and anything the United States can do directly to secure the future of the four million inhabitants of Hong Kong will help to prevent a potentially disastrous refugee situation should China decide to end the colony's present status. In order to avoid damaging non-Communist businesses in Hong Kong, it would be wise, at least at the outset, to restrict Sino-American trading activities to Hong Kong (rather than allowing the Communists to shift them to the Canton Trade Fair, for example) and to provide Hong Kong with favorable quotas for exports to the United States during a transitional period. So long as China's primary source of foreign-currency earnings is sales of foodstuffs and other commodities in a Chinese cultural milieu, it is to the advantage of both China and the United States to maintain the prosperity (hence purchasing power) of the population of Hong Kong. One further consideration in opening up economic relations is that the United States can make this change unilaterally and can time it to coincide with other initiatives in a new China policy. Trade with China, in the absence of military and political changes such as those advocated earlier, will not of itself make much difference in Sino-American contacts. The China market is not very large-the Chinese have relatively little cash or attractive commodities to exchange for American exports—and no nation is going to get rich doing business with China. Moreover, no trading country, such as Japan, wants to tie up a very large share of its exports in so politically volatile a market as China at the present time. From the Chinese point of view, there is no need to trade with the United States so long as China can buy what it needs in Germany or Japan; therefore it probably will not reciprocate an offer to trade unless a change in trade relations is made a part of change in other relations as well. Thus, the real focus of a changed trade policy will be the opportunity it offers a post-Maoist Communist leadership to participate in and profit from the expanding East Asian economy based on Japan. The Communists are not likely to take this bait eagerly or without stringent controls of their own, but even under Mao Tse-tung they have found it ideologically not impossible to eat Canadian and Australian wheat or to import Japanese fertilizers. By entering the East Asian economic system more fully, China will be able to speed its economic development, one of the authentic goals of the Chinese revolution, a goal which predates and is likely to survive Mao Tse-tung. The long-range prospects for the economic development of China are good. Explorations by the Communists have revealed greater resources of petroleum, hydroelectric power, coal, iron, and light metals than any observer, Chinese or foreign, believed to exist twenty years ago. In addition, the capacity of the Chinese people for social organization, hard work, and frugality suggests that the human prerequisites for development, including capital accumulation, exist at the present time in China. Even birth control, undertaken through the more disciplined methods of late marriage and delayed childbirth rather than through contraception alone, appears to have made headway despite Marxist prejudices. It is only in the short run, and largely because of the political leadership of an aged, possibly senile and megalomaniacal revolutionist, that China's economic development and the level of living of the Chinese people appear bleak. This short-run situation is changing at the present moment and is likely to be totally transformed in the relatively near future. Mao Tse-tung and his generation must soon pass from the scene. Mao's efforts in the Cultural Revolution to predetermine the qualities of his successors have, if anything, brought to power in positions of regional and local leadership men who are more pragmatic and more nationalistic (i.e., the 2.5 million men of the Peoples Liberation Army) than his defeated enemies in the Communist Party bureaucracy. Thus, it is entirely in conformity with events to predict that the emerging generation of Chinese leaders will be in Communist parlance "revisionist," but with the added meaning that they will redirect their energies toward the two main goals of the century-old Chinese revolution of which the Chinese Communist movement is only a segmentnamely, great-power status and economic development for China. A realliance between China and Russia seems utterly improbable. The binding force of Marxist-Leninist ideology has become as weak as water, both because of Mao's thorough de-Europeanizing of it for the benefit of Chinese communicants and because of Russia's sharp turn toward imperialism. The Chinese have good reason to remain hostile to the Soviet Union for decades to come. Not only did Russia support China in a niggardly and authoritarian way, but it also tried, during the 1960s, to cripple China economically and to isolate it from all other Communist nations. The conquest of Czechoslovakia and the proclamation of the "Brezhnev doctrine" (whereby Russia stakes out an imperial claim to direct the policies of all so-called "socialist" nations) have only thrown up further and more difficult obstacles to any Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Even Mao Tse-tung seems to appreciate that there are worse things on earth than doing business with "capitalist" nations; he has recently elevated "Soviet revisionism" to the same level as "American imperialism," calling them common enemies of the Chinese and "all progressive peoples of the world." American foreign