3. We deployed U.S. planes and ships to move hundreds of thousands of Nationalist soldiers into positions against the Chinese Communists, in what may well have been the largest airlift in the history of Asia.

4. We gave military aid, training, and equipment exclusively to the Nationalist forces. All told, we spent approximately 2 billion dollars between 1945 and 1949 in support of the Nationalists, a huge sum of money in those days.

5. And when it appeared in 1948-49 that the Chinese Communists were going to win, we lobbied among our allies to prevent their recognizing the new government.

In short, much as we have done in Vietnam, we intervened in a domestic civil war on the side of an unpopular, corrupted government and thereby criminally prolonged the agony of that civil war.

But what of our seemingly well-intentioned, if benighted, attempt in 1946 to bring the warring factions in China together? Even that effort, the Marshall Mission, loses most of its lustre in retrospect. True, its primary aims were to arrange a cease fire and to encourage the setting up of a coalition government. Our motives in pursuing those aims, however, suggests that something less than the desire for a just peace lay behind our efforts. We sought to arrange a cease fire largely because we feared that the Nationalist forces could not hold Manchuria from the Chinese Communists without such a halt in the fighting. And we sought to establish a coalition government expecting that the Nationalists would dominate it, and hoping that such domination, with our support, would lead to the elimination of Communists from the government. In short, it appears that the purpose of the Marshall Mission was to achieve by less costly means the same goal to which our military strategy had been tailored, the domination of China by the Nationalist forces. We consistently opposed the Communists, because we feared they would close the door on us. Ironically our persistent support of the Nationalist made it more likely that our fears would prove to be selffulfilling.

III

Very interesting, some might say, even enlightening as a precedent for our current Vietnam involvement, but why bring it up today when the immediate issue is what to do about China and the U.N.? Why? Because Peking's entry into the U.N. is not the central issue. Rather it is only the most immediate and most obvious aspect of the continuing crisis in our China policy. Why, because if we are to begin to deal with the Chinese on the basis of equality and mutual respect, we must begin to understand the basic core of truth in their perception of America's behavior toward China in the Twentieth Century. If we truly desire to improve relations with China, we cannot do so without first understanding what is important to China; what she is likely to be willing to bargain away and what she will not; what she sees as directly threatening her interests; and what the grounds are for Chinese suspicions of America, and how those suspicions can be overcome.

Chinese Communist suspicions of America, reinforced in the last half of the 1940s, were confirmed once again by America's behavior during the Korean war. Despite the fact that China did not initiate that war, despite the fact that China warned us she could not tolerate our crossing the 38th parallel and our driving up to the Yalu River, and despite our own awareness of these facts, we chose nonetheless to send our armies up to China's borders, to bomb those borders, and even before China entered the war in reasonable self-defense, to interpose our Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, both to prevent Peking from consolidating her victory and to perpetuate a rival claimant to China.

And after the Chinese entered the Korean war under these circumstances, we then: (1) had China branded by the U.N. as an aggressor, which she clearly was not; (2) redefined as "to-be-determined" the status of Taiwan, in derogation of our prior treaty commitments and official statements which recognized that Taiwan was part of China; (3) had a trade embargo imposed on China, and encouraged and pressured our allies to enforce it; (4) renewed large-scale military and economic aid to the Chiang government, which unduobtedly could not have survived without it; and (5) consistently led the fight to keep the Chinese Communists from gaining the China seat in the United Nations.

Today we continue to intervene in the Chinese civil war. We still support and maintain treaties with the Chiang regime, which claims to represent all China. We have continued to block China's entry into the U.N. by a series of ruses, be

ginning with our keeping the credentials question off the agenda in the 1950s, and then subsequently in the 1960s by making it an "important question" requiring a two-thirds vote of the membership. In addition, we continue to pursue a heinous, genocidal war on the very borders of China. We ring China with missiles, military bases, naval fleets, and a rearmed Japan.

And now, in the 1970s we appear to be in search of a new ruse, as it appears that our earlier ploys are about to fail to prevent the seating of the People's Republic in the U.N. This latest ruse is intended, I believe, either to further delay Peking's entry into the United Nations, or in the hope that we can more-or-less dictate the terms upon which she is permitted to enter. This latest ruse, and I characterize it as such with all due respects to the many people who sincerely support it on principled grounds, is the one-China, one-Taiwan formula-and all the variations on that theme, from the grosser two Chinas formulation to the more sophisticated trusteeship proposals covering Taiwan.

