The Soviet Union probably decided sometime in 1966 to take advantage of the growing opposition to Mao in military circles and openly intervene in the cultural revolution. Moscow no doubt felt that the area was fertile for exploitation and that there was not too much risk involved on her part. The beginning of the Soviet attempt to subvert the Maoist leadership and provoke discontent within the PLA was signaled by an editorial in the 29 December 1966 issue of Red Star, the Soviet daily military newspaper, entitled "Events in the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Liberation Army of China."3

ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN

The article begins with a commentary on the anti-Soviet campaign currently being waged in China and praises the PLA as representatives of the working class and true revolutionaries. It further states that the Maoist leadership is attempting to make the army a blind weapon for implementing its anti-Marxist-Leninist, anti-Soviet course. On purges, it stresses that those purged:

... were experienced military leaders and Communists who tried to base and strengthen the combat capability of the PLA with a consideration for national peculiarities and revolutionary traditions.*

Having purged the army of all those disagreeing with Mao's politicomilitary theoretical concepts, the article accuses the Maoists of attempting to strengthen the army's role in the nation's political life and make it a bastion for Mao's ambitions. The article closes recalling the history of friendship between the PLA and the Soviet Army and expressing the hope that they will march together again united.

The Radio Moscow phase of the campaign to turn members of the PLA against Mao's military thought began slowly in 1967 and picked up momentum toward the end of the year. In February 1968, the Soviets sharply escalated the attack by increasing their half-hour programs to PLA listeners from three broadcasts a week to daily programing with each broadcast repeated four times per day.5

The general format of a "Program for the PLA" usually consists of a commentary by a military officer. He holds the rank of colonel or above and in many instances is identified as a former Soviet advisor to the PLA. Frequently, the previous warm ties of friendship between the PLA and the Soviet Army are recalled before the commentator attacks various Maoist policies said to be harming the armed forces. The program usually closes with a summary of the main theme and the hope that the PLA will overcome the grave obstacles put before it and become united once again with the Socialist camp.

The propaganda effort by Radio Moscow toward the PLA is based on six basic themes: a general attack on Maoist military doctrine, combat weakness and training, the cultural revolution and the army, the purge, the use of the PLA for nonmilitary purposes, and the recall of historical ties between the PLA and the Soviet Union. It is evident that the aim of

these programs is to cause a breakdown in the morale of the PLA which could lead to an open revolt against the Maoists.

The following is a typical Soviet attack on Maoist military doctrine:

Mao's theory is basically erroneous, negative and defensive and points to defeatism. Mao proposes retreat and defensive maneuvers; giving the soil to the enemy. What was thought to be correct during the period of guerrilla war cannot be made the basis of present day combat maneuvers.

The broadcast closes with the following appeal:

We know the PLA is an army which has spirit, patriotism and love for the fatherland. It will not be a silent and pliable tool in the hands of Mao.

On guerrilla warfare, Radio Moscow exhorts:

Mao's guerrilla war thesis is not only a mistake of a man who has no knowledge of military affairs but an ideological attack aimed at shattering the Chinese people's belief in the Soviet Union's advanced military science.

COMBAT DEFECTS

The broadcasts which probably have the greatest impact on professional soldiers are those which attack combat weakness in the PLA. This weakness is attributed to the lack of modern weapons and realistic training.

In a program for the PLA entitled "Fatal Effects of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought on the Development of the Chinese PLA" on 14 July 1968, the Soviets played on their favorite theme with this quote from V. I. Lenin.

The ones who win the upper hand in war are those equipped with the best technological weapons, good discipline and behavior. . . . war tactics depend on the level of military technological equipment. . . . the finest army will be instantly mopped up by the enemy if it does not have the necessary arms, supplies and training.

The program concluded: "There are no planes or tanks in the PLA and the lack of spare parts makes useless those given by the Soviet Union." Radio Moscow often quotes official Chinese Communist sources and then attacks the statement. In January 1968, it quoted a People's Daily statement that "the best weapon is Mao's thought as far as the Revolutionary Army in the contemporary era is concerned." The broadcast then charged that no PLA fighter can seriously accept this view and that planes and weapons are necessary for victory-not Mao's thought.

RHETORICAL QUESTION

The Soviets often use the rhetorical question to make their point. The query "Why does Mao's propaganda deny the importance of modern weapons in warfare?" is answered: "To have weapons you must first have a strong economy. The cultural revolution has dislocated the economy so that new equipment for the PLA is out of the question."

Individuals such as Lo Jui-ch'ing, former Chief of Staff of the PLA, are used as propaganda vehicles. One program stressed that Lo's purge was

due to his suggestion that weapons play an important role in modern warfare and his insistence on the modernization of the army instead of following the thought of Mao.

The Soviets boast of their assistance to other countries. One program detailed the modern equipment and training the Soviet Union was providing to the North Vietnamese Army. The idea apparently is to make the PLA jealous of the North Vietnamese Army and indignant at Chinese leaders for the poor relations with the Soviets.

Ridicule is sometimes injected into the campaign. The New China News Agency is quoted in one program as announcing that a U-2 spy aircraft was shot down while the Chinese air commander used Mao's quotes. The Soviets say this is laughable and that all Chinese people know that the victory was achieved not through quotes, but through the use of Soviet MiG aircraft.