policy in Asia, worked out in conjunction with our Japanese partners, should become responsive to and aligned with these overall economic and political trends. The United States must, through its treaty commitments and actions to implement them, convey to the Chinese leaders what they will not be allowed to do: plunge East Asia into another war because of the ideological pressures and pretensions of the Asian Communist revolution. At the same time, the United States must adjust these necessities of containment so they support and encourage what the Chinese have every right to do: develop their own country, feel secure, and participate in the international life of the world as an equal. THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Recently at two separate meetings of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, actions were taken with respect to United States-China relations. The first of these was a recommendation within a larger report on the war in Indo-China to the 183rd General Assembly of our church, meeting in Rochester, New York, May 17-26, 1971. That recommendation was as follows: (We) Welcome President Nixon's initiatives to improve U.S.-China relations, and encourage the possibility of the entry of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations, recognizing that a permanent and just peace must consider the interests of China. Following the General Assembly, our Council on Church and Society, on which this Commission is represented, met on June 12-13, 1971 and approved the attached statement on U.S.-China Relations. It is our understanding that the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which you are chairman, will be holding hearings on U.S.-China Relations later this month and therefore we are communicating these resolutions of our church to you for consideration. You will note that we have encouraged our government to approve the seating of the People's Republic in the United Nations as the government of China as well as to pursue all available opportunities for developing further economic, social, cultural and diplomatic relations. As your committee studies this matter prior to the announcement of the Administration regarding the position it will assume concerning the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, we would urge your strong support of their being seated as the government of China, recognizing that the complex question of the future of Taiwan will need to be considered as a separate matter. Your attention on this matter will be greatly appreciated. DONALD J. WILSON, Secretary for Race Relations and for International Affairs. STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS We, the Council on Church and Society, affirm our belief that major measures should be taken to enable the People's Republic of China to enter into normal relationships with the full international community and specifically into membership in the United Nations. Such membership would reduce international tension, make possible more constructive dealing with the issues of war and peace in East and Southeast Asia, foster trade, encourage cultural exchanges, and lead to new levels of mutual understanding by the peoples of China and those of other nations. Therefore, we welcome the recent measures taken by the People's Republic of China and the U.S.A. which promise increased contact and openness between the two governments and peoples. In particular we commend President Nixon for his initiative in ending the twenty-one year old embargo on trade with the People's Republic of China. We encourage our Government to indicate its approval of the membership of the People's Republic of China in the UN as the government of China, and to pursue all available opportunities for developing further economic, social, cultural, and diplomatic relations. We recognize that there remain complex issues regarding Taiwan's future, but we are convinced that these need not impede the development of mutually respectful relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States. Approved by the Council on Church and Society June 13, 1971. STATEMENT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON (By the League of Women Voters of the United States) The League of Women Voters of the United States is pleased to have this opportunity to present to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee its members' views on U.S.-China relations. We feel that the Committee hearings on this subject are both timely and important to future U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China. In the spring of 1969, after three years of detailed study, League members reached agreement on several issues associated with the question of the international and diplomatic status of the People's Republic of China (PRC). At that time, our members made it clear that they favor initiatives by the United States to facilitate PRC participation in the world community. In order to implement this goal, League members, numbering 167,000 nation-wide, favor unilateral U.S. moves to encourage normalization of U.S. contact with the PRC on three levels: first, on the level of travel and cultural exchange; second, on the level of commercial relations; and finally, on the level of diplomatic relations with the U.S. and within the United Nations. In recent months, the Administration has taken several new steps toward a loosening of trade and travel restrictions with respect to mainland China. League members are gratified by these indications of greater realism and increasing flexibility in the U.S. stance toward the PRC. League members have noted with equal interest the reaction of the American people to this spring's venture on the part of both governments into the field of ping-pong diplomacy. The warm and enthusiastic response accorded these developments clearly indicates public readiness to accept and endorse further forward movement in the United States' relations with the People's Republic. Throughout this period, members of Congress have shown their responsiveness to both the changing framework of international relations and of American public opinion. This attentiveness to the pressing problem of U.S.