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In the present human society, there are the following basic contradictions: (1) contradictions between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp; (2) contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries; (3) contradictions between the oppressed people and the imperialists and colonialists; (4) contradictions between imperialists and imperialists, between one monopolist capitalist clique and another monopolist capitalist clique in imperialist countries. The four above contradictions are basic contradictions in human society because they reflect the true nature of the era, they survive...during the entire phase of evolution from capitalism to socialism throughout the world. The first group of basic contradictions belongs to the contradictions between two opposing international systems. The other basic contradictions belong to the internal contradictions of the international capitalist system.

CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM CARRIES OUT CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVES

Following the earlier resolutions of the Lao Dong Central Committee, the situation in Vietnam underwent a great change. In response to increased North Vietnamese army participation in the Southern war, the United States began aerial bombardment of key North Vietnamese military targets in February 1965 and made a full-scale combat commitment of American troops in the South a few months later.

In the face of this massive American intervention, the Central Committee 12th plenum met in Hanoi in December 1965 to lay down new guidelines. These new policies were then translated into directives by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the Viet Cong's highest echelon of political and military direction (the NLF being a facade with no real power). COSVN, which is an integral part of the Lao Dong's interlocking machinery and which acts as a Central Committee for Southern operations, then called its fourth congress in March 1966 to translate the 12th plenum's guidelines into an all-encompassing "Resolution of the Central Office for South Vietnam." A copy of this top-secret document was seized on April 21, 1967, in Khanh Hoa Province by units of the 101st Airborne Division.

This resolution covers almost every aspect of Hanoi-COSVN plans and programs for the Viet Cong, from high-level matters such as peace negotiations to detailed village-level activities. Thus only a fraction of it can be quoted here. The document is quite open in discussing Hanoi's leadership of the war, and one of its central themes is the need to increase the Party's control of all Viet Cong activities. While pointing out the importance of the NLF as a useful united front tactic to be developed to the utmost, the resolution nowhere indicates that the Front has any real decision-making authority whatsoever.

First, the document reviews the military and political situation in 1965, both as to successes and failures, strengths as well as weaknesses.

1965 was also a year when we all marched forward to win victories. Our entire army, people, and Party strongly stepped up their activities in all fields and all the movements achieved great successes in the midst of an extremely arduous situation.

a. Our major success was in the military field.

All the three forces expanded and fought the enemy well. Our guerrillas succeeded in causing the attrition of and destruction to both the U.S. and puppet

regime armies with very brave and creative forms of combat in resisting mop-up efforts, attacking communications lines and the enemy's rear. But most outstanding of all were our regular forces which came upon the battlefield in a bigger operational force and with increasingly creative combat tactics...

For that reason, in the effort to destroy the enemy, we overfulfilled the norm prescribed by the Central Office for South Vietnam at the beginning of the year. Concerning the build-up of the armed forces, we moved quickly, over-passing the regular force and regional force build-up requirements...

b. Our second success was in the political field. . . . We broadened the National Front to unite all classes and social strata and ethnic minorities in the same effort of rising up against the Americans to save the country.

In the disputed rural areas and at strategic hamlets, we continued to score

successes.

...in spite of the hard conditions, the morale of our partisans remained unshaken and united..

...yet there were still deficiencies, difficulties, and weak points:

Our armed forces developed considerably but still did not meet the requirements of the situation.

Only half of our regular forces fought well. The regional forces mostly did not fight well and some of them hardly fought while others were so embarrassed that they could not fight. . . .

Political activities and Party tasks...were still poor among the regional forces in certain areas. Therefore, there were many incorrect displays of ideology, behavior, and activities. . . .

Although the liberated zone was expanded, it was not yet consolidated and no solid base was established there which could serve as a stable rear for the South.

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Political struggle activities were not brought up to the same rate as military activities and did not keep up with military achievements. . . . Not enough emphasis was given to the ideological leadership of the masses and to the task of breaking up the enemy's psywar and Chieu Hoi schemes [Editor's note: a program designed to encourage defection from Viet Cong ranks] and his peace trick swin

dles.

Mass organizations especially at the village levels were not well built.
Leadership and indoctrination of the masses were also weak....

The unsatisfactory state of mass proselyting activities affected other activities, especially those pertaining to recruitment, conscription, finance, prevention of spies, protection of secrets, guerrilla warfare, etc.

Activities related to the building of the Party, especially those pertaining to organization, were still weak. . . .

Next came an evaluation of enemy intentions and the prescription of general strategy to counter them. Party leadership is emphasized in all aspects of struggle, particularly in the matter of peace negotiations.

