with a platform inferior to that of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam but endowed with the conditions to operate openly and to attract the above classes for a struggle against the Americans and their lackeys.

****

It is apparent from the expression of tasks in the cities that the Viet Cong have made little headway in the urban areas, despite the existence of substantial anti-government feeling in the larger population centers. Viet Cong leaders have also been dissatisfied with results in general proselyting [sic] among the civilian population. Their dilemma has become evident. On the one hand, they have worked hard, and not with great success, to move the peasant out of his world of narrow self-interest and to mobilize him for the larger goals of the revolution; on the other, it has become plain that in the context of the very personal suffering of rural families in the war, this effort has led to some alienation from the movement. The following excerpts illustrate these points:

Intensification of Civilian Proselyting [sic] Activities.

... in the recent past, our civilian proselyting [sic] activities have been too weak. We have not fulfilled the task of motivating, indoctrinating and assisting the people to settle those complex problems created for them by the war so as to enable them to carry out the resistance activities.

... Emphasis has been placed only on the mobilization task while the difficulties and problems of the masses remained incompletely understood.

The Party's cadres and personnel must remain close to the masses, particularly the workers and farmers, and must stand back to back with them, remain with them during moments of hardship and danger and not leave them in the lurch or stay aloof from them even under easy circumstances.

A large-scale mass motivation campaign must be opened... Nationalism must be
promoted, sufferings pointed out, national and class hatred provoked. . . .
Mass organizations must be strengthened and developed, . . . so as to enable the
Party to secure its control over the elements of the populace—farmers, youths,
women in the rural areas, liberation unions and syndicates in cities. . . .

The class factor must be viewed as the key factor. But due consideration must also be given to an individual's character, age, and walk of life. In the meantime, efforts must be made to attract and gain the middle classes.

We must be more enlightened on the position of the farming class, comsolidate our control over the rural areas, strengthen the poor and middle farmers' unity and make them an active force of the Party in the rural areas. . . .

We must penetrate into the religious masses and motivate them, promote their nationalist spirit, . . . prevent them from being fooled by reactionary elements.... With regard to the ethnic minorities . . . we must properly carry out the Party's ethnic policy, penetrate deeply into the masses...

With regard to the Chinese residents, we must continue to penetrate their masses and motivate them to unite with our people...

... The Labor Youth Group must have sound control over the youths, and must encourage them to join our ranks and in countering the enemy's conscription effort. We must motivate the women to participate in the political struggle... and assume activities in the rear area so that young men can go to the front.

Strengthening the Party, both ideologically and organizationally, is made the order of the day. Attention is to be concentrated on improving

the Party chapters, the key "grass roots" organization of the Lao Dong (or the People's Revolutionary Party, as its Southern branch is publicly known) in both the rural areas and towns. Again a dilemma appears. While the directive stresses the flexibility and initiative necessary to continue operation by lower echelons under difficult circumstances, it tends to defeat this purpose by calling at the same time for tight controls from the top. Thus it provides some explanation for reports from observers in the field that there is a considerable lower-level paralysis among the Viet Cong cadres in the absence of direction from above.

Increase the Party Development Activities

... Development must be efficient from both the ideological and organization standpoints so as to insure the unity of thought and action in the Party. Ideological development must be considered as the primary requirement.

First the entire Party, population and army must be indoctrinated so that all realize the sublime historical mission of our people..

The effort of developing and promoting the class viewpoint among cadres and Party members in the days to come must satisfy the requirements of creating a spirit of perseverance, revolutionary optimism, readiness to overcome hardships and dangers and to accept sacrifices, determination to eradicate the enemy, to cling to one's area and to the populace, especially the workers and farmers, to share hardships with the people, to properly carry out every activity and not to be shaken by the enemy's peace trick arguments and his Chieu Hoi scheme. Within the Party as well as among the population, the outstanding ideological problems, such as deviationism, conservatism, rightism, must be settled. . . .

we must see that the Party's political and ideological views are firmly upheld by using political and ideological indoctrination as a basic means to promote the position of the proletarian class in order to enhance revolutionary vigilance...

we must increase counterintelligence and counterespionage activities... The Party's leadership activities must be increased. . . .

