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teams were placed in separate rooms in the safe house. The source was assigned to the three-man team. On each team there was one man who had attended the "695", a special political school for indoctrinating agent trainees. These two persons arrived at the safe house first, and then the source and the others arrived. A package of North Korean propaganda materials was given to each two-man team, about 200 or 300 booklets. The plan was for each team to carry its package of propaganda materials to a location on the West Coast area of North Korea. The planned training exercise, however, was not carried out because other missions were given to several members of the teams.

The source mentioned that he believed that another method used to disseminate North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK was carried out from Japan through Chosen Soren (Association of Korean Residents of Japan).

According to the source there were two purposes in disseminating North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK: (1) to convey the leaflet and booklet themes to the ROK target audiences, and (2) as a communication means between a North Korean agent in the ROK and his headquarters in North Korea.

If a North Korean agent brought propaganda material with him into the ROK, he might disseminate it himself, get another person to disseminate it, or have an agent-in-place do the disseminating. Usually, agents or others disseminated the leaflets during the hours of darkness, but not during the ROK curfew, 12 midnight to 4:00 A.M., for fear of being caught by ROK police for violating the curfew. First, a target was selected where the leaflet was to be disseminated in accordance with the theme of the leaflet. For example, if the message attacked the United States, then the leaflet target would be a U.S. compound. The agent then tried to get the leaflets into office areas, toilets, desk drawers, and the like. On some occasions, leaflets were disseminated widely, regardless of the PSYOP theme, if there was a good opportunity for distribution. When there was no wind blowing an agent might put groups of leaflets on the top of walls, and when the wind came up later it would blow the leaflets around.

If the agent was busy with other missions, he might try to get someone else, such as an agent-in-place, to disseminate the leaflets. If an agent believed he had recruited someone as a potential North Korean agent, he might give the prospect the task of disseminating some leaflets to test him out. When giving the prospect the task, he was assigned an exact time and place to disseminate the leaflets, and then the North Korean agent would check to see that he carried out his mission.

A North Korean agent who did not have radio communication means could use leaflets to communicate with his headquarters. For example, at the end of some North Korean leaflets, on the back side, the agent would write the name of a certain society or association and some numbers to indicate that the agent desired to return to North Korea on a certain

date, for example, 11 Battalion, 5th District. In this case, "5th" means the month of May and "11th" means the 11th day of that month. The agent places this information on a number of leaflets which he then disseminates. North Korean agents believe that when leaflets are disseminated they are reported in ROK newspapers, or an agent-in-place might find the leaflet and report it to North Korea. In either case, the aim was to get information about the agent's desire to return to the proper authorities in North Korea. Each agent, before dispatch to the ROK, was given a different message to use on leaflets for communicating his desire to return to North Korea. Thus when such a message was acquired by North Korea, it was known which agent was communicating the message. Broadcasts

RADIO BROADCAST MONITORING*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

An example of how content analysis of a radio braodcast, by indicating the relative emphasis that the source wishes to place on propaganda themes, may provide valuable insights into political objectives and strategy.

KHMER REPUBLIC

Stations considered in this report are Hanoi international, Liberation, Voice of the National United Front of Kampuchea (VNUFK), Peking, and Moscow. This report covers the period 11-17 December 1971. All broadcasts were in the Cambodian language.

Hanoi international and Liberation stressed continued support for peoples struggles. They stressed such topics as the downing of U.S. helicopters, comments by Sihanouk on the failing Lon Nol administration, combat victories of CNPLAF units, and a report in which a Vietnamese Student Association located in Hue condemned the use of Saigon troops in Cambodia. CNPLAF units claim total defeat of Lon Nol's CHENLA II operation.

VNUFK continued broadcasting about the combat victories of CNPLAF units. An 88-minute speech by Sihanouk (31st message, part II) was used to propogate support for people's struggles.

Peking placed primary emphasis on international prestige; however, the amount of time devoted to the attendant themes, support for people's struggles and negative treatment of an established government, were of significance. International affairs were the keynote this week with references to the People's Republic of China (PRC) ambassador's party in Hanoi, the Albanian visit to Peking, NUFK and RGNUC delegations to Pyongyang, and development of communications in the mountain regions of Chekiang Province. In support of people's struggles, Peking extolled the success of PLAF units for victories in Cambodia and Laos. Much time

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Radio and News Service Highlights: Trends and Analysis," Issue no. 51-71, 27 January 1972, pp. 51-16 to 51-18.

