The conventional wisdom has been and remains that Communist China's entry into Korea was a manifestation of pure aggression on that country's part. The U.S. pushed for and achieved condemnation of China in the U.N. While I understand and in part agree with our government's posture on China at that time, the point that has been missed is that Communist China most certainly felt threatened by our military actions in the Asian Theatre and we must take part of the blame for her entry into the Korean War.

Presently the United States has over 800,000 men militarily encircle half of China. On her eastern and southern border, from Japan to Thailand, the line of American military bases stretches from Okinawa through South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The United States is still intervening in the remnants of the Chinese Civil War, not only by supporting the Chinese forces on Taiwan, but also by giving logistical support to the Chinese forces on Quemoy and Matsu Islands just off the coast of the mainland.

Thus the situation has changed very little from the time twenty years ago when our original China policy was established and it is my fear that our current inflexible China policy carries with it the risk of another (avoidable) military conflict. I did say that there has been some talk on the part of the Nixon Administartion as to a change in China policy. And the President reduced the Taiwan Strait Patrol of the Seventh Fleet as an indication of his good faith. Yet as I pointed out, military assistance to Taiwan continues unabated. At this time approximately 10,000 American troops remain on Taiwan-there have been repeaed rumors that a large American air base is being built on that island.

Last fall the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill authorizing 54.5 million dollars to provide an 18 to 20-plane squadron of F4 jet fighters to Taiwan. Fortunately during conference, that authorization was defeated by the Senate. But at the end of January, 1970, the Pentagon announced that Taiwan would be getting 34 F100A aircraft to modernize its air force. Although Congress refused to approve military authorizations for Taiwan, the Executive branch proceeded to give Taiwan the jet fighters.

On March 30, 1970, the State Department confirmed that the U.S. "secretly supplied Nationalist China with surplus military equipment last year, including war planes and four destroyers, worth $157 million.' In 1968 the official defense spending of the Taiwan government was $302 million. In 1969 the figure was comparable. Consequently with United States gifts of $157 million, in a secret arms agreement our government furnished the equivalent of one half of Taiwan's defense budget. This action was taken without the knowledge of Congress which has the Constitution-given power to appropriate money for such gifts.

Thus a reasonable man in Communist China might conclude that the U.S. foreign policy toward his country remains one of blind hostility and that his country will have to react accordingly. The risk exists, then, that we will find ourselves in military conflict with China. Based on the recent past, at least some of the blame would have to be placed at our feet if this conflict occurs.

Take a look at China's handling of her close to 3 million man army. There has been no sizeable shift in China's deployment of troops in the last few years. Those troops that have been moved have been transferred to the Sino-Soviet frontier. Approximately one-fourth of the army is deployed on the coast between Shantung and Hong Kong. It is situated in anticipation of an attack from Taiwan. Along the axis of the Canton Wuhan Railroad there is another quarter of the army. In Manchuria and around Peking the third quarter of the army resides. The fourth quarter is located in Tibet (3 divisions), Sinkiang (4 divisions), Inner Mongolia (4 divisions), Hainan Island (3 divisions), Western China (11 divisions), Szechuan and Uynnan (12 divisions). Along the SinoSoviet border there are approximately eight to nine additional divisions not included in the above figure of three million. It is generally agreed that the Chinese forces are deployed defensively and it would be very difficult for them to mount an offensive, especially on more than one front.

The Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance for 1969-70 states: "China's conventional arms industry would be in no position to produce weapons on a scale needed for war; neither could Chinese-produced nuclear arms be a substitute for them." High members of the Nixon Administration have indicated that essentially China's foreign and defense policy over the last few years has been very cautious and essentially one of nonintervention. While the Chinese have been supporters of various wars of liberation, at the present time they remain non-involved in the matter of sending troops to assist various communist

movements in Asia. Marshall Lin-Piao's famous speech in 1965 was widely quoted as being a Chinese Mein Kamp, yet essentially advocated not direct Chinese action and involvement in wars of liberation, but a fairly generalized support-logistical and otherwise-of these wars of liberation. In many ways it commits the Chinese to nearly nothing, yet leaves their options open to provide support when necessary.