... it is necessary to improve our technique and to increase centralized leadership and, in particular, to strengthen the Party's absolute control over the armed forces. ...

. . . In the days to come, the task of developing and consolidating the Party's chapters (especially in villages and cities) must be considered as a central effort in the task to develop the Party from the organizational standpoint.

First we must start with improving each individual member of a Party chapter. This is accomplished by raising his political and ideological levels, making him thoroughly understand the situation and his mission, enhancing his will to attack and destroy the enemy, his determination to cling to the land, to the people, and to fight until the end. . . .

. . . Substantial assistance must be given to help each member of the Party to know what he is supposed to do daily, how to do it . . . we must proceed toward developing working methods, raising the political and organizational standards of committee chapters and chapter secretaries. Only thusly can we make the chapters capable of functioning by themselves under difficult circumstance and execute the policies from above without remaining passive as before.

Finally, a summary of the Viet Cong mission, in clarion tones:
. . . Our resistance for national salvation against the American imperialists, the
most powerful and cruelest enemy of mankind, is occurring in the center of an
area in which are concentrated the most serious contradictions in the world at
the present time. Our resistance is part of the world revolution which is
designed to liberate our people, and at the same time protect national indepen-
dence, democracy and socialism throughout the world.

... the factors determining our ultimate victory are apparent. We have the
correct domestic and foreign policies of a Marxist-Leninist party. We possess a

Central Committee which is clear-sighted and which is headed by Chairman Ho.
We have the heroic army and people of the South, a people's war line which is
matchless, a North which is solid and strong, and the increasing support of the
socialist camp and people all over the world.

.. every individual leader and Party member must clearly perceive and be
proud of his responsibility before history. . . .

ROMANIA-A CHINESE TOEHOLD?*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Propaganda

As evidenced in this excerpt, careful analysis of propaganda and news in a society in which both are controlled by the government can yield results useful for political forecasting.

At the present time, Romania seems to be successful in treading a relatively impartial line between the USSR and Communist China. Or, as stated by Emil Bodnares, Vice President of the State Council of Romania, "Romania aims at developing friendship, alliance, and cooperation with all socialist states on the basis of equality and mutual respect.” On 25 March, Radio Peking announced ... that Cornel Burtica, head of the Romanian Trade Delegation and Minister of Foreign Trade, arrived at the Peking Airport. On 28 March, Peking reported that the Romanian trade official had met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and Acting Minister of Foreign Trade Lin Haiyun. A second broadcast later the same day announced the signing of a trade agreement for 1970 by Burtica and Lin. On 1 April, the Romanian Trade Delegation left Peking by air, seen off by Romanian Ambassador to China, Aurel Duma, and Li Chiang, Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Trade.

A Radio Peking broadcast on 19 April carried an article from the Romanian paper Scinteia which warmly praised the friendly relations between Romania and Communist China. Referring to the trade agreement which had been signed some three weeks earlier, the article stated that goods to be exchanged between the two countries would continue to be increased and diversified. After mentioning the strides made by Communist China in the field of industry and agriculture, the article concluded by stating that Romania was convinced that "the friendship and cooperation between Romania and China will be further developed."

A 19 April Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin to China reported that Nikolae Ceausescu, Secretary-General of the Romania Communist Party and President of the State Council of the Romanian Republic, had said that "Romanian people join people of the Soviet Union and people of other countries in commemorating the great Communist theorist and the revolutionary leader of the proletariat, Lenin." The Moscow broadcast went on to state, "The Romanian Party activist and statesman emphatically point out that the Romanian Republic values its friendship with Lenin's country and will henceforth develop cooperation between the two *Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights: Analysis and Trends," Issue No. 25-70, 19 June 1970, pp. 25-27-25-29.

countries in order to consolidate the world socialist system and promote universal peace."

On 9 June, Radio Peking ... reported the arrival of Emil Bodnares and the delegation of the Grand National Assembly of the Romanian Socialist Republic by special plane after concluding their visit to NK. On hand to greet them at the airport were Kang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, Li Hsien-nien, and Kuo Mo-jo. A second broadcast later the same day reported that Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, and Li Hsien-nien had held talks with Bodnares and Romanian Ambassador Aurel Duma. The speeches by Kang Sheng and Emil Bodnares at a dinner celebrating the arrival of the Romanian delegation that evening were carried the following day by Radio Peking.

