ally a team is composed of five to eight men, all lightly armed for self-protection. They may spend anywhere from a number of hours to a few weeks living and conversing with the population of a particular village. They may conduct rallies and distribute informative literature about the government. They may distribute food commodities in short supply. These men, organized loosely along military lines, provide visible proof to the population that the government backs up the policy of the Chieu Hoi program. At the same time, by just being there they point up the fallacy of VC propaganda, which states defectors are tortured, imprisoned and generally, shot.

Each province and the city of Danang in I Corps has an armed propaganda company composed of Hoi Chanh (returnees) who are trained and equipped to conduct face-to-face propaganda operations. These teams have proved their value by assisting in the control, interrogation and propagandizing of the local populace; by applying their knowledge of VC tactics to locate mines, booby traps and caches; by gathering intelligence from the populace with whom they come in contact; and by spotting VC suspects.

UNORTHODOX TECHNIQUES

Some of the unusual means of communicating messages and appeals include the use of deception, poison pens, mournful sounds over loudspeakers during the night, gossip, superstitions, and rumors. The first two essays recount incidents in which deception was used effectively, and discuss conditions for its use. In "Our Poison Pen War Against the Nazis," a gimmick for unwittingly exposing a target group to PSYOP messages and appeals is described. "Psychological Warfare Unit Sends. Out Mournful Sounds" briefly covers unusual themes used over loudspeakers at night in Vietnam. Superstitions are useful to psyoperators because they are closely related to audience predispositions. Also related to audience predispositions, rumors spread because they are congenial to members of the target group and are passed on by them. "Rumors and How to Counter Them" describes how rumors change in the process of being passed on to others and indicates the kinds of defenses that can be used against rumors. In a similar way, "Intra-Group Communication and Induced Change" relates how positive gossip is utilized for spreading ideas and how an established information flow can prevent rumors from spreading.

TACTICS OF DECEPTION IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS*

BY ROBERT I. HOLT AND ROBERT W. VAN DE VELDE

Tactics of deception in psychological operations are often uncertain and become effective in influencing behavior and at the same time maintaining communication credibility only if three general rules are followed.

Tactics of deception attempt to make the audience build up a psychological environment which differs from the material environment. In the terms of perceptual psychology, tactics of deception try to provoke . [illusory] percepts..

...

There are many examples of the use of the tactics of deception. Much of Hitler's success in the late thirties was due to the fact that the official decision-makers in Britain and France defined the situation (particularly in regard to Hitler's goals) in a manner which deviated disastrously from reality.

There were many instances during World War II when deception was used effectively by both sides. Deception is responsible in some degree for the reputation of "evil" which tends to surround the psychological instrument. Indeed, among some people whose understanding of the dynamics of human behavior is meager and whose knowledge of world affairs is parochial, "psychological operations" are understandable only in what they refer to as "the dirty tricks department." All other aspects of the psychological instrument are apt to be scathingly referred to as "globaloney."

One of the most famous and successful uses of deception was the British "Operation Mincemeat"-the case of The Man Who Never Was. After the Allies had driven German and Italian military forces from North Africa, the next step in the Allied offensive was obvious to both them and the Germans. Before the Mediterranean could be available for shipping, Sicily had to be taken. The move was so obvious that the Germans could be expected to mass their defensive forces there and make the invasion, even if successful, extremely costly. The value of making the Germans think that the blow would come elsewhere was apparent. Operation Mincemeat was an attempt to do just this.

It involved releasing a corpse, dressed as a major of the Royal Marines, from a submarine off the coast of Spain. A "Most Secret" letter was planted in a dispatch case attached to the body. It appeared to be from General Sir Archibald Nye, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff to General Sir Harold Alexander, who commanded an army in Tunisia. The letter indicated that there would be a major Allied offensive against Greece. Other documents on the body were designed to lead the Germans

*Excerpts from Strategic Psychological Opeations and American Foreign Policy, The University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 33–35. ©1960 by the University of Chicago. Published 1960. Second Impression 1964. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

to believe that the major was being flown into the Eastern Mediterranean on a plane that crashed off the coast of Spain.

The body was picked up by Spanish officials and the documents handed over temporarily to a German agent who made copies that were sent on to Berlin. After the war, captured documents proved that the German intelligence service believed the documents and convinced the High Command that the Allies would make their major attack in the Eastern Mediterranean. Military and naval forces were sent to Greece and held there even after the invasion of Sicily, because Hitler and the High Command were convinced that the attack on Sicily was diversionary.1

There were also a number of "black" propaganda operations undertaken by the Allies in World War II which employed the tactic of deception. "Operation Annie" and "Gustav Siegfried Eins" are examples of two radio stations that operated as if they were broadcasting from inside Germany. Their success was predicated on getting the Germans to believe that they were not Allied stations.2

There are three basic rules that must be followed if deception is to be an effective way of influencing behavior. First, the deception must be "reasonable." The success of Operation Mincemeat was due to the fact that it was entirely reasonable that a Royal Marine officer would be flying to North Africa with special messages in a plane that crashed, and that an Allied invasion in the Eastern Mediterranean was a reasonable if not the most likely move from Africa.

