Mr. Pat Clever, Canadian businessman; Dr. Jeremy Stone of the Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Noel Brown of New York; Professor Jerome A. Cohen of the Harvard Law School; and Mr. Fox Butterfield, New York Times correspondent. We were also fortunate to have papers presented at these same meetings by our colleagues, Congressman Paul Findley, Senator Walter Mondale, Congressmen Charles Whalen, Robert Leggett, Jonathan Bingham, and Morris Udall, and Senator Dan Inouye.

At these meetings, which were attended only by the Members of Congress, we tried to explore in depth all of the major ramifications of U.S.-China policy. I might add that our Committee laid the groundwork for these studies by preparing an extensive report on the historical, political, and military aspects of the People's Republic of China. At the conclusion of our series, I submitted a summary and recommendations which I will discuss in a moment. The Members of Congress who have asked to be associated with the recommendations made in my U.S.-China Committee statement are Congressmen Bella Abzug, Bertram Podell, Howard Robison, Benjamin Rosenthal, William Ryan, and James Scheuer of New York; John Conyers and Donaid Riegle of Michigan; Robert Drinan and Mike Harrington of Massachusetts; Don Edwards, Augustus Hawkins, Tom Rees, and Edward Roybal of California; Paul Findley and Abner Mikva of Illinois; Don Fraser of Minnesota; Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa; Congressmen Robert Kastenmeier and Henry Reuss of Wisconsin; Senator George McGovern of South Dakota; Congressmen Frank Thompson of New Jersey and Charles Whalen of Ohio; and Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon.

In brief, I feel that we have looked at this matter closely over a period of time, including the recent innovation of ping pong diplomacy by the Chinese. I will leave a copy of both documents, which are of a background and informational nature, for the Committee.

Based on our studies, it is my firm belief that Congress should support and cooperate fully with all efforts to normalize relations between China and the United States. You will note that I did not say "Red China" as I feel that this is typical of the kind of thinking that we must change. Just as we do not say "Red Russia" or "Red Czechoslovakia," I believe we have reached a point of maturity where we need not add such an appellation in our references to the People's Republic of China. I sometimes think that such denigration is an attempt to characterize the Chinese, as a nation, as somehow less than human, as in the term "Gook”. Once we have reduced the people involved to a sub-human status, it is easier to justify our actions of belligerence. This is just one of our accustomed habits that we will need to re-examine.

We have seen a general thaw in our governmental stance towards the People's Republic. All indications are that we will advocate that the People's Republic is a new entity newly established to represent a part of the people of China, but not all, thus leaving the government of Taiwan as a separate entity. This 'two' China policy is the divided nation rationale.

The central issue is whether the two Chinas approach is a viable solution. I think that this issue is crucial to the Committee's hearings, for any action you may take on the pending legislation will affect the existing status quo and thus tend to support the case of either Taiwan or Peking. In taking any action, we should be fully aware of the implied decision and its consequences.

I believe that the time has long since passed when we should have acted to redress some of the ills that have arisen from our 21 years of avoidance of this matter. For nearly a quarter of a century, we have pretended in all of our official pronouncements and policies that 700 million Chinese people did not exist. They were referred to as "Red China", a mystery and an enigma whose very inscrutability justified an attitude of indifference and disdain. We refused to think about China and excluded it from the international councils of nations and our own diplomatic relations.

Plain logic tells us that we cannot safely or prudently shut ourselves off completely. It would be impossible, even if we wanted to. The pressures for contact are too immense and too irresistible. Evidence of this is seen in the declining world support for our efforts to exclude Peking representatives from the United Nations. Over the years we have gradually lost ground in the battle for world opinion, and finally last year there was a majority vote in favor of the Albanian resolution to seat the People's Republic of China in place of the Nationalist government. The only thing which prevented this majority opinion from forcing the

recognition of the People's Republic as the proper representative of China despite United States opposition was the parliamentary tactic of requiring a twothirds vote on the issue as an "important question". But our support on the "important question" tactic is slipping, too, and there is general recognition that very soon, possibly this year, we will not have the votes to prevent the seating of the People's Republic. It is noteworthy to point out that a majority can vote to eliminate the two-thirds requirement.

Just as the Great Wall of China failed to seal out foreign invaders, so our policy of exclusion is bound to fail. Unless we are willing to have the rest of the world dictate such decisions to us, we will have to face up to this issue and act on our own. I think favorable action by the Congress can be of inestimable aid in creating a climate in this country where the Executive Branch can act to restore a more rational and meaningful policy toward China.

This brings me to the question of what our policy should be. I feel that the major issue with which we are confronted concerns the recognition conflict between the two governments which both claim jurisdiction over all of China. I believe it is inevitable that this dispute will be decided in the United Nations for purposes of recognition with or without our approval. For practical purposes the United States will either have to abide by whatever action is taken there or our participation in the United Nations will have little meanings.

