whom this request is addressed emerged as independent States through the route of self-determination initiated by the international influence of the United Nations, including holding plebiscites under its direct aegis.

23. Therefore, a legally, politically and morally sound solution to Formosa's indeterminate status is to hold a plebiscite in Formosa. It must be held under the auspices of the United Nations in accord with the principle of self-determination. Only in that manner can the Formosan people freely express their will and determine their future.

24. Only when Formosa becomes free and independent can the China question be answered. There is only one China. When it fulfills the Charter requirements, it should be seated in the United Nations. There is only one Formosa, which should be free and independent.

25. In the light of the foregoing, we urge the Member States to adopt in the 25th General Assembly a Resolution, declaring the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations applicable to Formosa (Taiwan), particularly the preemptory principle of self-determination. Noting the critical relation of Formosa's status and world peace, the Member States can direct the appropriate U.N. instrumentality to commence the implementation of a plebiscite for Formosa (Taiwan).

PROPOSED RESOLUTION ON

SELF-DETERMINATION FOR FORMOSA-TAIWAN

The general assembly

Considering that self-determination is a fundamental principle of the United Nations and of World Order,

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, Considering its commitment to human rights throughout the world,

Considering its competence to deal with matters of international concern that may threaten the peace of the world,

Recognizing that Formosa (Taiwan) is a former Japanese colony whose international legal status was left undetermined by the post World War II Peace Treaty with Japan,

Deploring that the Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) regime has continued to occupy Formosa with neither international legal right nor the consent of the people of Formosa,

Noting with grave concern that the continued illegal occupation, neo-colonial domination, subjugation and exploitation of the people of Formosa by the Nationalist Chinese exiled regime contravene purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Confirms

That denying self-determination to the people of Formosa under the perpetual state of siege (martial law) constitutes a threat to the peace;

That the legal, political and cultural status of Formosa are matters of international concern ;

That by virtue of the foregoing the plenary jurisdiction of the General Assembly is activated;

Recommends

That an internationally supervised plebiscite be held forthwith on Formosa (Taiwan) to resolve the indeterminate status of Formosa and to decide the form of government desired by the electorate people of Formosa;

That the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples be forthwith directed to supervise the preparations for the plebicite.

REPORT BY U.S.-CHINA COMMITTEE, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW

"AN EVEN-HANDED POLICY TOWARD PEKING AND MOSCOW"

(By Paul Findley, March 26, 1970)

Earlier this month the Nixon Administration took another forward stepsmall but nevertheless significant-in easing relations with Mainland China by announcing that travel to that country by Americans would be permitted

"for any legitimate purpose." This was the third announcement in a series by the State Department which hopefully will bring about greater contact and understanding between our two countries.

Last July, the Administration decided to permit six categories of Americans to have their passports validated for travel to China. In addition, U.S. citizens traveling abroad were told they could bring back $100 worth of goods originating in China.

Then, in December the Administration further liberalized the regulations governing trade with China. The $100 ceiling on Communist Chinese goods which could be brought into the United States was removed entirely. More significantly, the ban on trade with China by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms was also lifted. Last year I wrote to President Nixon urging him completely to "remove from U.S. passports the requirement of an official endorsement which prohibits travel to China by most Americans." The action taken last week by the State Department removes that prohibition for all practical purposes. It is the type of bold initiative which I feel will contribute to world peace and security, but other initiatives remain to be taken, other doors opened, other barriers knocked down. Although much remains to be done, the United States is beginning to show a progressive attitude toward participation by the People's Republic of China in the world community.

At the United Nations on September 18, 1969, President Nixon stated to the General Assembly that our country is ready to talk with the leaders of Communist China in a frank and serious spirit whenever they choose to abandon their self-imposed isolation. Representative Irving Whalley, who is a U.S. representative at the United Nations and who delivered the official U.S. statement of position on the Albanian resolution to seat the People's Republic of China and expel Nationalist China, did not at any point preclude future membership for China in the United Nations or place unreasonable restrictions upon such membership. Rather, he stated that the United States "shares the conviction that it is important for mainland China to return to the family of nations." And Representative Whalley reiterated Secretary of State Rogers' comment that "Communist China obviously has long been too isolated from world affairs."

