Taipei April 9, 1965; entered into force July 1, 1965. 16 UST 583; TIAS 5782; 546 UNTS 81. Extension and amendments: February 2, 1968 (19 UST 4629; TIAS 6451). June 30, 1970 (21 UST 1478; TIAS 6906). Education: Agreement for financing certain educational and cultural exchange programs. Signed at Taipei April 23, 1964; entered into force April 23, 1964. 15 UST 408; TIAS 5572; 524 UNTS 141. Extraterritoriality: Treaty for the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China and the regulation of related matters, and accompanying exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Januay 11, 1943; entered into force May 20, 1943. 57 Stat. 767; TS 984; 10 UNTS 261. Finance: Agreement regarding the ownership and use of local currency repayments made by China to the Development Loan Fund. Exchange of notes at Taipei December 24, 1958; entered into force December 24, 1958. 10 UST 16; TIAS 4162; 340 UNTS 251. Health and sanitation: Agreement relating to the establishment and operation in Taipei of a United States Navy Medical Research Unit. Exchanges of notes at Taipei March 30, April 26, and October 14, 1955; entered into force October 14, 1955. 7 UST 173; TIAS 3493; 268 UNTS 165. Amendment: December 27, 1956 (7 UST 3453; TIAS 3720; 268 UNTS 177). Investment Guaranties: Agreement relating to guaranties for projects in Taiwan proposed by nationals of the United States. Exchange of notes at Taipei June 25, 1952; entered into force June 25, 1952. 3 UST 4846; TIAS 2657; 136 UNTS 229. Amendment: December 30, 1963 (14 UST 2222; TIAS 5509; 505 UNTS 308). Language and Area Studies School: Agreement concerning the status of the American Embassy School of Chinese Language and Area Studies at Taichung and its personnel and of Chinese Embassy personnel studying in the Washington area. Exchange of notes at Taipei July 15 and August 22, 1969; entered into force August 22, 1969. 20 UST 2856; TIAS 6759. Lend-Lease: Preliminary agreement regarding principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression. Signed at Washington June 2, 1942; entered into force June 2, 1942. 56 Stat. 1494; EAS 251; 14 UNTS 343. Agreement under section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act. Signed at Washington June 28, 1946; entered into force June 28, 1946. 61 Stat. 3895; TIAS 1746; 34 UNTS 121. Agreement on the disposition of lend-lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United States. Signed at Washington June 14, 1946; operative September 2, 1945. 60 Stat. 1760; TIAS 1533; 4 UNTS 253. Maritime Matters: Agreement relating to the loan of two destroyers to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei January 13, 1954; entered into force January 13, 1954. 5 UST 207; TIAS 2916; 233 UNTS 111. Extension: June 11 and 18, 1969 (20 UST 2647; TIAS 6723). Agreement relating to the loan of small naval craft to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei May 14, 1954; entered into force May 14, 1954. 5 UST 892; TIAS 2979; 231 UNTS 165. Extensions and amendments: March 22 and 31, 1955 (6 UST 750; TIAS 3215; 251 UNTS 399). June 18, 1955 (6 UST 2973: TIAS 3346; 265 UNTS 406). May 16, 1957 (8 UST 787; TIAS 3837; 284 UNTS 380). October 12, 1960 (11 UST 2233; TIAS 4597; 393 UNTS 320). August 15, 1962 (13 UST 1924; TIAS 5150; 460 UNTS 237). February 23, 1965 (16 UST 126; TIAS 5771; 542 UNTS 361). Agreement for the loan of a destroyer to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei February 7, 1959; entered into force February 7, 1959. 10 UST 177; TIAS 4180; 341 UNTS 225. Extension: June 11 and 18, 1969 (20 UST 2647; TIAS 6723). Agreement for the loan of small craft to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei July 8, 1959; entered into force July 8, 1959. 10 UST 1306; TIAS 4274; 354 UNTS 47. Agreement for the loan of an additional naval vessel to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei January 18, 1961; entered into force January 18, 1961. 12 UST 78; TIAS 4676; 402 UNTS 348. Agreement relating to the loan of two naval vessels to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei June 8, 1961; entered into force June 8, 1961. 12 UST 1164; TIAS 4828; 416 UNTS 350. Agreement relating to the transfer of certain vessels to China and the extension of the agreements of January 18 and June 8, 1961 (TIAS 4676 and 4828). Exchange of notes at Taipei January 16 and March 6, 1967; entered into force March 6, 1967. 18 UST 1281; TIAS 6283. Agreement for the loan of an additional vessel to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei March 14 and April 1, 1967; entered into force April 1, 1967. 18 UST 1275; TIAS 6282. Agreement relating to the loan of a naval vessel to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei December 7 and 15, 1967; entered into force December 15, 1967. 18 UST 3170; TIAS 6411. Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Yarnall to China. Exchange of notes at Taipei June 19, 1968; entered into force June 18, 1968. 19 UST 5185; TIAS 6511. Agreement relating to the transfer of the USS GERONIMO to the Navy of the Republic of China. Exchange of notes at Taipei December 12 and 16, 1968; entered into force December 16, 1968. 19 UST 7857; TIAS 6623. Mutual Security: Agreement relating to assurances required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Exchange of notes at Taipei December 29, 1951 and January 2, 1952; entered into force January 2, 1952. 3 UST 4543; TIAS 2604; 181 UNTS 161. Narcotic Drugs: Arrangement for the direct exchange of certain information regarding the traffic in narcotic drugs. Exchanges of notes at Nanking March 12, June 21, July 28, and August 30, 1947; entered into force August 30, 1947. Pacific Settlement or Disputes: Treaty looking to the advancement of the cause a general peace. Signed at Washington September 15, 1914; entered into force October 22, 1915. Exchange of notes signed May 11 and 19, 1916. 39 Stat. 1642; TS 619 and 619-A; III Redmond 2514. Treaty of arbitration. Signed at Washington June 27, 1930; entered into force December 15, 1932. 47 Stat. 2213; TS 857; IV Trenwith 4021; 140 LNTS 183. Postal Matters: Agreement for the exchange of international money orders. Signed at Taipei October 8 and at Washington November 14, 1957; operative October 1, 1957. 