine and thoughts of each person so as to discover any mistake and help correct it immediately.

Party chapters and organization commanders are to keep well in hand the family situation of each of their men, their strong points and weak points regarding their way of thinking, behavior, and psychology as well as their aspirations so as to constantly help them. And, especially with people who have committed certain mistakes, Party chapters and organization commanders are to analyze such mistakes, judge them, and create for them favorable conditions to progress and achieve merits instead of overcriticizing them and having prejudices against them.

... The question of getting in touch with family members must be thoroughly studied and correctly organized and carried out. However, in this critical situation, such contacts ought to be limited. Commanders must educate their men prior to their departure and motivate them to reeducate their family members. . . . For people whose standpoint and thought are still shaky, commanders must not allow them to contact their families at once. In emergency cases and when facing righteous aspirations of these people, commanders are to assign some other people to go with them to strive to educate their families if this is possible. (Avoid causing people to think that we are doubting them when having them accompanied by some other people.)

We must not, even when short of personnel, admit into our ranks doubtful elements whose "curriculum vitae" we do not know about, so as to avoid all possible infiltration.

Actively control and implement regulations guaranteeing the realization of democracy in organizations and units; raise to a higher degree the people's attitude toward Party chapters cadres and commanders; promote unity among the cadres and fighters; absolutely fight against despotic, bureaucratic, imperious, nepotistic, and militaristic thought and gesture among the ranks of the army, especially among the ranks of the cadres. . . .

Actively realize the . . . task of supplying our troops and taking care of the material needs of cadres and fighters within the reach of our capacity. . . Absolutely fight against the thought of refusing to share the sweet and the bitter with everybody and striving to improve personal benefits.

In case we discover a cadre or fighter who induces some other people to desert our ranks, we are to thoroughly study the case to see whether that cadre is someone sent by the enemy or just a person who could no longer endure hardships and has resorted to such a wrong means.

If the man happens to be a real enemy, then we must deal with him in a proper manner. If he happens to belong to the second case, then we must reeducate and reform him right at the unit.

In case some cadres and fighters receive appeals from their families to return and inform us about such moves, we are to promote their revolutionary spirit and comfort them. We must also make public such a revolutionary spirit and have it studied by other people. Concurrently, we are to consolidate their thought and strive to prevent them from being shaken by other appeals that will be launched by their families at other times. Finally, we are to motivate people to write letters to build revolutionary concepts for their families or inform regional authorities to take care of that work.

It is evident from the above directive that restoration of discipline is a mixture of persuasion and coercion, with the former preferred whenever possible. The NLF leaders apparently realize that Draconian measures would tend to erode the psycho-political underpinnings of the revolution. References to the requirement that cadres share "the bitter and the sweet" with their subordinates are frequently seen in Viet Cong operational and training documents dealing with criticism and self-criticism. There is no evidence, however, that such directives are ever put into full effect. In fact, gross inequality between cadres and rank and file (particularly in food rations and access to sexual pleasures) is built into the system Furthermore, some Communist POW's have expressed surprise at the degree to which combat dangers shared by American officers with their men exceed those to which NLF cadres expose themselves.

1. I. de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. 56.

NOTES

ON ANALYZING PSYOP CAMPAIGNS BEFORE USING THEM*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

CONSIDERING POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS

In attempting a persuasion campaign, it is best to use a step-by-step procedure. First, the PSYOP planner decides which attitudes or behaviors are to be changed. Next he determines the desired direction of the change, and then he writes the message. If the message is to go to an audience that does not speak the writer's language, it is translated into the language of the audience. (If there is time, the message may be translated back into the original again to check the adequacy of the translation.) Then the message is disseminated via the available media and one hopes for the best.

The PSYOP planner must then assess the effect this campaign had on the target audience. This he can do in several ways. He could make surveys or he could analyze the media of the target, or he could note the effects of the audience. If the campaign appeared to work, there is a feeling of satisfaction over a job well done. If it did not work, a plethora of rationalizations are available either from the technical literature or from the contingencies of the situation. For example, if leaflet drops were used as the distribution method, one can easily blame the lack of success on bad luck (that is, high winds, skirmishes, and the like).

If, however, the PSYOP evaluator dwells only on the determination of success or failure, he does not gain any insight into the factors that caused the success or failure. When operating in the field, clearly the psyoperator does not have the luxury of addressing himself to all, or even a portion, of the factors that may enter into the persuasion process. The question then becomes, what can and should he do to anticipate the potential effectiveness of a campaign. An answer may be found in W. J. McGuire's analysis of the persuasion process.' Although this analysis is specifically meant to deal with some aspects of personality and persuasibility, it can reasonably be extended to other areas of the persuasion process.2

THE THREE-FACTOR THEORY

The model proposed by McGuire has been labeled the "three-factor theory." The name of the theory is derived from the three factors examined: (1) receiving, (2) yielding, and (3) opinion change. Essentially, it says that the likehihood of opinion change derives from the answers to two questions. Although the two questions may seem oversimplified, they really go to the heart of the issue as will be shown later. The

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.