Prisoners are usually captured by the battalion's frontline troops. The doctrinal guidance to the capturing forces is to disarm and then to perform the five "S's"-search, silence, segregate, safeguard, and secure. During the search phase, the PW's and documents are tagged with a card giving pertinent facts concerning the capture. The documents are forwarded to the battalion intelligence officer (S2) and the prisoners are evacuated to the battalion PW collection point.

This doctrinal guidance is sound and simple to follow. Emphasis is placed upon preventing escape and evacuation to a place of less danger for interrogation. However, because of the quick evacuation and lack of interrogation capability, the company commander does not obtain the needed timely information.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The company commander does not have an organic intelligence support capability, but the battalion has this capability in the intelligence officer and intelligence sergeant. The primary function of both is to advise the battalion and subordinate commanders on enemy intelligence and information, but neither is required to have the capability to interrogate PW's or to translate documents. This requires special qualificationsinterrogator and interpreter-that are not organic to the combat battalion. The emphasis is to evacuate PW's and documents as quickly as possible to brigade and division for interrogation or translation. The principal tactical interrogation of PW's and evaluation of documents take place at division level.

The field army, or equivalent level headquarters, military intelligence (MI) battalion provides each division with an MI detachment. This detachment has the mission of providing specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require special skills in the utilization of foreign languages.

The detachment includes an interrogation prisoner of war (IPW) section with interrogation and document translation capability. Although division is the tactical focal point for PW operations, the normal procedure is to attach IPW teams to committed brigades. This provides the capability to conduct formal interrogations and to scan documents for tactical information. The IPW teams are a valuable asset to the brigade commander and his staff.

Depending upon the number of interpreters, the IPW team usually consists of approximately four to eight people. The number of personnel limits the team's ability to screen and determine accurately the true intelligence value of each PW and document. The thorough analysis must be left to higher echelon where time is lost in transit, processing, and dissemination of the gained intelligence. When this intelligence arrives at the brigade and battalion level, it has become history and is of little [tactical] value.

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS

U.S. Army doctrine envisions the temporary attachment of IPW personnel below the brigade level for specialized operations. But this is not encouraged. Also, the battalion commander may request brigade IPW teams to come forward to interrogate selected PW's before being evacuated from the battalion operational area. This has advantages in that the brigade interrogators should be familiar with the battalion's operation, and the PW's information should be up to date.

If IPW support cannot be obtained, the doctrinal guidance is for battalion and subordinate commanders to rely on assigned noninterrogator personnel who have a language capability and some interrogator experience. There is unlikely to be any personnel in a combat battalion with a significant interrogator or indigenous language capability. When required, battalion and lower units probably will be provided an interpreter. This appears to be a satisfactory solution, but much depends upon the capability of each individual interpreter. Logically, the better trained and more capable interpreters will be placed in higher priority assignments than with a combat battalion.

Interrogation is an art requiring special training in questioning and examining an individual. To be most effective, the interrogation of a PW should begin as soon as possible after capture. Being captured, even voluntarily, is a harrowing experience. At this time, the PW can be expected to talk more freely and to lack the ability to remember security lessons. To exploit this vulnerability, the interrogator should begin his examination with minimum delay.

PW interrogation and document translation immediately after capture would enhance the brigade and battalion capabilities to conduct a rapid pursuit and other operations with the least possible hesitation. To eliminate delay in obtaining this enemy information, the battalion and the brigade commander require an adequate IPW capability that will meet their stability operations requirements.

The U.S. Army's doctrinal principle of prompt evacuation from the combat zone states:

Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.... Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone."

Any point is a likely point of insurgent attack to include PW collecting points, higher headquarters, and PW compound locations. The GPW principles must be followed, but should be interpreted in accordance with the type conflict involved. GPW does not prohibit retaining a PW at brigade, battalion, or lower level for interrogation unless the PW would be subjected to danger from known or suspected combat. Unless there is continuous fighting, the point of conflict in a stability operation is difficult to predict. The brigade and battalions should not maintain PW compounds or hold documents for excessive periods. Both should be

evacuated to higher headquarters as soom as the command's tactical requirements are fulfilled.

In reevaluation of current doctrine, the emphasis must be placed upon the characteristics of internal defense conflicts and operational requirements of stability forces. The key to success in brigade and battalion stability operations is the capability to destroy the insurgents. This capability would be greatly enhanced with a PW and captured document doctrine conceived in context with the distinctive characteristics of internal defense stability operations.

NOTES

1. The United States, the Republic of Vietnam, and North Vietnam have ratified the GPW. Both the United States and the Republic of Vietnam are following the agreement's provisions while North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have refused to apply the GPW. The Vietnamese Communists have taken the position that they are not a signatory to the convention. North Vietnam contends that U.S. pilots captured in their territory are criminals and subject to North Vietnamese laws.

2. Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 18 July 1966, p. 39.

