officers employed to drill the Persian army in the European style had answered beyond all expectation. For a time the tide of Persian sympathies for England ran very high, and naturally became the envy of Russia. A quarrel was soon pitched upon, which resulted in the Perso-Russian war, the disastrous end of which was the treaty of Turkman-chai, by which the Caspian Sea was turned into a Russian lake, and Persia was taught the lesson that English assurances in times of anxiety were of no great value in times of distress. No wonder, therefore, that the Shah's sympathies turned at once towards Russia, and English influence from that time began rapidly to go downwards. As men in their proper places are apt to work wonders, we must not be astonished that Sir Henry Rawlinson succeeded during the time of his mission to Persia in restoring the lost prestige of England in Teheran to its former place. Being, however, insufficiently supported by the Ministry on the Thames, his ability came to nought, and he very soon returned to Europe.

Since that time England's position in Persia has always been a secondary one, compared with the almighty and ubiquitous influence of Russia. There was no lack of gifted and zealous English ambassadors; but what use is there in the official zeal of single individuals, if the leading statesmen of the

home Government are unable or unwilling to second the aspirations of their representatives abroad. Persia was said to have become once and for ever unworthy of the care bestowed on her, and, by giving up every hope of winning her over to Western civilisation, she was left alone, i.e., in the fatal embraces of her northern wooer.

Russia, finding her way unchecked in this part of the Asiatic world, very soon set to work to utilise the favourable opportunity offered to her, by meddling with Afghanistan through Persia, as we had occasion to allude to in our previous pages. She thus became the real cause of the first Anglo-Afghan war; for, whatever may have been the reasons of the dispute between Dost Mohammed Khan and Lord Auckland, the former certainly would not have ventured to enter publicly upon hostilities with Great Britain, whose power and greatness he knew so well, if Russia, by her secret and public missions, had not fomented his hatred and encouraged the otherwise cautious ruler of Afghanistan to measure swords with England. During this first Anglo-Afghan war the English policy of vigilance against Russia had reached its climax.

As I previously remarked, it went even beyond the proper limits; for the Russian outposts stood at that time very, very far from any point that might have been styled the gate of India.

But, alas! it is with States as it is with individuals in the ordinary concerns of life. Extraordinarily vigorous actions are almost inevitably followed by reaction; the excessive English vigilance inaugurated by the somewhat rash policy of Lord Auckland gradually turned into carelessness and indifference, from the time following the conclusion of the disastrous first Afghan campaign. The bleaching bones of the English soldiers left beyond the Kheiber Pass, the unexampled treachery, cruelty, and savageness of the Afghan opponent, seem to have left an indelible impression on the minds of the English. Add to this the accounts of the horrible murder of Stoddart and Conolly in Bokhara, and you will understand pretty well the detestation and scorn the English manifested of all matters connected with Afghan and Central Asia in general. Oh yes! we can understand, but not justify this aversion; for any other European power better qualified to deal with the Asiatics than the English are, would certainly have avoided the catastrophes connected with this campaign, and even if visited by misfortune, would not allow herself to be scared away altogether. Look at Russia. In spite of defeats by the score, she did not relax in her arduous work in the Caucasus until the most inaccessible gorges of rocks were cleared, and her victorious banner was made to float over all the

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Caucasus. Similar proofs of her perseverance she gave in her fights against the Turkomans, when, three times repulsed with severe wounds she again drew the sword, and did not give in until the enemy was crushed and the Akhal-Tekkes were lying at her feet. Of the reasons of this yielding spirit of the English we shall speak hereafter suffice to say here, that the epoch of English indifference concerning Russia's dealings in Central Asia dates from this period. Such is the official tone that prevailed, with slight interruptions since that time, in Downing Street as well as on the Hoogly; and if the individual views of certain ministers and leading statesmen occasionally proved an exception to this rule, the exception and the isolated facts proceeding from it are not sufficient in themselves to alter the whole line of premeditated policy.

Thus, many persons will find it rather surprising that Lord Palmerston could have feigned indifference to the Russian conquest of Tashkend, considering his views expressed as follows in a letter written to Lord Clarendon, July 31, 1851-"The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided

resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian policy has always had two strings to its bowmoderate language and disinterested professions at St. Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend, but cannot in honour recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified in the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simonitch and Vitkovitch in Persia. Orloff succeeded in extorting the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circum-. stances of the time and place, and not the result of any previous instructions; but, having been done, it could not be undone. On the other hand, Simonitch and Vitkovitch failed in getting possession of Herat, in consequence of our vigorous measures of resistance; and as they had failed they were disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held at St. Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, although no human