Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World

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Cato Institute, 1996 - 255 頁
America's foreign policy and military deployments remain largely unchanged despite the end of the Cold War. The expensive U.S. commitment to South Korea exemplifies Washington's outmoded strategic thinking and could easily embroil the United States in another Asian war. Doug Bandow points out that the balance of forces has shifted dramatically since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Today South Korea vastly outstrips North Korea by every measure, with twice the population, 18 times the gross domestic product, and a huge technological advantage. The South has also lured away the North's military allies - China and Russia. South Korea can now defend itself without U.S. assistance. Bandow suggests gradually withdrawing all U.S. troops from South Korea and ending the security treaty. The latter step is crucial, for only then will the United States be free of entanglement in Korean affairs and able to demobilize the military forces now necessary to back up the treaty. Bandow proposes applying the same principle elsewhere in East Asia. The threats to Japan and America's other Cold War allies have diminished while the ability of those nations to defend themselves has greatly increased. America's role should be limited to helping repel a truly hegemonic threat. Washington would thus return to the foreign policy of a republic rather than an empire, risking the lives and wealth of U.S. citizens only when their own political community was in danger.

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Korea and Americas International Role
1
The USROK Relationship
15
The Costs of Commitment
33
Reappraising the Security Relationship
57
A Strategy for Disengagement
83
The Nuclear Complication
103
The Asian Context
147
A New Foreign Policy for a Changed World
181
Notes
191
Index
247
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第 85 頁 - ... nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
第 193 頁 - Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: WW Norton, 1969), p.
第 35 頁 - Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.
第 35 頁 - The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.
第 3 頁 - Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.
第 87 頁 - Korea may change further with time (as it has done in the past), it probably makes sense to continue approximately our current deployments in the Western Pacific, and with them, our ability to react swiftly to any aggressive moves by North Korea.
第 191 頁 - Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp.
第 11 頁 - We let it be known that we considered the Korean situation vital as a symbol of the strength and determination of the West. Firmness now would be the only way to deter new actions in other portions of the world. Not only in Asia but in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere the confidence of peoples in countries adjacent to the Soviet Union would be very adversely affected, in our judgment, if we failed to take action to protect a country...
第 11 頁 - East, and elsewhere the confidence of peoples in countries adjacent to the Soviet Union would be very adversely affected, in our judgment, if we failed to take action to protect a country established under our auspices and confirmed in its freedom by action of the United Nations. If, however, the threat to South Korea was met firmly and successfully, it would add to our successes in Iran, Berlin, and Greece a fourth success in opposition to the aggressive moves of the Communists. And each success,...

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