Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean WarBloomsbury Academic, 1999年9月30日 - 186 頁 A general history of the critical first year of the Korean War, this study deals primarily with relations between General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry S. Truman from June 1950 to April 1951, a period that defined the war's direction until General Mark Clark, the final U.N. Commander, signed the Armistice two years later. Although the ever-changing military situation is outlined, the main focus is on policymaking and the developing friction between Truman and MacArthur. Wainstock contradicts the common view that MacArthur and Truman were constantly at odds on the basic aims of the war. In the matter of carrying the fight to Communist China, MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs differed only on timing, not on the need for such action. |
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... amphibious landing and envelopment . Collins and Vandenberg agreed on the need to launch an amphibious counteroffensive , but they had serious concerns about the Inchon site . From their World War II experiences , they knew that an ...
... amphibious assault at Inchon on September 15. The attack force , named X Corps , would include General Oliver P. Smith's 1st Marine Division , General David G. Barr's 7th Infantry Division , and the Eighth Army's 4th Division . Once X ...
... amphibious operations , working closely with MacArthur in the South Pacific campaign . Doyle's experience included Guadalcanal , Tulagi , and the Solomon Islands campaign . Smith , considered one of the Marines ' top amphibious experts ...
內容
Background to the Korean War | 1 |
Invasion and Response | 15 |
The North Korean Steamroller | 31 |
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