The one-China, one-Taiwan formula is portrayed as the new pragmatic but principled rational route to a better China policy. It is said to protect our honorable commitments to the people of Taiwan while taking account of the need to normalize relations with Peking. By contrast, just as proposals for unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam were seen as extremist only 3 years ago, so today a policy that recognizes only Peking as the government of all China and which, reaffirming our position of the 1940s, declares that Taiwan in principle is part of the People's Republic, such a policy is portrayed as extremist or illiberal. But is such a policy really so radical? Or is it simply made to appear radical in the context of America's cold war politics. If, as a reasonable standard for judging the quality of such a policy, one looks to the position of our hardly radical NATO allies on this issue, the conclusion is inescapable. Checking the voting of our NATO allies on the one-China, Albanian resolution at the last session of the U.N., a resolution that would have seated Peking and excluded Taipei from the U.N., one is shocked to learn that of all our NATO allies only Greece and Turkey-the two most dictatorial and corrupt of those allies-voted against the Albanian resolution. So, with regard to the United Nations issue, a two-China policy, which many in the U.S. argue is a pragmatic and principled position, is equivalent to the Greek-Turkey position.

Must we not, moreover, after our experience in Vietnam, be wary of our selfasserted idealism as it applies to other parts of the world. Have we really, for example, been concerned as we claimed, about the right to self-determination of the Vietnamese. And similarly can one take our suddenly asserted claim for the people of Taiwan's right to self-determination at face value, however sincere some of its proponents may be. We have on Taiwan, after all, supported for over twenty years a police state government, one that represents at best only a small minority of the island's population. Some of our leaders now chose to talk of self-determination for the Taiwanese because it suits them to do so. Those officials selectively apply moralistic slogans when they think it is to our selfinterest, and many Americans are taken in by such stands.

On the other hand, there is no denying, however ill-fit America may be to raise this issue, that a potential moral dilemma nevertheless may remain. To put it most simplistically, one may have to choose on the one hand, between the morality of normalizing our relations with China, which in turn is likely to substantally reduce the intensity of the cold war in Asia and thereby to reduce the probability of future Vietnams, and on the other, the pure morality of selfdetermination. It is not without some difficulty that I have, on balance chosen the former.

But aside from the moral issue, we will be, if we adopt a one-China, oneTaiwan formula, once again on the road of trying at great cost to achieve the unachieveable. Both the Peking and Taipei governments, in accordance with Chinese tradition, embrace the vision of one China. Both reject the various conceptions of 2 Chinas. Moreover, the Chiang government's very claim to legitimacy depends upon its claim to represent all China.

Why, then, do we resist the one-China formulation and seem likely, at best, to adopt a one-China, one-Taiwan formula. What might we gain and what might we lose by adopting a one-China policy?

The main principled reason for opposing a one-China policy appears to be to safeguard the right to self-determination of the people of Taiwan. As indicated

above, however, we have not been very solicitous of that right up to now. Nor are we solicitous of the right of the Greek, the Spanish, or the Brazilian peoples to a government of their choice. Moreover, if the Taiwan regime were expelled from the United Nations, would the people of Taiwan suffer, or only the dictatorial government that rules them? In any event, there is no hard evidence that the people of Taiwan want to be independent of the People's Republic. And for those who suggest a neutral plebiscite to decide that issue, it must be remembered, first, that there are no such things as neutral plebiscites in a police state, and, second, that the proponents of such a seemingly equitable solution are proposing to dispose of the territory of another nation in a manner that were it applied to, say, the American South in 1860 would have greatly distressed them. Leaving astule, then, the complex matter of principle, what do we fear in the oneChina formula, which leaves it to Peking and Taiwan excluded from the U.N. to work out their future between themselves? Do we believe that if we adopt a one-China policy and thereby terminate our mutual security pact with the Nationalist regime, that the Chinese Communists will invade Taiwan? Surely our panoplied intelligence networks know better. The Chinese Communists have no navy, and Taiwan is 100 miles off the coast. Do we fear we will lose face if we adopt such a policy? But that is ridiculous. We will soon have no face left to lose if we do not change our position, for a majority of the members of the United Nations voted last year to seat Peking and to expel Taipei and the number that will vote this year to do so has risen substantially. We will not save face by going down with the boat.