Defectors

A NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Defectors, agents, and prisoners of war can be a useful source of PSYOP intelligence. In this essay the defector provided information which could help (1) enhance communicator credibility, (2) lead to recommendations for operational changes to increase effectiveness, and (3) update available target group information.

The source was a male, who graduated from a North Korean agricultural college, was a former member of a North Korean economic planning unit, came to the Republic of Korea in July 1969.

PSYOP TARGET GROUPS IN NORTH KOREA

Based upon his knowledge of conditions and of categories of people in North Korea, he suggested the following as suitable target groups for PSYOP directed against North Korea:

1. Workers in factories, enterprises, mines.

2. Farmers

3. Students

4. Intellectuals

5. Government office workers

6. Full-time Party office workers

7. Military personnel

*From "PSYOP Intelligence Notes," Nos. 249, 254, 253, 252, 255, the 7th PSYOP Group, 5-13, April 1971.

8.

Office workers at factories and enterprises

9. Fishermen

10. Agent trainees

11. Repatriates from Japan

Workers in Factories-Enterprises-Mines

According to the source, North Korea defines workers as people who engage in work in the industrial field and who receive wages based on this manual or physical effort. Also classified in this group are farm workers (nongup rodongja) who are employed at state-run farms and receive wages rather than work points, as do farmers on cooperative farms. In North Korea, "workers" are treated as a basic class and a nucleus of the state because they are responsible for production.

Workers and their families can be classified according to their backgrounds into these groups: (1) those who have worked in factories and mines during and since the Japanese occupation; (2) those who were former landlords and capitalists during the Japanese occupation and became workers after it; (3) those who were formerly middle and small businessmen; (4) those who had family members who had defected to the ROK since the liberation from the Japanese; (5) those who had supported UN Forces during the Korean War; (6) those who had been purged from high official North Korean posts on charges of anti-Party activities or factionalism; (7) repatriates from Japan; (8) those formerly engaged in low-level labor such as A-frame porters and peddlers.

North Korean authorities claim in indoctrination programs that workers are the basic class. When this is closely examined, it is seen that workers are composed of people with a wide variety of family backgrounds (songbun). The source said that while workers can be termed a key production group, they can by no means be designated as a political unit. Except for those who were workers during and since the Japanese occupation, workers in the other categories listed above are distrusted politically by North Korean authorities. All of these groups of workers have grievances against the North Korean Government because they know that they and their children will not make any progress where they work or in North Korean society. People who were workers under the Japanese occupation can get and hold positions at all levels and can certainly be, at least, work team chiefs who may not be engaged in direct manual or physical work. Members of the other groups can never become work team chiefs. Workers aspire to progress and become work team chiefs, management workers, or office workers, but only those workers in the first group, those who have worked in factories and mines during and since the Japanese occupation, have the possibility of achieving their aspirations. Workers in the other groups cannot progress to such positions even though educated and qualified for them. The reason is political distrust because of the family background of all the groups except those who were workers during and since the Japanese occupation. The source

estimated that no more than one out of every four workers had a favorable family background bacause of having been a worker during and since the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the chance to improve their position is denied to the majority of North Korean workers. Educated and qualified workers who might otherwise progress see less wellqualified workers with good family backgrounds rise to positions above them. This has been a continuing source of resentment.

Farmers

The source separated farmers in North Korea into four categories according to backgrounds: (1) farmers now farming and whose families have been farmers for generations; (2) farmers and their families and people who have been sent by the North Korean regime to work on farms because of unfavorable family backgrounds, especially people who had made false statements or entries during family background investigations; (3) former urban dwellers and their families who committed political errors, engaged in anti-Party activities and factionalism, and who have been purged and punished by being sent to work as farmers; (4) people and their families who engaged in business during or after the Japanese occupation.

According to source, North Korean farmers, like those in the ROK, tend to be conservative and believe in the maintenance of traditional Korean cultural practices. They also have a strong desire for private ownership.

In the North Korean farming population women outnumber men. The reasons are: (1) during the Korean War many men were killed, leaving their widows on the farms; (2) for a while after the Korean War, men moved from the rural areas to cities to work in factories; (3) there was a tendency after the Korean War for men who had been discharged from the North Korean Army to go to jobs in factories; (4) there was a past pattern for students from rural areas on graduation to move to jobs in urban areas. At present, North Korea prevents the movement of people, especially males, from rural areas to the cities.

Farmers, particularly the young, would like, if they could, to go to cities as factory workers. Most girls in farming areas aspire to be urban dwellers so that they can escape living and working on farms. Some people would like to move to other farming areas where the land is more fertile so they can increase their incomes.

Older farmers would like to operate their own farms as they once did. They want to cultivate land and live on it as they did for generations -working hard on the land during the farming season, but relaxing, eating, drinking, and visiting during the farming off-season-in other words, to follow the traditional living pattern of Korean farmers.

Older farmers wish for return to the pattern of genial farm life, but former patterns are now extinct on North Korean farms. Now farmers in North Korea must work during the winter; formerly they had been able