The CHAIRMAN. We have accepted it in the sense that we have not mounted an attack upon them to remove it, have we? Mr. EDWARDS. No, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Do you advocate that we should? Mr. EDWARDS. Well, I think that is something for the Chinese people to decide for themselves. It would not be appropriate for American citizens to advocate it. The CHAIRMAN. It strikes me that is correct, too, and I don't see why admitting them to the United Nations would say that we accept it any more than it is already accepted. Mr. EDWARDS. I think it would be interpreted throughout Asia not only by the Chinese people but by Asians in the countries I have mentioned heretofore, that we have truly recognized and have truly conceded that Mao is there to stay. It would be a major diplomatic victory, I think, for Peking. PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that the principal object of the Committee of One Million is to prevent the admission of the Chinese mainland Government to the United Nations? Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. That has been its principal mission. Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. If they are admitted, what happens to the committee, are you then dissolved? Mr. EDWARDS. I think at that point we would have to see what we could do with our resources and knowledge of the China question and of Asia. SUCCESS OF U.S. POLICY EXCLUDING CHINA FROM U.N. QUESTIONED The CHAIRMAN. One last question. You say some place that the exclusion of China from the U.N. is the most successful policy that we have had. Do you not say that at one point? Mr. EDWARDS. I think that I said, sir, that that policy has been one of the most successful. I was careful to qualify that. The CHAIRMAN. Some of us are under the impression that conditions in our own country, economically and politically and psychologically, are not very satisfactory, and many of us attribute this to the overextension of our commitments, particularly military commitments around the world. This may have been beneficial to Japan; for example, you mentioned Japan's great prosperity, but some of us, including myself, have come to the conclusion that this policy has not been a very satisfactory one for the people of the United States. Not since the Civil War can I recall that we have been in such grave difficulties internally with as much disillusionment among many people with the way our own society is functioning. I was a little surprised that you feel our policy, including this one, has been such a success. Mr. EDWARDS. Well, sir, I am referring there, with regard to the policy, to the question of admission of Communist China, not to the Vietnam war. The CHAIRMAN. But the commitment, the engagement of our forces in Vietnam, it seems to me, is a logical concomitant of the policy we have had toward China during this long period. They are interrelated; aren't they? Mr. EDWARDS. They may be interrelated but I think that specifically the policy I was refrering to, which I think can be successfully defended and logically defended, is that of admission, our opposition to admission. The CHAIRMAN. It is true the reasoning shifted from time to time, but at one time this committee was told by the then Secretary of State that our principal objective in Vietnam was to contain China—the policy of containment to prevent their expansion, so I would have thought that this was closely related to the attitude we had toward China. Mr. EDWARDS. I think I probably would defer the answer to that question to Dr. Judd, and I will make sure he gets it to you upon his return. (The information referred to had not been submitted as of the date of publication.) The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, do you have any questions? RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA AFTER WORLD WAR I The CHAIRMAN. Well, just one last observation. How long was it before we recognized Russia after World War I, do you remember? Mr. EDWARDS. It was 1933, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Was that about 15 years? Mr. EDWARDS. They went in, of course, in 1917. That would be some 16 years. The CHAIRMAN. Sixteen years. Rather curious that after that long delay then in the next world war we ended up as an ally. Mr. EDWARDS. I think it is highly unlikely with regard to Communist China, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We thought it was highly unlikely then, too. These things are very difficult to foresee, aren't they? Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir; they are. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Edwards. The committee is adjourned. (Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.) APPENDIX REMARKS OF SENATOR JOHN SHERMAN COOPER CONCERNING STATUS OF TAIWAN TOGETHER WITH INSERTIONS FOR THE RECORD One of the most difficult aspects of U.S. relations with China now and in the future concerns the status of Taiwan. Many proposals have been made about how to resolve the issue. Chief among them are: 1. That Taiwan belongs rightfully to the government of Mainland China and that any settlement concerning Taiwan should take account of Mainland China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. 