9 UST 223 ; TIAS 3995; 304 UNTS 241. Parcel post convention. Signed at Peking May 29, 1916, and at Washington July 11, 1916; entered into force August 1, 1916. 39 Stat. 1665; Post Office Department print. Agreement for exchange of insured parcel post and regulations of execution. Signed at Taipei July 30 and at Washington August 19, 1957; entered into force November 1, 1957. 8 UST 2031; TIAS 3941; 300 UNTS 61. Relief Supplies and Packages: Agreement relating to duty-free entry of relief goods and relief packages and to the defrayment of transportation charges on such shipments. Exchange of notes at Nanking November 5 and 18, 1948; entered into force November 18, 1948. 3 UST 5462; TIAS 2749; 198 UNTS 287. Amendments: October 20 and December 12, 1952 (3 UST 5462; TIAS 2749; 198 UNTS 294). July 12 and October 26, 1954 (5 UST 2930; TIAS 3151; 237 UNTS 337). Scientific Cooperation: Agreement relating to cooperation in science and technology. Exchange of notes at Taipei January 23, 1969; entered into force January 23, 1969. 20 UST 374; TIAS 6639. Surplus Property: Agreement relating to the sale of United States excess property in Taiwan by the Armed Forces of the United States, and memorandum of understanding. Signed at Taipei July 22, 1959; entered into force July 22, 1959. 10 UST 1643; TIAS 4312; 357 UNTS 293. Trade and Commerce: Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with accompanying protocol. Signed at Nanking November 4, 1946; entered into force November 30, 1948. 63 Stat. 1299; TIAS 1871; 25 UNTS 69. Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with related notes. Exchange of notes at Washington October 12, 1967; entered into force October 12, 1967. 18 UST 2752; TIAS 6361. Extension and amendment: December 22, 1970 (TIAS 7011). Visas: Agreement prescribing nonimmigrant visa fees and validity of nonimmigrant visas. Exchange of notes at Taipei December 20, 1955 and February 20, 1956; entered into force February 20, 1956, operative April 1, 1956. 7 UST 585; TIAS 3539; 275 UNTS 73. Amendments: July 11, October 17 and December 7, 1956 (18 UST 3167; TIAS 6410). May 8, June 9 and 15, 1970. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ballantine, Joseph W. Formosa A Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, Bristol, Horance. Formosa-A Report in Pictures. Tokyo: Toppan, 1954. Cressey, George B. Land of the 500 Million: A Geography of China. New York: Davidson, James W. Island of Formosa. New York: Macmillan, 1903. Department of State. "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and Gallin, Bernard. Hsin Hsing: A Chinese Village in Change. Berkeley: University Goddard, W. G. Formosa: A Study in Chinese History. London: Macmillan, 1966. Goddard, W. G. Formosa (Taiwan). Taipei: Government Information Office, 1958. Hsieh, Chiao-min. Taiwan-Ilha Formosa. Washington, D.C.: Butterworths, 1964. Jacoby, Neil H. U.S. Aid to Taiwan. New York: Praeger, 1967. Kerr, George H. Formosa Betrayed. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965. Mendel, Douglas. The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. Berkeley, California : Rankin, Karl L. China Assignment. Seattle: University of Washington Press, Raper, Arthur F. Rural Taiwan: Problems and Promise. Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1953. Riggs, Fred W. Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule. New York: Macmillan, 1952. Valeo, Francis. The China White Paper. Public Affairs Bulletin No. 77. Washington, D.C., 1949. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA: A CHRONOLOGY-1941-1971 (By Larry A. Niksch, Analyst in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs Division, Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service) 1941-1942 December-January: President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill engaged in a high-level strategy conference in Washington. The United States reassured Britain that it would hold to military plans formulated in early 1941 to concentrate military efforts on the European theater first, leaving full concentration on the Asian theater to the time when Germany had been defeated. Both Chiang Kai-shek and General MacArthur had favored the opposite priority. 1943 December 1: President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued a declaration following their meetings at Cairo. It stated as a war aim that "Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China." 1945 February 11: President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin entered into the secret Yalta Agreement. The sections of the Agreement on the Far East provided that certain Manchurian railroad, port, and naval concessions lost by Russia to Japan in 1905 would be restored to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. also received assurances that the "status quo" would be preserved in Mongolia. President Roosevelt agreed to secure the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek to these conditions and Premier Stalin promised in return to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance with the Nationalist Government of China. November 30: In a letter to Congressman Jack Anderson, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes described the China policy of the United States as that of favoring "the creation of a strong, united and democratic China which will contribute to peace and stability in the Far East and which will enable China effectively to support the United Nations organization. In line with this policy, we deem it desirable and essential that China solve her internal problems. While we recognize that this is a task which China must carry out largely through her own efforts, we seek by all appropriate and practicable means to pursue such policies and action as will best facilitate China's achievement of internal unity and stability." December 16: President Truman set the China policy objectives of the United States as the arrangement of a cessation of hostilities between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists and the convening of "a national conference of representatives of major political elements . . . to develop an early solution to the present internal strife. . . ." He described the Nationalist Governments as "the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China" and declared that "The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China." Truman added, however, that "United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife." December 27: The Big Three Foreign Ministers issued a communiqué following the Moscow Conference, which stated that the Ministers "were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China." 