No doubt the ultimate insult was a broadcast statement that the PLA was even inferior to Chiang Kai-shek's troops in technology and equipment.6

Maoist policy on military training stresses learning through actual combat. Moscow criticizes this policy as leading to great bloodshed at the hands of green leaders and points out that poorly trained troops cannot compete against modern armies. Mao is accused of betraying resolutions adopted at the 8th Party Congress which called for modern training for PLA cadres, for the PLA to master the skills possessed by Soviet troops, and for the PLA to guard the Socialist camp with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets set up the military school system in China, and many Chinese officers were trained in the Soviet Union. In the late fifties, the Maoists launched a campaign to deemphasize Soviet methods and doctrine. Today, Moscow broadcasts use ridicule to promote distrust of the present school system as a means for military preparedness. Commenting on a Chinese article announcing the establishment of an academy for training navy minesweeper personnel, a Soviet program had this to say:

The major subjects in the curriculum are class struggle and the struggle between the two roads. . . . Mao claims there was not a single qualified military academy prior to the Cultural Revolution. Training of two to three years is too long involving too much book work... only one month is needed to train a good pilot. . . . An army which loudly recites Mao's slogans does indeed only need a couple of months of training.

The Soviets devote the largest percentage of programming to the cultural revolution and its effect on the PLA. They charge that opposition exists within the army and that Mao needs the army for the cultural revolution to succeed. In discussing an editorial in a PLA organ, which advises the army to keep away from factional conflicts, a Soviet broadcast concludes that this testifies to disturbances and disorder within the army and the factional conflict between supporters and opponents of Mao.7

In two programs in 1968 dealing with the opposition problem, Moscow claimed that 12 military corps do not support Mao, that Mao's policy in splitting this once closely knit group (the PLA) is contrary to China's

national interest, and that Mao is afraid of the PLA. The only answer for Mao is to split the army and sow discord.

PURGE STATISTICS

When a nation is in turmoil, the purge is no doubt the most feared consequence for those in power. Six programs for PLA listeners in 1968 were directly concerned with purges, and many other broadcasts alluded to them.

Statistics are frequently employed in exploiting this theme as indicated in an October 1968 broadcast:

Ninety percent of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] military affairs committee in the last two years were expelled...as well as sixty top level PLA commanders. Probably the best ploy used by Radio Moscow is the threat that the purge will be extended to the lower levels of the PLA. For example: Mao Tse-tung does not limit his purge to high-ranking commanders, but has decided to expand the purge to reach the middle and low ranking commanders, such as commanders of regiments, battalions, and companies.

SECRET POLICE

The Soviets also promote suspicion in the ranks of the PLA by referring to a secret police organization set up within it by Mao. The claim is stressed that any one can be arrested and units can be discarded at any time by the secret police.

The opposing military line in China has frequently complained that government use of the armed forces for nonmilitary purposes was detrimental to morale and combat preparedness. This theme is exploited by broadcasts which claim that the use of the PLA in propaganda efforts to spread Mao's thoughts and in military police work to put down clashes by the Red Guards detracts from its combat readiness and mastery of weapons. Radio Moscow calls on the PLA to refuse these tasks and not be manipulated.

For consumption by the Chinese civil populace, the Soviets claim “the army is everywhere having assumed the roles of police, judges, workers, executioners, peasants, and schoolteachers." To further opposition to the PLA and promote discontent among minority groups in China, broadcasts are directed to these people in their dialect. The aim is to unite the minority groups against the army and possibly provoke open opposition.

Stress is also placed on the deterioration of the PLA since the break with the Soviet Union. Weakness in the PLA is said to be due to the absence of cooperation with the Soviet Union, and this is Mao's fault. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact is held up as a symbol of unity and strength.

The PLA is asked in another broadcast why Mao attempts to incite hatred within the army for the Soviet Union. Moscow answers the question by stating that it does not matter what Mao attempts since Soviet and Chinese troops know the real value of combat friendship.

These programs stress the "good old days" and contrast them with the turmoil of the present day. There always appears to be the hint lurking in the background that conditions would improve if Soviet aid were provided.

This two-year propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union to subvert the PLA began to taper off in late 1968, and, by the end of the year, it had virtually stopped. The Soviets may have felt that they had exhausted the subject or that the campaign was not accomplishing the results desired and quite possibly that it was becoming counterproductive.

NOTES

1. The best known of these doctrines are concerned with the defense of mainland China and the Chinese Communist theory on revolutionary war. See Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," Asian Survey, No. 4, April 1968, pp. 239-256.

2. Samuel B. Griffith II, The Chinese People's Liberation Army, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y., 1967, p. 302.

3. Red Star, 29 December 1966.

4. Ibid.

5. Radio Moscow in mandarin to China, 1 February 1968. Future reference to broadcasts will be Radio Moscow programs in mandarin to China during the period 1 January 1967 to 31 December 1968 unless otherwise footnoted.

6. Radio Moscow in mandarin to Southeast Asia, 4 September 1967.

7. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 29 June 1967.

East Asia

POLITICAL WARFARE-QUALIFIED APPLICATION* **

BY MONTE R. BULLARD

The political warfare concept has been used as a system to promote governmental legitimacy and to develop supportive political attitudes within the military forces, as well as to close the gap between the military services and the civilian populace. A political warfare doctrine to be transferable must recognize and be able to adapt to the underlying traditions of the society to which the transfer is attempted.

The importance of political warfare in countering wars of "national liberation" is evident in the increasing discussion of the political side of warfare. Asians, as well as Americans, are conscious of the need to place more emphasis on the political. As a result, Asians have begun to review Asian sociopolitical experience in the hope of finding a model which fits Asian problems more precisely than the Western approach which stresses military technology.

One model which is considered quite successsful by Asians is that of the Republic of China (ROC). It is considered successful because it seems to have reached an appropriate compromise between sociopolitical and technological considerations. The Republic of Vietnam was the first to adopt the Chinese system.

*

*Excerpts from "Political Warfare-Qualified Application," Military Review, LI, no. 6 (June 1971), pp. 18-23.

**Copyright © 1971 by Major Monte R. Bullard, United States Army. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright holder.