This year, the vote to seat Mainland China and to expel Nationalist China won four more votes than last year. Even this small shift is evidence of the slow but steady progress being made each year, and of the inevitability with which most view China's eventual seating at the United Nations. Mainland China maintains that it has a "legitimate right" to be represented in the world body and would doubtlessly assume a seat in the U.N. under certain circumstances. By the year 2000, China will contain one-third of the people in the world and no one will surely question that right. Hopefully it will not take that long for this most populous country to be accorded representation in some form and to cease its isolation.

While it is fair to describe China's isolation as self-imposed, it is also true that this isolation has been encouraged by U.S. policy. Our government has but limited potential for influencing internal China policy, but at least we can discard the remnance of our own out-dated, self-defeating and ineffective effort to isolate China.

The time is long past, if it ever existed, when Communist China can be isolated within her Asian borders merely by the fact that the United States pretends that politically and economically it does not exist. The time is past when this giant among nations can be ignored and relegated to the ranks of those either too weak or too muscle-bound to deserve attention. The time has gone, if it ever existed, when simple bilateral power politics between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is sufficient to assure the security of the world-eastern and western alike. The time has gone when the United States can afford-either politically or economically-to stand idly by in the make-believe of mythology while other countries adapt to the reality of the changing relationships among Russia and the two Chinas.

It may be argued that there never was a such a time; that only minor countries separated by huge geographical, economic and cultural expanses could afford to conduct their policies as if China did not exist. The Asian countries which rim China, while many have welcomed our support, have never for a moment felt that China was isolated. Rather, they have only hoped that Communist China be "balanced" by western support.

The balance was based upon the fact that while China was as close as next door to many of these countries, it had not yet achieved the status of world

power. Thus, what the United States and other western countries lacked in proximity and understanding of their Asian friends, we made up in military and political power.

This balanced situation no longer exists. While the geographical separation still exists between the east and the west, China has itself truly become a power with a major influence on world affairs, and one to be reckoned with whenever major policy is formulated, whenever world security is discussed, whenever conditions, of peace are sought. Thus, Prince Sihanouk has journeyed to Moscow and Peking, seeking their support for the removal of North Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and to support his personal position at home. China's influence in Asia is unquestioned.

The enormous power of this Asian giant has been demonstrated most convincingly within the Communist family of nations. China's behavior over the last decade and a half caused her great ally, the U.S.S.R., to reduce economic and military support to a trickle, to call home its ambassador, and to make contingency plans for the possibility of unlimited war with Communist China.

The Soviet Union created a new Central Asian Military District along its 1,000 mile border with China in the area of Sinkiang province. Moscow also shifted the former First Deputy Commander of Soviet strategic missile forces to head up the Far Eastern Military District on the Manchurian border to the north.

Western intelligence shows a marked shifting of some Soviet nuclear-tipped short range missile installations into positions threatening China, not the West. One year ago, in the early months of 1969, both sides reported bloody clashes between armed regulars of the two countries along the 4.575 miles of territory which forms their common border. Western newsmen who have spoken with soldiers while traveling the trans-Siberian railway confirm these incidents and testify to the rapid and heavy build-up of armed material, tanks, troops and other war supplies which could be used defensively or offensively. And Soviet correspondent Victor Louis, who often operates at the behest of the Soviet officials, reported after one of these border incidents over islands in the Ussuri River that "the whole surface of the island was burned together with any Chinese troops and equipment there." Such "scorched earth" tactics are extreme indeed, and suggests that fighting has been particularly savage between these former allies.

Perhaps the most significant piece of news to come out of Moscow since the invasion of Czechoslovakia was the speculation that the U.S.S.R. might be giving serious consideration to the possibility and consequences of mounting a surprise attack upon China, with the intention of knocking out China's nuclear facilities and perhaps other industrial and population centers. This possibility of a pre-emptive first-strike was apparently broached to member nations of the Warsaw Pact in anticipation of any expanded conflict. Whether or not the Russians ever seriously contemplate such a conquest, no one can doubt that their satellites in Europe, still smarting from the invasion of Czechoslovakia, viewed the possibility as a very real one. The Brezhnev Doctrine, which proclaims the right of socialist countries to intervene in each other's internal affairs, is surely as applicable to China as it was to Eastern Europe.

