to supply the "Punitive Expedition" in northern Mexico. Meantime, with World War I, military motor transportation was coming into its own in Europe. Dramatic instances were the use of the Paris taxis in the flanking movement of Maunoury's troops during the first Battle of the Marne, and the reinforcement and supply of Verdun in 1916 via the "Voie Sacrée."

When we entered the war the various supply services bought commercial motor vehicles on a large scale. By the time of the Armistice a total of 129,154 had been procured and 85,010 shipped overseas. The absence of centralized procurement control resulted in a multiplication of makes and types, with consequent grave maintenance difficulties; during the war the AEF operated 216 makes of vehicle requiring 445,000 different parts, mostly not interchangeable. Nevertheless motor transport performed a vital service. For example, in the fall of 1918, over 500,000 men were transferred by motor vehicle to the St. Mihiel area, and thereafter to the Argonne, in 19 days.

In December of 1917 a Motor Transport Service was set up in the AEF and made responsible for the supply and repair of vehicles. Later it became the Motor Transport Corps. In May of 1918 it was given operational control of motor vehicles in the Service of Supply, and technical supervision of all others. At the close of hostilities the MTC was responsible for 36,943 trucks, 7,551 passenger cars, 13,784 motorcycles, 4,323 trailers, and 17,577 bicycles, as well as for numerous reception parks, service

stations, heavy repair shops, and reconstruction parks.

REPATRIATION OF THE AEF. With the signing of the Armistice it became apparent that the War Department could not expect from the Allied governments the same assistance in the return of American forces that it had received in moving them overseas. Since the total troop-carrying capacity of Americanflag transports (111,783 men) was inadequate, it proved necessary to find other means of bringing our forces home. To this end the Director of Embarkation took immediate steps to increase the American transport fleet. The conversion of 58 cargo vessels was undertaken; the Navy assigned battleships and cruisers for transport service; ten German passenger ships were obtained and equipped for carrying troops; and negotiations were successfully concluded with the Italians, French, Spanish, and Dutch for the use of suitable passenger vessels. By such means, the troop fleet was increased to a total of 173 vessels with a capacity of 419,251 men.

From 11 November 1918 through 30 June 1919, 1,608.873 of the American forces embarked from France, and during the same period 1,467,547 landed in the United States. By the end of the latter year the total number of passengers returned had mounted to just under the 2,000,000 mark. Principal ports of debarkation were New York (Hoboken), Newport News, Boston, and Charleston.

Accompanying tables show American troop and cargo movements overseas during 1917 and 1918 and also show the movement of returning troops, beginning in November 1918.

Between the two World Wars the War Department attempted unsuccessfully to obtain approval for a permanent Transportation Corps and Motor Transport Corps. On the eve of our entrance into World War II, the military transportation responsibilities were still dispersed. However, important advances had occurred in the transportation field. Progress was made in motorizing and mechanizing the combat forces, and increasing recognition was given to the role

of truck transport in providing them with sustained and flexible support. Although handicapped by limited funds for military vehicle experiments, the Army, capitalizing on technological advances in automobile production, made important strides in developing a standard fleet of vehicles suited to military needs. Ultimately one type each of automobile, solo motorcycle, and cargo trailer, and five types of trucks, were adopted as general purpose personnel

and cargo hauling vehicles. In the rail transportation field, under a War Department affiliation program, the cooperation of the industry was enlisted in sponsoring reserve Military Railway Service units, thereby providing the Army with a nucleus of experienced railway personnel ready for early em

ployment. During the same period air transport was coming of age, and though still receiving limited use by the military, it offered a new and significant means for effecting the rapid movement of troops and emergency and priority materiel.

Transportation needs bulked larger in this war than ever before in history. The conduct of a multifront war, characterized by increased mechanization, greater mobility in land warfare, and a tremendous expansion of air power, involved movement tasks of unprecedented magnitude and complexity. The mobilization, deployment, and support of our armed forces, plus considerable assistance to our Allies, imposed tremendous burdens on our domestic transportation system, and necessitated the development and maintenance of supply lines girdling the globe. To come to grips with the enemy, moreover, it was necessary to undertake extensive shipping, beach, port, rail, motor transport, and inland waterway activities within the oversea theaters. Throughout the conflict, transportation was a vital consideration in strategic planning and a basic factor in the conduct of military operations.

ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES. This evolved during the war. In its final form it was largely integrated under the Transportation Corps, although air transport was placed under the Army Air Forces, railway construction (but not maintenance or operation) remained under the Chief of Engineers, and the Quartermaster General retained control of the organizing and manning of motor transport units. In June of 1945 the military and civilian personnel of the Transportation Corps or under the Chief of Transportation numbered 434,998. Of these, 194,123 were at Transportation Corps headquarters or employed at field installations; 50,582 were on vessels under Army control; and 190,293 were in troop units overseas or in training. (The latter figure excludes QM truck units which operated over

seas under Army transportation organizations.)

