own position, but also the range of his acceptance and rejection of other positions on the opinion measure. The results of this study are accentuated when this additional dimension is taken into account.

This rather exploratory experiment leaves many important variables uncontrolled, and the results are legitimately subject to diverse interpretations. Nevertheless, they suggest some fruitful directions for additional research. For one thing, disconfirmation of expectancy in the direction of hope or goals seems to suggest why some opinions change-a welcome contrast to the abundant evidence we have on why opinions do not change. The results also highlight the fact that political opinion change is a sociological as well as a psychological phenomenon. In this study, the entire social system of the audience must be considered for a full understanding of the impact of Radio Moscow's broadcasts. The broadcasts seem to have had an effect, not because of any particular skill in communication, but because conditions in our own society had led the audience to hold unrealistic negative images which, upon actual exposure, were clearly refuted for many of the listeners. According to the replies of the subjects in this study, the domestic mass media were among those aspects of our society which played an important role in determining their response to these foreign broadcasts. The domestic media came in for specific censure from individuals in the unexpectedly better group as a prime source of their unrealistic expectations. 28

Some implications for traditional issues in international political communication may also be found in these results. To cite but a few, there is the issue of the comparative effectiveness of political communications that deliberately attempt to persuade and "propagandize," in comparison with a relatively candid and straightforward presentation. 29 The results of this study suggest that national groups which expect biased political persuasion from a source in another nation, and get (or perceive) the communication in that form, tend to respond negatively; national groups which expect biased political persuasion from a source in another nation, and do not get (or perceive) the communication in that form, tend to respond positively. Since most people are taught to expect political "propaganda" from their nation's adversaries, this fact has obvious implications for developing effective political communications to the people of other nations.

Related to this point is the political import of overtly nonpolitical content in international political communications. Having expected overt political persuasion attempts, but confronted rather with concerts, accounts of everyday life in the Soviet union, and descriptions of Soviet social institutions, the subjects frequently cited this overtly nonpolitical content as prominent in the refutation of their expectations. Many other areas of relevance could be cited, such as the relation of expectancy confirmation to the frequently noted "boomerang" phenomenon, and the value of side effects in political communication.

In sum, these results strongly suggest the value of continuing to

examine the factor of confirmation/disconfirmation of expectations in assessing the effectiveness of international political communications.

NOTES

1. International political communication is considered here as the deliberate attempt by a communicator in one nation to further the political interests of that nation through the dissemination of messages to audiences in other nations by means of the mass media. 2. Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-five Years Later," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 33, 1969, pp. 537-545.

3. Floyd H. Allport and Mary M. Simpson, "Broadcasting to an Enemy Country: What Appeals Are Effective and Why," Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 23, 1946, pp. 217-224. See W. Phillips Davison, International Political Communication, New York, Praeger, 1965; Eron M. Kirkpatrick, ed. Target: The world, New York, Macmillan, 1956; Internationales Handbuch für Rundfunk and Fernsehen, Hamburg, Hans-Bredow-Institut, 1960.

5. Smith, op. cit.

6.Ibid.

7. Don D. Smith, "Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts: An exploratory Study," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 42, 1965, pp. 643-645.

8. It is an assumption, of course, that at least one of the goals of the broadcasts is the creation of favorable opinions about the communicating nation.

9. See Robert P. Abelson et al., eds., Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1968.

10. See Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.

11. Cf. J. Merrill Carlsmith and Elliot Aronson, "Some Hedonic Consequences of the Confirmation and Disconfirmation of Expectancies," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 66, 1963, pp. 151-156; Edward E. Sampson and Linda B. Sibley, “A Further Examination of the Confirmation or Nonconfirmation of Expectancies and Desires," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol, 2, 1965, pp. 133-137; Salvatore R. Maddi, "Affective Tone during Environmental Regularity and Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 62, 1961, pp. 338–345. Also see Harry Helson, Adaptation-Level Theory, New York, Harper, 1964. A recent study by Keisner indicates that negative affect as a consequence of strong expectancy disconfirmation is limited to public conditions; see Robert H. Keisner, "Affective Reactions to Expectancy Disconfirmations under Public and Private Conditions," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 11, 1969, pp. 17-24.

12. O. J. Harvey and William F. Clapp, "Hope, Expectancy, and Reactions to the Unexpected," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 2, 1965, pp. 45–52.

13. Harvey and Clapp, op. cit.; also see J. Scott Verinis, Jeffrey M. Brandsma, and Charles N. Cofer, "Discrepancy from Expectation in Relation to Affect and Motivation," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 9, 1968, pp. 47-58, and David C. McClelland, et al., The Achievement Motive, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

14. For other treatments of the confirmation and disconfirmation of expectancies in real life situations see Robert T. Bower and Laure M. Sharp. "The Use of Art in International Communication: A Case Study," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 20, 1956, pp. 221-228, and Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, Politics and Television, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1968, pp. 43-48.

