For the modern U.S. Army, operations such as in Vietnam are a new experience. In contrast to the two World Wars and the Korean Conflict, there are no frontlines, no adjacent friendly divisions, and no rear areas containing an echelon of higher headquarters. Instead, there is a fluid battlefield with an elusive enemy. The command and control pattern has changed with brigade command posts usually located at such a distance from division headquarters that the brigades conduct virtually independent operations.

The subordinate battalions of the brigade, often widely separated, conduct small-unit operations to find the insurgent forces. When a significant insurgent force has been located, the brigade, and its battalions build up firepower and conduct a coordinated operation. However, these operations are generally brigade controlled and not the multiple-division coordinated operations envisioned for higher intensity warfare.

Operating on a fluid battlefield, the brigade and battlion commanders require fresh information to keep pace with the fast tempo of operations. Newly captured PW's and documents are important sources of this information as they have been in past conflicts. But the commander must have the capability to obtain this information before its timeliness is lost. This capability should be provided for in U.S. Army doctrine.

ADEQUATE DOCTRINE?

Doctrine contains the fundamental principles guiding military actions. These principles provide the guidelines for organization and equipment that determine capability and operational procedure. U.S. Army doctrine for brigade and ballation PW and captured document operations was conceived for general and limited war. Is the doctrine adequate for stability operations?

The characteristics of internal defense have changed the military operational pattern. In general and limited war, the military forces create their own operational environment. Both sides have established frontlines and rear areas. Progress is marked by the capture of key terrain features which usually results in the tactical defeat or destruction of the defending enemy forces. The brigade and battalion commanders plan their operations based upon terrain-oriented objectives and intelligence of the defending enemy. If the enemy gives up the objective without a fight, this is a "plus" and generally accelerates the operation, But the characteristics of stability operations are different.

In stability operations, there are no well-defined frontlines and rear areas. All areas are an actual or potential battleground. The objectives are the insurgent's forces, underground infrastructure, logistic support system, and support by the population. From the brigade and battalion point of view, the predominant differences from general and limited war are the fluidity of the battlefield and the difficulty in fixing the location of the insurgent forces.

In over-all terms, the insurgent is generally the weaker military force. He cannot afford a major battle with stability forces until he gains a preponderance of strength. The insurgent must use mobility, clandestine locations, and advantageous terrain to offset the stability force's superiority. His is a war of continuous movement dictated by the capability of the terrain and population to shield his location. To prevent annihilation, the insurgent must retain the capability to strike and then withdraw before his initiative is lost or the stability forces can employ their superior firepower against him.

DIFFERENT PROBLEM

The stability force commanders have a different problem. They must find the insurgent and maintain contact until their superior firepower can be built up and employed. In a war with frontlines, enemy withdrawal is a battlefield victory. In stability operations, the withdrawal is the insurgent's way of changing the location of the conflict to another area where he will have the advantage.

In stability operations, the brigade and battalion commanders do not achieve success by taking a terrain objective or forcing an adversary to retreat. Success is gained only through the complete destruction of the insurgent force. To destroy the quarry, contact must be maintained with an effective pursuit. However, the insurgent has a variety of options to conduct his withdrawal. To counter, the stability force commander needs immediate, up-to-date information on the enemy's plans and strength. The brigade and battalion commanders cannot wait the time required for higher headquarters to develop intelligence for their next operational phase. The information is needed immediately if relentless pursuit is to be initiated without hesitation.

EVALUATE SOURCES

Captured insurgents, refugees, and defectors are firsthand, lastminute observers of the adversary's operations and plans. Also, documents and personal letters often are a valuable source of recent information. However, capture is not enough. The brigade and battalion commanders must have the available capability to screen, interrogate, translate, and evaluate their sources immediately after capture in order to obtain timely information. An hour's delay, especially when operating in difficult terrain or under the cover of darkness, is often enough time for the insurgent to slip away.

In Vietnam, it [was] not uncommon for a unit to spend over 90 percent of operational time searching for, and less than 10 percent fighting, the insurgents. Most contacts [were] broken by the insurgents under the cover of darkness. Prisoners and documents are of limited immediate value to the battalion commander who does not have the organic or attached capability to interrogate or translate thoroughly.

The U.S. Army's doctrine sets the guidelines for a commander's operational procedures and outlines his operational capability. This does not imply that the commander cannot use initiative and ingenuity, but doctrine places a limit on these attributes. To be effective, doctrine must conform and change with the operational environment.

U.S. Army doctrine concerning PW's is based upon the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 (GPW) which prescribes the humane treatment of captives.

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When U.S. military combat units were introduced into Vietnam in 1965, the U.S. command in Saigon announced that its soldiers would follow the GPW in the treatment of captives. This establishes the precedent for U.S. Army PW doctrine for stability operations to be based upon the GPW's principles.1

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

The objectives and principles of current U.S. Army PW doctrine are concerned with assisting friendly operations within the limits implied by the laws of land warfare to include the GPW. These objectives and principles set the goals and parameters for PW operations and guide the development of doctrine. These objectives are:

• Acquisition of maximum intelligence information within restrictions imposed by the law of land warfare.

