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ment of new and improved items of equipment to support those troops actively engaged in combat with the enemy. The Corps' major job in the nuclear energy field is nuclear power plants for military purposes.

Increased mobility for the field forces which the engineers support is one of the principal fields of investigation. This involves studies in bridging and stream crossing equipment; high-speed, easilymoved construction equipment; pipelines; storage, pumping, and operational controls in the transportation of fuel, including ship-to-shore movement; industrial engines; soils and surfacing; mobile maintenance shops; prefabricated buildings; processing and packaging; and electric and electronic equipment.

In addition, the engineers are doing research in special weapons; developing new techniques in camouflage and deception; developing new types of field fortifications; classifying the world into regions having distinctive military requirements; studying fire fighting; developing data on materials such as plastics, synthetic rubber, and coatings; seeking to improve equipment for more accurate topographical mapping; and developing better equipment for surveying. They are working on problems presented by snow, ice, and frozen ground, particularly as these affect operations at our Arctic bases. Techniques developed in the laboratory are thoroughly tested in Greenland. A nuclear power plant is being operated at Fort Belvoir. Studies are under way to develop new design criteria for airfield pavements subjected to the heavy bomber wheel loads of today, and the heavier ones of tomor

row.

MAPPING AND ENGINEER INTELLIGENCE. Modern technological warfare makes exacting demands for accurate and detailed maps and terrain information. There are several reasons for this. One is the rapidity of movement and of attack which will characterize future battles; a commander will often have no time for a leisurely reconnaissance of the area into which he is moving, but must go into action at once on arrival. Again, in joint air ground attacks, locations and distances must be known with mathematical precision. Tank commanders must know not only

the location, width, depth, flow, and other characteristics of streams to be crossed, but also the nature of the soils of the area, so as to anticipate how many vehicles, of what weight and type, can cross a given area without bogging down. Air and artillery commanders must have exact data for pinpointing their fire. Ground commanders must know precisely where, as well as when, their troops may be moved into the objective area. The combat engineers, building the roads and bridges over which our forces may reach objectives, or demolishing the enemy's means of maneuver and supply, must have detailed knowledge of the terrain, including natural resources, physical improvements such as power and water supply, fuels, construction materials, and means of communication.

Not only accuracy but quantity is involved. For example, 10 million maps were printed and distributed during the first four weeks of the Korean War. Maps are today as important to the patrol leader as they are to the man firing a supersonic weapon.

Mapmaking and the production of engineer intelligence are therefore among the highest priority missions of the Corps of Engineers. The preparation of maps for modern war involves a great deal more than the simple act of drawing the shape of a given area of the earth's surface on a sheet of paper. For example, Army mappers recently completed a survey that extended from the Arctic to the Antarctic. They operated in the jungles of central Africa, and climbed the Andes in South America, to obtain measurements that have enabled the Army Map Service to compute new dimensions of the earth. The corrections were not large; but to the man charged with aiming a long-range missile at a small area of enemy territory, a seemingly very small error on his map or in his computations could mean missing the target by a considerable distance.

Among the more important subjects of engineer intelligence are: coasts and landing beaches, ports, urban areas, lines of communication, electric power, water supply, fortifications and defenses, characteristics and logistics of foreign engineer materiel, engineer research and

development, hydrology, construction, engineer order of battle, and natural environment, including soils, vegetation, drainage, and relief. Engineer intelligence reaches into the technological, geographical, political, sociological, economic, and armed forces fields. It produces terrain studies for the Army. Its organization, techniques, and equipment are constantly evolving to meet the changing requirements of modern warfare. (On the subject of military intelligence, see also chapter 16.)

REPAIRS AND UTILITIES. The Corps of Engineers is responsible for providing and operating the basic utilities of all Army installations, and, in general, for the repair and upkeep of those installations. It is big business, since it calls for service to a population of some two million persons, military or civilian. The soldier who takes a drink of water or a bath is using a part of the 93 billion gallons of water furnished by R. & U. in a year. The electric bulb which he switches on in his barracks burns a tiny fraction of the two and three-quarter billion kilowatt hours of electrical energy that the Army consumes annually.

R. & U. operates all over the world. It uses the services of 80,000 persons, and has an annual budget of nearly half a billion dollars. At each post or station there is an engineer R. & U. officer on the staff of the commanding officer, whose duties are roughly comparable to those of a city engineer except that they are more varied. He is responsible for furnishing utility services such as water, electric power, sewage disposal, heat, and refrigeration. He sees to it that all structures and installations are kept in good repair, and makes necessary alterations and additions. He takes care of fire protection, refuse collection and disposal, insect and rodent control, the packing of household goods and organizational equipment, custodial services, snow removal, and various other service functions.

REAL ESTATE. The Corps of Engineers has important real estate duties. The principal one is to acquire land for the establishment or expansion of posts, camps, stations, training and testing areas, and tactical positions such as antiaircraft defenses, aircraft warning sites, air bases, and the like. Appraisers on the staff of the district engineer in the territory in question, or independent appraisers under contract, determine the fair values of properties to be acquired. It is important both to insure that the Government gets its money's worth and to see that the land owner receives the full amount that he should.

