Soviet Union. Both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution must be seen as partly a search for more natural balance of local and central interests, a balance in which the province has such has stayed in the foreground.

By and large, the boundaries of China's provinces-like those of the Chinese nation are an inheritance from centuries ago. The institutions and the capitals of those provinces have, however, been changing constantly. In the more remote past, any single province was almost by definition a place run by officials from another province. Ambitious men from any province were actively recruited into government but only in order to run other provinces. The Peking governments kept in check local challenges to their power in large part by preventing officials from serving in their home provinces.

By 1911 and 1912, when the last emperor was overthrown, contacts not only between officials but also between merchants and common people from different provinces had increased greatly. Peking governments had previously been able to control in a general way contacts between the natural leaders in the various provinces. Around 1911, however, dissatisfied with Peking's weak response to foreign threats, these leaders got together on their own to set up a rival national government.

From 1911 until 1949 it was unclear just how these local leaders could work together successfully in the face of foreign threats and domestic economic problems.

But their determination to work together and not separately lay behind such success as either the Nationalists or the Communists had in keeping China unified in this period. The Communist success by 1949 was due basically to its ability to bring an ever wider range of people into this cooperative effort thanks to its sensitivity to economic and social as well as to natural issues.

Since coming to power, the People's Republic has been working successfully— as I suggested above-at giving the people of each province a voice in their own affairs and at the same time keeping them devoted to the cooperative effort of national unification and economic and social progress despite foreign threats. Where does Taiwan fit in this theme? Taiwan seems from this perspective a province that is still backward in reconciling local and national interests. In contrast to the present situation in most provinces, Taiwan's top leaders remain almost exclusively from other provinces. Thanks to this political backwardness (in Chinese terms) there is still considerable tension between the long time residents of Taiwan and the officials who are most recent arrivals and mainly from different provinces. Politically the situation most resembles that in other provinces in the past when the central government's control did not penetrate deeply.

At the same time, the close ethnic, linguistic, and general cultural ties between the population of Taiwan (minus about 200,000 aborigines) and their counterpart provincial groups on the Mainland continue. In this respect, the Fukien or Hakka speaking "Taiwanese" are not so different from the "Mainlanders" who speak the dialects of other provinces. And just like Chinese in the Peoples Republic, by now the vast majority of people on Taiwan can speak the national language of Mandarin and are steeped in the national culture.

One result has been that political dissidents in Taiwan are drawn in at least equal proportion from the "Mainlander" population and from the "Taiwanese” population.

In 1895 Taiwan had a local political movement which declared the province independent. This was, however, an effort stimulated by certain Peking officials who were not natives of Taiwan and was designed solely to delay surrender of the province to Japan following the Sino/Japanese war. This was in other words simply a transitional device of nationalist, anti-foreign leaders. The same device was used in 1911 by fourteen mainland provinces revoluting against the last emporor. "Independence" in each case lasted only a few weeks and represented an effort to stay within the Chinese community of provinces.

Between 1911 and at least the late 1950's outside powers often tried to exploit the tension between local and out-of-province populations in various parts of China in order to create independent "entities" over which they could hold sway. The Soviet Union succeeded during the 1920's (when Peking was weakest) in bringing about the independence of Outer Mongolia and Outer Mongolia has remained independent despite Chinese objections in the 1950's. Japan failed in a similar effort in Manchuria. One obvious reason for the Soviet success is the fact that the Mongolian population has few or no ethnic and linguistic ties with

other Chinese provinces; nor indeed had it ever been accepted as a true province. The same factors did not lead to Tibetan independence, however, in the late 1950's when China feared the same kind of foreign threat as existed previously in Mongolia. This time China was able to react as a strong nation.

Japan tried and failed to keep Taiwan independent partly because the population there had (as it still does) even closer ties with other Chinese provinces than did Manchuria, not to mention Mongolia or Tibet. Taiwan's inhabitants welcomed their liberation from Japan in 1945-though their mistreatment afterwards by out-of-province rulers soon led to a resurgence of the traditional kind of tensions.

The Peoples Republic knows that, given the ethnic and linguistic similarity of the population of Taiwan to that of her central provinces, time would be on the side of reunification in a way not true of Mongolia, Tibet or even Manchuria. She could tolerate the slow working out of the tensions between outsiders and the local population which would bring Taiwan politically up to conditions in other provinces.