-China relations is clearly demonstrated by the presentation of no fewer than five resolutions, all currently before this Committee, as well as several House resolutions. There is no single "China issue," but several, each related to all the others. We would like to address ourselves to the separate aspects of U.S.-China relations, starting with the relatively limited questions of commercial and cultural exchange, then moving to the issue of U.N. representation, and finally to the question of diplomatic recognition. Under the heading of trade and travel, we recommend a prompt return to everyday patterns of communication and non-strategic commerce. The key word here is "everyday." For too long, the Western image of the Chinese people has been based upon the accentuation of differences, whether racial, ideological, cultural, or linguistic-often to such a degree that many Americans find it impossible to visualize 800 million Chinese as individual human beings. The political dangers resulting from such stereotyping are well-documented. These dangers can be lessened, however, through increased communication and reciprocal commercial relations. Among nations, it is often ignorance, not familiarity, that breeds contempt. We believe that as soon as possible, the U.S. should move toward free and open trade in non-strategic goods with the PRC. We welcome the significant steps that have already been taken in this direction, as announced by the Administration June 10, and we would urge an even further loosening of commercial restrictions. In advocating policies which would encourage normalization of U.S. relations with the Chinese mainland, the League believes that the U.S. should respond favorably to the questions of PRC representation in the United Nations. As the legitimate government of China, the PRC is entitled to be seated in the Security Council, as well as in the General Assembly. The League of Women Voters believes that the United States should be prepared, beginning with the upcoming 26th session of the General Assembly, to support constructive initiatives leading to the seating of the PRC in both these U.N. organs. Naturally, such action cannot be taken if our government elects to continue to expend its energy and influence in the General Assembly to assure acceptance of the "Important Question" procedure, requiring a two-thirds majority on the China representation issue. We urge, therefore, that the U.S. immediately abandon its previous position concerning the use of the "Important Question" procedure. League members acknowledge the sensitivity of both the PRC and the government of Taiwan to the implications of such a change in the composition of the United Nations. The League also recognizes that it remains highly unlikely that any U.N. representation decision will finally resolve the differences between the mainland and Taiwan. We believe that the United States should not attempt to resolve, on a unilateral or bilateral basis, the highly complex questions of the Taiwan problem. It is our position that the United States has neither the power nor the authority to do so. The consequenuces that the seating of the PRC will have for the government on Taiwan should instead be dealt with by the two governments themselves and by the world community in the context of the United Nations. We believe that the United States can contribute to a solution by seeking, within this multilateral framework, possible step-by-step constructive solutions to the problem of Taiwan's political identity and political future. In keeping with this multilateral emphasis we urge the Administration, and the Congress, to adopt a stance which would facilitate long-range peaceful resolution of the differences between the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Such a stance could involve a thoughtful re-examination of U.S. military presence on Taiwan, in so far as that presence prevents a settlement between Peking and Taipei. Such actions might serve to diffuse some of the current tension between the PRC and the government on Taiwan and to encourage more matterof-fact consideration of the real issues at stake, both within the multilateral framework and by the two parties themselves. In adidtion, U.S. action along these lines would clearly have a salutory effect on our relations with Peking. Finally, the League of Women Voters believes that the time has come to move beyond relaxation of trade and travel restrictions and a loosening of our position at the U.N., and toward the goal of full normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC. Since it is abundantly clear that the PRC has established its identity as the sole legitimate government of China, it is evident that normalization of U.S.