Relatedly, do we hope that by adopting a one-China, one-Taiwan position we can negotiate a compromise with the Peking government, using our new position as a bargaining counter. But what is there for Peking to compromise? Her sovereignty? And what, I ask you, does the U.S. plan to give up? If it plans to give up merely its opposition to the seating of Peking in the U.N., then it is giving up nothing of value, for we are about to lose on that issue.

Or perhaps some of our leaders hope that by standing for an independent Taiwan we can hold the island for Japanese expansionism. Taiwan once was a colony of Japan and it is today increasingly under the joint economic dominance of Japan and the U.S. Once again we may be hoping to preserve the Open Door in Taiwan by denying the island to the mainland government.

In any case, it appears likely that Taiwan will continue to be a pawn in the political moves of the great powers. That is the unfortunate fact. If its future, like its past, is to be determined by power politics in any event, then it seems reasonable that the disposition of Taiwan should at least contribute to the resolution of the critical problem in Asia, the normalization of Sino-American relations. American machinations in the effort to salvage something in the short run from our ill-fated policy of supporting the Nationalist government on the other hand, will only exacerbate relations between Peking and Washington and will in the long run redound to our detriment.

Here, then, is what I propose in an attempt to deal with the major problems in U.S.-China relations. First, regarding Taiwan, which is the nub of the problem, I propose that the U.S. withdraw its forces from Taiwan, end its treaty commitment to defend the Republic of China, and withdraw all support and recognition from the Chiang government. We should instead declare that the sole, legitimate government of China is the Peking government, that Taiwan is part of the People's Republic, and that it will be up to the Chinese themselves on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to work out the future specific relationship between the mainland and Taiwan.

Second, we must end the Indo-China war immediately. We should unilaterally, totally and unconditionally withdraw from Indo China as fast as is logistically possible. We cannot substantially improve relations with the People's Republic while we pursue an obscene war on the edge of her territory.

And finally, we should dismantle our military bases and support operations around the periphery of China which encircle her. We should, in short, withdraw from our position as successor to the colonial powers in Asia.

These steps, I believe, are in our national interest, in the interest of better relations with China, and in the interest of world peace. We cannot improve relations with China by gimmicry. We cannot improve relations with China without dealing with the security and other interests that are central to China's existence and status. She is not about to bargain away any of these interests, for which she 70-772-72- -36

fought militarily in the 1940s and 1950s. There are no easy routes to better relations with China. The kind of fundamental changes I suggest will require a total reassessment and rejection of much of our Asia policy.

And what is so impractical or naive about confronting directly the most serious problems in our relationship with China? Press the so-called 'pragmatic' men who give you all the assertedly 'realistic' arguments why we cannot do what I have proposed. Press them, and you will see the seeds of the Vietnam tragedy and of future such tragedies germinating in their pseudo-realism.

Given our past and continuing behavior toward China, peace between the U.S. and China cannot be achieved without substantial U.S. concessions. But it will be well worth the cost to us. And that is realistic!

STATEMENT OF WARREN S. RICHARDSON, GENERAL COUNSEL,
LIBERTY LOBBY, AUGUST 16, 1971

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: This statement is submitted for Liberty Lobby, representing the views of its 20,000 member Board of Policy and 100,000 subscribers to its monthly legislative report Liberty Letter.

By an overwhelming majority, the Board of Policy opposes recognition of Red China. Yet it seems that the President's overtures to Mao herald the sudden discovery that the communists keep their agreements and are honorable men. Presumably Red China will be recognized in due time, just as Russia was in 1933. The whole situation represents an American security nightmare, a tragedy in the making.

In September, 1968, candidate Richard M. Nixon said, "Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China. This does not mean rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations, and to ply it with offers of trade-all of which would serve to confirm its rulers in their present course.

Now let us look at the record, as President Nixon would say, of what the U.S. has done:

July 1969-Relaxed restrictions on travel by Americans to China and permitted purchases of Chinese goods up to $100

Nov., 1969-Suspended regular U.S. Seventh Fleet naval patrol in the Taiwan Straits after two decades

Dec., 1969-Removed $100 limitation on purchases and permitted trade with mainland China in non-strategic products (is heroin strategic?) Aug., 1970-Lifted restrictions against U.S. oil companies abroad

Oct., 1970-Nixon began to refer to Red China as the "People's Republic of China"

Mar., 1971-Lifted all restrictions on use of U.S. passports for travel to Red China

Then came ping-pong diplomacy.

July, 1971-Accepted invitation to visit Red China

Aug., 1971-Dropped opposition to seating Red China in the U.N.