In a recent paper presented at an Asian scholars meeting in Washington, Professor Mark Mancall of Stanford University addressed himself squarely to that question "Monolithic Communism: The Falacy of the China Threat." Professor Mancall says: "While America's justification of its war in Southeast Asia has passed through many verbal permutations in the last three administrations, it has hewn to one major theme: the threat of an aggressive Communist China and the need to contain it through the maintenance of a balance of power in that region. Moreover, it has insisted upon this theme despite the failure of reality to match Washington's expectations."

He then goes ont to quote various Administration officials from Eisenhower's to the present ones indicating that we must maintain a strong presence in East Asia. Otherwise there would be a "grave imbalance of power." In 1965 President Johnson in a speech at Johns Hopkins University said, "Over this war-and all The Asia-is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China . contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes." Undersecretary of State Richardson evidently used the same argument to justify our actions in Vietnam and Cambodia in a recent meeting with a group of visiting professors and students. Professor Mancall further states: "It would be logical to conclude, given this argument, that American escalation in Southeast Asia, particularly since 1964, took place either in response to an escalation of Chinese activities in the region or as a preemptive measure to prevent Chinese escalation. However, the Chinese have rather persistently spoken loudly but carried a small stick. They have always talked of support, not intervention."

Mancall concludes by stating: ". . . the escalation of American involvement to well over 500,000 men was independent of any real Chinese threat in Indochina itself; nor did the Chinese respond at any time with a comparable influx of personnel into combat areas of North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia . . . Peking has wanted to maximize her influence in the region while minimizing the possibility of a direct United States-China conflict." China has displayed utmost caution in confrontation with the United States, while the U.S. has elusively sought to continually contain the so-called China threat which never really did materialize. One result has been a tragic war in Indochina. If we are to avoid future and wider war, it is time we reassess our China policy.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

I propose the following steps the United States Government could undertake in developing a genuinely new China policy.

1. Recognize as President Truman did prior to the Korean War that the fight over Taiwan is a dispute internal to all Chinese. I realize that there would of necessity be a transitional period between the phasing out of our present policy and the implementation of this new one, but we should state this policy as our objective. I was delighted to see that the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright, in a recent article said, "I think there is nothing for the United States to do as to the status of Taiwan except to leave it to the Chinese to resolve-or to leave it unresolvedin their own way." He went on to state that, "It is by no means clear that the Chinese themselves can resolve this issue, but it is quite clear that if it can be solved, it is only the Chinese that can solve it." Essentially then, Fulbright calls for non-intervention in the Chinese civil conflict, precisely what President Truman advocated prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in mid 1950. 2. The United States should withdraw American forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and terminate military aid to Chinese nationalist authorities. This action would be the first step in implementing the policy enunciated abovea withdrawal from the Chinese civil conflict. Very possibly the controlling function that the Taiwan Strait patrol of the Seventh Fleet has been undertaking for the last twenty years could be performed by the Chinese Nationalist Navy which includes ships of the same caliber as in the U.S. patrol.

3. In order to add credibility to our change in policy toward China we must end the current policy of military encirclement and trade embargo of China. This 70-772-72- -32

step would be in keeping with the Nixon Administration's avowed aim of a lower profile in Asia. As was stated earlier, we have military bases and troops in every country in China's border from Japan to Thailand. Such stationing of troops seems unnecessary in an age in which our primary defense is strategic nuclear weapons. I question the necessity of having military bases on China's borders. It provides too much a provocation to China-a provocation not worth the risk of a Sino-American confrontation.

4. After the above steps had been taken by the United States, we could then make a meaningful attempt to establish economic, social, cultural, and diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect, and nonintervention in each others' affairs.

In essence, the above constitutes the policy whinch recognizes the fact that the Peoples Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of mainland China. Although a new departure for the United States, this policy is followed by many of our allies. Most importantly, it is a policy based on the actual facts of the situation, and not a perpetuation of the myth that surrounds the present policy. While we have no guarantee that China would react favorably to a new policy, there have been indications from the Chinese that if this kind of policy is adopted by the United States Government, there could be a very rapid establishment of diplomatic relations between our two governments.

President Kennedy in his famous address at the American University in 1963 quoted a Chinese saying: "A journey of a thousand miles starts with a single step." Sino-American relations have for the last twenty-one years been frozen in the concern that developed in the early 1950's and the era of the late Senator McCarthy. It is time to break with the past and take that one bold step along the path of reconciliation between two great powers-the United States and China. With the policy stated above, we can start down that long road. Peace in Asia and peace in the world make it imperative that we move now.

CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(By Jonathan B. Bingham, July 8, 1970)

BACKGROUND

The problem concerning Chinese representation in the United Nations arose after the Communist regime of Mao Tse-tung gained control of the Chinese mainland in late 1949 and the National regime of Chiang Kai-shek established itself on Taiwan (Formosa). Both claimed to be the only legitimate government of China. Each government claimed the seat of China, which was an original member of the United Nations and a veto-possessing permanent member of the Security Council. The Nationalist government continued to occupy China's place as it already had a representative at the United Nations whose credentials had been certified earlier.

During 1950 the Soviet Union made attempts in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other organs and subsidiary bodies of the United Nations to unseat the Nationalist representative and seat the representative of Communist China. All of these attempts failed.' Subsequent efforts to unseat the Nationalist representative have also failed.

The manner in which the United Nations should decide the representation of a member nation is not spelled out in the United Nations Charter. Usually the rules of procedure of each organ stipulate that credentials are to be examined by a Credentials Committee whose report is passed upon by the parent body. However, whether a case of contested representation such as is involved in the case of China is a matter of credentials to be decided by a procedural vote, or whether it is a substantive question (thus requiring a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and the concurrence of all permanent members in the Security Council), has become part of the controversy.

Although each organ or subsidiary body of the United Nations decides matters of representation independently, the action of the General Assembly has been guiding. On December 14, 1950, a resolution of the General Assembly recommended that when a problem of representation arose "the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its interim Committee concerning any such question

1 1 Although the Executive and Liaison Committee of the Universal Postal Union seated : a Communist delegate provisionally, the decision was later reversed.

should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies."

In 1950 the General Assembly rejected, by 37 to 11, with 8 abstentions a Soviet draft resolution to seat the representative of the Peoples' Republic of China.

Starting in 1951 the tactic of the United States was to seek to postpone discussion of the so-called "ChiRep" item from year to year, thus preventing any substantive debate. This tactic succeeded for a while, but after 1953 the margin in favor of postponing discussion of the issue steadily declined and in 1960 the vote on the United States proposal was 42 in favor, 34 against, and 22 abstentions. The next year, 1961, instead of leading a move to keep the subject off the agenda as in the preceding years, the United States sponsored a resolution designating the question of Chinese representation an important question. This would make a two-thirds majority necessary to adopt a resolution on the subject. The resolution was adopted by a substantial margin, with 61 in favor, 34 against, and 7 abstentions. A Soviet draft resolution to remove the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek and invite representatives from the Peoples' Republic of China to participate was then defeated by a vote of 48 against, 36 in favor, and 20 abstentions.

This has been the pattern of action in the General Assembly every year since. 1965 was the high point for Peking, in terms of votes: in that year the resolution requiring a two-thirds majority on the issue passed by a margin of only seven votes, 56 in favor, 49 against, and 11 abstentions, and the vote on the resolution which would seat Peking and oust Taiwan was defeated by a vote of 48 to 56, with 21 abstentions.

It is interesting to note that in recent years Albania, not the U.S.S.R., has been the principal sponsor of this resolution. The only other Communist sponsor among the 14 co-sponsors last fall was Romania, the other sponsors being Algeria, Cambodia, Congo Brazzaville, Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Southern Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia. Last year for the first time the Soviet Union did not speak in the debate on the item.

Most states which favor the Albanian resolution vote against the important question resolution, but the United Kingdom, while voing for the Albanian resolution, has consistently supported the important question resolution, at the request of the United Staes.

THE "TWO CHINAS" APPROACH

For a number of years it has seemed to many observers that the logical solution to the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations was to have both Peking and Taiwan represented. There are various versions of this proposal, especially with respect to China's seat in the Security Council. At the one extreme, it has been suggested that Peking could be admitted to the United Nations (and the General Assembly) as a new member, possibly under the name "Peoples' Republic of China", with the Republic of China (Taiwan) retaining the Security Council seat. Other proposals include: (a) leaving the China seat on the Security Council vacant, and (b) adopting a Charter amendment which would eliminate China as a permanent member, possibly substituting India or Japan. The most common "Two Chinas" proposal would give the Security Council seat to Peking, but would leave Taiwan as a member of the General Assembly. This was the recommendation of a distinguished National Policy Panel set up by the United Nations Association and headed by Robert B. Roosa, as Chairman, and Frederick S. Beebe, as Vice Chairman.