1946 June 28: The State Department issued a statement concerning U.S. military and economic assistance programs to China, stressing the neutrality of the United States in the conflict between the Nationalists and Communists. It asserted that U.S. policy "cannot rightfully be interpreted as current support of any factional military group in China" and that "Too much stress cannot be laid on the hope of this Government that our economic assistance be carried out in China through the medium of a government fully and fairly representative of all important Chinese political elements, including the Chinese Communists." It further said that there was "a direct relation between the successful implementation of the plan [The Chungking Agreement of February 25, 1946, between the Nationalists and Communists] for the reduction and unification of Chinese military forces and steps that might be taken" by the United States under proposed legislation "to give military aid and assistance to the Chinese Army." December 18: The White House issued a statement by President Truman that the agreements reached between the Nationalists and Communists in January and February 1946, providing for a coalition government and a unified army, had broken down. Truman reaffirmed the U.S. view that the general principles behind these agreements were still "fundamentally sound." He emphasized the neutral position of the United States in the Chinese Civil War: "China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace. . . 1947 January 7: General George C. Marshall issued a statement upon the termination of his mission of mediation in China, describing "the greatest obstacle to peace" in China as "the complete, a most overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other." He stated that "On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed to a communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type." Marshall added that: "Combined with this mutual deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of ignoring the effect of the fears and suspicions of the other party in estimating the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of various matters under negotiation." He described the Kuomintang as "a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government." Marshall expressed the view that "on the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals" and that the liberals, particularly the young men, "would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future." "The dyed-in-the-wool Communists," Marshall said, "do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end. . . ." He concluded by recommending a course of action for the Nationalist Government: "Now that the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted constitution, practical measures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what extent the Government will give substance to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to share in the responsibility of government." (General Marshall had been sent to China on December 15, 1945, as President Truman's personal representative to induce the Chinese Nationalists and Communists to form a coalition government in order to restore peace and order in China. Agreement on a ceasefire was reached in January-February 1946 through the mediation of Marshall. A multi-party Political Consultative Conference agreed on: (1) convening a National Assembly in May 1946; (2) forming an interim coalition government; and (3) creating a national army with a 5 to 1 ratio of divisions as between the Nationalists and the Communists. Fighting broke out again in the spring of 1946, ending all possibilities for setting up the coalition government.) 1949 August: The Department of State issued a White Paper on China, summarizing U.S. relations with China and stressing the preceding five-year period in which the Communists had gradually gained control of the mainland. The letter of transmittal from Secretary of State Acheson said that the "ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. The failures of the Nationalists did not result from any inadequacy of American aid; U.S. military observers, according to the White Paper, reported that Nationalist armies "did not lose a single battle . . . in 1948 through lack of arms and ammunition." Although U.S. aid totalled approximately $2 billion, a large proportion of the military supplies furnished had fallen into the hands of the Chinese Communists through Nationalist ineptitude, errors and lack of will to fight. The White Paper concluded that only a full-scale U.S. military intervention could have prevented a Communist victory. The shortcomings of the Nationalist government and military were listed in some detail: the Government had lost popular support, its leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them, the military leadership was inept, Nationalist troops had lost the will to fight and did not have to be defeated; "they disintegrated." Critics of the White Paper charged that it glossed over U.S. shortcomings and attempted to place all the blame on the Nationalist Government. 1950 January 5: President Truman made a statement on U.S. policy concerning the status of Formosa following the Communist victory on the Mainland. Significant points included the following: the U.S. had no "intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lend to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to [Nationalist] Chinese forces on Formosa." January 12: Secretary of State Acheson, in a speech before the National Press Club, defined the defensive perimeter for the United States in the Pacific as running along a line extending from the Aleutians to Japan to the Ryukyus to the Philippines. Areas to the west of this line, including Korea and Formosa, |