-China relations cannot be fully consolidated until there is a U.S. Ambassador in Peking and an accredited spokesman of the PRC in Washington. Constructive moves toward establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, therefore, should be an item high on the Administration's agenda. We are gratified to note that several resolutions before this Committee accord appropriate emphasis to this essential element in the process of restoring China to membership in the family of nations. We feel that current efforts to deal with the more immediate U.N. questions, however important in themselves, should not be allowed to obscure or impede serious attempts to deal with the most significant aspect of U.S.-China policy-progress toward diplomatic recognition. As the government of the PRC resumes an outward-looking stance, and as relationships among all Asian nations continue to adjust and evolve, the U.S. must be certain that its actions encourage, rather than impede active and responsible international behavior on the part of the PRC. Such mainland participation, of course, will not guarantee peace in Asia, but we believe that it is a necessary prerequisite for stability in that region and, in this nuclear age, a prerequisite for true global security as well. The League of Women Voters of the United States strongly urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to report to the Senate a resolution paralleling the above-mentioned principles. Many of those principles which League members endorse are contained in both the McGovern and Kennedy resolutions, now pending before this Committee. Through the passage of a clearly-worded de finitive statement of position, the Senate has an opportunity to assume a leading role in U.S. policy-making toward the People's Republic of China. We hope this Committee and the full Senate will take that opportunity and act upon it without hesitation. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE Washington, D.C., June 28, 1971. Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: On behalf of the National Council of Churches I would like to submit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee our testimony on U.S. policy toward China and to request that our testimony be included in the official record of your current hearings on that subject. Since your Committee was unable to hear in person all those groups requesting to testify, including the National Council of Churches, we were requested by the Committee staff to submit our testimony in writing. I am enclosing two copies of the testimony and we can make additional copies available should the Committee have need of them. Sincerely, ALLAN M. PARRENT. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A. Testimony on U.S. Policy Toward China for Presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 29, 1971 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: My name is Allan M. Parrent. I am Director of the Washington Program, Department of International Affairs, National Council of Churches. I am submitting in writing the following testimony on U.S. policy toward China on behalf of the National Council of Churches. The National Council is an ecumenical federation of thirty-three Christian denominations with a combined membership of about 43 million. No one can speak for all these denominations of their many members and I do not claim to do so. My testimony is based on explicit policy adopted by the General Board of the National Council, a governing body of 250 members which meets several times a year. This body is made up of delegates selected by the member denominations in proportion to their size. We welcome this opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. policy toward China, but welcome even more the recent evidence of new initiatives, new perceptions, and a new political environment which doubtless were factors in bringing these hearings about. The vote in the United Nations General Assembly last November in which a majority for the first time supported the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in that body, a series of resolutions proposed by various members of the Congress, and, of course, the highly publicized "ping-pong diplomacy" event have all helped to make a major re-evaluation of U.S.-China relations an idea whose time has come. Major credit should be given to the present Administration for helping to create a political atmosphere in which these and other similar events could take place. During his presidential campaign, Mr. Nixon spoke of his awareness that China could not be left outside the family of nations indefinitely, "there to nourish its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors." He went further in his first foreign policy report when he declared his intention to "take what steps we can toward improved practical relations" with China and stated that "the principles underlying our relations with Communist China are similar to those governing our policies toward the U.S.S.R.” A major “practical" step was taken this spring when the President acted to end the 21-year-old ban on direct U.S.-Chinese trade, to ease travel restrictions, and to lift currency exchange barriers. We of course applaud this long overdue step. The National Council of Churches has for many years opposed the main thrust of U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China, believed such a policy of total exclusion to be both politically shortsighted and morally questionable. Therefore, we welcome the thaw which has been developing in recent months and believe it is now time for further and more far-reaching actions to solve major outstanding differences and to heal the painful and dangerous rift between these two great nations. While we believe that the American people have 70-772-72- -30 |