There are all kinds of points to be made in favor of the U.N.A. Policy Panel's recommendation: it is logical; it reflects the factual situation; it is consistent with the idea of eventual self-determination for Taiwan which would give the Taiwanese control over their own political destiny; it preserves the principle of universality, which is widely recognized as the best principle for membership in the United Nations today.2

The "Two Chinas" approach, as reflected in the U.N.A. Policy Panel recommendations, is also politically realistic in the United States. A number of elected

2 It is unfortunate that the principle of universality is not consistently supported by a number of United Nations member states that favor the admission of Peking. The Lusaka Manifesto issued last year by Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, and supported by most African states, specifically call for the explusion of South Africa from the United Nations and its related agencies.

officials, including the author of this paper, have made recommendations along these lines without adverse effect, or even much adverse comment. Starting, I believe, in 1963, the State Department and the United States Mission to the United Nations gave serious consideration to the idea of having a study committee set up by the U.N. General Assembly to review the Chinese representation issue, with the idea that such a committee would no doubt come in with recommendations along the lines of the "Two Chinas" approach. In 1966 this idea came to fruition, and Italy emerged as the principal sponsor of such a resolution in the General Assembly, with the United States indicating its support of the resolution. The following paragraphs from Ambassador Goldberg's speech announcing the United States' position are of interest:

"Our discussions of this issue, I would recall, have always foundered on one rock: Peking's insistence that we repudiate solemn treaty commitments to the Republic of China and leave Peking a free hand to take over the people and territory of Taiwan.

"We have refused and shall continue to refuse to repudiate our commitments to the Republic of China.

"Similarly, we refuse to countenance any solution to the problem of Chinese representation which involves the expulsion of the Republic of China on Taiwan from the United Nations. As we understand the study-committee proposal, it does not in any way prejudice or undermine our commitments, nor indeed does it prejudge the results of the study to be made.

"We hope this inquiry of the committee may help to obtain answers to questions which can only be answered by Peking:

"Will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptably demands, and specifically the unacceptable demand that the Republic of China be expelled from this organization?

"And will they assume the obligations of the U.N. Charter, in particular the basic obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state?"

While the study resolution was not put forward in 1969, the statement of the United States Representative in the debate on the Chinese Representation issue (Congressman Whalley) was not at all polemical against Peking provided Taiwan would not have to be expelled.

On the question of political realities, it should be noted that the Congress each year routinely readopts provisions contained in the Department of State, Justice and Commerce Appropriation Act and in the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act reiterating the opposition of the Congress "to the seating in the United Nations of the Communist China regime as the representative of China." But these are only "sense of Congress" provisions not binding on the President, and indeed the provision in the Foreign Assistance Act contains the following rather mild language of what the President is requested to do in the even that Peking is seated in the Security Council or the General Assembly: In the event of the seating of representatives of the Chinese Communist regime in the Security Council of General Assembly of the United Nations, the President is requested to inform the Congress insofar as is compatible with the requirements of national security, of the implications of this action upon the foreign policy of the United States and our foreign relationships, including that created by membership in the United Nations, together with any recommendations which he may have with respect to the matter.

The trouble with the Two Chinas approach-and it is likely to prove a fatal weakness-is that this approach is opposed both by Taiwan and by Peking. The opposition of Taiwan would not necessarily be fatal, if Peking were agreeable. It is true that Taiwan currently enjoys a veto power in the Security Council and could argue that its expulsion from the Security Council would be a substantive matter, not a procedural one, and hence would be subject to the veto. Taiwan could also argue that a motion to declare the question of credentials for the seat in the Security Council a procedural question would itself be subject to veto (the so-called double veto). All this, however, would probably prove ineffective if all the major powers were prepared to support the substitution of Peking for Taiwan on the Security Council. In that event, it is hard to conceive that procedural devices by Taiwan would long delay the action."

Interestingly enough, in 1950, the United States took the position that the question of China's representation on the Security Council was a procedural matter, but in 1951 Secretary Acheson stated that, if it ever appeared the United States might be in a minority on the question, it would seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether the negative vote of a permanent member counted as a veto in such a case.