therefore, assumed the role of a battlefield in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Chinese activities in Africa directed toward the subversion of Soviet influence and credibility took many forms, including the campaign to identify the Soviet Union as a "European" State and the attempt to link Soviet policies with "United States imperialism."

1965 dates the beginning of the . . . present period of Chinese-African interaction. This period has been characterised by a reduction in the overt formal presence of China on the African continent and the initiation of a "selective" Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. Within China, this period coincided with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; and except for Angola, Mozambique and a few other colonies this has been the post-independence era in Africa. Without question, this had been a period of Chinese retreat. . . . Really meaningful interaction with China involved less than six States, including the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Tanzania and Zambia. Thus toward the end of 1969, China's policy toward Africa had changed from one of indiscriminately seeking to win recognition from and establish diplomatic relations with most of the African States in the early and mid-1960s to a policy of selective interaction with a limited number of African States.

CHINA'S AFRICAN POLICY: OBJECTIVES

Since the late 1950s with the passing of the colonial empires and the emergence of the independent African States, Africa has served an important function in the foreign policy of China. While for reasons of security, and other immediate factors, Asia represents the area of primary national interest, China has perceived Africa as second only in importance. Three primary objectives can be suggested for the importance of Africa to China. Anti-imperialism has constituted a major theme in the foreign policy of China. . . . The 1965 statement by Lin Piao calling upon the "world countryside" of Asia, Africa and Latin America to surround and capture the "world cities" of North America and Western Europe can be accepted as a Chinese variation of the classical MarxistLeninist thesis.1

If anti-imperialism constitutes a primary policy objective, the campaign to challenge and subvert the international status of the Soviet Union has become equally important to China. . . . A Chinese objective, therefore, has been to identify the Soviet Union with "United States imperialism" and to discredit the Soviet Union as a revolutionary force. . .

A final Chinese objective has been the constantly reiterated theme: African-Asian-Latin American solidarity.

INSTRUMENTS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

China has conducted an aggressive campaign in Africa to achieve its

policy objectives, utilising a vast variety of foreign policy instruments, formal and informal. In the formal category, China has put great emphasis upon inter-State relations and has sought to win recognititon by, and exchange diplomatic missions with, most of the African States.

To give substance to the relationship with the African States, China has been quick to employ additional formal foreign policy instruments. These have been expressed chiefly in the form of a variety of agreements. Generally speaking, they fall within four categories. First, there have been the more traditional alliance type of agreements, expressed in the form of friendship treaties. These treaties have always been based upon the Five Principles of Bandung, intended to promote solidarity between the two parties, and contained the provision "to develop economic and cultural relations in the spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.". . .Cultural pacts represent a second type of agreement. utilised by the Chinese. Such agreements usually call for the exchange of students, educators, newspaper reports, theatrical groups, and other activities in the cultural domain.

Finally, there are the economic aid and technical assistance agreements. As an instrument of foreign policy designed to give substance to Chinese-African interaction, this formal instrument has been most important. The hunger and need for funds, the lack of technical know-how and human resources, and the great desire to engage in developmental work to attain political and, moreover, economic independence, have made the African States highly receptive to foreign assistance.

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Concurrent with the utilisation of formal foreign policy instruments, China has made extensive use also of informal instruments. A study of statecraft has pointed to the importance of informal foreign policy instruments. Basically, such instruments seek to bring into direct contact a State's representatives and opinions with the people and/or processes of another country, in an effort to achieve specific policy objectives. The emphasis here is upon face-to-face interaction as opposed to the formal State-to-State relationship. A major assumption is that by utilising informal instruments a State may better solidify friendship (or increase the level of conflict) with other States. Within the context of Chinese-African interaction, a degree of face-to-face contact has evolved through China's use of informal foreign policy instruments.

China's use of informal instruments includes a wide variety of techniques, overt and covert, violent and non-violent. (It is important to note that many of the informal techniques are made possible through prior formal access; e.g., film agreements concluded between states make possible the showing of motion pictures to the general public.) Among the overt, non-violent techniques of informal access has been the exchange programme. This has brought Africans from various social levels and

professions to China and has sent delegations of one sort or another from China to Africa. Until the advent of the Great Proletarian Cultrual Revolution, an increasing number of Africans and Chinese had visited each other's country. During the month of September 1964, e.g., no less than twenty-five separate reports on Africans in China were announced, ranging from an art delegation from Mali, a youth league from Zanzibar, to a music scholar from Morocco; in the same month, a Chinese youth delegation was visiting several central African states while a trade union mission was in Algeria. Whatever the type of delegation and whoever the individuals, the exchange programme has without doubt done much to introduce China to the Africans.

China has made extensive use of the communication media to reach the African population. Since 1956, radio broadcasts have been utilised with increasing frequency. Beginning with only seven hours per week in English, China in 1969 was broadcasting to Africa over 100 hours per week in English, French, Hausa, Portuguese, Swahili, and Cantonese and Mandarin Chinese. Radio Peking's programmes have consisted of combinations of news and commentary, strongly ideological in nature, with intervals of recorded music. Another important media has been motion pictures. China has exported to Africa full-length films, short films and newsreels; Chinese film weeks have been held in several African cities. Modern Chinese theatre groups have also toured Africa.

