degree of serious attention. This group meets the requirements for effectiveness described in 6c and 6d.

A toal of 15 NVA and 9 VC read rally leaflets but do not consider that the leaflets contributed to their rallying. While the simple act of reading a leaflet can be ascribed with equal justification to curiosity or boredom, as well as interest in gaining information, these individuals had read the leaflets thoroughly enough and often enough to remember specific kinds of leaflets and to recall message content. The responses of this sub-group clearly meet the requirements for effectiveness described in Requirement 6d.

In summary, PSYOP leaflet messages are effective in that approximately two-thirds of large samples of NVA and VC ralliers believe that the leaflet messages played a part in their decision to rally.

Effective Themes in Influential Messages.

Although those who read leaflets had read an average of about twenty and could recall a variety of themes, 56% of the VC soldiers and 50% of the NVA soldiers, or 53% of the total sample, said that a specific leaflet message had contributed to their decision to rally. The themes most frequently cited as specifically influential are shown in Table 9.

Nearly one-third had a leaflet with them when they rallied, 19% of the VC and 37% of the NVA. The primary reason given for not rallying sooner was the constant surveillance; the next most frequently cited reason was the fact that they had not yet come to believe what the leaflets said.

The Rally Decision Process

The process of reaching and acting on a decision to rally was probed with a structured series of questions about attitudes that existed when the term "Chieu Hoi" was first heard, at the time of actual rally, and at various times after rally.

Knowledge of the Chieu Hoi Program and arrival at some degree of confidence that the GVN will act in accordance with the policies it proclaims emerge as the primary factors in the constellation of developing

attitudes that eventually lead to rally. Motivation is two-factored: there can be motivation to leave the NLF and there can be motivation to join the GVN; the two motivations are separate and do not necessarily appear together. The two factors work together to move the individual in one direction; while the factor impelling the individual away from the Front ranks is fear and distrust, the factor impelling him to rally is some measure of hope and trust. In 200 responses, 200 different situations may be described at a "total detail" level of analysis. But overall there is a clearly discernible consistent general pattern that starts with initial disbelief, perhaps even intense dislike for the term "Chieu Hoi". This is followed by growing recognition of evidence of the truth of the messages, and a slow transition to acceptance of the belief that the GVN descriptions of the Chieu Hoi Policy are made in good faith. Once arrived at this opinion, if some factors motivate the individual to leave the Front and at the same time others motivate him to move toward the GVN, the decision to rally and the actual rally becomes only a matter of finding or making an opportunity.

Almost all of the ralliers placed their first consideration of the possibility of rallying at a point in time between one and two years before actually rallying. The most frequently cited reason was the fact that they did not yet believe fully in what the leaflets said. Investigation of the time lag between consideration of rallying and actually doing so, in cases where there was a considerable time gap between having made a decision to rally and the actual rally, indicate the primary reason was constant surveillance the validity and generality of this reason is supported by the results of several more lengthy related studies not reported here.

Thus knowing about the Chieu Hoi Program, knowing how it works, knowing how to rally, knowing what to expect, believing that good treatment will be received, and staying alive long enough for accretion of credibility is essential in inducing rally. Family urging of the prospective rallier is particularly effective for VC, and for NVA where relatives or friends exist; the family can explain the program, can cite the well-being of other ralliers, and assist by escorting him to the rally point or by making prior arrangement for a safe reception when rallying.

In summary, the thinking and feeling processes that lead to a decision to rally operate over a one to two year time period if unusual situations do not occur.

SUMMARY

As one part of a total systems approach to the complex manifold problems involved in attempting to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP as a military function in a field operational setting (Vietnam), the basic ingredient of all PSYOP-messages-was selected for a total-detail-level examination. For this task a total of 700 NVA and VC ralliers and prisoners was interviewed (200 NVA ralliers, 200 VC ralliers, 100 VC prisoners, and 200 NVA prisoners). The issue of effectiveness of PSYOP

messages was fractionated into six aspects or dimensions; proximity of media, clarity of reception, language appropriateness, thematic comprehensibility, credibility, and evocation of behavioral response. Questions applicable to each aspect were formulated and used to query the data resulting from the rallier and prisoner interviews.

Step-by-step analysis of the data in relation to the first five of the six criteria demonstrated the pre-eminence of leaflets and airborne loudspeakers as effective media in the sense that they do reach the enemy, are understood, and have some credibility. An even more searching test of the sixth question or criteria showed that leaflets, to a much greater extent than loudspeaker messages, were effective in that they contributed to the defection of two-thirds of the VC soldiers and twothirds of the NVA soldiers sampled. Almost one-third of the VC and one-half of the NVA ralliers maintain they would not have defected if they had not read leaflet messages.

