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KOREANS STRIVE FOR SELF-RELIANCE IN NUCLEAR
PLANT CONSTRUCTION

Although nuclear plant vendors, turbine-generator manufacturers, and architect/engineers welcome South Korea's recent invitation to bid on the nation's 10th and 11th nuclear units (nominally Korea Nuclear Units 11 and 12) (NW, 7 Nov., 1), the heyday of turnkey nuclear plant construction in Korea is over. While Korea has no present plans to design complete nuclear reactors on its own, Seoul's plan to "localize" nuclear engineering and construction for future plants is moving slowly but very effectively, according to industry and government officials.

Under a long-term program adopted by the government in October 1984, Korea is pushing to be self-reliant in nuclear engineering by the early 1990s and in nuclear-quality equipment and components by the end of the century. If this goal is met, officials said, Korea should be able to save 15% on nuclear plant construction cost, lower foreign capital requirements from the present 35% to 10%, and shorten the average plant construction leadtime by one year.

Korea now has four nuclear plants in operation and five more under construction, with the fourth at Kori, KNU-6, scheduled to enter service very shortly. The three units operating in 1984 generated 117-million kilowatt-hours, supplying 22% of the nation's total power and the equivalent of 10% of its oil consumption. Addition by 1996 of the 10th and 11th units will enable Korea to meet 43.6% of its total electric power demand with nuclear generation, according to the plan.

Korea currently imports nearly 80% of its energy and is heavily oil-dependent. Its only indigenous energy resource is low-grade anthracite at a depth of 300 meters. Thus, it needs to diversify and "Koreanize" its energy supply, and the first priority is nuclear power, according to Kim Se-jong, chief of the Nuclear Power Generation Department of the Energy & Resources Ministry. "In terms of production cost, nuclear power generation can be regarded as a semi-local product," Kim said. "If we can be self-reliant in plant construction and fuel recycling, the only thing we need to import is raw uranium." Kim estimated the current local content of a Korean nuclear KWH at 57%, compared with 31% for a coal KWH and 16% for an oil KWH.

The country's goal now is to improve its technological and industrial ability to design and manufacture equipment for future nuclear plants. Progress is likely to be gradual: When Korea's first 587-MW Westinghouse PWR, KNU-1 at Kori, came on line in 1977, only 8% of the plant's equipment and components were made locally. The so-called localization ratio increased to 12.9% for the 650-MW KNU-2 PWR at Kori and to 14% for KNU-3, a 678-MW Candu PHWR at Wolsung. Under current plans, the ratio will rise further to 29.2% for KNU-5 and -6, the third and fourth units at Kori, which are 950-MW Westinghouse PWRS, 34.9% for KNU-7 and -8 at Yeonggwang, al so 950-MW Westinghouse PWRS, (and 41.5% for KNU-9 and -10 at Uljin, 950-MW PWRs supplied by Framatome and Alsthom-Atlantique).

Korea's first three reactors were designed and built by foreign suppliers under turnkey contracts by Westinghouse and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), who also assumed construction and startup responsibilities. The state utility, Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO), played a minor role in those projects by taking partial charge of construction management, and local construction firms, mainly Hyundai Engineering & Construction and Dong-Ah Construction Industrial Co., undertook civil works and equipment installation as subcontractors to the prime foreign contractors.

Anxious to gain greater control over its nuclear program, KEPCO switched to a component contracting approach for the next six plants, four of them contracted to Westinghouse and two to Framatome. Under the new method, the state utility played a bigger role than before, handling engineering services and equipment supply separately, with foreign companies becoming subcontractors. The adoption of a nonturnkey method opened the way for domestic engineering and manufacturing firms to take part in nuclear projects.

Korea's "localization" (self-reliance) program basically covers two categories: design engineering and equipment manufacturing. Korea is already self-reliant in civil works and plant installation.

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The core of the design issue is standardization, an idea that has become something of a buzzword in Korean nuclear politics. Korean industry plans to adopt its first standardized design by 1990 through working jointly with foreign partners in designing KNU-11 and -12, which are to be built by 1996. Under an operational blueprint adopted by the Ministry of Energy & Resources in October 1984, the basic concept of Korea's first standardized nuclear plant design will be modeled after an "Italian-type concept," rather than those of West Germany, the U.S., France, and Japan.