The Corps also acts as real estate management agent for the Department of the Army. This involves a continuous inspection program, designed to assure the maximum utilization of Armyowned real estate and to make available to the civilian economy, through lease or sale, any lands or interests therein which the Army does not need. (See also chapter 10.)

As part of the effort to limit Government land holdings, the extent of ownership acquired by the United States at reservoir projects has been reduced. Above the elevation which is flooded less than once every five years (average), only the right to flood the land occasionally is acquired. This permits the growing of crops, grazing, and the exploitation of minerals, while protecting project requirements.

Statistics on Army real estate holdings are maintained and kept up to date. As of 30 June 1957 the holdings of the Army and the Air Force totaled 25,651,855 acres owned, and 4,105,590 acres leased, for military purposes. (The former figure includes 1,608,366 acres overseas utilized by the Air Force, for which the Corps of Engineers has no responsibility.) In addition, a total of 6,870,127 acres are owned or leased by the Army for civil works projects.

ENGINEER SUPPLY AND CONSTRUCTION IN TWO
WORLD WARS

World War I presented the greatest challenge that the Army engineers had thus far met. It called for the large

scale construction of training camps, supply bases, and other facilities in the United States, and of ports, railroads,

roads, bridges, depots, hospitals, and many other installations in Europe. New weapons such as airplanes, tanks, longrange heavy artillery, and toxic gases called for new departures in field fortifications, protective construction, and camouflage. Large mobile searchlights came into use for the first time. Engineer troops, first to arrive overseas, were among the first to come under fire. They served with the British and French while the rest of the AEF was being built up, and then fought and built across France with the American Army. On 11 November 1918 the total strength of the Corps was 295,869.

During the war, purchases of engineer supplies and equipment for military use totaled 4,636,000 tons valued at over $870,000,000. The engineers built, among other items,—

Storage depots (sq ft)

Hospitals (bed capacity)

Troop barracks (buildings)

Port docks (length in feet) Railway track, standard gage (miles) Stables and veterinary hospitals (sq ft)

25,961,144

141,000 16,000 5,000 1,002 2,210,000

Forestry operations produced 217,884,337 board feet of lumber, 3,955,618 railroad ties, 2,954,563 piles and poles, and 431,147 cords of fuel wood.

The experience of World War I had much to do with developing the organization, equipment, and techniques with which the Corps handled the far heavier load of World War II. In that war its strength was expanded from about 8,500 (officers and men) in 1939 to a peak, on 31 July 1945, of 693,296. Engineers were among the advance elements in every theater of operations. They led the way in 42 out of 61 major amphibious operations, including the Normandy landings where five engineer combat battalions were cited for battle honors. The tank-mounted bulldozer blade and other new engineer weapons helped in the breakout across France and the drive into Germany. Engineer soldiers secured river crossings under fire, and engineer assault teams helped advance forces to break through fortified positions. They were in the fore as fighting troops when the Japs were stopped at Milne

Bay in their farthest penetration into New Guinea. Some of the most famous generals of the war came from Engineer ranks.

Construction activities were on an enormous scale. Hundreds of airfields were built in every continent. Countless thousands of miles of roadway were built. Never before in history, probably, were so many bridges, of so many different types, erected in so many places in a short period of time. The railroad mileage constructed would link New York to Tokyo, with a side spur running from Duluth to New Orleans. The port capacity installed or restored was capable of handling a tonnage equivalent to the combined capacities of the ports of New York, Boston, and San Francisco. The capacity of pipelines constructed would have taken care of the normal gas and oil consumption of the United States.

In the Zone of the Interior, $10,884,196,000 were expended on 2,973 command installations, including camps, training areas, airfields, storage depots, hospitals, ports of embarkation, and harbor defenses, plus 300 major industrial construction projects. Between July 1940 and December 1945, 38,000,000 acres of land were acquired. The Corps had maintenance responsibility for 12,550 miles of sewer lines, 4,260 miles of railroad, 12,860 miles of water mains, 62,640 miles of roads, 22,600 miles of electric power lines, 2,860 miles of gas lines, 1,590 miles of steam lines, 22,200 square miles of grounds, and 1,180,243,710 square feet of maintained floor space. An estimated $4,835,000,000 of military equipment was delivered to engineer procurement agencies in 30,000 "enditem" categories. The Corps created the $2,000,000,000 atomic bomb project ("Manhattan District"), and the bomb was devised and put into production under its administrative supervision. The Army Map Service in Washington, and map reproduction units in the United States and overseas, produced and distributed more than 500,000,000 maps for the Armed Forces.

