Song of Kim II-song." When Kim II-song came to deliver a speech or when "The Song of Kim II-song" was sung, it was the custom for everyone to applaud. At the time source was at the Pyongyang Grand Theater, when "The Song of Kim II-song" was sung, everyone in the theater stood up during the song and applauded when it was finished, except for the three Communist Chinese representatives.

Unpublished Studies ATTITUDES, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNIST PROP

AGANDA:

FACTORS IN INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

By the U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

This report illustrates how an unpublished study, bringing together a number of communication findings, can constitute a compact sourcebook of PSYOP-related intelligence for field personnel, even though the report was prepared for other purposes.

ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Small increases in literacy and education, improved communication factilities and urbanization in the Far East have been responsible for a slow expansion of the base of public opinion. Young army officers, professionals, students, religious leaders, businessmen and trade union leaders all seek a voice in their future. Alien and competing foreign influences often reinforce these national groups, which are beginning to understand the nature of their influence and attempt to exert it more freely. Successful expression of opinion and influence is still sporadic, however, and suffers from official efforts to censor and repress in many countries.

Some of these primarily urbanized groups have begun to serve also as links back to the predominantly rural, more traditionally oriented sectors of their communities. They thus help to change the outlook and orientation of the rural masses. Often they interpret and communicate government policy and opinion to the masses, and are becoming increasingly influential opinion molders, creating as well as interpreting mass opinion for the government. These new groups represent a new type of nationalism; pragmatic but with a touch of idealism; cosmopolitan, but without a loss of patriotism; modern, yet somewhat tolerant of tradition. They are more interested in action and results than in the dogma and ideology of their elders. For them, integrity and competence count more than the traditional values based on kinship, status or wealth, and their actions indicate their anxiety to improve matters.

*****

In general, where accommodation is made to the surge of opinion and change, transition can be orderly and peaceful; where opinion is suppres

*Excerpts from "Attitudes, Communications and Communist Propaganda: Factors in Insurgency in Southeast Asia-1962, "R-76-62 (A), U.S. Information Agency, 1962, pp. 1-29.

sed or ignored, events are more likely to produce violence or upheaval. . . . In Japan [during 1961, for example], public opinion showed a more mature and responsible face. While the mechanisms for the expression of public opinion were relatively unchanged, evidence suggests that mass media, organized pressure groups, political parties and various front groups were forced to become more aware of and responsive to public opinion favoring moderation. This desire for moderation and public order was galvanized into forceful expression by the excesses of the 1960 anti-security treaty struggle.

The Japanese example provides a classic observation on the impact of opinion. When such crystallization of opinion takes place, all institutions must pay attention to closing the gap between popular sentiment and performance of the media, parties, etc. Only when opinion is in the process of formation, or when it is not held strongly, can the media or parties pursue an active course seeking to control and mold public opinion. Once opinion has crystallized, media and political leaders ignore it only at their peril.

BASIC FACTORS INFLUENCING OPINION

Several environmental factors produce unique or special problems in all nations of the Far East and basically influence the general orientation of opinion. These include: The aftermath of colonialism during which most Southeast Asian nations are attempting to recover from the painful distortion of traditions resulting from automatic imitation of the West without adequate adaptation; demands of urban elites for rapid modernization of the economy; right wing resistance to reform; peasant pressures to secure social justice and agricultural reforms; attempts to form adequate administrations and the inability of some governments to exercise authority as in South Viet-Nam, Indonesia, Laos and Burma; internal warfare and subversion as in Laos, Thailand, South Viet-Nam; separatist movements and problems of national unity in Indonesia and Burma which weaken the central goverment and aid the Communists; ethnic and racial disputes as in Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Laos; outbursts of nationalist extremism as in Indonesia; regional antagonisms like that of the triangular struggle between Thailand, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam; tensions of the divided countries of Korea, Viet-Nam and Laos; contiguity of several Southeast Asian nations to Communist China and North Viet-Nam.

REGIONAL AND LOCAL ISSUES

Local and regional issues dominate the thinking of most Asians, whether they be political or "trained" elites, laborers or peasants. A brief listing of the prevailing regional and local concerns would include: (1) social change and dislocation caused by modernization, (2) economic orientation, (3) regionalism, (4) Communist threats, (5) separatist movements and problems of national unity and (6) tensions of divided countries and problems of guerrilla warfare.

It would be difficult to over-emphasize the problems and difficulties attendant on modernization and national development in the Far East. Demands for modernization are strong among urban elites, but weak from the primarily unreceptive rural sectors. Peasants prefer to secure social justice and agricultural reforms with few resultant changes in their traditional way of life. Yet, political leaders have over-extended themselves through efforts to modernize their country too rapidly. Some of them, however, like U Nu and Sihanouk, have realized that traditional mores also must be maintained and adapted to the times if stability is to be assured.

Meanwhile, the process of modernization has progressed enough to add new strains to the old as traditional and modern groups clash. Radical changes have produced expectant new social groups, plans without managers, factories without technicians and university graduates without jobs.

COMMUNICATION PATTERN

With the exception of Japan and the urban centers of the Far East, the communication pattern is far from adequate for the nations' needs. A low level of information is characteristic for all sectors except the small urban elites. The press remains limited largely to urban distribution and radio receivers are too few and not widely dispersed. Most information is still transmitted through informal channels. Mass media serve to feed an increasing amount of information into informal channels.

