more rigorous research on relationships between variables that come into play in communications and development.

EFFECTS ANALYSIS

The effects of persuasive communications are particularly difficult to ascertain because in practice it is usually impossible to isolate the cause of observable results. To discover 100 enemy troops defected within a certain time after a direct appeal to do so does not prove the appeal had anything to do with the defection, and certainly not that the appeal was the defection's primary cause.

Clearly, then, the major need in effects analysis-and to a somewhat lesser extent in the SCAME categories-is the isolation of appropriate methodologies to measure effect or at least assist in its determination. The first essay, by Lieutenant Colonel R. P. Morris gives some idea of the diversity of approaches currently used by Army personnel to measure effect and effectiveness. His article is based upon survey research as well as an extensive literature search.

The second and third papers illustrate methodologies used or recommended by various researchers for the evaluation of effectiveness. Similarly, Joseph G. Whelan's essay demonstrates the techniques used to determine effect by a source involved in political communications with an audience to whom the communicator does not have unimpeded research

access.

Donald D. Smith's essay on the effects of Moscow's short-wave transmissions to North America is interesting in terms of both methodology and findings. The article illustrates that audience predispositions may bring about the success of international communications even when other conditions presumed necessary for effectiveness are lacking.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM: INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS AT THE U.S. ARMY DIVISION LEVEL*

BY R. P. MORRIS

A review is made of the numerous indicators of effectiveness used by the U.S. Army in the Vietnam era.

This study reviews the types of PSYOP indicators employed by Army divisions in South Vietnam and suggested by Army personnel at the U.S. Command and General Staff College.

CASE STUDIES

*Excerpted and adapted from "Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the Division Level," student thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969, pp. 34–93. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

I. 1st Infantry Division

In the 1st Infantry Division a total of seventeen PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness were identified. These indicators ranged from quantifiable direct indicators, such as the number of Hoi Chanh (returnees to Government of Vietnam control from VC/NVA ranks) per month in the division area of operations, to subjective indirect indicators, such as conversations with the division Vietnamese Army Liaison Officer and attached Vietnamese Army interpreters.

The indicator given the greatest significance during 1968 was the Chieu Hoi (Vietnamese Government Open Arms Program) rate.1 The rate was figured on the number of ralliers per month in the division area of operations. This indicator was considered to be significant because the main thrust of the division PSYOP effort was directed toward causing members of the enemy forces to defect from their own units and to rally to the side of the free world forces. A related incidator utilized by the 1st Infantry Division was interrogation information obtained from among ralliers in the division area. Another indicator was the "mass rally rate," or the frequency in which multiple ralliers from the same enemy organization defected to the allied side together.

Two other statistical PSYOP indicators used by the division that are related to the Chieu Hoi Program are: (1) the rate of ralliers per month who turn themselves over to U.S. units rather than to Vietnamese officials, and (2) the number of ralliers who volunteer to serve with the division in the "Kit Carson Scout Program." 3 The Kit Carson Scout data is considered significant from a PSYOP viewpoint because the participation in the program reflects not only defection from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army ranks, but reflects complete reversal of loyalties to the point where the rallier takes up arms against his former comrades in an active and hazardous manner.

According to PSYOP doctrine, one of the functions of tactical PSYOP is to reduce interference by civilians with tactical operations. The extent to which PSYOP accomplishes this function is judged by the next indicator used by the division, which is "direct observation." The extent to which people in the target audience follow instructions (often simple administrative instructions) broadcast from an overhead PSYOP helicopter can usually be observed directly from the helicopter by the PSYOP crew aboard. A variation of the direct observation indicator by U.S. troops on the ground is used to check the technical effectiveness or the operational capability of the electronic broadcast equipment aboard PSYOP helicopters. On certain operations where U.S. troops are known to be on the ground in the close vicinity of the ethnic target audience, a control message is often broadcast in English so that the U.S. troops can provide rapid feedback as to the technical effectiveness of the electronic equipment.

Another important effectiveness indicator used by the division is feedback information from prisoners of war.

The division participates in a combination intelligence and PSYOP

program known as the Volunteer Informant Program. In return for voluntary services, the people may be compensated with money, rice, or other commodities. The resultant effectiveness of these efforts is indicated by the number of informant tips received, the number of weapons turned in, and the frequency of other positive services rendered to the friendly forces by the people in the target audience.

Captured enemy documents are used as indicators of PSYOP effectiveness because they sometimes contain specific information concerning enemy reaction to PSYOP broadcasts and leaflet drops.

Two additional indicators of effectiveness that originate outside the division, but relate to the division PSYOP effort, are: (1) the monthly reports of province senior advisors, and (2) periodic civilian attitude reports from the province advisory staff."

The number of Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP) patients treated per month is considered to be a direct PSYOP indicator. A variation of this indicator is the number of dental civic action project (DENTCAP) patients treated per month; however, the figures are usually consolidated into a single MEDCAP figure that includes both the medical and the dental patients.

Another direct PSYOP indicator is the attendance rate at divisionsponsored movies provided for the benefit of local audiences. These movies are publicized by PSYOP media and the attendance at the movies is considered to be "responsive action" on the part of the target audience; hence, this data qualifies as a direct PSYOP indicator under the criteria set forth in the official field manual on PSYOP doctrine.

