網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

of congestion on the rail lines that extended as far back as Charleston. Meantime there was the problem of getting ships for the Tampa-Cuba run. At the outbreak of the war we did not possess a single troopship. The QMG, after canvassing all available vessels, managed to charter thirty-eight. Then there was more delay while they were being refitted. When water movement started, both the unloading and the landing operations were poorly managed. Units, equipment, and supplies were split up among ships; and the debarkations, although unopposed, were chaotic.

WORLD

Our entrance into the war, in April of 1917, again found us unprepared as regards military transport. We faced the task of mobilizing, equipping, and training an Army of 4,000,000 men or more, sending some 2,000,000 of them across 3,000 miles of ocean, and supplying them by the same route. In oversea theaters of operation, lines of communication had to be established and existing transportation facilities adapted or supplemented. Finally, after the fighting was over, our forces would have to be shipped home. All this posed transportation problems of the first magnitude.

ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY TRANSPORT IN THE UNITED STATES. At the outbreak of war, military transportation was primarily the responsibility of the QMG. Among the functions coming under his supervision were: transportation by common carrier between posts, camps, and stations within the United States; shipments overseas by commercial vessels; the operation and maintenance of the Army Transport Service, which included the Army's ports of embarkation and a small fleet of seven transports; and the procurement of animals and animal-drawn vehicles. However, the actual operation of the system, including shipments by inland carrier, oversea shipments, and the operation of Army transports and port facilities, was highly decentralized. Motor vehicles were procured by a

Fortunately the transport for the later expeditions to Puerto Rico and the Philippines was better organized.

One good result of this transportation fiasco was the establishment, in November of 1898, of the Army Transport Service (ATS)1, with ports of embarkation at San Francisco and New York. It operated a fleet of ocean vessels, which after the war were used primarily to garrison and supply our oversea possessions. At one time there were 20 vessels in the fleet, but by 1905 the number had been reduced to 7.

WAR I

number of agencies. The Chief of Engineers was responsible for military railways.

It soon became evident that peacetime machinery and methods would be inadequate to handle the wartime transportation problems. To meet the need for a stronger organization, the War Department General Staff increasingly moved into the operational sphere and eventually absorbed the entire transportation organization of the Quartermaster General. To cope with the vast and unregulated flow of men and supplies to the ports an Embarkation Service was established as an independent War Department bureau in August 1917. Subsequently brought under a Storage and Traffic Division (later expanded into a Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division) of the General Staff, the Embarkation Service was given responsibility for regulating oversea movements and for the supervision of operations of the ports of embarkation and the Army Transport Service. To enforce the Embarkation Service's system of releasing traffic to the ports, and to exercise jurisdiction over other matters relating to the inland routing and transportation of troops and supplies, a Division of Inland Transportation (later Inland Traffic Service) was established in January 1918. Working closely together as coordinate subdivisions of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, the Embarkation and

1 Not to be confused with the Army Transport Command (ATC) established in 1941, or the Air Transport Command (also "ATC").

Inland Traffic Services did much to dissipate earlier rail and port congestion in the Zone of Interior, and to assure the orderly flow of traffic from points of origin to oversea destinations.

Toward the end of the war, also, a Motor Transport Corps was organized in the United States, based on experience overseas (see below).

SHIPPING. Ocean shipping was critically short at the outset. Various emergency steps were taken on the national level, with Army and Navy cooperation, including a huge construction program, seizure of interned German ships, chartering of American merchant ships, acquisitions from neutrals, loans from our allies, and more efficient utilization of shipping and port facilities. By November of 1918 the Army's trans-Atlantic fleet had grown from 7 vessels to 512, with a deadweight of 3,251,000 tons. In addition there was a cross-Channel fleet of 104 vessels with a total of 460,000 deadweight tons.

PORT OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. Primary ports of embarkation were established at New York and Newport News (Hampton Roads). New York was the principal port for troop shipment and the largest single mover of cargo. Hampton Roads handled mostly freight, troop property, and animals. Philadelphia, Baltimore, and ports on the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes were also used. Total outloadings to France, by the end of 1918, were over 2,000,000 passengers and 6,270,000 short tons of cargo.

INLAND TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES. Almost the entire burden of the Army's inland traffic requirements fell on our railroads. At first, the railroads were unable to meet demands for movements of freight and passengers. Efforts by the rail carriers to coordinate traffic on a voluntary basis, through a Railway Board composed of their own representatives, met with some success, but failed to keep pace with the increasing requirements for transportation. Traffic, concentrated largely in the East, quickly became snarled. A shortage of motive power, rolling stock, and skilled labor

developed. Moreover, various civilian and military government agencies issued numerous and often conflicting priority orders to secure preference for shipments of their freight, regardless of the ability of the consignees to receive it or of shipping to lift it from the ports. As a result, by late 1917 there was a serious tieup of rail equipment at the ports, shipyards, industrial centers, and other key points on the Atlantic seaboard.

On 28 December 1917 President Wilson seized the nation's railroads and placed them under a Director General (William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury). A new Railroad Administration was formed, taking over the personnel of the Railway War Board. Through such measures as the abolition of priorities, the placing of embargoes on congested points, and traffic diversions, the Railroad Administration made rapid headway in eliminating the rail tieup.

