States would simply go down with the ship. Even that seems better to me than advocating a dual representation policy-a policy that would prevent Peking's participation in the U.N. for the foreseeable future and that would add to the already heavy legacy of ChineseAmerican hostility we bear today.

U.S. PURSUANCE OF ONE CHINA POLICY

The two China policy so prominently urged in some quarters today is not without irony. Since 1950, the United States has rigidly pursued a one China policy-but always it was the wrong China. Now, at last, when we are within reach of our goal of embracing a one China policy that has the right China, we cannot allow ourselves to be lured astray by the illusory appeal of a two China policy.

This is why I have introduced Senate Resolution 139. In spite of the doubts that cloud so many other aspects of our China policy, the opportunity is at hand to take a clear step forward on the issue of U.N. representation. We know the other issues of our China policy will require difficult negotiation and accommodation, a process that may go on for years. Peking's entry into the U.N. is the step we can take today to insure that this process will begin.

It is time to take that step.

Thank you.

QUESTION OF STATUS OF TAIWAN

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. That is a very interesting presentation. If I understand it correctly, you take issue with the Senator from New York on the question of the status of Taiwan. You feel that no progress can be made toward the admission of the People's Republic if we insist upon what is called the two China policy. Is that correct?

Senator KENNEDY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. There is an intermediate position, I suppose one could say, in which they leave off taking a position on Taiwan and simply support the motion for the seating of the People's Republic. What do you say about simply not dealing with the question?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I think, as Senator Sparkman indicated, that if you have a one China policy, you cannot escape from the reality that there will only be one China in the United Nations, and Taiwan would be out.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have only one China, but you will then have Taiwan and

Senator KENNEDY. I'm not sure I see a middle ground. Once Peking is seated, there is no seat for Taiwan.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant in the sense of fuzzing it up. I am not any authority on the effect of the Canadian position, but they recognized China. I think all they said was, "We take note of your position on Taiwan and leave it at that," which is a rather ambiguous position.

It is very interesting. You give an excellent presentation and I am sure we will pursue this further.

Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. No questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

CONFLICT BETWEEN WITNESS' AND SENATOR JAVITS' POSITIONS QUESTIONED

Senator CHURCH. As I understand the situation at the U.N. today, we have a proposal by Albania which would seat mainland China and expel Formosa, those being the two operative provisions of the Albanian proposal. Senator Javits said he would oppose American support for the Albania proposal, but would favor an American position which admitted China but did not by its terms expel Taiwan.

If we were to take the Javits position and that were to be adopted by the General Assembly, I would expect that Taiwan, although not formally rejected, would simply withdraw by virtue of its refusal to sit in the General Assembly once mainland China were admitted. Wouldn't you expect that to be the consequence, too?

Senator KENNEDY. I would expect that to be the case.

Senator CHURCH. Then, I don't see, Ted, any necessary conflict between your position and Senator Javits', that is to the extent that he proposes that we favor the entry of mainland China, but not under the terms of the Albanian resolution which also rejects Taiwan. I should think that his position could be made consistent with your own.

Senator KENNEDY. The important difference is, as I understand it, that Senator Javits is proposing a two China policy or a one Chinaone Taiwan policy, which would give Taiwan the choice of remaining in the U.N. As I have indicated in point two of my resolution, I have tried to be clear in rejecting a two China policy or dual membership or one Taiwan-one China policy because I think the effect of such a policy will be to keep Peking out of the U.N. Any proposal that seats both Peking and Taiwan is inconsistent with the resolution which I have proposed even though they have some similarities, in the sense of giving Peking the China seat in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

I think we have to leave the status of Taiwan to be worked out in the future. We have to recognize and respect the history of that island, especially the commitments that were made in Cairo and Potsdam in terms of recognizing that Taiwan was a part of China. The events of 1950 sought to give a different interpretation to those commitments, so the whole question is a very difficult one.

Obviously, a one-China policy for the U.N. is not a very happy situation in terms of our relationship with Taiwan. I think it is a very difficult conclusion for our Nation to reach. Of course, we are only reaching it in terms of the United Nations itself, and not in terms of the other relationships which exist between the United States and Taiwan. But I am convinced that, if we support Peking in the U.N. on the one hand, and attempt to retain Taiwan in the U.N. on the other hand, then Peking will see our action as just another device to keep the People's Republic out. We used the moratorium device to keep Peking out in the 1950's. We used the important question devise in the 1960's. And now, suddenly, we are about to discover the dual representation device in the 1970's. I think that there would be ample reason and justification for that view, and U.N. representation on such terms would be unacceptable to Peking.

POSSIBILITY OF LEAVING TAIWAN QUESTION UNSPOKEN

Senator CHURCH. Your reference to the continuing Chinese civil war is very accurate; there is no likelihood that a two-China policy will ever prove acceptable. But it might be possible for the United States to advocate affirmatively the admission of mainland China and simply leave the question of what happens to Taiwan unspoken. Isn't that what you are saying?

Senator KENNEDY. Even if it is unspoken, however, Taiwan would have no choice. Once Peking is in, Taiwan would be out. Of course, so far as other issues surrounding the status of Taiwan are concerned, I think they should be decided by the people of the area.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Senator KENNEDY. Not decided by the People's Republic or by the Chiang Kai-shek regime alone, but by the peoples of the area. Obviously, with respect to U.N. representation, the future will reflect the results of those accommodations and adjustments.