The authors advise that the results of this study and their implications be considered with caution. It is clear that the much-maligned leaflet has received unmerited disparagement from enthusiasts for other media but it must be remembered that leaflets represented about 95% of the planned PSYOP effort in Vietnam. It is not possible to say whether the same amount of expense and effort devoted to another media would produce equivalent returns and the problem cannot easily be subjected to cost; yield analysis.

EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO THE VIETNAM CONFLICT*

BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

The results presented in this preliminary account of the effectiveness of Western international broadcasting efforts in the formation of East European opinions toward the U.S. involvement in Vietnam show RFE's audience covered a broad range of the attitudinal spectrum. The listeners were far from unanimous in approving U.S. policy.

INTRODUCTION: SAMPLE AND METHOD

This is a preliminary report, based on interviews with 583 Hungarians, 569 Poles, and 261 Czechs and Slovaks-1,413 respondents in all. Interviewed in four West European countries, they were in nine cases out of ten on temporary visits to the West and have since returned home; only 10% of the sample comprised defectors, refugees, and emigrants.

Among the 1,413 respondents, there was a predominance of males, urbanites, and the better-educated, with a disproportionate number fit

*Excerpts from "East European Attitudes to the Vietnam Conflict: A Study in Radio Effectiveness," Radio Free Europe, Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, July 1967.

ting into the higher occupational categories. Overall, the general run of the interviewees consisted of "opinion leaders."

The interviews were done by independent research institutes in various West European countries, the interviewers being in no way identified with Radio Free Europe.

I. Attitudes To The United States Course in Vietnam

Respondents were asked whether they considered the U.S. course in Vietnam to be "right," "wrong," or "right in some respects and wrong in others." In Table 1, half the Hungarian and Polish samples and nearly half the Czechoslovak were critical of American policy in Vietnam.

II. The Most Important Factors in Attitude-Formation Toward The U.S. Course in Vietnam

Once his attitude toward the U.S. course in Vietnam had been ascertained, each respondent was asked to select from a list the influences he thought had contributed to his opinion. The list included the three major mass-communication media (press, radio, television) as well as informal channels ("discussion with friends and relatives"); he could also indicate that, mistrusting contradictory influences, he had used his own resources ("thinking the matter over by yourself'). Lastly, each respondent was encouraged to volunteer unlisted influences (few did volunteer any).

Table 2, shows the five items in the order in which they were submitted to the respondents. Radio, standing fifth in the order of submission, was the most frequently cited influence in two samples and the second most frequently cited one in the third, a result that argues against any link between responses and placement in the list.

Radio was the strongest influence among the Hungarians and the Poles, and the second strongest among the Czechs and Slovaks. The frequency of the "discussions" and "thinking it over" responses in all three samples is typical for the attitude formation process as seen by the respondents involved.

Television in all three samples turned out to be less important not only than radio and newspapers but than the two other options as well. Only in the Polish sample did television emerge as an important attitude-forming factor. As for newspapers, their showing was significant. Radio, it must Table 1

"What do you think of the U.S. course in Vietnam?"

be remembered, refers to both regime-controlled broadcasts and the uncensored ones from abroad; newspapers on the other hand refer, in practical terms, to the communist press alone.

The above figures suggest that radio listeners (including listeners to Western radio) may not be impervious to the tendentious "interpretation" of the U.S. course in Vietnam carried by the Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak press.

III. Reference to RFE, VOA, BBC, And The Domestic Radios As “Important” in Forming Opinions About Vietnam

Those who regarded "listening to the Radio" as an important influence on their Vietnam opinions were asked to specify stations. For the purposes of this preliminary report, minor Western stations were disregarded. [The results are in Table 3.]

Of the three major Western stations, the only one with an impact approaching that of the domestic radios on attitudes to Vietnam was RFE. Among Poles, Radio Warsaw and RFE were specified about equally, another indication of RFE's authority in Poland.

The Hungarian interviewees cited Radio Budapest somewhat more often than the Poles cited Radio Warsaw, and they mentioned RFE somewhat less often than the Poles did. This result is hardly surprising: Table 4 shows that Hungarian respondents hostile to the U.S. course in Vietnam outnumber its supporters even among the regular RFE listen

ers.

In the Czechoslovak sample, references to radio-both the domestic broadcasts and RFE's-occurred less frequently than in the other two samples. The importance Czechs and Slovaks accorded to "thinking the

Table 2

"Which of the following were important to you in helping you to form this opinion [on the U.S. course in Vietnam]?"