China recognized this fully, and began making preparations for all out war with the Soviet Union. Air-raid shelters and complex systems of tunnels have been constructed in many areas, and air-raid drills have become a part of regular Chinese life. Training in guerrilla combat tactics with dummy guns has been given to Chinese men so that should war come, they will be equipped and capable of defending their homeland.

There can be little doubt that the Communist Chinese feared greatly an outbreak of war and took steps to lessen its impact should it occur. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that the danger of an Asian explosion between Russia and China has yet passed.

True, the rising crescendo of mutual vilification between Moscow and Peking En-Lai on September 11, 1969. However, Victor Louis' justification for Soviet intervention in China in terms of the Brezhnev Doctrine came one week after the meeting in Peking. And on the evening the Sino-Soviet talks were to begin Tass distributed a summary of an article describing "the adventurist and chauvinistic policy of the present leaders of the Chinese Communist Party." On this unpromising note, the talks began in October, 1969. Almost six months later, the two parties appear to be deadlocked, and the prospect for a long, hot summer along their borders all the more real.

With Soviet troops massed threateningly just inside Russia, the Chinese have insisted that they will not negotiate "under the barrel." Before any progress can occur, Peking demands the withdrawal of troops from 60 to 100 kilometers behind their respective borders. The Russians refuse, asserting that this will leave the way clear for Chinese encroachment.

Vasily V. Kuznetsov, the Soviet chief negotiator, has already returned to Moscow once for new instructions. But the intransigence of both parties on the basic issues which divide them continues to remain. If Kuznetsov returns home a second time without progress, the talks in Peking may follow the same course as the Paris Peace Talks.

Already this year there have been unconfirmed reports of a new clash on the Ussuri River last month. Even if they are false, such reports only add to the tension and beget emotions and circumstances which may cause such an outbreak in the future.

The possibility of an outbreak of war between Russia and China poses an incredible threat to world peace and security, and in fact, a threat to the very existence of life as we know it. The threat has been spawned by a controversy dating back into antiquity and of undeminished ferocity.

Although experts may differ as to the likelihood of war breaking out, and the significance to be attributed to the polemics surrounding the controversy, none can doubt the seriousness of the situation. Some suggest grimly that war is inevitable, that it is merely a matter of timing for the Soviet Union to select the exact moment when a first strike will be most effective. Others, who are more optimistic, believe that war is unlikely and that Russia threatens only to maximize its bargaining position in the meetings being held in Peking. Yet the Chinese have given no sign of bending to threats of military force, and this unyielding attitude may yet provoke the Soviets into considering the real possibilities of a first strike. Russia is not used to dealing with anything but a weak China. The prospect of a strong China on the southeast flank, dominating Asia, may be more than Moscow bargained for and it may tempt militarists to make a preemptive first-strike even as some in the United States suggested a similar course of action a quarter century ago when Russia was developing her own nuclear potential.

The attitude and the policies adopted by the United States at this critical point in world history-as the Asian cauldron containing Russia and China continues to boil-may well determine the future of mankind.

What the United States must realize in making such a policy judgement is that with the rise of China to the status of a major power, world diplomacy and power politics have become much more complex. At the same time, a world with three great powers instead of two also presents new opportunities for great national leaders.

The United States, as the only one of the three great powers committed to individual liberty, is fortunate to have as its President in this crucial, challenging formative stage in world diplomacy a man willing to think anew and act anew. His actions thus far have, in my judgement, greatly added to the stability of peace and the stature of the United States in the eyes of all mankind.

For example, consider President Nixon's visit to Rumania just six months after taking office. To the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe is private property. Just how private was amply demonstrated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which it spawned. The fact that an American president actually visited an Eastern European communist nation at the invitation of its President speaks well of the future course of our relations with that part of the world. But more important is what that visit symbolizes to all Europeans-east and west alike.