The People's Daily carried a welcoming editorial on 9 June, which was broadcast over Radio Peking that day. The editorial praised Romania for maintaining its independence and sovereignty from "foreign aggression and interference." The editorial then concluded, "We believe that the coming friendly visit to our country ...is bound to strengthen the traditional friendship between the people of China and Romania still further and make a positive contribution to the militant unity among the revolutionary people of the world."

On 11 June, Peking domestic Chinese and NCNA English language service carried the texts of speeches made by Chou En-lai and Emil Bodnares at a banquet given by the Romanian Ambassador in honor of the visiting Romanian delegation. Chou reported that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao had met with Bodnares and the other Romanian guests and that cordial and friendly talks had been held on those questions that "concerned them both" and that "positive results had been received thereby." Chou also took the opportunity to assail directly the US for its actions in Indochina. Without naming the Soviet Union, Chou alluded to US-USSR collusion in the division and maintenance of their respective spheres of influence and in their interference in the internal affairs of other nations. For his part, Bodnares praised Communist China for its achievements in agriculture and industry, the launch of its first man-made satellite, and condemned the US for its actions in Indochina.

On 12 June, the departure of the Romanian delegation was reported on Radio Peking's English language service. The safe arrival of the delegation in Bucharest was carried by Radio Peking on 13 June.

Comment: Official claims by all concerned notwithstanding, there appears to be a definite bias in the activities of Romania in its relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. This may be due in part to the rather hard line expressed by the Soviet Union in the past, typified by a UPI article dated 8 August 1969 from Bucharest, reporting that the Soviet delegate to the Romanian Communist Party Congress, Konstantin F. Katushev, walked out when a message from Communist China was read congratulating Romania on success in its "defense of national independence." Katushev later returned to the meeting and reportedly

warned that the Soviet Communist Party would use "any effort" to counter excessive independence or disunity within socialist ranks.

Resentment of such an attitude, encouraged by Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and the no doubt gentle arguments of the Chinese Communist representatives in Bucharest and Peking, may have contributed to the two-year delay in the renewal of a treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and Romania. The initial friendship treaty was signed in 1948 for a period of 20 years with a provision for renewal. At the present time, according to a Japan Times article dated 14 June, Leonid I. Brezhnev is planning to travel to Bucharest in early July to sign the treaty.

In the meanwhile, an extended and enlarged trade pact with Communist China has been in effect for almost three months, and the Chinese have contributed a reported 50,000,000 yuan ($20,000,000) for flood relief in Romania. Communist China's concern for Romania, its repeated praise of Romania's "defense of its national independence," and the assurances that China would support Romania in maintaining its freedom of action, tend to indicate a closer relationship than has previously been the case. Although it is a bit early to say, it is not impossible that ChineseRomanian relations may develop to the point that the Soviet Union may fear the establishment of another "Albanian situation." Additionally, the stated position of Romania that it would fight if Soviet troops crossed its borders would lead one to suspect that Romania was counting on something more than world opinion to discourage such adventurous moves by the Soviet Union.

Finally, the presence of Yuang Uung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, at the 9 June meeting between Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, Li Hsien-nien, and Emil Bodnares and other unspecified members of the Romanian delegation at least opens the possibility of some type of Communist Chinese military aid or assistance agreement being offered to, if not yet accepted by, the Romanians.

Continued observation of relations between Romania, the Soviet Union and Communist China may disclose another "Albania," albeit a more independent one, in the making.

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF BURMA*
By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

Analysis of Burmese antigovernment clandestine radio provided an indication of the objectives and tactics of the radio's sponsors.

The Voice of the People of Burma (VPB) (clandestine) continued to berate the Ne Win military government. For the week of 12-17 December 1971 the station held true to its policy of repeating its programs over a two day period. All was transmitted in Burmese. Reception was poor.

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights, Trends and Analysis," Issue No. 51-71, December 1971, pp. 51-15-51-16.