15. This taping took place between October 7, 1966 and December 15, 1966.

16. The before-after responses of this group were matched by social background data.

17. Generally, no more than 25 percent of a given evening's broadcast content dealt overtly with international political affairs.

18. All of the judges were students who had previously listened to Radio Moscow's North American broadcasts and who were familiar with the literature on opinion-attitude forma

tion and propaganda. They listened to a one-hour sample of the same tapes presented to the experimental group and responded on a semantic differential.

19. Replies from the subjects (and the panel of judges) indicate that they did indeed view this material incredulously.

20. The subjects' opinions on all items were measured on the evaluative continuum of favorableness-unfavorableness.

21. There were no significant differences in the initial opinions held on these issues by either the experimental group or the control groups.

22. Although the results do not reach the .05 level of statistical significance.

23. The broadcasts appear to be particularly effective on the issue of sincerity. Again, the need is clear in future research to obtain measurements of prior expectations on each specific issue.

24. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience."

25. In this study 41 percent of the subjects perceived what they had expected in the broadcasts, 48 percent saw the broadcasts as better than they had expected them to be, and 11 percent found them to be worse than expected.

26. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, New York, Basic Books, 1960.

27. In interpreting these results, it should be mentioned that a highly shortened version of the dogmatism scale was used. See Rolf H. K. Schulze, "A Shortened Version of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale," Journal of Psychological Studies, Vol. 13, 1962, pp. 93–97. 28. Indeed, some of the respondents, finding the stance taken in the broadcasts to be so different from what they had expected, felt "betrayed" by American media coverage. 29. Ralph K. White, "The New Resistance to International Propaganda,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1952, pp. 539–551.

THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM POSES THREAT OF
SPECIAL DIMENSIONS*

BY HAMMOND ROLPH

This article illustrates the use of captured documents as a measure of the effectiveness of psychological operations programs. The selection is an assessment of the impact of the Chieu Hoi Program through textual and documentary material.

Ever since the Viet Cong insurgency reached serious proportions in the early 1960's, the Saigon government has had some kind of program for inducing defectors from the revolutionary movement. These were not highly organized or very effective, however, until the present chieu hoi or "open arms" plan was instituted about three years ago. Furthermore, the military situation in the earlier period did not favor Viet Cong defection. ... The basic program was designed to persuade NLF soldiers and lower-level personnel to lay down arms and rejoin the national community, with assurances of full constitutional rights, a fraternal welcome, and material assistance. It was supplemented in April, 1967 by a National Reconciliation Policy specially aimed at inducing defection by higher-level Viet Cong military officers and political cadre leaders.

*Excerpts from "Viet Cong Documents on the War (III)," Communist Affairs, VI, no. 1 (January-February 1968), pp.21-25. Reprinted with the permission of Studies in Comparative Communism (successor to Communist Affairs) and the author, copyright holders.

Defections to date have been largely from the hamlet and village level and from the ranks of the local guerrillas and functional associations, but there have been some "ralliers" of distinctly greater importance, and recognition of the threat to the cadre structure is explicit in the NLF documents on the subject. A report . . . taken from a cache in the Iron Triangle area north of Saigon in Binh Duong Province during Operation "Lam Son 67" by the U.S. 1st Division, blamed the success of chieu hoi on poor security policies, loose personnel procedures, lack of vigilance, and weak ideology. It also recognized the key operative element in the defections: appeals from the families of Viet Cong members.

The Current Affairs Committee has published directives concerning internal protection against the enemy "Open Arms" activity. All echelons, organizations, and branches complied with this, but the results were limited. Secrecy preservation classes have been conducted for all cadre and personnel of all committee echelons, organizations, and societies. Some organizations have reestablished the personal history statement, controlled to some extent the internal political situation, set up protection teams, and constructed defense works to protect the organizations. This was successful in avoiding regrettable casualties to some extent. However, from time to time and in some areas, particularly at district and village levels, the preservation of secrecy was not strictly carried out. This was evidenced by the lack of secrecy in conversation. Moreover, the loss of documents was noted in some areas. The recruitment of soldiers and personnel was done without caution; defense against psywar and "Open Arms" was not rigorously undertaken. . . . As a result many soldiers and workers have lost spirit and become demoralized. There were also cases of dereliction of duty. This was common everywhere. . . .Some of our soldiers and cadres are misled by the enemy, have surrendered to the enemy, carrying important documents and weapons with them. As compared with 1965, the rate of deserters is higher. In some areas, the number of soldiers and cadre workers who deserted or defected to the enemy as a result of the appeals of their family amounted to 80 percent, and the number of village guerrillas, hamlet guerrillas and cadres and civilians was 70 percent. The rest were district-level cadres and higher (including workers, District and Province Concentrated Forces). Some defectors . . . have shown the enemy our base areas and installations, thus causing some damge to us, much political effect on the people, and reducing the people's absolute confidence in our cadres and soldiers. Worse still some people began to doubt our cadres' and soldiers' loyalty.