• Prevention of escape and liberation.

• Promotion, through example, of proper treatment of U.S. personnel captured by the enemy.

• Weakening the will of the enemy to resist capture.

Maximum use of PW's and civilian internees as a source of labor.

The principles are:

• Humane treatment.

• Prompt evacuation from the combat zone.

• Provisions of opportunity for prisoner interrogation.

• Instruction of troops in the provisions of international agreements and regulations relating to PW's and civilian internees.

• Integration of the procedures for evacuation, control, and administration of PW's and civilian internees with other combat service support operations.

With the exception of objectives regarding use of PW's as labor, these objectives and principles apply to the brigade and subordinate units. For brigade and battalion stability operations, there are contradictions between the second and third principles. The principle of providing for PW interrogation is primarily aimed at division and above. However, it does have applications to PW evacuation and control at all levels. In general, the objectives and principles are satisfactory for internal defense situations, but not all current U.S. Army PW doctrine developed within these guidelines is adequate for brigade and subordinate unit-level stability operations.

Prisoners are usually captured by the battalion's frontline troops. The doctrinal guidance to the capturing forces is to disarm and then to perform the five "S's"-search, silence, segregate, safeguard, and secure. During the search phase, the PW's and documents are tagged with a card giving pertinent facts concerning the capture. The documents are forwarded to the battalion intelligence officer (S2) and the prisoners are evacuated to the battalion PW collection point.

This doctrinal guidance is sound and simple to follow. Emphasis is placed upon preventing escape and evacuation to a place of less danger for interrogation. However, because of the quick evacuation and lack of interrogation capability, the company commander does not obtain the needed timely information.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The company commander does not have an organic intelligence support capability, but the battalion has this capability in the intelligence officer and intelligence sergeant. The primary function of both is to advise the battalion and subordinate commanders on enemy intelligence and information, but neither is required to have the capability to interrogate PW's or to translate documents. This requires special qualificationsinterrogator and interpreter-that are not organic to the combat battalion. The emphasis is to evacuate PW's and documents as quickly as possible to brigade and division for interrogation or translation. The principal tactical interrogation of PW's and evaluation of documents take place at division level.

The field army, or equivalent level headquarters, military intelligence (MI) battalion provides each division with an MI detachment. This detachment has the mission of providing specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require special skills in the utilization of foreign languages.

The detachment includes an interrogation prisoner of war (IPW) section with interrogation and document translation capability. Although division is the tactical focal point for PW operations, the normal procedure is to attach IPW teams to committed brigades. This provides the capability to conduct formal interrogations and to scan documents for tactical information. The IPW teams are a valuable asset to the brigade commander and his staff.

Depending upon the number of interpreters, the IPW team usually consists of approximately four to eight people. The number of personnel limits the team's ability to screen and determine accurately the true intelligence value of each PW and document. The thorough analysis must be left to higher echelon where time is lost in transit, processing, and dissemination of the gained intelligence. When this intelligence arrives at the brigade and battalion level, it has become history and is of little [tactical] value.

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS

U.S. Army doctrine envisions the temporary attachment of IPW personnel below the brigade level for specialized operations. But this is not encouraged. Also, the battalion commander may request brigade IPW teams to come forward to interrogate selected PW's before being evacuated from the battalion operational area. This has advantages in that the brigade interrogators should be familiar with the battalion's operation, and the PW's information should be up to date.

If IPW support cannot be obtained, the doctrinal guidance is for battalion and subordinate commanders to rely on assigned noninterrogator personnel who have a language capability and some interrogator experience. There is unlikely to be any personnel in a combat battalion with a significant interrogator or indigenous language capability. When required, battalion and lower units probably will be provided an interpreter. This appears to be a satisfactory solution, but much depends upon the capability of each individual interpreter. Logically, the better trained and more capable interpreters will be placed in higher priority assignments than with a combat battalion.

Interrogation is an art requiring special training in questioning and examining an individual. To be most effective, the interrogation of a PW should begin as soon as possible after capture. Being captured, even voluntarily, is a harrowing experience. At this time, the PW can be expected to talk more freely and to lack the ability to remember security lessons. To exploit this vulnerability, the interrogator should begin his examination with minimum delay.

PW interrogation and document translation immediately after capture would enhance the brigade and battalion capabilities to conduct a rapid pursuit and other operations with the least possible hesitation. To eliminate delay in obtaining this enemy information, the battalion and the brigade commander require an adequate IPW capability that will meet their stability operations requirements.

The U.S. Army's doctrinal principle of prompt evacuation from the combat zone states:

Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.... Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.2

Any point is a likely point of insurgent attack to include PW collecting points, higher headquarters, and PW compound locations. The GPW principles must be followed, but should be interpreted in accordance with the type conflict involved. GPW does not prohibit retaining a PW at brigade, battalion, or lower level for interrogation unless the PW would be subjected to danger from known or suspected combat. Unless there is continuous fighting, the point of conflict in a stability operation is difficult to predict. The brigade and battalions should not maintain PW compounds or hold documents for excessive periods. Both should be