2. That Taiwan is now under the firm control of the Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek, and Mainland China is firmly under the control of Mao and his followers and that therefore, the U.S. should adopt a two-China policy. Recognition of the sovereignty of Mainland China should be accorded to the Chinese People's Republic now in control in Peking while recognition of sovereignty over Taiwan should be accorded to the Chinese Nationalist Government now in control in Taiwan. There is a third point of view which has not been discussed as fully as the "one China" and "two China" approaches that the issue of Taiwan should be settled by the process of self-determination, perhaps by a plebiscite. Those who argue for this point of view maintain that the indigenous Taiwanese population would prefer to maintain a status independent of either Peking or the Nationalist Government. Because this problem was not addressed in detail by any of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee, I have had prepared at my request, two studies on the question of Taiwan. The first is by Dr. Lung-chu Chen of Yale University which is written on the point of view of the native Taiwanese. The second is a study prepared for me by the Department of State entitled "Background Papers on Taiwan" which provides a thorough analysis of the Taiwan situation. I ask unanimous consent that these documents and my exchange of correspondence with the Department of State be printed in the hearing record at this point. Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, JUNE 29, 1971. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been holding hearings on China. President Nixon's initiatives to better relations with Peking are a most hopeful step in strengthening our foreign policy. Membership in the UN of mainland China is a problem that is immedately before the Committee in the form of several resolutions, and I know it is a question that you and the President are now seriously considering. One of the related issues that has been discussed by all witnesses who have appeared thus far, is the question of the future of Taiwan. It would be most helpful to me and, I believe, to the Committee, if you could provide for me an historical analysis of the Taiwan question. I enclose an analysis prepared at my request by Dr. Lung-chu Chen of Yale University, which is written from the point of view of the native Taiwanese. I would appreciate your comments upon his statement. With kind regards, I am Yours sincerely, 70-772-72- -23 JOHN SHERMAN COOPER. (347) AUGUST 4, 1971. Hon. JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR COOPER: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of June 29 asking for the Department to prepare an historical analysis of the Taiwan question for use in the current hearings on China by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I understand a Department officer has discussed your request informally with Mr. Miller of your office and it was agreed that the Department would prepare a review of the major aspects of Taiwan. I am pleased to enclose the attached background papers that, I believe, will provide a useful overview for the Committee's use. You also asked for the Department's comments on a paper prepared at your request by Dr. Lung-chu Chen of Yale University. The central argument of Dr. Chen's well-reasoned manuscript is that as the legal status of Taiwan remains undetermined under international law, a United Nations conducted or supervised plebiscite should be conducted to determine the desires of the people of Taiwan. I hope you will appreciate that our position on this matter has been, and is that while we favor elections in any country to determine the views of the people, neither we nor the United Nations can impose our views in this regard on other governments. If I can be of assistance at any time, please do not hesitate to let me know. Sincerely yours, DAVID M. ABSHIRE, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. ONE TAIWAN, ONE CHINA: SELF-DETERMINATION FOR TAIWAN (By Lung-chu Chen) Biographic Note: Dr. Lung-chu Chen, presently a Research Associate at Yale Law School, is also Secretary for External Affairs of World United Formosans for Independence. With Professor Harold L. Lasswell, he has co-authored Formosa, China, and the United Nations. His new book, The Independence and Nation-Building of Taiwan (in Taiwanese), has just been published. He is an international lawyer specialized in international protection of human rights. The China question has been made to appear extremely complicated, though it need not be so. It appears complicated when one deals with myths rather than realities. The so-called two Chinas dilemma is artificial because the synthetic "China" on Taiwan-Nationalist China-is often mistaken to be the authentic China. China is not at issue, for it is quite clear who governs the 800 million people on the Chinese mainland. It is a fact that cannot be undone by indulging in fictional polemics about authority. The real issue is Taiwan, whose international status is yet to be settled. (Unless specified otherwise, Taiwan includes the Pescadores and the other isles of the Taiwan archipelagic system, and is used interchangeably with Formosa.) POLICIES AT STAKE As has so often been said, a major objective of U.S. policies toward Taiwan and China is to seek to establish both regional and global peace and securityin a public order in which small as well as large nations, secure from external aggression and subversion, are able to develop as viable independent