A second rule of deception is that there must be no simple way of checking what the facts in the case really are.

A third rule is that the use of deception should not descredit a source which may have valuable future potential. Deception is usually discovered eventually and the more successful the deception the more likely is the source to be discredited. In World War II the "black" Allied station, Operation Annie, was once used to direct a Nazi column into Allied hands. The deception was excellent, but it completely destroyed the future of the station. It is usually unwise to use a newspaper or radio station which built up a large audience for purposes of deception.

NOTES

E. Montagu, The Man Who Never Was (London, 1953).

2 Howard Becker, “Nature and the Consequences of Black Propaganda." A Psychological Warfare Casebook, edited by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, March 1958), pp. 672-677.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VIETMINH*

BY EDWARD GEARY LANSDALE

Unusual situations and traditions may provide the opportunity for ingenuity in the development of PSYOP initiations. This account describes the exploitation of an historic moment and of local superstition for PSYOP purposes.

.

Just before the French quit the city of Hanoi and turned over control to the Vietminh, . . . the Communist apparatus inside the city was busy with secret plans to ready the population to welcome the entry of Vietminh troops. I suggested that my nationalist friends issue a fake. Communist manifesto, ordering everyone in the city except essential hospital employees to be out on the streets not just for a few hours of welcome but for a week-long celebration. In actuality this would mean a seven-day work stoppage. Transportation, electric power, and communication services would be suspended. This simple enlargement of plans already afoot should give the Communists an unexpectedly vexing problem as they started their rule.

An authentic-looking manifesto was printed and distributed during the hours of darkness on the second night before the scheduled entry of the Vietminh. The nationalists had assured me that they could distribute it safely because the chief of police in Hanoi was a close friend of theirs and would rescue any of them who might be caught and arrested. The next day the inhabitants of Hanoi read the fake manifesto and arranged to be away from homes and jobs for a one-week spree in the streets. The manifesto looked so authentic that the Communist cadre within the city bossily made sure, block by block, that the turnout would be 100 percent. A last-minute radio message from the Communists outside the city, ordering the Communists inside to disregard this manifesto, was taken to be a French attempt at counterpropaganda and was patriotically ignored. When the Vietminh forces finally arrived in Hanoi, their leaders began the touchy business of ordering people back to work. It took them three days to restore public services. A three-day work stoppage was a substantial achievement for a piece of paper.

[A] second idea utilized Vietnamese superstitions in an American form. I had noted that there were many soothsayers in Vietnam doing a thriving business, but I had never seen any of their predictions published. Why not print an almanac for 1955 containing the predictions of the most famous astrologers and other arcane notables, especially those who foresaw a dark future for the Communists? Modestly priced-gratis copies would smack too much of propaganda-it could be sold in the North before the last areas there were evacuated. If it were well done,

*Excerpts from In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1972, pp. 225-227. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright owner.

copies would probably pass from hand to hand and be spread all over the Communist-controlled regions.

The result was a hastily printed almanac filled with predictions about forthcoming events in 1955, including troubled times for the people in Communist areas and fights among the Communist leadership. To my own amazement, it foretold some things that actually happened (such as the bloody suppression of farmers who opposed the poorly-executed land reforms and the splits in the Politburo). The almanac became a best seller in Haiphong, the major refugee port. Even a large reprint order was sold out as soon as it hit the stands. My nationalist friends told me that it was the first such almanac seen in Vietnam in modern times. They were embarrassed to discover that a handsome profit had been made from what they had intended as a patriotic contribution to the nationalist cause. Unobtrusively, they donated this money to the funds helping the refugees from the North.

OUR POISON PEN WAR AGAINST THE NAZIS*

BY BRIAN MOYNAHAN

Target audiences will unwittingly expose themselves to propaganda messages and appeals not in line with their predispositions if the messages and appeals are subtle and presented in ordinary, normal, or routine fashion.

One of the most ingenious bits of propaganda used by the Allies during World War II was called "Operation Cornflakes." Its details were never released, and it is still on the U.S. secret list. But recently an international stamp actioneer, Mr. Robson Lowe, came across a sheaf of documents and stamps describing it, and next month they will go on show in South Africa.

"Cornflakes" had a beautiful simplicity to it. Dropping leaflets indiscriminately was expensive and largely ineffective. The Germans knew it was Allied propaganda and treated it as such. But if it were to arrive normally, through the German mail, on their breakfast table (hence "Cornflakes"), then most Germans would think that it had come from a resistance group inside the country. This would be a far more shattering blow to their self-confidence.

The idea, conceived by the Americans, was to bomb mail trains northward bound for the Reich with Italian based P-38 fighter bombers. The P-38s would stop the train and damage it heavily with strafing. Then mail bags containing the propaganda letters would be dropped amongst the wreckage. When they found them, the Germans would presume they came from the train and deliver them as normal mail.

*From The Sunday Times [London] 2 May 1971, reproduced in Falling Leaf Magazine, XII, No. 2 (June 1971), pp. 64-65. Reprinted with the permission of The Sunday Times (London), copyright holder.