In the present human society, there are the following basic contradictions: (1) contradictions between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp; (2) contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries; (3) contradictions between the oppressed people and the imperialists and colonialists; (4) contradictions between imperialists and imperialists, between one monopolist capitalist clique and another monopolist capitalist clique in imperialist countries. The four above contradictions are basic contradictions in human society because they reflect the true nature of the era, they survive...during the entire phase of evolution from capitalism to socialism throughout the world. The first group of basic contradictions belongs to the contradictions between two opposing international systems. The other basic contradictions belong to the internal contradictions of the international capitalist system.

CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM CARRIES OUT CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVES

Following the earlier resolutions of the Lao Dong Central Committee, the situation in Vietnam underwent a great change. In response to increased North Vietnamese army participation in the Southern war, the United States began aerial bombardment of key North Vietnamese military targets in February 1965 and made a full-scale combat commitment of American troops in the South a few months later.

In the face of this massive American intervention, the Central Committee 12th plenum met in Hanoi in December 1965 to lay down new guidelines. These new policies were then translated into directives by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the Viet Cong's highest echelon of political and military direction (the NLF being a facade with no real power). COSVN, which is an integral part of the Lao Dong's interlocking machinery and which acts as a Central Committee for Southern operations, then called its fourth congress in March 1966 to translate the 12th plenum's guidelines into an all-encompassing "Resolution of the Central Office for South Vietnam." A copy of this top-secret document was seized on April 21, 1967, in Khanh Hoa Province by units of the 101st Airborne Division.

This resolution covers almost every aspect of Hanoi-COSVN plans and programs for the Viet Cong, from high-level matters such as peace negotiations to detailed village-level activities. Thus only a fraction of it can be quoted here. The document is quite open in discussing Hanoi's leadership of the war, and one of its central themes is the need to increase the Party's control of all Viet Cong activities. While pointing out the importance of the NLF as a useful united front tactic to be developed to the utmost, the resolution nowhere indicates that the Front has any real decision-making authority whatsoever.

First, the document reviews the military and political situation in 1965, both as to successes and failures, strengths as well as weaknesses.

1965 was also a year when we all marched forward to win victories. Our entire army, people, and Party strongly stepped up their activities in all fields and all the movements achieved great successes in the midst of an extremely arduous situa

tion.

a. Our major success was in the military field.

All the three forces expanded and fought the enemy well. Our guerrillas succeeded in causing the attrition of and destruction to both the U.S. and puppet

regime armies with very brave and creative forms of combat in resisting mop-up efforts, attacking communications lines and the enemy's rear. But most outstanding of all were our regular forces which came upon the battlefield in a bigger operational force and with increasingly creative combat tactics...

For that reason, in the effort to destroy the enemy, we overfulfilled the norm prescribed by the Central Office for South Vietnam at the beginning of the year. Concerning the build-up of the armed forces, we moved quickly, over-passing the regular force and regional force build-up requirements. . .

b. Our second success was in the political field....We broadened the National Front to unite all classes and social strata and ethnic minorities in the same effort of rising up against the Americans to save the country.

In the disputed rural areas and at strategic hamlets, we continued to score

.in spite of the hard conditions, the morale of our partisans remained unshaken and united..

...yet there were still deficiencies, difficulties, and weak points:

Our armed forces developed considerably but still did not meet the requirements of the situation.

Only half of our regular forces fought well. The regional forces mostly did not fight well and some of them hardly fought while others were so embarrassed that they could not fight.

Political activities and Party tasks...were still poor among the regional forces in certain areas. Therefore, there were many incorrect displays of ideology, behavior, and activities. ...

Although the liberated zone was expanded, it was not yet consolidated and no solid base was established there which could serve as a stable rear for the South.

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.The revolutionary base in the cities was still too weak.

Political struggle activities were not brought up to the same rate as military activities and did not keep up with military achievements. . . . Not enough emphasis was given to the ideological leadership of the masses and to the task of breaking up the enemy's psywar and Chieu Hoi schemes [Editor's note: a program designed to encourage defection from Viet Cong ranks] and his peace trick swindles.

.Mass organizations especially at the village levels were not well built.
Leadership and indoctrination of the masses were also weak...

The unsatisfactory state of mass proselyting activities affected other activities, especially those pertaining to recruitment, conscription, finance, prevention of spies, protection of secrets, guerrilla warfare, etc.

Activities related to the building of the Party, especially those pertaining to organization, were still weak. . . .

Next came an evaluation of enemy intentions and the prescription of general strategy to counter them. Party leadership is emphasized in all aspects of struggle, particularly in the matter of peace negotiations.

In general, in 1966, the basic intention of the enemy will be to carry on the major plans laid down in 1965, but they will do it with new vigor, more wicked schemes and a higher determination. Therefore, the war will develop in a more fierce

manner.

In the face of the new situation, the mission for the entire country as prescribed by the [12th] resolution of TW [Hanoi Party Central Committee] is as follows:

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"All the Party, the army, and the people should exert the maximum effort and Concentrate all forces to step up the armed and political struggles, to defeat the American imperialist aggressors and their henchmen on the main battlefield which in the South

by the North the war of destruction of the American imperialists must be debuted the achievements in the development of a socialist regime must be wwwerred human and material resources must be mobilized for the liberation war the South, and preparations must be made to defeat the enemy in case the local war is expanded throughout the country

while conthung to acquire a thorough understanding of the long-term sistance slogan and in applying it, we must exert a maximum effort to concer te dagt of both ones of our country in order to achieve a decisive entertain any illusions concerning a negotiated She battlefeld within a relatively short period of time.