China has relied also upon the printed word to reach the African populace. There are now English, French and Spanish editions of the weekly Peking Review for Africa. Where sale and distribution have been permitted, the China Pictorial, Quotation from Chairman Mao Tsetung, Mao's selected military writings, and other Chinese offerings, have been readily obtainable. Other communication media include the New China News Agency, which freely distributes news of China to the Africans. In discussing the communication media, one must be intellectually aware that the measurement of flows is not necessarily a measure of their impact. Nevertheless, China's intensive use of the communication media, whatever the impact, cannot be denied.

Direct, face-to-face interaction between the representatives of one State and the populace of another constitutes another type of informal foreign policy instrument. Such personal contacts, it has been maintained, allow the representatives of one State to enjoy the maximum level of interaction with and impact on the populace of another State.

Within this context, the dispatching of Chinese experts to assist African individuals and groups in specific fields of knowledge (together with the training of select Africans in China) must also be considered. No doubt through such personal interaction, China has sought to influence a segment of the African population. Chinese technical assistance to Africa has included experts on tea planting and soil analysis in Morocco, rice growing and military training in Tanzania and Uganda, and building construction in Guinea. To date, the impact of the face-to-face interaction.

via the presence of Chinese experts in Africa has been less as a consequence of personal interaction than through perceived exemplary Chinese behaviour patterns. Chinese experts in Africa, have largely refrained from establishing close social contact either with their African counterparts at work or with Africans generally. Personal interaction, therefore, has been minimal. Where the Chinese experts have made an impact has been in their collective and individual hard work and frugality, which has been cited by the indigenous leadership as behavioural patterns to be followed. In Tanzania, where over a thousand Chinese experts were residing in 1969, the face-to-face interaction between the Chinese experts and the indigenous population has followed this pattern.3

Participation in regional and functional international organisations constitutes yet another level of Chinese-African interaction. As an informal instrument of foreign policy, membership and participation in various international organisations have permitted China to gain access to both the representatives and processes of the African States. China's past and present role in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, the Afro-Asian Conferences, the Afro-Asian Journalists Association and other organisations represent examples of the great use of this informal instrument.4

China has been equally active in the use of covert informal foreign policy instruments. Unlike overt instruments which can readily be observed, covert operations are hidden and therefore difficult to measure. The great secrecy surrounding such activities have [sic] sometimes led to a majority of the covert operations being attributed to Chinese influence, thereby giving the Chinese a far greater role in Africa than they in fact enjoy. This is not to deny the use of covert instruments by China. Chinese "illegal" arms and money, and methods in unconventional warfare have been uncovered in a sufficient number of instances to lend support to certain charges. For example, Chinese assistance to the Angolan, Mozambique and other African liberation movements has not been without total foundation. In short, we can correctly assume that China has made free use of covert informal foreign policy instruments. The question, however, is not the utilisation of covert instruments. Rather it is the extent of Chinese covert instruments, and China's perceptions pertaining to the use of covert instruments in relation to its use of overt instruments of foreign policy.

Fundamentally, China perceives no conflict between its concurrent use of overt and covert informal instruments of foreign policy. The two instruments have been seen as complementary. Thus, China has not hesitated to employ-or threaten to employ-revolution as an instrument of foreign policy, while utilising overt instruments in its relations with the African States and territories.

Taking into account all foreign policy instruments, formal and informal, overt and covert-and positing that the extent of one State's interest in another's can be measured in terms of the degree and depth of utilisation

deciding when they cease to be useful and should be attacked or destroyed. However, while recommending cooperation with nonproletarian and non-Marxist groups and organizations whenever it is expedient, the 1960 communique and other current Soviet documents make it clear that the communists are prepared to resort to violence, or at least to threaten its use, to prevent the loss of any gains that may have accrued to them as a result of their exploitation of the national liberation movement and other contemporary social forces. In this connection it is significant that the 1960 communique also declared that it was the duty of all communists to oppose the "export of counter-revolution." This doctrine has assumed a particularly ominous significance since 1961 in connection with the Cuban problem and Khrushchev's ambiguous but nevertheless threatening statements that United States military action against the Castro government would mean war.

The main lines of the 1960 communiqué were reiterated in Khrushchev's speech of January 5, 1961, to a gathering of Soviet communists in Moscow, entitled, significantly, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," as well as the 1961 program of the CPSU. For example, the program indicated that although there could be differences in the "forms and tempo" of social revolution, revolution remained the only means and the dictatorship of the proletariat (declared by the program to be superseded inside the Soviet Union by the "state of the entire people") the inevitable outcome of the struggle still underway in the non-communist world. 16

The above doctrines, reflected in Soviet strategy vis-à-vis such countries as Guinea, Laos, and Cuba, indicated Khrushchev's determination to achieve Leninist aspirations for world revolution even in the conditions of the nuclear age. Among many ominous manifestations of the postStalin rededication to the export of violent revolution, certain littlenoticed Korean developments are worth mentioning. The Fourth Congress of the North Korean Workers (Communist) Party, in September 1961, called for establishment in South Korea of a "revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party," to fight against U.S. "imperialist occupation," and carry out an "anti-imperialist" program.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk in an address on July 10, 1961 noted that in Soviet policy, "the very language of international intercourse became distorted and contrived." "Peace" had, he observed, become a word to describe whatever condition would promote the communist world revolution. "Aggression" was whatever stood in the way of this revolution. He thus reminded the world of a communist practice, first applied on a global scale in the mid-1930's, of employing traditional symbols of democracy and liberalism for communist purposes. Of course, such terms as peace, negotiation, freedom, democracy, progress, etc., mean different things to communists than to western democrats, liberals, and noncommunist socialists. The importance of what Lindley Fraser in his excellent study Propaganda called "double-talk" is that very often the