When the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, many in West Germany feared that troops from that Warsaw Pact would not stop at the German borders. Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania, members of the Eastern bloc who are to varying degrees independent, also felt the icy breath of Moscow upon them. Similarly, the message was not lost upon Red China. As a consequence, Peking issued a warning to the Soviets that intrusions upon the territorial integrity of its European allies would be intolerable and the Romanians and Yugoslavs pledged their mutual support for each other and began organizing people's militia to protect their own independence.

Seizing upon these signs of defiance in the fact of overwhelming Soviet military might, President Nixon decided to indicate clearly the position of the United States in favor of national independence by visiting the Romanians and talking with their President. The rest is history.

The Romanians accorded him a tumultuous welcome, unprecedented even for their own national heroes. The President earned more goodwill for the American people than our national leadership had engendered in almost a decade. And in the international diplomatic game of "one-upmanship", the President had clearly won the first round.

Similarly, the dispute between the Soviet Union and Red China-the Nixon Administration adopted a stance which greatly contributed to the peace and security of the world while at the same time maximizing the stature of the United States.

He wisely rejected the forecast from some quarters that an all-out war between the two Communist giants would benefit the United States. While the resulting holocaust might well cripple both and perhaps demolish one of the Communist power centers, it could not possibly leave the United States unscathed.

The conflict might quickly spread to worldwide proportions, engaging the United States itself. Even if Soviet and Chinese military operations were aimed only at each other, its consequences inevitably would seriously endanger other nations.

War between Russia and China would certainly involve the use of nuclear weapons, almost of necessity. Thus, the possibility of massive nuclear fall-out would present a grave danger to life and health in the western hemisphere. Also, peace, security, and stability would hardly be enhanced; the survivor in such an engagement would emerge as the unchallenged leader of the Communist world, a development certain to influence neutral nations and complicate U.S. policy problems.

In a carefully worded statement, Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Richardson announced the U.S. policy of non-alignment in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Starting that the conflict would not deter the United States from trying to improve relations with the Chinese, Richardson said:

"President Nixon has concluded that our national security would in the long run be prejudiced by associating ourselves with either side against the other. Each is highly sensitive about American efforts to improve relations with the other. We intend, nevertheless, to pursue a long-term course of progressively developing better relations with both."

As intelligence and other evidence began to show that the Soviet Union might be giving serious consideration to mounting a military offensive against the Chinese, the United States acted to make sure that the entire world was apprised of this possibility and to bring world opinion to bear on the Russians to forestall such action.

The surprise of the invasion of Czechoslovakia was still fresh in mind. This daring move by the Soviet Union had paid off handsomely, and its success might prompt an act of even greater daring against China. The world needed to be put on notice concerning the possibility of a Soviet invasion of China.

The positive acts by the United States may well have helped deter the Soviets from this adventure. They also served a valuable purpose in laying the foundation for additional peaceful initiatives.

Our Administration now has the rare opportunity to facilitate an important advance in U.S.-Chinese relations. This is so because of the convergence of several major factors.

First, there is little likelihood that the U.S.S.R. and Red China will work out their differences sufficiently to permit any real cooperation between them to the detriment of the West. Present differences are long standing and will not be overridden in a few meetings. China adamantly maintains that Russia appropriated 100 million square miles of Chinese territory in unequal treaties imposed upon them in years past by the Czars. While China does not presently demand its return, this disputed territory remains a sore point. Moreover, about 20,000 additional square miles of land are in active dispute between the two nations.

In addition, China is unlikely to forget being stabbed in the back by its Soviet allies in 1960, when Premier Khrushchev, spurred by the widening ideological gap between the two countries, suddenly withdrew most economic and military aid and support from China. This left the Chinese in an extremely sensitive and precarious position, with many industrial factories incomplete, and others unable to operate because of the lack of trained technicians. China was prematurely and summarily forced into a position of self-sufficiency, and it is unlikely that it will soon, if ever, put faih in the Soviet Union.

Second, China feels challenged by Russia in what it regards as its own legitimate sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. The heavy support given by Russia to