Chapter 13

MILITARY TRANSPORTATION

Throughout history the course of wars has been largely determined by adequate transportation or the lack of it. The brilliantly successful campaigns of Hannibal and Genghis Khan, of Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War and FrancoPrussian War, and of Nazi Germany in the Blitzkrieg of 1940-and on the other side, the failure of Napoleon in his Russian campaign of 1812, and of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and World War I are among hundreds of instances of the vital role of transportation in warfare, and of the disastrous effects of a breakdown in an army's lines of communication.

Military transportation has taken an added importance in modern times for several reasons. First, armies have grown steadily larger. Second, thanks to mechanical transport, they can-and therefore must-move faster and farther than in the past. Third, modern weapons and other equipment are complex and heavy, and make enormous demands for ammunition, liquid fuel, and repair parts. Finally, the recent de

THE PERIOD

Military transport problems arose early in our history. In both the Revolution and the War of 1812 the supply of our armies was severely hampered by bad roads and by British blockade of the sea lanes. Wagons and animals were in critically short supply, and the Quartermaster General, who was responsible inter alia for transportation, had great difficulty in procuring more.

With the outbreak of the Mexican War there was another transportation crisis. There had been little advance planning for equipment requirements,

velopment of "mass destruction" atomic weapons points to a future need for still greater mobility and dispersion of troops, and to a correspondingly increased workload on transportation agencies.

Until recently the United States has never systematically attacked the problem of military transportation. We have accomplished some remarkable feats in this field, but at a heavy cost in money and initial delay. Here, as in other fields, due to Congressional and public neglect of the Army in the past, each successive emergency found us unprepared and forced us to resort at the outset to improvisation and costly expedients. Most of our wars have been fought with the odds on our side, so that we won in spite of our initial unpreparedness. But it has become abundantly clear that next time this may not be the case. With that in mind, a permanent agency, the Transportation Corps, has been established to direct and coordinate the Army's transportation activities. BEFORE 1861

and an immediate shortage of wagons, animals, and shallow-draft steamboats developed. The QMG had to buy animals and equipment from all available markets and at exorbitant prices. A forward step taken at this time was to replace civilian teamsters with enlisted drivers. The war also marked the first important use of railroads as part of our Army's supply line; a regiment of Pennsylvania militia was moved by rail from its home station to New Orleans to join General Scott's expedition into Mexico.

THE CIVIL WAR

By 1861 our railroad system had so expanded that it was in a position to play a vital part in the mass transportation of men and materiel. The North early saw the value of harnessing this new resource in the prosecution of its war effort. On 4 February 1862 Congress passed an act authorizing the President to take possession of any or all railroads, if and when in his judgment the public safety required it. One week later, Daniel C. McCallum, an experienced railway executive, was appointed military director and superintendent of railroads in the United States. Given the rank of brigadier general, McCallum was empowered to take possession of and use all railroads and equipment that might be required for the transport of troops, arms, ammunition, and military supplies. Other prominent civilian experts, including Herman Haupt, the chief engineer of the Pennsylvania Railroad, were also brought into the Army, and a military railway service was established.

From the outset, emphasis was laid on securing the cooperation of the railroads in the loyal States, interfering or assisting only where the carrier was unwilling or unable to meet military needs. Such cooperation was promptly secured. Military railway operations were conducted primarily within the limits of the Confederacy and in direct support of the armies. At its maximum strength the military railway service had almost 25,000 officers and men operating in Virginia, North Carolina, and the military divisions of the Mississippi.

The importance of the railroads in concentrating and supplying the Northern armies can scarcely be overemphasized. By the beginning of 1863 they had moved more than a million men to the various fronts and had delivered a vast quantity of equipment and supplies. It was General Sherman's opinion that his successful Atlanta campaign would have been impossible without the logistic support given by the railroads.

By contrast, the South failed to develop its railroads as an effective instrument of war. They were inferior to those of the North to begin with, and extensive improvement in wartime was impracticable. In addition, however, the Confederate leaders were too slow in imposing adequate wartime controls. The final breakdown of the system was a material factor in the Southern defeat.

Water transportation was also important during the war. The Potomac, Tennessee, Ohio, Cumberland, Missouri, and Mississippi Rivers were extensively used by one or both of the combatants to move men and supplies, and to operate light-draft gunboats. In the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, McClellan's 120,000 men were delivered to the lower Chesapeake area by water, and evacuated by the same means after the failure of the campaign. There were many other instances of the water movement and supply of troops.

Military land transport, other than by rail, of course depended on animal power; principally horse- or muledrawn vehicles or weapons, and pack animals.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

This short war was marked by almost ludicrous transportation difficulties and shortcomings, which might have ended in disaster except for our opponent's extreme military and naval weakness. The Santiago expedition highlighted the deficiencies in our system. The plan was to use Tampa as a port of embarkation, shipping men and materials thereto by rail and thence to

Cuba by water. Early in the war hurriedly procured supplies were sent there and to other destinations, by rail, without bills of lading. Arrived at Tampa they had to be searched, identified, and segregated, a laborious and timeconsuming process. Loading and unloading facilities at Tampa were inadequate, and supervisory personnel were inexperienced. The result was a state

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