States and in which legal principles, including the principle of self-determination, are honored. In moving toward such a public order, it is essential to create and nurture the predisposition of decision-makers to forego the unilateral use of military force in settling international disputes, particularly in controversies over the acquisition of territories. So far as U.N. membership is concerned, it is increasingly agreed that the principle of universality should be applied evenhandedly. In such a system, the welfare of people must be basic. With all its efforts to glorify and sanctify "people," the People's Republic of China simply fails to talk about people when it comes to the subject of Taiwan. If one pierces the veil of the political rhetoric employed by both Chiang and Mao, he will grasp what is critically and ultimately at stake-the future of the 14 million people living on Taiwan. The human rights of the inhabitants of Taiwan are not to be dismissed out of hand as though "a mere 14 million people" are involved. A mere 14 million is a population larger than that of more than two thirds of the Member States of the United Nations. It would seem to be obvious that the change of status of a territory should be based primarily on the popular will of its inhabitants, THE PRESENT RECOMMENDATIONS The legal status of Taiwan, still undetermined under international law, has been and will continue to be the focal point of controversy for the Chinese participation question in the U.N. and in the relations between the United States and mainland China. The "one Taiwan, one China" policy, as distinguished from a "two Chinas' formula, is the solution offering the greatest promise of clarifying and serving the common interests of the world community, the people of Taiwan, the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Pacific community. According to this policy, the People's Republic of China would be recognized as the sole legitimate government of China having both effective control and formal authority over mainland China, and Taiwan's de facto independent status would be recognized de jure. Applying this formulation to the Chinese representation question in the U.N., the People's Republic of China would be seated in both the General Assembly and the Security Council in place of the Nationalist Chinese delegation, and Taiwan would simultaneously be assured a separate membership in the United Nations. The key to all these arrangements would be a U.N. conducted or supervised plebiscite for Taiwan. The plebiscite is an important instrument to give effect to the fundamental U.N. principle of self-determination. The purpose would be to ascertain the true will of the people of Taiwan about the future status of Taiwan and the form of government under which they wish to live. Among the options open to all the electorate population of Taiwan would be (1) explicit formalization of an independent State of Taiwan, and (2) integration of Taiwan with the People's Republic of China. Historical considerations BASIC CONSIDERATIONS Blood may be thicker than water, but an expansive water barrier can be more important for peoples' demands, identification, and expectations than ancient ethnic origins. Separated by a 100-mile Strait from the Chinese mainland, the Formosan people have been for centuries living in an island environment different from that of the Chinese people and undergoing experiences distinctly Formosan. They have undergone a succession of struggles in resisting foreign subjugation and exploitation. Wave after wave of immigrants and generation after generation, the inhabitants on Taiwan have developed a Taiwanese consciousness, a Taiwanese soul, and a Taiwanese culture. They have forged a distinct sense of identity and perspective in their quest to be masters of their own activities and destiny. While it is uncertain when and whence the first inhabitants came to Taiwan, dissident Chinese began to cross the 100-mile Strait and migrate to Taiwan in substantial number in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They came to settle in Taiwan to escape Chinese despotism, pursue a good life, and create a free and prosperous land. From its inception Asian and European Powers sought to make Formosa their colony. In the sixteenth century Portuguese navigators came to the island and called it "llha Formosa," meaning "beautiful island." Thus for a long time the island had been better known internationally as Formosa rather than Taiwan ("terraced bay"). During the seventeenth century, foreign Powers, notably the Portuguese, Spaniards and the Dutch, as well as dissident Chinese forces, vied for control of the island. In 1683 the Ch'ing Dynasty of China nominally purported to annex Formosa but kept it under very loose control for about two centuries. It is questionable if China ever exercised sufficient control to perfect its title to the island under international law. Indeed, in 1871 the Ch'ing government of China stated to Japan that Formosa was "outside its jurisdiction" and thus it could not be held responsible for what Formosans had done to Japanese nationals in Formosa. It was only in 1887 that the Ch'ing government proclaimed Taiwan a province of China. But shortly afterward, defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, China ceded Formosa to Japan and agreed to Korea's “independence” by the Treaty of Shimonoseki concluded in 1895. |