The Italian type of standardization, according to Shin Jae-in, research director of KEPCO subsidiary Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC), suits Korean reality because it emphasizes economy in construction costs and plant operation. Korea has decided to adopt the 900-MW PWR as its main standard model and the 600-MW PHWR as "supplementary" model. The government blueprint calls for reiterative construction of at least six units referencing a standard design.

Korea's standardization program is being pushed under the supervision of KEPCO's "Electric Power Consultative Group," which consists of the state-run Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute (KAERI), 12 private companies directly involved in nuclear power plant construction, and the state utility's four subsidiary firms-KOPEC, Korea Heavy Industries & Construction Co. (KHIC), Korea Nuclear Fuel Co. (KNFC), and Korea Electric Power Operations Service Co. (KEPOS). The advisory group sets year-by-year goals for Korea's standardization program and supervises its progress. The group's goal is to adopt Korea's unified standard design by 1990. To do this, basic design should be completed by 1988 and detailed design by 1990, according to KOPEC's Shin. If the projected standardization is achieved, the localization ratio of Korea's nuclear engineering will approach 90% in the early 1990s, Shin said.

As for nuclear equipment and components, Korea's goal is to boost the localization ratio to the 90% level for nuclear island, turbine-generators, and balance-of-plant by the late 1990s. Korean industry experience in this area began with KNU-5 (Kori-3), for which some equipment and components were manufactured by local firms under technical agreements with foreign licensors. The local content of equipment manufacturing was 29.2% for KNU-5 and -6, rising to 34.9% for KNU-7 and -8 and 41.5% for KNU-9 and -10. In the meantime, Korean Manufacturers have learned how to produce key components such as reactor pressure vessels, emergency diesel generators, steam generators, pressurizers, and control rod drive mechanisms. KEPCO subsidiary KHIC has been designated by the Korean government as main contractor for supply of power plant equipment (partly to be made at KHIC's Changwon complex, which can turn out heavy components for 2,500 megawatts of power plants yearly), as well as for site erection. Korean firms have obtained international quality authorization (ASME stamps) for most equipment and components they produce except for pumps and valves.

With KNU-11 and -12, the units for which bids have just been invited, the localization plan will take "a step forward," as KOPEC President KunMo Chung puts it. Under the new approach, KEPCO will award prime contracts for engineering and major equipment to local firms, which will choose foreign partners as subcontractors via competitive bidding with emphasis on technology transfer terms. Kim Nam-ha, senior researcher at KEPCO's R&D Center, said

this approach is expected to expedite technology transfer to Korean firms.

Pil-soon Han, president of the government-run KAERI, said that Korea will now ask for transfer of NSSS technology, including core design. An informal division of responsibilities among the Korean players has been established, suggesting a "possible scenario" of KAERI receiving software from a main NSSS vendor, KOPEC receiving engineering expertise, KHIC receiving hardware expertise, and KEPCO taking care of overall system management, Han said. are ready to receive technology," he delcared.

"we

However, an important weak point remains in the self-reliance chain:
Local Ization of raw materials for nuclear plant construction lags far behind.
The local content ratio of materials for KNU-9 and -10, for example, is only
13% (7% for nuclear island, 37% for conventional island).

Self-reliance is also being promoted in other areas, such as fuel fabrication and nuclear waste disposal. Kraftwerk Union was recently selected to build Korea's first nuclear fuel fabrication plant at KAERI's Daeduk complex south of Seoul. If all goes according to plans, this plant, with a nominal annual production capacity of 200 metric tons, should be completed in 1988 or 1989 and will supply enough fuel for the eight Korean PWRs scheduled to be in operation at that time.

There again, according to the "division of responsibilities" outlined by KAERI's Han, KAERI will do fuel design (based, for example, on Westinghouse's new OFA fuel), KNFC, a joint venture of KAERI and KEPCO, will do the manufacturing, and KEPCO will do fuel management. Separately, KAERI is studying construction by 1989 of a plant to fabricate fuel for Candus; it has already produced some Candu fuel on an experimental basis, which has been qualified in the Wolsung reactor.