In general, in 1966, the basic intention of the enemy will be to carry on the major plans laid down in 1965, but they will do it with new vigor, more wicked schemes and a higher determination. Therefore, the war will develop in a more fierce

manner.

In the face of the new situation, the mission for the entire country as prescribed by the [12th] resolution of TW [Hanoi Party Central Committee] is as follows:

"All the Party, the army, and the people should exert the maximum effort and concentrate all forces to step up the armed and political struggles, to defeat the American imperialist aggressors and their henchmen on the main battlefield which is in the South.

In the North, the war of destruction of the American imperialists must be defeated, the achievements in the development of a socialist regime must be preserved, human and material resources must be mobilized for the liberation war in the South, and preparations must be made to defeat the enemy in case the local war is expanded throughout the country.

****

.while continuing to acquire a thorough understanding of the long-term resistance slogan and in applying it, we must exert a maximum effort to concentrate the strength of both zones of our country in order to achieve a decisive victory on the Southern battlefield within a relatively short period of time.

..we are determined not to entertain any illusions concerning a negotiated settlement to the problem of Vietnam, and we must concentrate all our strength to destroy the enemy. Only when the American imperialists' aggressive will is crushed and the objectives of independence, peace, democracy, and neutrality of the South are guaranteed can we negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam problem.

.At a certain time, we can apply the strategy of fighting and negotiating at the same time, in order to support the armed struggle, and thus accelerate the disintegration of the puppet army and regime, and create more conditions favorable for our people to win a decisive victory.

...That objective can only be achieved if we coordinate very closely the armed struggle with the political struggle and psychological warfare. . .

The Southern branch of the [Lao Dong] Party has extensive and solid foundations. It is a valiant vanguard element, thoroughly trained in combat, closely connected with the masses and fully trusted by them. It is well experienced in the matter of political and armed struggle and it is also closely led by the Party Central Committee."

In order to carry out the general mission, major tasks are then assigned in detail. Included among these assignments are build-up and deployment of the armed forces, political leadership in the armed forces, expansion of the united front under the Party's guidance, diplomatic efforts abroad, consolidation and expansion of the Viet Cong base areas, defeating the enemy in the contested areas, clarification of agrarian policies, improvement of mass proselyting [sic] campaigns and development of the Party's strength.

We must strongly emphasize armed warfare, build up our armed forces, expand the people's guerrilla movement, destroy a major portion of the American and puppet forces. During 1966, . . .we must try to inflict a loss of 30,000 or 40,000 American personnel, including the total destruction of about 10 battalions and some scores of companies. We must also destroy and distintegrate about 200,000 puppet troops, over a half of whom will be regulars, . . .

All the armed forces, from the regular forces to the regional forces, shall be responsible for participating in, assisting and emphasizing guerrilla warfare.

Regulars must retain the initiative in the attack to destroy the enemy. . Regular warfare must be active, mobile, flexible, aggressive and must be victori

ous.

All our armed forces must be sharp instruments of both armed and political struggle...

Efforts must be made toward mobilizing the youths and the populace to insure the replacement of regular forces and to provide vanguard elements and civilian manpower in service of the battlefield.

Increase the Party's political and leadership activities in the armed forces.

. . In the armed forces, maximum attention must be paid to building up the Party, especially the basic structures, . . .

In the field of leadership, class lines and the mass viewpoint must be maintained; .

The front for national unity, anti-American resistance, and national salvation must be expanded, the political and military proselyting [sic] movements must be intensified.

We... have the capability to motivate the partiotic sentiments of the people in various social strata and walks of life, to win over even those in the puppet regime and army who follow a progressive trend. . . in order to expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam,

... we must try to implement democracy, step by step, to secure the interests of the working classes, especially the farmers. The expansion of a national solidarity front must be founded on the close unity of the masses and a consolidation of the workers-farmers alliance.

the Americans and puppet regime exhort their "peace trick" slogan, intensify their psywar and espionage activities, intimidate and bribe the people by flattering them with plans of "rural development," "social revolution," "democratic regime," etc. . . . hoping to deceive and lull all our people, weaken their combat morale, make them suspicious of our victory, and moving ahead with their Chieu Hoi plans. This dangerous plot of the enemy has somewhat affected the combat morale of our people in certain areas. Therefore, breaking up the enemy's political schemes and indoctrinating the people are two things that must be done on a regular basis.

We must intensify our propaganda and diplomatic activities.