But the Peoples Republic also knows that, except in the various longest run, time would be on her side only if foreign powers clearly and unequivocally stated their intention to allow Taiwan back into the community of Chinese provinces. If outside powers instead play upon and exploit local tensions, the Peoples Republic will be forced-on the evidence of past experience to help one side or another on Taiwan to resolve their differences by force. We do not know just where the political community on Taiwan would split in such a situation. Our ignorance only proves that the United States or other foreign countries or agencies would be no more successful than the Japanese in guaranteeing Taiwan's independence without bloodshed.

SUGGESTED U.S. POSITION CONCERNING TAIWAN

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Gravel. It is a very interesting proposal. If I understand it correctly you are not only suggesting that we take an affirmative position concerning the seating of the People's Republic of China but also that we recognize that there is only one China. You do not wish to defer the question of whether or not Taiwan should be considered a different entity. Is that correct? Senator GRAVEL. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I feel we have used Taiwan as a crutch long enough.

CANADIAN RECOGNITION OF PRC

The CHAIRMAN. Taiwan, of course, is the most difficult aspect of it. Are you familiar with what the Canadians did in recognizing China? Senator GRAVEL. In accepting the status, yes, I realize the impact of it. I think it leaves the whole issue in hiatus, but I think that was part of the evolutionary progression that we have seen in the last 6 months. What I am suggesting is that as a world power we demonstrate for our part an intelligent, forthright and imaginative leadership in this whole area.

The CHAIRMAN. I would assume the Canadian attitude is to recognize China and leave for the future the relations between China and Taiwan, to be determined perhaps by the Chinese. They would simply take no position upon it. Is that correct?

Senator GRAVEL. That is correct, but I think it must be recognized that they took no position because they wanted to arrive at some interchange. intercourse with the People's Republic while at the same time they didn't want to offend us. Canada is our closest friend and they didn't want to give us the back of their hands. I think they evolved what they thought was right without being discourteous to us.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very interesting subject. We will be pursuing that aspect, as you know, with other witnesses.

Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.
Senator AIKEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

POSSIBILITY OF FUDGING FORMOSA QUESTION

Senator CHURCH. Senator Gravel, have you seen the account in yesterday's Wall Street Journal written by Robert Keatley on a recent interview with Chou En-lai?

Senator GRAVEL. I was just glancing at it before coming forward this morning. I did read a brief report of it this morning in the New York Times, and I was very impressed with the statement.

Senator CHURCH. It has just been called to my attention. If the quoted portions are correct, Chou En-lai seems to suggest that informal contacts with the United States can grow, but normal relationships including normal recognition can't be expected until the Formosa problem is resolved. Would you have an opinion on why the People's Republic of China might be willing to establish diplomatic relations with Canada or with Italy without insisting on the solution to the Formosa problem?

In these other cases, countries have established diplomatic relations by simply fudging the question of Formosa, and leaving it later for the Chinese to decide. Do you think that might be a possible course for the United States to follow in the future?

Senator GRAVEL. I think not, Senator Church. In fact, I think it should be noted that the Canadians and the other nations which are now fuzzing the question are sort of following our leadership because we, in 1950, were the first to talk in terms of a solution by fuzzing the question, and I don't think we will ever arrive at effective relationship with the People's Republic of China unless we squarely face this issue.

I think we have too long dodged it. It is very simple. Both parties to this conflict say that this is part of China. Who are we to now intervene and say "My God, we have got a stake in this little island. It may suit our strategy or tactical advantage." So, therefore, we exacerbate the political exigencies that exist there. I think this is wrong, and I think we have seen examples of this in the last 2 weeks with the Pentagon papers.

Senator CHURCH. If it has been acceptable to mainland China to establish formal relations with Italy, Canada. and other countries without insisting on some declaration on their part relevant to the question of Formosa and have been content to let that matter be fudged over, do you think there is any possibility that mainland China might adopt the same attitude toward the United States in any future attemp to formalize relations between our wo countries?

Senator GRAVEL. I doubt that. I doubt that very much. In fact I think we should at least give them the benefit of doubt and take their statements a face value and honestly. I don't see where it would be in their interest; they feel so strongly about this and I would hope that

we would change our position. I am convinced and pursuaded that we, as a matter of policy, have tried to discourage contact between mainland China and Taiwan and I would hope that both overtly and covertly we let these Chinese people worry about and settle their own differences, and I am convinced that will come about.