Amerot imperalsts aggressive vil s Nera Vera, sh we must concentrate all our strength:

In the field of leadership, class lines and the mass viewpoint must be maintained; .

The front for national unity, anti-American resistance, and national salvation must be expanded, the political and military proselyting [sic] movements must be intensified.

We... have the capability to motivate the partiotic sentiments of the people in various social strata and walks of life, to win over even those in the puppet regime and army who follow a progressive trend. . . in order to expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, .

...

we must try to implement democracy, step by step, to secure the interests of the working classes, especially the farmers. The expansion of a national solidarity front must be founded on the close unity of the masses and a consolidation of the workers-farmers alliance.

the Americans and puppet regime exhort their "peace trick" slogan, intensify their psywar and espionage activities, intimidate and bribe the people by flattering them with plans of "rural development," "social revolution," "democratic regime,” etc. . . . hoping to deceive and full all our people, weaken their combat morale, make them suspicious of our victory, and moving ahead with their Chieu Hoi plans. This dangerous plot of the enemy has somewhat affected the combat morale of our people in certain areas. Therefore, breaking up the enemy's political schemes and indoctrinating the people are two things that must be done on a regular basis...

We must intensify our propaganda and diplomatic activities.

In our anti-American resistance for national salvation, we depend mainly on ourselves but we also need the sympathy and support of our friends in the world. Furthermore, our revolution is part of the world revolution. It is related to the movements of national liberation on the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it is also related to the preservation of the socialist camp and world peace. For that reason, we must do our utmost to gain the support and assistance of the socialist camp, the people of the world, the American people.

The diplomatic requirement at this stage is to concentrate all efforts... to gain the sympathy and support of the socialist countries, the people of the world, including the American people, and to isolate to the maximum degree the American imperialists and their henchmen.

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Consolidate and expand the liberated areas and establish bases to provide rear support of the revolution, destroy the enemy's pacification plan, continuously attack the enemy in cities and areas controlled by him, and restrict the enemy's

rear.

in order to help our three strategic zones develop and support . . . the accomplishment of the mission prescribed by the Party for the Southern revolution, we must fully understand the following:

We must constantly seek to develop and expand our bases and liberated areas in both the jungle and delta and secure a solid base for the revolution. Along with that, we must continuously attack the urban areas and those enemy-controlled areas to disrupt and restrict the enemy's rear areas. Those are the two points of the party's great strategic mission. Accomplishment of one is not enough but would also be ineffective. [sic]

Defeating the enemy's pacification plan is an urgent requirement. If we cannot meet this requirement, we will be unable to build up our rear and disrupt and restrict the enemy's. Vice versa, if we cannot strengthen our rear areas, we will be unable to defeat the enemy's pacification plan.

We must thoroughly understand the Party's general strategic principles concerning the leadership of the movements in the delta, the rural areas, the jungle and in the urban areas. . . .

We must try to convert a major portion of the enemy-controlled areas into disputed areas (some into liberated areas controlled by us), to convert a major

radio used the strident, ardent style of agitators; he did not consider this to be effective. Instead he preferred the natural, calm voices of the announcers he had heard on stations from the ROK. The source said that while he was in North Korea, he listened mostly to news programs on KBS 1, but on many occasions he considered the announcer's reading speed so fast that it was difficult to follow what was being said. He, therefore, recommended that announcers avoid excessive speed. Also, he noticed that KBS 1 used many words of foreign origin; this also made the programs difficult to follow.

8. For credibility, the source recommended that programs should take a neutral, objective viewpoint. They should take a position between the Western countries and the Communist nations. In the period before 1965, North Koreans considered Japanese news reporting credible because North Koreans believed that the news took a neutral, objective position. As a result, North Koreans listened to and believed Japanese-originated news broadcasts. Since 1965, according to source, because of Japan's closer relations with the United States and the use of the theme of the revival of Japanese militarism in North Korean propaganda, the credibility of Japanese news among North Koreans has fallen.

9. The source recommended coverage of rural affairs as a way of enhancing credibility. Generally, North Koreans believe that under capitalist societies, cities are emphasized while rural areas have withered from lack of attention.

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION
TECHNIQUES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The source had some knowledge of the dissemination of North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK, gained through conversation with others while he was in North Korea.

He reported that North Korean leaflets were disseminated in the ROK through the use of balloons drifted down from North Korea, He knew that not only leaflets but also booklets and pamphlets were disseminated in this way. He believed that a certain section of the Liaison Department of the Central Party was responsible for such balloon operations.

The source also believed that some North Korean agents were used to disseminate materials in the ROK. He said that North Korea utilized two types of agents for propaganda dissemination in the ROK: long term, in-place agents, and those dispatched on missions to the ROK. In some cases, North Korean propaganda materials were carried into the ROK secretly by couriers and placed in caches. The agent-in-place was told by radio where the cache of propaganda materials was. He then went to recover them. In other cases, agents dispatched on missions to the ROK carried the propaganda materials with them.

The source mentioned as an example that in April or May 1967, six fellow trainees and himself were sent to a safe house in North Korea and divided into two teams, one of four men and the other of three. The two