IRONY OF PAST U.S. JUSTIFICATION FOR CHINA POLICY

Senator CHURCH. I was very much taken with your general review of American policy in the past, and with the statement you made that we have been pursuing a one-China policy for 20 years, but it has been the wrong China.

One of the ironies of this whole period is that we have constantly justified our policy through the years on the grounds that we were containing a powerful and aggressive China, and in the name of that containment we have flung a ring of steel around China that extends all the way from Japan through the Philippines, to Southeast Asia, finding its southern anchor in Thailand. Curiously, I don't think we could have done this if it had not been for the endemic weakness of China, rather than its strength. For example, it has been the endemic weakness of China that has enabled us to maintain an American military force in South Korea all those years within the shadow of China. It has also been the endemic weakness of China to allow half a million American troops to fight in Southeast Asia, so close to Chinese boundaries, and I think it has been the endemic weakness of China that has permitted us to successfully exclude her from the United Nations all these years. Now that is changing. The surest proof that it is changing is to be found in the vote at the United Nations itself, the recognition of other countries, now a majority--and soon to be an overwhelmingly majority in the upcoming vote that-that conditions have indeed changed, that China is emerging in her own right and has to be given the same kind of recognition and treatment that other countries obtain as a matter of course. More importantly, considering her gigantic size and her potential importance as the center for whatever prospects of peace there may be in the future in Asia, certainly China will be the major determinant in Asia's future.

So your plea for adjusting our own policy to this new reality is not only well timed, but it has been eloquently presented.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me make just two final comments. First it is interesting to me that the countries that border on China-such as India, and Burma-have supported representation for Peking. The countries that have opposed it, of course, are the ones where there has been a very strong U.S. presence. But the countries next door to China supported her representation. They have a much more realistic position on this issue.

NECESSITY OF CLARITY ON TAIWAN AND PEKING REPRESENTATION

QUESTION

Second, let me just say in response to an earlier question, Senator Church, I think it would be a great mistake to fuzz up the question of Taiwan in any resolution which we would support, I think the resolution has to be completely clear in terms of its effect. It cannot be ambiguous or fuzzy.

I think it has to be precise on the question of the representation of Peking in the United Nations. We can have in our own mind the future action that we might take, but I would not want to suggest anything that would be interrupted by the People's Republic as just another device to exclude her from participation in the United Nations.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.

The next witness is Senator George McGovern of South Dakota.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MCGOVERN, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a rather lengthy statement that I would like to ask to have inserted in the record in its entirety and in view of the lateness of the hour and the fact that some of the points have already been made that I think need to be brought out before this hearing, what I would like to do is just summarize extemporaneously the highlights of my testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I think there is no part of American foreign policy where we have been so painfully guided by myth and by unjustified fears as we have in reference to our 20-year relationship, or lack of relationship, with the people of mainland China, extending back to

1949.

PRINCIPLES GUIDING PAST U.S. POLICIES CONCERNING CHINA AND

INDOCHINA

Mr. Ellsberg, who has been in the news recently, has delivered a lengthy paper in the last few days in which he has addressed himself to what he regards as the two cardinal principles that have guided American foreign policy in Indochina, and also in reference to our relationships with the people of mainland China. I would like to mention those two assumptions because they fit very closely my own view of where we have gone wrong in our relations with the people of China,

and also because they provide the seed bed for our long and disastrous involvement in Indochina.

The first of those assumptions that have guided every American President going back to President Truman in 1950, and coming on down to the present time, is the assumption that "this is not a good year in American politics to lose a piece of Asia to the Communists." That assumption has been dictated not so much by realities that confronted us in Asia but by the fear of what might happen in terms of the next election or in terms of that particular administration's position in history.

The second cardinal principle is one that seems to be in contradiction to the first one, and that is the assumption that "it is not wise to commit American forces to a ground war in Asia.”

It is the contradictory nature of those two assumptions, on the one hand that we can't lose any ground in Asia to the Communists and second that we can't put any Americans on the ground in Asia, that explains the confusing and contradictory nature of our policy in that part of the world.

There have been three other ingredients that seemed to be necessary in order to try to carry out these two contradictory goals. The first is that it is necessary for us to find a client or a puppet who can at least give the appearance of holding the ground in Asia for us. That, I think, has really been the rationale for our support of Chiang Kai-shek over these last 22 years on the island of Formosa, and for the stubborn contention that that is where China is really located, that that is the legitimate Government of the China, and that some day, with our help, if we are just patient enough, this legitimate Government of China upon Formosa or Taiwan would be restored to the Asian Mainland.

The second ingredient we have had to add is that you have to get rid of people in the State Department who face reality or who talk commonsense. That, of course, was the purpose of the purge that was conducted in the late 1940's and the early 1950's when virtually everyone in the State Department who called for us to face the realities of the Chinese civil war, to face up to the fact that it was over and that Chiang Kai-shek had lost and a new government had come to power, those people were driven out of office and discredited. The political pain of what had happened was so intense that I think from that day to this many people who ought to have known better have advised American Presidents not on the basis of the political realities of Asia but on the basis of their fears of what might happen if they told the truth to the American people.

This leads us to the third ingredient of our policy, which is the necessity of deceiving the American people as to what the facts were with reference to China and to Indochina.

It has been on that basis, I think, that we have backed away from a total military commitment to our client states in Indochina or on the island of Taiwan, and yet have tried at each stage to maintain just enough American military support and military involvement so that we could get by that political crisis here at home and not have to face up to the fact that another area had fallen to the Communists.