IMPACT OF SENATE RESOLUTION 18 LANGUAGE ON DEFENSE TREATY

Senator CHURCH. I am in full agreement with you that the only possible way of ever solving this problem rests with the Chinese. I do Lessil have one further question on the resolution that you have proposed. I would like an interpretation of the first resolving clause. It reads:

That the United States inform both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China that it is not committed to the indefinite separation of Taiwan from Mainland China, and that it shares the expressed interest of both governments in eventual reunification, and that it proposes that those governments attempt by and between themselves to reach a settlemen of disputes dividing them and to seek means for accomplishing the eventual peaceful unification of the Chinese people.

Is that, in your opinion, written in such a way that if it were adopted and made part of the law it would not impliedly alter or repeal the present treaty we have to defend Formosa? What impact would that language have on the present treaty, in your opinion?

Senator GRAVEL. I think, Senator, you assess it very, very well. I think it would have the implied negation of it, and I think that would be very salutary to the peace of the world and to our relationships because essentially what that paragraph says, that resolve is that China is for the Chinese and ipso facto not for the Americans, and we would love to honor that situation.

Senator Church, if I can only add I am cosponsor of your resolution and I think that is a meaningful first step to all of this.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Senator. We are all striving toward the same objective-the eventual normalization of relations between the United States and China. You have made a very imporant contribution.

Senator GRAVEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits.

Do you have any questions?

Senator JAVITS. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we will call you.

We called on you a moment ago as you probably have been informed.

Senator GRAVEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Gravel.

STATEMENT OF HON. JACOB K. JAVITS, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEW YORK

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I shall try to limit my direct presentation to 10 minutes, and I am testifying in support of Senate Resolution 37, which is sponsored by Senators Case, Hart, Hughes, Inouye, Kennedy, Mondale, Stevenson, Symington, and Williams as

well as myself. I will insert my statement in the record and then speak from it.

TRANSFER OF SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT

It is my judgment that we must face first and foremost the issue that we should favor the transfer of the Security Council seat to the People's Republic of China. That is the prime question. If we do not do that, Mr. Chairman, we will, in my judgment, court a major diplomatic defeat in respect of the following: One, a majority has already voted

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you there a technical question, as our lawyer. Does not being seated as the member of the U.N. General Assembly automatically take with it membership on the Security Council?

Senator JAVITS. It does, because China is a permanent member and, therefore, the transfer need not be voted formally beyond the admission of a new party to the seat.

The CHAIRMAN. The seating is all that is really necessary.
Senator JAVITS. Exactly right.

The CHAIRMAN. This question was brought up at some other meeting the other day. I thought that was correct, but I wanted to check it with our attorney.

Senator JAVITS. And the corollary to that which goes to Senator Church's very astute question-You ought to make him your lawyer

now.

Senator CHURCH. I am a lawyer, just not as well paid. [Laughter.]

CHALLENGE TO U.S. POLICY

Senator JAVITS. The corollary, Mr. Chairman, the seat being transferred in possession, the question of admission of another member would be a new question. They need not necessarily be joined, although a resolution could invite the people of Formosa or the government in power in Formosa to apply for membership. A resolution might also pass just "continuing" the Republic of China as a member of the General Assembly.

Now my guess is they may not do it because of the situation which Senator Gravel pointed out. But for us to toll the bell, no, I thoroughly disagree with that. I thoroughly disagree with it because there are two fallacies. One is that our policy is world policy. The world may not necessarily vote it. We are entitled to have a policy, consistent with the posture we have taken toward the Republic of China for years, including a mutual defense agreement. Second, what about the 12 million people, indigenous Taiwanese, on Formosa? Are they cordwood? The Republic of China government does not represent them. It was never elected to represent them. Are they just to be delivered over to the mercy of what a non-elected government, and a Communist dictatorship on the mainland, decide will be their fate? I think for both those reasons, the challenge to U.S. policy is to move now to a position favoring the admission of the People's Republic of China, but without compromising our own position with respect to the Republic of China on Taiwan and the reserved or undecided question of sovereignty over Taiwan itself.