Another PSYOP effectiveness indicator is the monthly "Hamlet Evaluation System" report which shows the percentages of hamlets that are considered to be pacified in degrees ranging from unsecured to secured.

The final PSYOP indicator revealed by the data on the 1st Infantry Division is an indirect indicator. This indicator concerns specific VC/NVA PSYOP actions directed against the division PSYOP efforts.

In summary, the 1st Division case study has produced a total of seventeen different PSYOP indicators of effectiveness that are or have been used by the division in evaluating the results of its PSYOP effort.

II. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

The data examined concerning the 1st Cavalry Division yielded eight major PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. Of these eight indicators, six were the same or were variations of indicators that were also identified in the 1st Infantry Division case study.

Of the two new indicators developed, the first one was "voluntary surrender broadcasts" or "quick reaction messages" broadcast by ralliers to their VC or NVA units.

The other new indicator developed from the 1st Cavalry Division study consisted of incidents in which the enemy fired upon PSYOP helicopters broadcasting messages.

III. 4th Infantry Division

Fifteen indicators of PSYOP effectiveness were identified in the 4th Infantry Division. Seven of the fifteen indicators were not mentioned in the studies of the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions.

Of the seven new indicators, one was "results per dollar cost," and the other was "results per manpower unit." An internal staff study found the average monthly cost of the 4th Infantry Division PSYOP program to be $19,420 and 11.5 or 12 manpower spaces. To complete the ratios, results were quantified in terms of Hoi Chanhs who had rallied in a given time period and the number of items of intelligence value reported to the division during a given time period.

Weather conditions were also cited in the 4th Infantry Division as a subjective indicator. The damp, soggy conditions brought about during the wet monsoon season work against PSYOP effectiveness by limiting loudspeaker ranges and by reducing the legibility of paper leaflets lying on the ground in the jungle. On the other hand, the rainy monsoon season works for PSYOP effectiveness by creating less desirable living conditions for the VC/NVA forces and thus possibly making the target audiences more susceptible to allied PSYOP efforts.5

Another subjective indicator of PSYOP effectiveness that was cited in the 4th Division was "status of enemy medical care.”

Similar to the reports received concerning the status of enemy medical care, was another closely related subjective indicator. This indicator consisted of interrogations which directly reported upon the state of morale within the enemy ranks.

The 4th Infantry Division disseminated a two-to-four page news leaflet by air drop to suspected enemy areas. The leaflet was named Binh Minh, a Vietnamese phrase which means "First Light." The PSYOP indicator in this situation was the number of Binh Minh clippings found on the bodies of enemy troops.

Another different indicator that was developed through the 4th Division study was "JUSPAO analyses of VC propaganda." This indicator is subjective and is based upon a series of periodic field memorandums published by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon. This indirect indicator of PSYOP effectiveness is unique in that it is based on material developed at the national level from which information can be extracted that pertains to the local division area of operations.

IV. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

The study of the 101st Airborne Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness, of which three had not been mentioned previously in this research project.

Probably the most unusual example of PSYOP effectiveness in the 101st Division was the incident in which PSYOP was used successfully to aid in the repatriation of forty Vietnamese Government troops who were being held captive by the Viet Cong in a prison compound. In the confusion following a raid on the prison compound, the prisoners scattered into

the surrounding jungle areas. It was only after the airborne PSYOP loudspeaker reassured the repatriated prisoners as to their safety that they were successfully brought back under friendly control.

The three indicators which had not been mentioned previously in this study were: (1) the repatriated prisoners' response to PSYOP, (2) the verbal surveys conducted by the armed propaganda teams, and (3) the monitoring of the tactical operations of target groups.

V. Americal Division

In the Americal Division a total of nine PSYOP indicators of effectiveness are utilized. These indicators were identified in a letter from the Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Robinson, dated January 5, 1969. The nine indicators used by the Americal Division are common to the other divisions previously discussed. VI. 9th Infantry Division

No letter response was received by this investigator from the 9th Infantry Division; however, some data was available from other sources, and six PSYOP indicators were identified. These indicators generally follow the pattern of those mentioned most frequently in the studies of the other U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam.

VII. 25th Infantry Division

The data available on the 25th Infantry Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. All seven of these indicators have also been identified in the modus operandi of other divisions in Vietnam. COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE (CGSC) SURVEY

The approach to the problem in this research study was the consideration of two major batches of data-division case studies and a survey of Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students. There were eight PSYOP indicators of effectiveness mentioned by multiple respondents. The indicators most frequently cited by the respondents and the percentages of same are shown in Figure 1.

Of the eight indicators mentioned by multiple respondents, all but two indicators had been developed in the case studies of the divisions. The two new indicators were the following: (1) number of desertions in enemy ranks reported per period of time, and (2) the number of prisoners captured per period of time.

There were fourteen other PSYOP indicators mentioned by respondents only a single time. These additional indicators covered a relatively wide range and included six indicators that had not been mention previously in the study. The six new indicators were: (1) attitud behavior of Vietnamese civilian laborers employed on U.S. ba (2) frequency of enemy rocket/mortar attacks against camps, (3) number of "high impact" Vietnamese patie

fully by division surgeons (medical conditions

manner with resultant favorable psychological

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