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The quality of translations is limited by time, personnel, and budget. One cannot be certain of achieving ideal translations. One can, however, strive for a reasonable approximation of meaning by using the above suggestions within the given limitations.

When the respondents speak another language, the questions have to be translated. Translations should carry the precise meaning, yet often there is no one-to-one relationship of words in two languages. While the PSYOP officer may not find ideal conditions to solve these problems, a number of suggestions are offered to obtain reasonably accurate translations.

NOTES

1. Herbert P. Phillips, "Problems of Translation of Meaning in Field Work," Human Organization, XVIII, no. 4 (Winter 1959-60), pp. 184–192.

2 Eugene Jacobson, Hideya Kumata, and Jeanne E. Gullahern, "Cross-Cultural Contributions to Attitude Reasearch," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (1960), pp. 205–223. 3. Phillips, "Problems of Translation."

Frederick W. Frey, "Surveying Peasant Attitudes in Turkey," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII, (Fall 1963), pp. 335–355.

Susan Ervin, and Robert T. Bower, "Translation Problems in International Surveys," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (1952), pp. 595–604.

6. Frey, “Surveying Peasant Attitudes.”

7. Ervin and Bower, "Translation Problems."

TET IN VIET-NAM*

BY CHUONG DAC LONG

Time is an important determinant in the receptivity of audiences to media as well as to messages. Analyses such as this one facilitate message composition and media selection.

The custom of celebrating Tet goes back to remote antiquity. Like many other Vietnamese traditions it was imported from China.... One of the best preserved rites of Tet is the celebration of the feast of the Jinni of the Home, on the 23rd day of the 12th month. This feast gradually lost its original meaning, even in China, and when it was imported into VietNam, it underwent a profound change in the minds of the people and became simply a sentimental story.

The same may be said of nearly all the customs concerning Tet: originally they were imbued with lofty and precise philosophical significance, although usually disguised under a poetic parable. The incomprehension of later ages brought about profound transformation and alteration, and the customs became largely folk beliefs. They should be examined in this light, rather than rejected outright as beliefs of no value, unworthy of consideration. Nothing is more moving to Vietnamese than the permanence of these rites, they are like messages addressed to us by our ancestors from the distances of time.

*Excerpts from JUSPAO Field Memorandum, Number 31, November 28, 1966. JUSPAO Planning Office, Saigon.

One of the most characteristic customs of Tet consists in buying a flowering peach-tree branch that is placed in a vase for the duration of Tet.... Many people imagine that these branches have no other purpose than to add a graceful decoration to Vietnamese homes, and today, in fact, they have no other significance. Originally, however, they had the same effect as the cay-neu (a tall decorated pole erected before the house during Tet) and were used like them, to protect oneself from the visit of demons.

According to the Chinese astrological calendar, time is circumscribed in revolutions of 60 years, divided into cycles of 12 years, each cycle containing 12 months, and the like. Years and months thus have the same names: there is the year thin (Dragon), just as there is the month thin; the year ty (Serpent), the month ty, the day ty, the hour ty, and the like.

A cycle of twelve years is placed under the sign of twelve supernatural powers (hanh-khien), some of whom are well-disposed and others hard and cruel. On the last night of the year, this power passes to the new power. The passing of service that is known as giao-thua.

In town and countryside, the head of each family; each mayor (lytruong), each mandarin governing a province, the Emperor in his capital and all the pagodas, would offer a token sacrifice at the same moment to thank the old power hanh-khien and to welcome the new. This ceremony of giao-thua is performed in homes at midnight, the moment when the hour of the Pig (gio hoi) changes to that of the Rat (gio ty). It is carried out with great solemnity. In the old days it used to be accompanied by noisy and interminable fireworks and the beating of drums. This has given rise to the expression “Trong keu ran nhu trong giao-thua” (“A rolling of drums comparable to those of the giao-thua").

It is the custom at giao-thua for everyone to stay awake till morning so as to be prepared to welcome in the New Year. It is often amusing to see parents, as soon as the drums of the pagoda announce the arrival of the New Year, rush to wake up all the sleepy children in the house, sitting them up by force if necessary and, in spite of their cries and grumblings, so they too will not tempt fate by failing to observe this custom.

It is strictly forbidden to sweep the house (after giaothua) during the first day of the Tet. During the days that follow, sweeping is allowed but it is absolutely forbidden to gather up rubbish and throw it away.

. . It is forbidden to touch a broom on this Tet day. Vietnamese children recite the following riddle: "Trong nha co mot ba hay la liem,' which means: "What person in the house scrounges all she wants?" The answer, of course is "The broom," it picks things up wherever it passes. The origin of the prohibition on removing household refuse is found in another Chinese legend. . . . .

One of the customs concerning Tet has a curious resemblance to a practice taught by the Druids of ancient Gaul, who used to lead the people into the forest on the first day of the year seeking lucky branches of

instance. Whichever of the alternatives are offered to NVA soldiers in our PSYOP messages, the vulnerabilities which they exploit remain the

same.

The NVA as a PSYOP Target

The most recent study shows that the age of infiltrators has dropped significantly. Prior to 1966, the most frequent age at infiltration was 22 years, with a lesser age peak for cadre at 25. By mid-1967 the age distribution had changed to a very sharp concentration at 19 with a much lesser age peak (again cadre) at 26 years. Further age drops are indicated. For instance, prisoners captured in July 1967 stated that 60 NVA replacements received by the battalion in June had all been 16 or 17 years old. Moreover, the composition of the NVA force has undergone a change from a majority of volunteers to over 70 percent draftees or former servicemen recalled to duty.

