The first item on 12 December 1971 dealt with the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) policy on the treatment and education of prisoners of war. VPB stated there were five basic principles followed in the treatment of captured Burmese soldiers. This lasted nine minutes. The Ne Win clique was criticized in San Yu's speech on defense expenditures and dependence on imperialists to build Burma's industries. Another program entitled "Military Clique Which Is Stepping Up Military Expenditures to Depend More on Imperialists and to Oppose the People" lasted for nine minutes. Another program, "Talk on Austerity Exposes Dogfight” lasted 7.5 minutes and stated that the military clique is corrupting itself from within at high levels by squandering the country's money. Lasting six minutes, the last program, "Who Suffers from a System of Providing Raw Materials and Procuring Finished Products?" dealt with the Goverment's poor system of distribution of finished products. Eleven minutes of victory news from Cambodia and Vietnam closed out the broadcasts. The program for 12 December 1971 was repeated on 14 December 1971.

On 16 December 1971, the broadcast opened with "Combat News" for 3.5 minutes. The first item, "Dogfight Within Ne Win's Military Clique," was a repeat of the topic of 12 December 1971. For 5.5 minutes, it treated the corruption of high level officials and predicted more political fights and power struggles. A seven-minute program, "Ne Win's Economic Plan Will End Up Like the Welfare State Plan" followed. Calling on the people facing housing problems to fight together, "Beware of the Dangers of Military Government, Rangoon Hut Dwellers" lasted 5.5 minutes. "The Growing Struggle of the Thai People against the US and Its Followers-The Thanom-Praphat Clique" continued the broadcast for four minutes. The usual Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought program closed the broadcast period. The foregoing lasted 18 minutes. and presented quotations from Lenin's teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. This program was repeated on 17 December 1971.

Comment. During this period VPB was stressing governmental graft and corruption. The attack is aimed at high level officials who are said to squander the Government's money on luxurious office equipment while preaching austerity to the people. This line may create more distrust and unrest among Burmese because many are discouraged by Burma's lack of progress. Nothing is known of the VPB audience. If only Communists listen, they are probably convinced already that Burma's only solution is Communism. VPB programs then serve to reaffirm the conviction. Whether the corruption charge is true or false in Burma is not really important. People in Burma, patient though they be, know that progress is minimal. To blame some of this on corruption is a way of saying that Communism is needed and is not corrupt. VPB, as usual, reports the strides forward in other nation's people's wars. There is no reason, VPB implies, that such progress will not occur in Burma, too.

Intelligence Reports

VIEWS HELD BY NORTH KOREANS ABOUT FOREIGN

COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES*

By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

This report gives an example of how intelligence reports can improve the audience information data on which PSYOP targeting is based.

1. UNITED STATES

Source said North Koreans believed that economically, militarily, scientifically, and in material wealth the United States was the most powerful nation in the world. The NK Government did not deny these facts about the US.

Older North Koreans had the opinion that Americans were humane and gentle, and in fact some other North Koreans believed this privately. They believed that the US engaged in international cooperation. But many North Koreans believed that the US had held a constant war aggression policy throughout its 200 year history. They also believe that the US, a mighty nation, was defeated by North Korea during the Korean War, and they are proud of this victory. Moreover, in connection with the Pueblo seizure and the shooting down of the EC 121, some unsophisticated North Koreans firmly believe that the US will never think lightly of the North Koreans. On the other hand, some intelligent North Koreans believe that the US has restrained itself and endured these events in a cautious, prudent way because the US wished to avoid further involvement in Asian wars, since it was already involved in Vietnam.

When many North Koreans think of the US, their first impression is imperialism. North Koreans do not know about the real functioning of the democratic system in the US. Many also believe, because of North Korean propaganda, that Americans outwardly are humane and cooperative toward underdeveloped and small nations, but in actuality are cunning and crafty. North Korean movies and plays portray Americans in this

manner.

North Korean propaganda uses the theme that US forces are stationed in Korea (1) to exploit Korea and (2) because the Korean Peninsula is a strategic base for future US expansion on the Asian mainland in concert. with the Japanese. Despite this propaganda, some North Koreans reason that US forces are stationed in the ROK to provide active and positive support to the ROK, to help the ROK develop into a more advanced nation, and to protect a friendly nation from the threat of Communism. On the other hand, source observed prior to his departure from NK in

*Excerpts from "Views Held by North Koreans About Foreign Countries and Peoples," PSYOP Intelligence Notes, No. 257, 17 May 1971.

July 1969 that some North Koreans complained about the passive attitude taken by the USSR and Communist China in supporting North Korea. The US has provided visible active support to its friend, the ROK, but Communist China and the USSR have provided only passive support to their friend, North Korea. Some intelligent North Koreans attribute their poor basic living conditions to the passive aid and support given North Korea by the USSR and Communist China.

2. USSR

Source provided some information about the attitudes of North Koreans about the USSR, but it should be noted that this is based upon his experience in NK before his departure for the ROK in July 1969, and therefore attitudes may have changed in some respects.

From the end of the Japanese occupation until the mid-1950s, North Koreans regarded the USSR as a very close and friendly socialist nation, in fact almost worshipping the USSR. However, their attitude toward the Russians changed to one of keeping the Russians at a distance. The reason for this, according to source, was that at first North Koreans greatly admired the Russians because they had come to North Korea as liberators, but this friendship was not based upon a long historical relation, instead upon the momentary assistance of the Russians in liberating Korea from the Japanese and in providing help during the Korean War. However, after the Korean War, when Khrushchev adopted revisionism and peaceful coexistence, North Korean leaders began to draw away from the Russians. The attitude of the North Korean leaders was spread among the people by the North Korean propaganda apparatus.