SHIPPING. When we entered the war, available shipping was far short of our military needs. An aggressive German submarine campaign aggravated the difficulty. To meet the shortage, as in World War I, we undertook an immense building program and adopted pooling measures at the national and international levels. By 1943 the situation had eased enough to permit more flexible strategic planning; but there was never any overall shipping surplus. By the close of hostilities the U.S. merchant fleet had grown from 11,600,000 to 54,000,000 deadweight tons. The Army had in its service 1,706 vessels of 1,000 gross tons or more, totaling 15,940,000 deadweight tons.

INLAND TRANSPORTATION, COMMERCIAL. Much greater use was made of highway, water, pipeline, and air transport than in World War I. Nevertheless, most of the load again fell on the railroads. During the period of active fighting they carried over 90% of all freight moving on War Department bills of lading, and almost 98% of Army passengers traveling in organized groups of 40 or more. In spite of this there was no such tieup as occurred in 1917; nor was there any repetition of Government seizure, except for a period of about 3 weeks in 1943-4, when the roads were placed under nominal Army control to avoid an impending work stoppage.

Working closely with the carriers and with other government agencies, the Transportation Corps handled the movement of a huge volume of Army traffic. The Office of the Chief of Transportation routed 33,678,000 personnel in organized groups of 40 or more. Of this total, 32,881,000 moved by rail and

797,000 by motor bus. A large number of other passengers, traveling in smaller groups or as individuals, were routed by transportation officers at points of origin.

Various measures were undertaken to facilitate troop movements. When a sufficient number of troops moved over a given route, special troop trains were made up, thereby simplifying the control of the movement and the discipline of the men. To meet specialized Army needs, commercial equipment was supplemented by special troop sleepers and by hospital troop and hospital kitchen cars. Under a joint Military Passenger Agreement negotiated annually by the railroads with the Armed Services, reduced rates were secured for military traffic. In addition, some 92 bureaus and branches were set up by the Chief of Transportation to assist Army personnel in obtaining reservations on Pullman cars and coaches.

With regard to freight movements, the Chief of Transportation, through his immediate office, routed all carload shipments, whether domestic or for export. He also handled a substantial part of the less-than-carload shipments through a Transportation Corps-operated consolidated car service. Other less-than-carload shipments were routed by transportation officers at points of origin. From December 1941 through August 1945 the freight moving on War Department bills of lading totaled 324,892,000 short tons. Of this total, 90.2 percent moved by rail. Motor carriers transported 8.2 percent of the total tonnage; 1.3 percent was moved by inland waterway.

OTHER INLAND TRANSPORTATION. The Transportation Corps operated and maintained numerous utility railroads at military installations; provided specialized railway equipment for use on commercial roads; and operated an Army bus fleet, which by 30 June 1945 totaled 7,498 vehicles.

PORT OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. In July 1940 there were two Army ports of embarkation -at New York and San Francisco. At the conclusion of hostilities there were in operation eight ports of embarkation, three cargo ports and two subports. During the same period military and

civilian personnel employed at these installations increased from 3,000 to 180,000. Under the command of the Chief of Transportation, each port commander was responsible for the receipt, processing, and loading or unloading of cargo and personnel passing through his port, and for the movement of Army traffic through all ports along the portions of the coastline placed under his jurisdiction.

Despite the obstacles created by such factors as shipping or supply shortages, the great variety and complexity of materials to be handled, changing priorities dictated by shifting strategic and tactical situations, demands for emergency shipments, uncertain communications, and overrequisitioning by oversea commands, the ports on the whole succeeded in meeting oversea requirements. Between December 1941 and August 1945 they handled the embarkation of over 7,290,000 passengers and the loading of more than 126,700,000 measurement tons of cargo. Although Navy and Allied military personnel, civilians, and prisoners of war were also handled, the bulk of the passenger traffic consisted of Army personnel traveling as individuals or in units up to and including entire divisions. In the period August 1944 through February 1945 alone, 36 Army divisions were moved to Europe. The personnel moved in 126 troop ships, and their organizational equipment was enough to fill 266 Liberty ships.

Outbound cargo movements through the ports involved the handling and loading of a tremendous number of items of varying shapes and sizes. The bulk of the cargo dispatched overseas was procured and distributed by the seven technical services of the Army and by the Army Air Forces. The largest shippers were the Quartermaster Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Army Air Forces, and the Corps of Engineers, in that order. Among the major types of cargo shipped overseas were more than 1,500,000 motor vehicles, 47,851 aircraft, and 11,466,000 short tons of ammunition and explosives.

Once loaded at the ports of embarkation, passengers and cargo had to be (Continued on page 261)

Troops Moved in Organized Groups of 40 or More Within U. S. By Rail; December 1941-August 1945

Hos. Patients & Attendants

Prisoners of War and Guards

Rotation

Div. Moves