If the Albanian resolution is passed, it will mean that the delegates from the Nationalist group will automatically be excluded as the legilitimate representatives of the government of China. It follows that when that happens, the Taiwan government can no longer be seated in the United Nations, unless the People's Republic surrenders its sovereignty and title to these lands-which is hardly possible in view of the People's Republic's long adamant opposition to such a proposal. If the United States attempts to seat Taiwan as a separate nation in the United Nations as part of the new arrangement, rejection by the People's Republic is a certainty. While some seem to speak favorably of this "two China" approach, this proposal is unrealistic. Realistically, we must recognize the refusal of both Chinese regimes to surrender claim to all of China. We have no alternative to a "one China" policy.

Of course, we cannot merely abandon the people of Taiwan even if we discontinue our support of the Nationalist regime. After 21 years of existence separated from the continent of China, we cannot ignore the growth of a new generation of Taiwanese. It should be clear, however, that if the Nationalist government is no longer the government of China because the People's Republic of China is the recognized sole and legitimate government of the Chinese people, then it follows that the Nationalist government has no rightful dominion over the people of Taiwan.

I believe that the solution for this most difficult problem can be found by treating the territory of Taiwan like the territories over which Japan had dominion prior to World War II which after the war were placed under U.N. trusteeship. Japan had territorial rights over Micronesia under a League of Nations mandate. After World War II, Nationalist China took territorial claim to Taiwan from the Japanese. Following its retreat from the mainland, this Chiang Kai-shek regime established on Taiwan, continued to receive the sanction of the U.N. when he was allowed to retain the China seat in the world orgnaization. If the Albanian resolution is adopted to recognize the People's Republic, that prior U.N. sanction of the Nationalist government's territorial claim over Taiwan will be rescinded. Then, the responsibility to find an equitable solution to the future status of Taiwan must be the duty and obligation of the U.N. which I believe can best be accomplished under the supervision of the U.N. Trusteeship Council. We could thus support the admission of the People's Republic and insist that the U.N. have a final decision, through recommendation of its Trusteeship Council, over how best to accommodate the interests of the people of Taiwan, with the territorial claim by the People's Republic of China.

Obviously, the interest of the People's Republic would be well protected by such a decision, by virtue of its membership in the U.N. The interests of the people who live in Taiwan would be protected by the Trusteeship arrangement. This proposal would provide for an orderly transition and, more importantly, it would provide time in which to solve the delicate questions of Taiwanese selfdetermination versus Chinese sovereignty.

If the Chinese cannot settle this matter among themselves, then the inter national community must assist in vaulting this high hurdle that has for far too long been a major obstacle in normalizing relations between the U.S. and China.

My proposal is in keeping with S. Res. 82, sponsored by Senator McGovern, except that he leaves the future status of Taiwan for settlement "by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits". I qualify this by placing Taiwan under the U.N. Trusteeship Council.

I feel that the alternative I have offered is worthy of consideration by this Committee. I concede that, as constituted, the Trusteeship Council is an imperfect mechanism, but I believe it can be modified and extended to fulfill this new role. Again, let me commend the Committee for these most helpful hearings. You have my sincere support in your efforts.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. I think that is a very fine statement. If I understand it correctly, you agree in principle with the proposal of Senators McGovern and Kennedy. You are suggesting further that in anticipation that the Chinese themselves don't settle the issue of Taiwan, you would enlist the assistance of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

Mrs. MINK. Yes; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the additional idea as advice to the administration.

Mrs. MINK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very relevant.

Unfortunately we have a vote which has just been called on the floor and we have to leave. Senator Sparkman, we have time for one or two questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. I shall not ask any questions. I join in commending the Congresswoman for her very able and very clear presentation.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. It was good to have the innovation of bringing the Trusteeship Council into consideration.

Senator CHURCH. I concur. It was a pleasure to have you.
Mrs. MINK. Thank you very much.

WITNESSES FOR NEXT HEARING

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. For tomor row morning's hearings the witnesses will be Mrs. Barbara Tuchman who has written recently a very fine book on China, Dr. Arthur Galston who recently visited China, and Prof. Jerome Cohen who is a specialist in East Asian law.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, and Aiken.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This is the second hearing in a series concerning the U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China.

As you know, yesterday we had the senatorial sponsors of the various measures which are before this committee. This morning we are very pleased to have Mrs. Barbara Tuchman, who is one of the most distinguished authors of this country. The first book I read of hers was "The Guns of August," which has become a classic on that war. I am not sure it is any more of a classic than "The Proud Tower," which I think in some ways appeals to me as an analysis of the attitudes of people, in that case prior to World War II. Her most recent book concerns General Stilwell and the American experience in China.. The study and research she did on that seems to me extremely appropriate to the subject we have before us now, which is, in effect, a reconsideration of our relations with China.

Mrs. Tuchman, we are very pleased indeed to have you. Do you have a statement?

Mrs. TUCHMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed.

STATEMENT OF MRS. BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, AUTHOR OF "STILWELL AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, 1911-45"

Mrs. TUCHMAN. Thank you.

An American foreign policy which has brought us to our present painful embarrassment between the de facto government of China and the rump government in Taiwan, and elsewhere in Asia has led us into the longest, wrongest, least successful belligerent action in our history—a policy which, in short, has produced dislike abroad and