Further relief of the rail and port congestion was afforded through the inauguration of a War Department "release system." Under this system, supply bureaus desiring to make shipments of supplies destined for overseas were first required to obtain a release from the Embarkation Service. This release would be presented to the Inland Transportation Division for a transportation order, without which the shipment could not move from the point of origin. The system, rigidly enforced through cooperation with the Railroad Administration, proved successful in maintaining an orderly flow of portbound movement consistent with the capability of the railroads, the ports, and available shipping.

In the end the railroads rose to the challenge. Between May of 1917 and the Armistice they carried 8,714,582 Army passengers, an average of 502,764 per month. Peak rail traffic was handled in July 1918, when 1,197,013 men were moved. Passenger traffic continued important into the post-Armistice period, bringing the total number of men transported by rail to 13,999,588 by 30 June 1919. Freight movements were correspondingly heavy, totalling around 40,000,000 tons in fiscal year 1919 alone.

This did not produce significant results until late in the war.

Embarkation of Army Personnel for Europe: 1 May 1917-11 November 1918

[blocks in formation]

b Includes War Department and miscellaneous civilians and welfare workers.

e First 11 days only.

Cargo Shipped Overseas by Port of Embarkation: 1 June 1917-31 December 1918

[blocks in formation]

Administration, 103,136 tons,

a Includes San Francisco, 1,064 tons. 0.2 percent; United States Food 18.5 percent.

ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY TRANSPORT IN THE AEF. As in the United States, transportation in the American Expeditionary Forces was hampered by the lack of advance planning. Transportation organization and procedure went through a variety of changes. At the outset, responsibility was divided between the Chief Quartermaster, AEF, and the Chief Engineer,

AEF. Later there was a tendency toward greater consolidation of transportation functions, though this was never carried to its logical conclusion. A Transportation Service was created, and on the day after the Armistice became the Transportation Corps. It took over ATC functions and a large part of military railway responsibilities. All railway construction, and all responsi

bility for narrow gauge railways at the front, was under the Chief Engineer. A Motor Transport Service was established under the CQM, and later became an independent Motor Transport Corps.

PORT OPERATIONS IN THE AEF. From the beginning, the task of moving American troops and supplies through the French ports was a major problem. Many of the best facilities had already been preempted by the British, and those which were available were antiquated, inadequate, or interdicted by the submarine peril. Moreover, once U. S. operations were established it was necessary to contend with faulty organization, slow port construction and improvement, inadequate forces of competent operating personnel, unsystematic loading at the home ports, critical shortages of floating equipment and cranes, and insufficient means for port clearance.

Despite these and other difficulties, the Army Transport Service rolled up an impressive record. During the period 1 June 1917 through 11 November 1918, a total of 1,918,125 American troops, 5,960,062 short tons of cargo, and 38,610 animals were landed at 31 ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of France, in addition to cross-Channel traffic.

RAILROAD OPERATIONS IN THE AEF. In France, men and supplies of the AEF were moved over 5,831 miles of standard gauge railway, with an average haul of 580 miles from port to railhead. Although these railroads were intact, they were heavily congested and lacked sufficient motive power and rolling stock to handle the increased load imposed by AEF traffic. American personnel and equipment had to be provided to assist in operating the lines, and to build and operate the narrow gauge lines in the combat zone.

Since the standard gauge railroads were required for French military and commercial traffic, none was completely turned over to the U.S. Army. Instead, American-operated trains were run over them, subject to French regulation. Because of the congested state of the French terminals and yards, however, the AEF built and operated its own yards for the use of solid American trains. At the time of the Armistice the

Americans were operating five Grand Divisions on the railway lines in the Services of Supply zone, and one Grand Division in the Zone of the Advance.

Among other measures taken to assure efficient operations, telephonic and telegraphic communications were installed on the lines over which the Americans operated; steps were taken to provide trains with adequate braking equipment; a system for the central control of American car distribution was established; and railway transport officers (RTO's) were placed at important terminals to expedite and trace freight shipments and assist Army personnel passing through. For the transportation of the wounded the AEF had 16 hospital trains completely equipped with ward cars. Maintenance of way by U. S. Army troops was limited largely to the trackage at American terminals, although a few men were furnished to aid the French. Some American personnel were also used to assist in French commercial service when the load became heavier than the French could bear.

Up to the Armistice the United States had placed 960 locomotives and 13,939 cars in operation in France. An additional 3,859 locomotives and 93,877 cars were on order, en route to France, or awaiting erection there. Also we had 350 Belgian locomotives in use on switching service. American labor did a great deal of repair work on both American and French equipment.

The Department of Light Railways and Roads, operating under the Chief Engineer, AEF, in the Zone of the Armies, had charge of the construction, maintenance, and operation of 60-centimeter gauge railroads and the repair of French roads within its sphere of activities. Numbering 13,650 men, this force handled 860,652 gross tons and built or rehabilitated 316 miles of narrow gauge line. At the time of the Armistice it was operating 65 locomotives and 1,695 cars over a system of 1,389 miles of track.

MOTOR TRANSPORT. As early as 1904 our Army had shown some interest in motor trucks, but it never operated them on any scale until the Mexican Border incident of 1916. At that time 2,000 were ordered and many were used

Arrivals in United States By Month and Port: November 1918-December 1919

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

a Only those who embarked from Europe after November 11, 1918 are included. Army includes officers, enlisted men, fleld clerks and nurses.

« 上一頁繼續 »