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KNFC plans to construct a shallow-land disposal facility for low- and medium-level waste by 1990 based on feasibility studies nearing completion at KAERI. Compaction, asphalt solidification, and bituminization processes have been studied at Daeduk, the latter two on a pilot level in a 40 liter/hr. facility, according to Park Hun-Hwee, head of KAERI's radwaste division. Park said that KAERI is interested in foreign technology (for example, polymer technology) for the commercial-scale waste facility five to ten times as large as the pilot), and is talking to companies such as Westinghouse/Hittman, Bechtel, and AECL, but added that Korea "intends to develop our own technology" as well. No firm decision has been made on bidding schedules for the radwaste technology transfer.

In other fuel cycle areas, Korea also is moving ahead with pilot projects, including five with the help of France's SGN (Societe Generale pour les Techniques Nouvelles) and related companies under an arrangement offsetting the cancellation of a reprocessing plant supply contract"in the late 1970s.

The projects include a pilot fuel fabrication plant for both HWR and PWR fuel, a yellowcake refining facility, and a U02 conversion plant for Candu fuel--a' | in operation--as well as a post-irradiation examination station and a radwaste treatment pilot that are expected to operate soon.

KAERI's Han said that deposits of low-grade uranium ore have been located in the center of the country, but that Korea intends to "reserve them until they are economic" to extract and burn. But the existence of domestic uranium resources, as poor as they may be, means that Korea can achieve "pseudo-self-sufficiency in energy." Why the "pseudo?" Because Korea, so far, has been discouraged from acquiring the enriching and reprocessing technologies that would make it really self-reliant.

The drive for self-sufficiency may, in fact, have ramifications for more than just the Korean market. KOPEC's Chung, noting that sister company KHIC is capable of constructing components for two 900-MW class PWRs a year, warned that "if the (domestic) market is not there, we will have to go to the export market." The same is true for KOPEC's 1,000 engineers. Korean industry will not do turnkey projects for export, he acknowledged. But as for construction, "We can beat Japanese companies on pressure vessels hands down," Chung declared (before a Pacific Basin Nuclear conference audience last spring that included some of those competitors). Korean companies can provide "the same quality at better prices," he asserted.

The "Step Forward" being taken with KNU-11 and -12--in terms of the responsibility of local contractors--is not expected to lead to immediate savings in capital cost, according to Chong-Hun Rieh, executive vice president of KEPOO. Rieh, who said that the decision on NSSS and turbine-generator supplier for the new units will be made late next year, acknowledged that "at the developing stage we don't expect a big change" in plant capital costs. But if the price can be kept stable, "we are satisfied," Rieh said; "we have to go that way" to allow local capabilities to develop. Already, the components approach to contracting relieved a financial burden for KEPOO, which has paid as much as 25%-30% interest on nuclear plant-related loans in the past. Rieh explained that on the turnkey projects, payments were firmly scheduled and KEPCO had to pay come what may. Under the components procurement approach, the utility can purchase components when that suits it: In fact, KEPCO saved money by buying components early at the beginning of the first oil crisis, when the U.S. market was "hungry" and prices had not started to escalate, he noted.

In the past, localization has sometimes led to construction schedule delays, since some supplies from local contractors were not up to nuclear-grade snuff and had to be returned to the factories. But with increased experience, these manufacturers are improving the quality of their supplies, Rieh said. The higher quality should lead not only to shorter construction schedules, but al so to greater ease of reactor operation and higher capacity factors, he believes.

The pace of ordering new nuclear plants will depend on the growth in electricity demand in Korea. Rieh expects a decision on units 13 and 14 to be made next year or in 1987 and thinks KEPCO can start a new nuclear project every year or every 1.5 years. Government policy is to maintain a balance of 40% coal and 40% nuclear for electricity generation, with nuclear continuing basically as baseload power and bituminous coal plant providing medium-load power.

--Shin Ho-Chul, Seoul; Ann MacLachlan, Paris
Nucleonics Week, Vol. 26, No. 51

December 19, 1985

pp. 8-9

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