There is also some indication that soldiers with relatives in the South were included for the first time among the infiltrators, by mid-1967, although no estimate of their number is available. Previously, the NVA avoided sending to the South men whose immediate families regrouped to the South in 1954.

These factors would appear to reduce to some degree the responsiveness of the latest NVA infiltrators to cadre propaganda and provide greater opportunity for exploitation of vulnerabilities by US/GVN PSYOP techniques.

Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities themselves have not changed significantly over the past two years but they may have been intensified somewhat due to the change in the makeup of the force.

Separation from families, the hardships of infiltrations, fear of allied arms, and perhaps most significantly, the contrast between what they have been told by the cadre and what they experience themselves, are major exploitable weaknesses. For example:

NVA soldiers, told that most of South Viet Nam is already "liberated," come South and find that they must hide in the jungle and are stalked continuously by the heavy weapons of their adversaries.

They have been told by the cadre that the side which controls the people will win the war and that the VC have already won the support of more than two-thirds of the people and control four-fifths of the land. But instead of being welcomed by the people, NVA soldiers find that they must live in hiding, cut off from the people, who are sullen and seek to avoid contact with them. the recent NVA-VC Tet offensive, which failed in its aim to induce a general uprising, reinforces this vulnerability.

They have been force-fed in training and throughout the constant indoctrination sessions with tales of NVA/VC victories and GVN/U.S. defeats. According to the cadre, Americans have low morale and fighting

skill, cannot stand the climate, think only of going home. ARVN troops are reported to be poor fighters who are despised by the people. In the face of these optimistic forecasts, NVA soldiers find that they are subjected to incessant pounding and that the VC units to which they are attached or with which they operate are forever withdrawing from areas or hiding in the jungle.

They are told that the Americans, like the French before them, have enslaved the people, who are living in misery, exploited by the colonialists and the landlord class. These are the lackeys of the Americans and compose the puppet government in Saigon. Instead, on the rare occasions that NVA troops come in contact with the civilian population, they find them relatively well off, in possession of more material goods than are available in the North, and not interested in being 'liberated.' Though US/GVN media messages are in part discounted because of the training and indoctrination of NVA soldiers, our PSYOP products with which they come into occasional contact (leaflets, radio broadcasts, posters) may also give them pause for thought if they project convincingly an image of SVN well-being and confidence.

The party's concern for the soldiers is a standard indoctrination topic, the gist being that the party and the country are proud of the fighter who will be given a hero's welcome when he returns after the Americans are driven out, or if wounded along the way, he will be well taken care of, or if killed in battle, he will die a hero's death and will be buried with honor and live forever in the grateful memory of his countrymen. But NVA soldiers fear that they will get little care if wounded, might even be left behind on the battlefield, and if killed, might be hastily buried in unmarked graves, which their families will never find. They have this fear because they know that this is what happened to some of their comrades, contrary to what they had been taught to expect.

There is almost no mail connection with their families in the North. While several years ago letters could be sent to immediate families without limitation, latest interrogations state that only one letter on a single sheet can be sent North every six months, and mail from the families is similarly sparse, censored, and uncommunicative. This deprivation is intensely felt by the soldiers, most of whom despair of ever seeing their families again.

Deterrents

The endless repetition of the same communist themes by the cadre, by official publications and training documents, and in the cadre-managed self-criticism sessions sets up near automatic responses along the lines desired by the party, irrespective of objective reality. Because of this pattern, there is a tendency to reject Allied arguments out of hand. It is hard to break through to the NVA soldier with PSYOP messages because of this mental conditioning.

...The capability of the party cadre to instill a spirit of self-sacrifice in

the minds of the troops is another of the strengths of its propaganda. To endure hardships, to be wounded or die for the just cause and live forever in the memory of the people as a hero of the revolution is a potent theme in talking to the young. By the time the trail and the hardships in the South have ground them down, they go on automatically. Each successive disillusionment alienates them further from the cause, but these doubts cannot be expressed to anyone, and with all the suffering and blood spilled for the cause, it is difficult for an NVA member to rationalize himself into defection.

A powerful cohesive element is the three-man cell system present throughout the NVA, by which political and disciplinary control is maintained. Though detested as a device to prove the cadre right most of the time, it serves the function of letting off steam, improving survival chances in combat, and responding to emotional needs as a kind of family substitute. But just as in the family group in a totalitarian state, innermost thoughts are kept to oneself.

Conclusion

While vulnerabilities among the NVA in South Viet Nam appear to be on the increase, units continue to show a remarkable degree of cohesion, largely due to the psychological controls and continuous group therapy (cell system, self-criticism sessions) to which they are exposed. However, according to the available evidence, NVA units and individual infiltrators are now younger and less conditioned than ever before. The effects of war weariness, disenchantment, and the nagging deprivations on these less seasoned troops should serve to make them a more promising PSYOP target than in the past.

GUIDANCE

In devising a PSYOP program aimed at NVA units and individual NVA infiltrators, both the elements of cohesion and the psychological vulnerabilities of the target audience will have to be taken into account. Whittling away at the indoctrinated response might be less productive in the short run than exploiting obvious vulnerabilities, but in the long run a weakening of the soldiers' psychological defenses, laboriously built by the cadre, may cause their entire world view to crumble. At any rate our approach should be in tandem. We deal here with the cohesive elements first, as they are harder to tackle.

Attacking Elements of Cohesion

The endless repetitions of communist themes of colonial oppression, liberation and revolutionary duty must be countered by patient, reasoned, and repetitive efforts to explain American policies and intentions in Vietnam simply and convincingly. That we seek no colonial status, no bases or special privileges, that we have solemnly stated we will withdraw when the Vietnamese people themselves have had a chance

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