The above situation was caused by many things, primarily because of the failure to heighten the vigilance by the committee echelons and organization Party Headquarters. It was also due to: Failure to fully understand the principle of building up and defending the Party's revolutionary forces; failure to thoroughly understand the cunning scheme of the enemy; too little emphasis on ideological and political instruction which was designed to heighten the cadres' and soldiers' revolutionary spirit and awareness. . . .

In the near future, psychological warfare on a greater scale will be initiated by the enemy. Intelligence, "Open Arms" activities, and military activities will be increased in support of his resettlement and pacification activities. Other activities will include demagogy and bribery. Indications are that television sets will be brought to rural areas to support psychological warfare and "Open Arms" activities.

To frustrate the enemy psywar and "Open Arms" plan, all committee echelons, Party and group agencies, and the commanding officers of the other organizations should understand that the building up of our forces and the security protection for our revolutionary forces are a common task. The protection of forces is as necessary as the development of forces. Without due protection, our forces will not last long before the cunning scheme of the enemy. . . .

Therefore, the security protection of the unit, defense of our revolutionary force against the enemy's psywar, chieu hoi and "appeal to surrender" attempts, at present, and in the future, constitute the most important and urgent mission. . . .

Continue to watch after the unit's political situation. We should grasp fast the people who have doubtful political tendencies or those who are still wavering. Cases of unclarity, signs of corruption, bribery, and demoralization should be halted in time, and each problem should be carefully judged, then solved logically and legally. Avoid mechanical settlements which may create antagonism in the internal organization. Concerning the suspected elements, the Party officials and security authorities concerned should submit proposals to the Party committee on the action to take against these elements and request that the committee echelon take drastic measures against them. The people who still have doubtful political tendencies but are not directly against us or considered dangerous should be continually educated, if they really want to progress, so they can adopt a decisive attitude and discern friends from foes. The core elements which assume key missions should be truly pure and clean.

The people in charge of recruitment should be careful and determined to put an end to easy and careless admission.

Special emphasis should be placed on the education of the servicemen's and soldiers' families in weak areas. . . the organizations should have a plan to contact the cadres' and soldiers' families and fight the enemy's dangerous attempts to lure them through their families.

A secret report from a district unit commander to his district committee... spoke bluntly of the difficulties the chieu hoi program is causing in his area.

An overall review of the Vietnam battlefield at the start of the winter and spring campaign shows that we have suffered both military and political failures. The enemy... intensified military action, and uninterrupted raids have eroded the will to fight of our army and people. Coupled with his military effort, the enemy has stepped up his perfidious chieu hoi campaign in his attempt at undermining our fighting spirit.

The impact of increased enemy military operations and chieu hoi programs has, on the whole, resulted in lowering the morale of some ideologically backward men, who often listen to enemy radio broadcasts, keep in their pockets enemy leaflets, and wait to be issued their weapons in order to go over to the enemy side.

They might betray the revolution by having their parents, wives, children, relatives and friends establish contact with the enemy to make arrangements for their eventual defection. They will steal documents, weapons and other equipment and cause us losses prior to going over to the enemy to betray the Revolution.

Addressees, upon receipt of this memorandum, will confer with their respective [Party] chapter committee authorities to work out plans for finding out these "bad elements," reeducating them as individuals and their units, as a whole.

On Nov. 20, 1966, the political department of the South Vietnam Liberation Army (the Viet Cong armed forces) issued a directive for action against the chieu hoi and other GVN-U.S. psychological warfare programs. The document was captured by a unit of the U.S. 25th Division in February, 1967.

The chieu hoi program, one of the most important activities of the enemy psychological warfare, is a national policy of the neocolonialist war. True to the nature of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, their psywar reflects aggression, reaction, and injustice. It is carried out under many aspects but its main purpose is to deceive, flatter or oppress us and impair our morale and ideology. In an attempt to weaken our combat spirit and sow doubt and fear, the enemy uses the label of false independence, seduces our men with money, women and sympathy, or resorts to bombs. These factors are used to make our troops surrender.