After these actions, President Nixon should have no doubt how he acquired his famous nickname.

As revealed in the Congressional Record of Aug. 6 (pp. E9177-9), a group, mostly Harvard professors, presented a memorandum to President-elect Nixon just after the 1968 election. They urged that "we move more positively toward the relaxation of tensions between China and the U.S., and the eventual achievement of reconciliation." Most of the proposals of these East Asian "scholars" have been followed, and it appears to be only a matter of time until our Nationalist China ally is dumped, all in the name of "a gradual shift in our China policy."

We think President Nixon would be well advised to recall Gen. Douglas MacArthur's timeless warning, first spoken in 1951: "There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. I strongly recommend that under no circumstances must Formosa (Taiwan) fall under communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington."

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, in the June 1971 V.F.W. Magazine, points out: "Red Chinese intelligence in the U.S., as compared with Soviet Russia's, has a major handicap in that Peking is not recognized diplomatically by this country nor is it a member of the UN. This deprives the Red Chinese of a legal base from which to operate spies.

...

"All the time, the red wind of espionage from the Far East continues to blow. The FBI's investigation reflects stepped-up intelligence activity by Peking. "Peking is attempting espionage in a variety of ways. One is to endeavor to introduce deep cover intelligence agents into the U.S., trained Peking agents who clandestinely enter this country using false identities and identifications and attempts under the cover of being an American to conduct spy operations. "The shadow of Mao Tse-tung can be seen and felt in the U.S. today. We can expect the subversive danger to grow as time passes. The only way to meet it is to be prepared. . . ."

But doubtless the most devastating document of all is the Senate Judiciary Committee print The Human Cost of Communism in China, by Prof. Richard L. Walker, "widely recognized as one of this country's foremost China scholars." This painstakingly detailed study of the many aspects of Chinese communist inhumanity includes the fact that these butchers are estimated to have slaughtered somewhere between 34.3 and 63.7 million of their fellow countrymen, all in the name of liberation, reform, revolution, et al.

The President's decision to meet with the bloody butchers of Red China is an outright betrayal of Nationalist China and all her supporters. We strongly urge against any policy of appeasing the inhuman Red Chinese aggressors.

Recently, President Nixon proposed that the U.S. pay a subsidy to farmers in Turkey, not to grow poppies. With this practice President Nixon has opened up a Pandora's box.

By international law seven countries are authorized to grow poppies for medicinal supply: Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. Greece and Iran have voluntarily stopped production. In addition to the legal producers, Burma, Laos, and Red China are major producers of poppies.

By our new policy, are we obligated to subsidize Bulgaria, India, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia to cut poppy production? There is no doubt that when Greece and Iran hear of the new U.S. policy, they will resume growing poppies so that they can then be subsidized to return to their present status.

Now, what have we accomplished? We have opened up the world market of poppy production to the illegal producers, the Red Chinese.

In a report by Harry P. Anslinger, former U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics, to the United Nations, he stated that "The communist regime of mainland China is distributing drugs abroad and selling heroin and opium in large quantities to the free countries of the world. These purposes (of the traffic in narcotics) include monetary gain, financing political activities in various countries, and sabotage. The Communists have planned well and know a well-trained soldier becomes a liability and a security risk from the moment he first takes a shot of heroin." Now our new subsidy program can be evaluated as to what will result:

(A) We can smoke ourselves to death from poppies grown in Red China, or (B) We can subsidize Red China, not to grow poppies, and thereby finance our own destruction.

Thank you for this opportunity to present our views for the record.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL TRETIAK, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR NEW CHINA POLICY, "FUTURE PERSPECTIVE ON UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS", JULY 23, 1971

(By Daniel Tretiak 1)

I am grateful in an organizational sense to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for giving me the opportunity to present this testimony as the Chair

Daniel Tretiak, former Senior Political Scientist, Advanced Studies Group, Westinghouse Electric Corp., is currently Chairman, Committee for New China Policy (CNCP) and Lecturer in Political Science at York University.

Author's Note: Because of time constraints, it was not possible for this document to be circulated to the entire National Board of CNCP and therefore should not be construed as necessarily representing the opinion of the Board. The author does wish, however, to acknowledge the assistance of those members of the Board who aided the author in the preparation_of_this_document: John Fincher, Thomas B. Manton, Ishwer C. Ojha, Henry Rosemont, Jr., and Lois Dougan Tretiak.

A Copy of the CNCP Statement of Policy is attached to this statement for the Committee's reference.