Peking

M

I

Moscow

M

Theme

Hanoi

Liberation

VNUFK

I

M

I

M

M

I

Propagation of ideology

0

0

1

3

0

0

0

0

1

11

Glorification of the revolution
Present success of socialism

0

0

1

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

9

11

25

Guidance for future success of socialism

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

11

International prestige

8

37

0

0

8

60

22

91

66

146

Support for people's struggles

[blocks in formation]

Negative treatment of a government

DANNA

Weekly Trend Analysis (11-17 December 1971). Broadcasting in the Cambodian language to the Khmer Republic.

was devoted to condemning the Indian and Soviet governments for involvement in the Indo-Pakistani war. It was claimed that Indian warplanes bombed Dacca and killed civilians. South Korean President Pak Chong-hui was denounced for declaring an emergency when China was admitted to the UN.

Moscow continued to expound on the Soviet Union's role in world. affairs in its quest for international prestige. The USSR continues to condemn U.S. involvement in Indochina affairs and to attempt to align Peking in collusion with the United States in some items.

Comment

Hanoi international, Liberation, and VNUFK will continue to support people's struggles, with little or no change in future formats.

Peking will continue to stress international prestige; however, an increase in the negative treatment of the Soviet and U.S. governments has been noted. The split between Peking and the Soviet Union is still evidenced by such commentary as "The Soviet Social Imperialists are the Master of the Indian Expansionists."

Moscow continues to stress foreign relations and express Soviet gains in economic and industrial efforts. Under the new Five-Year Plan, the USSR promises to have one-third of the Moscow population in new housing. The soft landing on and exploration of Mars received extensive coverage. Negative treatment of the Peking and U.S. governments is becoming a recurrent theme. The USSR has persistently condemned U.S. involvement in Indochina, the hypocritical nature of the U.S. stance on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and increased U.S. air activity in Indochina. The PRC was denounced for collusion with the US in an attempt to impede the Soviet disarmament conference.

Captured Documents

VIET CONG DOCUMENTS ON THE WAR (1)*

This report illustrates that document analysis is an important tool for understanding the target's perceptions as well as for remaining abreast of foreign military and political strategies and activities.

Since the early part of 1967 increasingly large quantities of Communist documents have been captured during military operations by American, South Vietnamese and Allied forces. Especially rich caches of highlyclassified documents and operational directives were found in headquarters areas during operations "Cedar Falls" and "Junction City" directed against long-established Viet Cong base areas. Among these were toplevel internal communications of the Viet Cong movement, many of which have been officially released for use by the press and by scholars.

*Excerpts from "Viet Cong Documents on the War (1),” Communist Affairs, V, no. 5 (September-October 1967), pp. 18-24. Reprinted with the permission of Communist Affairs, copyright holder and the author, Hammond Rolph.

These documents range from general analysis of the world situation and the strategic role of the Vietnamese Communist revolution to the exposition of tactics for implementing the revolution in the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam. In this and the next issue, Communist Affairs will present excerpts from some of these lengthy documents, most of which have not been comprehensively quoted at any length in this country and are therefore still relatively unknown. The selections illustrate not only the policy problems and decisionmaking environment of the Viet Cong movement, but also convey something of the Vietnamese Communist's view of his world.

In general, the documents reveal or confirm the following: (1) the tight control of the levers of power in the Viet Cong movement by the Lao Dong Party of North Vietnam, and the insignificance of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam as anything other than a tactic in the struggle; (2) the complete faith of the Vietnamese Communists in the doctrine and strategy of "people's war" as a road to certain victory; (3) a rather realistic sense of weakness in the Viet Cong movement, coupled with a grossly exaggerated view of the defeats and problems of the other side; (4) great stress by the Communists on a military victory within a relatively short time, while simultaneously preparing for protracted war and anticipating the use of the political weapon of negotiations at a propitious time; (5) emphasis on the international revolutionary role of Vietnamese communism; and (6) the absolute primacy of ideological motivation and purity in all aspects of the direction of the Viet Cong movement.

Chronologically the documents range from the end of 1963 to the spring of 1967. Thus they cover a period from Hanoi's confident decision to escalate the war decisively in the South following the death of Ngo Dinh Diem to the present situation of great difficulty for the Viet Cong. LAO DONG PARTY SETS TONE OF WAR IN SOUTH

One of the basic documents captured in the field is the resolution of the ninth plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party (Lao Dong) Central Committee in Hanoi, passed in December 1963. Entitled "World Situation and Our Party's International Duties," it presents a lengthy philosophical and doctrinal rationale for the Vietnam struggle, largely in terms of the demands of "proletarian internationalism" and the global requirements of the socialist camp. The resolution was prepared in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of Ngo Dinh Diem, which undoubtedly somewhat weakened the basis of the Viet Cong movement through the removal of its chief target, and it seems to represent a call by Hanoi for acceleration of the armed struggle in the South despite the changed political situation. Adopted during the period of Hanoi's marked leaning toward the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it reflects a strongly hostile tone toward "revisionists," while at the same time expressing Hanoi's desire for a mediated truce which would restore the unity of world communism in pressing toward its national and international goals.

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