In our anti-American resistance for national salvation, we depend mainly on ourselves but we also need the sympathy and support of our friends in the world. Furthermore, our revolution is part of the world revolution. It is related to the movements of national liberation on the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it is also related to the preservation of the socialist camp and world peace. For that reason, we must do our utmost to gain the support and assistance of the socialist camp, the people of the world, the American people. . .

The diplomatic requirement at this stage is to concentrate all efforts... to gain the sympathy and support of the socialist countries, the people of the world, including the American people, and to isolate to the maximum degree the American imperialists and their henchmen.

Consolidate and expand the liberated areas and establish bases to provide rear support of the revolution, destroy the enemy's pacification plan, continuously attack the enemy in cities and areas controlled by him, and restrict the enemy's

rear.

in order to help our three strategic zones develop and support . . . the accomplishment of the mission prescribed by the Party for the Southern revolution, we must fully understand the following:

We must constantly seek to develop and expand our bases and liberated areas in both the jungle and delta and secure a solid base for the revolution. Along with that, we must continuously attack the urban areas and those enemy-controlled areas to disrupt and restrict the enemy's rear areas. Those are the two points of the party's great strategic mission. Accomplishment of one is not enough but would also be ineffective. [sic]

Defeating the enemy's pacification plan is an urgent requirement. If we cannot meet this requirement, we will be unable to build up our rear and disrupt and restrict the enemy's. Vice versa, if we cannot strengthen our rear areas, we will be unable to defeat the enemy's pacification plan...

We must thoroughly understand the Party's general strategic principles concerning the leadership of the movements in the delta, the rural areas, the jungle and in the urban areas.

... We must try to convert a major portion of the enemy-controlled areas into disputed areas (some into liberated areas controlled by us), to convert a major

portion of the presently disputed areas into liberated zones where our control would be firm, and at the same time, we must devote all our efforts toward securing, developing and expanding our liberated and base areas... so as to convert a major portion of the areas under his control into disputed areas or liberated areas controlled by us.

Local and external forces must be coordinated and armed activities must be coordinated with local mass movements. Reactionary organizations must be destroyed. The tyrants and their public control organizations (including the police, security, pacification, and reactionary elements) must be attacked....

In guiding all kinds of activity, we must always and steadily maintain the objective of the uprising in the rural areas.

we must cleverly maintain the legal status of the people, a positive legality, which would permit the constant carrying out of our political and armed struggle movements in pulling down the enemy's influence.

One of the decisive prerequisites is the development of sound political organizations to include strong Party chapters able to lead the masses in the fight against the enemy, and into which the masses themselves are organized.

The requirements of the liberated rural areas consist in holding on to the land and people and making decided efforts to prevent the enemy from taking over additional land and herding the people to his areas..

... Strive to ideologically motivate the people so that they will step up their resistance. . . .

We must realize that the main point in the defense of the liberated areas lies in the fact of maintaining our control over the population and, most of all, in nurturing the fighting spirit.

... People must be determined to struggle against the enemy, to cling at all costs to their paddies and villages, to step up production for national salvation, to tie their personal interests to those of the revolution and resistance. . .

...

Reality shows that recently in order to avoid airstrikes, the population have left their lands and fled to the enemy-controlled areas. They then become homeless and penniless and their lives are miserable. For this reason, if we can perform well the tasks of protecting the people's interests, lives and properties, and of production, suitably in the new situation, and the relations between the people and Party are close and firm, they then realize that the Party really cares for them and will cling at any cost to their native villages for combat and production.

Great efforts must be made to achieve solidarity in the rural areas, to implement the Party's agrarian policy well and the Party's class lines which state that: "Based on the unity of poor, middle and rich peasants, we are trying to gradually topple the landlord class, to win over those landlords desirous of joining ranks, neutralize the fence-sitters and smash those wicked landlord agents of the American imperialists."

The urban areas and cities have to meet the following requirements:

According to the situation in each locality, uninterrupted attacks in every form and size must be launched against the enemy in order to create constant disturbances even in the enemy's safest rear bases. Movements in the cities and urban areas must be encouraged to catch up with those in the rural areas.

... We must capitalize on the differences existing within the enemy's camp, isolate and divide the diehards, win over the neutralists' sympathy, persuade the fence-sitters to take sides... [and] . . . to continuously expand the movement and create conditions for the forthcoming general attack and uprising.

We must create and develop the movements among various classes, the laborers, the needy urban people, the petit-bourgeoisie, the students, and then gradually associate them with other movements and organizations to form a coalition front for widespread action, proceeding toward the development of a united front

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