North Koreans believed that the USSR was the strongest and most powerful of all the socialist nations, but was not as economically powerful as the US. Some had believed that the USSR was the most powerful nation in the world, but they were surprised at Khruschev's announcement proposing peaceful coexistence, and that Russian productivity would catch up with US. In so doing, Khruschev admitted that the USSR was behind the US economically. This surprised many North Koreans. However, in science, especially space science, most North Koreans still believe that the USSR is ahead of the US. The fact that the Russians put the first man in orbit around the earth, ahead of the US, had a terrific effect on this North Korean attitude.

Some North Koreans began to feel uneasy after their dependence on the USSR became less and less, and the USSR followed revisionism and adopted some capitalist concepts. Nowadays, under Kim II-song's concept of chuche, North Korea has kept its independence of the USSR, economically, politically, and ideologically.

During the 1950s and even the early 1960s it was the ambition of young students to be able to go to Moscow to study, but now only a limited number of students go. Generally, learning from the Russians has

become less and less attractive, especially since the time Khruschev adopted peaceful coexistence, his trip to the US, and his humiliation in the Cuban crisis. Now, as far as source knew, there were almost no students from the USSR and the Eastern European satellite nations in North Korea. But there were some students from African nations and North Vietnam studying in North Korea.

North Koreans considered that the Russians were cowardly, selfish, and egotistical.

3. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Source provided some information about attitudes of North Koreans toward Communist China and the Communist Chinese, but this information is based upon his experience in North Korea up until he left there in July 1969. Since then based upon current relations between NK and Communist China, attitudes of North Koreans may have changed in some respects.

The first impression that North Koreans formed of the Communist Chinese was that they were "magnanimous" and "generous." Generally, North Koreans, both leaders and ordinary people, regard Mao Thought as the product of the dotage of an old man and the Cultural Revolution as an ultraleftist action. North Koreans, at the time of the Cultural Revolution, felt proud because they believed that only in North Korea was genuine Marxist-Leninist ideology being followed, the Russians having gone to the right, and the Communist Chinese to the ultraleft. North Koreans generally thought that the Cultural Revolution in Communist China brought shame upon the Communist Bloc, and that the Cultural Revolution, which they termed a riot, would stand in the way of the unification of Korea under North Korea. They considered that the cruel acts in the Cultural Revolution against the intelligentsia would stimulate negative reactions to Communism among the intelligentsia in the ROK. According to source, a large number of people of Korean ethnic origin lived in the northeastern part of Communist China, but during the Cultural Revolution many cadres of Korean ethnic origin were purged. This also was a factor in worsening the attitude of North Koreans toward the Communist Chinese.

Source said that there had been many small incidents during the Cultural Revolution along the Communist Chinese-North Korean border. Once in August 1967, when source was at Hyesan on the Yalu River, he saw such an incident. There was a small island in the river, which, because of floods, was usually submerged. The North Koreans built an embankment from the river bank on their side of the island. As a result of the construction of the embankment, the Chinese Communist side of the river was flooded instead of the North Korean side. The Chinese Communists, to protect their side, built a stone and wood embankment out into the river. Then the North Korean side was flooded. As a result, the

North Koreans built out from the island an embankment of stone and wood jutting out into the river at an angle a little below the Chinese Communist embankment. This directed the flow of the flood back against the Chinese Communist side of the river. Then the Chinese Communists started building another embankment to correct the situation. At this point the North Koreans proposed negotiations with the Communist Chinese. A North Korean high level provincial official was selected to meet with a Communist Chinese representative who was from a low-level organization. The North Koreans, as a result, would not hold negotiations with the Chinese. Source did not know what happened further in the matter.

Source had heard that there were many small incidents provoked intentionally by the Communist Chinese against the North Koreans. Once three or four Communist Chinese soldiers waited in an ambush in a border area until North Korean trucks came by, then they threw stones at them.

On another occasion the Communist Chinese allowed some relatives of North Koreans to cross into North Korea where they actively promoted Mao Thought.

During the period 1963-1965, according to source, the Communist Chinese authorities put economic pressure on the North Koreans by stopping or postponing the regular or periodic shipment of oil, coke, and other materials for which North Korea depended upon Communist China. Such factors worsened relations and the attitude of the North Korean leaders and people toward the Communist Chinese. North Korea did not officially attack Communist China's move toward the ultraleft, but unofficially, anti-Communist Chinese remarks were spread among the North Korean people. Brotherly relations between the North Koreans and Communist Chinese, based upon help from the Communist Chinese during the Korean War, almost disappeared. The first impression the North Koreans had of the Communist Chinese as magnanimous and generous was replaced by feelings that they were foolish, stupid, and stubborn.

In the case of an emergency, such as an attack from the ROK, the North Koreans expected that they would receive manpower support from Communist China, with material, modern military equipment, coming from the USSR.

The Communist Chinese, source believed, thought badly of the North Koreans for their great idolization of Kim II-song. Source said that in March 1968, when he was in the Pyongyang Grand Theater where there was a drama being put on by the North Korean Army, he saw the Communist Chinese diplomats display a bad attitude in welcoming Kim II-song. There were a large number of foreign diplomats present, including the Communist Chinese. The area in the center of the front rows of the theater was occupied by the foreign diplomats. A large portrait of Kim II-song was hanging at the back of the stage, and at the beginning of the affair as was the custom in North Korea, a choral group sang "The