.Consequently, the effective utilization of the village council is of considerable importance to leadership as a source of feedback and as a molder of peasant opinion on the government's authority and programs. District leaders and provincial governors share an important role as a feedback source to the leadership and as molders of opinion.

With the exception of Japan, and possibly Malaya and the Philippines, the general communication process providing for a dialogue between decision makers and the public is best characterized as a "semi-closed" one; the public generally cannot express itself by pressure or representative strikes or press campaigns or non-manipulated elections. Yet street demonstrations-albeit ones often organized by political parties for their own benefit, expressions of opinion in the press and intellectual quarterlies and party conferences and conventions, serve to keep the communication process partially open.

ATTITUDES

National Development, Economic

and Technical Aid

In most of the Far East, expectations of social reform and desires for economic modernization exist among Westernized, urbanized elites. The

The first item on 12 December 1971 dealt with the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) policy on the treatment and education of prisoners of war. VPB stated there were five basic principles followed in the treatment of captured Burmese soldiers. This lasted nine minutes. The Ne Win clique was criticized in San Yu's speech on defense expenditures and dependence on imperialists to build Burma's industries. Another program entitled "Military Clique Which Is Stepping Up Military Expenditures to Depend More on Imperialists and to Oppose the People" lasted for nine minutes. Another program, "Talk on Austerity Exposes Dogfight" lasted 7.5 minutes and stated that the military clique is corrupting itself from within at high levels by squandering the country's money. Lasting six minutes, the last program, "Who Suffers from a System of Providing Raw Materials and Procuring Finished Products?" dealt with the Goverment's poor system of distribution of finished products. Eleven minutes of victory news from Cambodia and Vietnam closed out the broadcasts. The program for 12 December 1971 was repeated on 14 December 1971.

On 16 December 1971, the broadcast opened with "Combat News" for 3.5 minutes. The first item, "Dogfight Within Ne Win's Military Clique," was a repeat of the topic of 12 December 1971. For 5.5 minutes, it treated the corruption of high level officials and predicted more political fights and power struggles. A seven-minute program, "Ne Win's Economic Plan Will End Up Like the Welfare State Plan" followed. Calling on the people facing housing problems to fight together, "Beware of the Dangers of Military Government, Rangoon Hut Dwellers" lasted 5.5 minutes. "The Growing Struggle of the Thai People against the US and Its Followers-The Thanom-Praphat Clique" continued the broadcast for four minutes. The usual Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought program closed the broadcast period. The foregoing lasted 18 minutes and presented quotations from Lenin's teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. This program was repeated on 17 December 1971.

Comment. During this period VPB was stressing governmental graft and corruption. The attack is aimed at high level officials who are said to squander the Government's money on luxurious office equipment while preaching austerity to the people. This line may create more distrust and unrest among Burmese because many are discouraged by Burma's lack of progress. Nothing is known of the VPB audience. If only Communists listen, they are probably convinced already that Burma's only solution is Communism. VPB programs then serve to reaffirm the conviction. Whether the corruption charge is true or false in Burma is not really important. People in Burma, patient though they be, know that progress is minimal. To blame some of this on corruption is a way of saying that Communism is needed and is not corrupt. VPB, as usual, reports the strides forward in other nation's people's wars. There is no reason, VPB implies, that such progress will not occur in Burma, too.

Intelligence Reports

VIEWS HELD BY NORTH KOREANS ABOUT FOREIGN

COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES*

By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

This report gives an example of how intelligence reports can improve the audience information data on which PSYOP targeting is based.

1. UNITED STATES

Source said North Koreans believed that economically, militarily, scientifically, and in material wealth the United States was the most powerful nation in the world. The NK Government did not deny these facts about the US.

Older North Koreans had the opinion that Americans were humane and gentle, and in fact some other North Koreans believed this privately. They believed that the US engaged in international cooperation. But many North Koreans believed that the US had held a constant war aggression policy throughout its 200 year history. They also believe that the US, a mighty nation, was defeated by North Korea during the Korean War, and they are proud of this victory. Moreover, in connection with the Pueblo seizure and the shooting down of the EC 121, some unsophisticated North Koreans firmly believe that the US will never think lightly of the North Koreans. On the other hand, some intelligent North Koreans believe that the US has restrained itself and endured these events in a cautious, prudent way because the US wished to avoid further involvement in Asian wars, since it was already involved in Vietnam.

When many North Koreans think of the US, their first impression is imperialism. North Koreans do not know about the real functioning of the democratic system in the US. Many also believe, because of North Korean propaganda, that Americans outwardly are humane and cooperative toward underdeveloped and small nations, but in actuality are cunning and crafty. North Korean movies and plays portray Americans in this

manner.

North Korean propaganda uses the theme that US forces are stationed in Korea (1) to exploit Korea and (2) because the Korean Peninsula is a strategic base for future US expansion on the Asian mainland in concert with the Japanese. Despite this propaganda, some North Koreans reason that US forces are stationed in the ROK to provide active and positive support to the ROK, to help the ROK develop into a more advanced nation, and to protect a friendly nation from the threat of Communism. On the other hand, source observed prior to his departure from NK in

*Excerpts from "Views Held by North Koreans About Foreign Countries and Peoples," PSYOP Intelligence Notes, No. 257, 17 May 1971.