creases in traffic. In India, for example, the Americans increased by 125 percent the tonnage flow over the metergauge portion of the Bengal and Assam Railway, until then a bad bottleneck. Similar results were attained in the Persian Corridor, where the railroads were the primary means of transporting lend-lease and U. S. Army materiel from the Iranian ports to Soviet transfer points in the north. The largest railway operations were in northwest Europe, where MRS General Headquarters and two complete MRS organizations were ultimately provided. In this area the MRS troops made rapid headway in restoring rail operations, and in advancing them from Normandy across France and into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. During April 1945, the 2d MRS alone operated 4,287 freight trains, which carried forward 1,927,000 long tons of supplies and equipment for a total of 329,814,000 ton-miles. In the same month it also ran 108 hospital trains, 278 prisoner of war trains, 71 troop trains, 97 leave trains and 93 refugee trains. In addition, considerable work was accomplished in the repair of track and bridges and of motive power and rolling stock. Though somewhat smaller in scope, railway operations were also of prime importance in supporting the armies in the Mediterranean and on Luzon. OVERSEAS. MOTOR TRANSPORT Military truck transportation was used on a huge scale for the movement of both men and materials. Great numbers of vehicles were required for port and base activities in all commands, and in many areas military motor transport found large-scale employment in line of communication hauling. Motor transport troops provided flexible support to advancing armies in the Mediterranean and European theaters; delivered vehicles and other materiel to our allies over the tortuous, 1,079-mile Stilwell Road, and via a 636-mile route crossing desert and mountain country in the Persian Corridor; and made long convoy runs on the Alaska Highway and in Australia, China, and the Philippines. Operations bulked largest in the European theater, where U. S. Army trucking units, engaged in port clearance, base operations, and line of communications hauling, moved 22,645,000 long tons and covered 702,926,000 tonmiles between 17 June 1944 and VE Day. Among the more spectacular of the several LOC express hauls were the Red Ball Express, which delivered 412,193 tons of supplies in 81 days to the armies advancing across France, and the even larger XYZ operation wherein 871,895 tons were delivered in 63 days to four of our armies in the final advance into Germany. INLAND WATERWAYS OVERSEAS. These, when available, were a valuable supplement to rail and motor transportation. The Army assisted in restoring inland waterways operations on the Seine River in France and on the Albert Canal in Belgium. During the period December 1944 to July 1945, more than 1,800,000 tons of Army cargo were forwarded by barge in France and Belgium. Toward the end of the war the Army further took over supervision of barge traffic on the Rhine and Danube, providing supplementary harbor craft companies and equipment. In Iran, river transport was used to clear military cargo, destined for our troops or our Soviet Russian allies, from the port of Khorramshahr to Ahwaz, whence it could be forwarded by rail. Local civilian steamship lines in India proved an effective supplement to rail transport in moving Army and Chinaaid supplies over the long line of communications between the port of Calcutta and the forward supply and air bases in Assam. An Army-operated barge line performed harbor services in the vicinity of Calcutta, and hauled vitally needed petroleum products and other supplies from that area to the East Bengal airfields. In the latter stages of the war the Army made increasing use of native craft in China for the movement of military supplies on the Yangtze, Yuan, and Hsiyang rivers. Other inland waterways utilized included the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers in Alaska and the Mackenzie River system in Canada. PLANNING AND REGULATION OF MOVEMENTS. As in the United States, movements within oversea commands had to be planned and controlled in order to avoid congestion and assure the most effective use of available transport. While such efforts were not uniformly successful, outstanding results were achieved during the build-up of American forces in the United Kingdom. Through cooperation with the British Ministry of War Transport, the Railway Executive Committee, and other interested British civilian and military agencies, incoming American shipping was directed to ports best able to handle it, and efficient use was made of the nation's hard-pressed interior transport facilities. In addition, through regional offices and a network of railway traffic officers (RTO's) at principal traffic points, measures were taken to control and expedite the movement of our troops, supplies, and equipment. On the European continent, as advance and base sections were established, movement control staffs were organized and traffic regulating personnel were assigned to important rail terminal and truck traffic control points. In addition, Army regulating stations were set up behind the armies to control the flow of traffic into and out of the combat zone. Overall planning and policing of movements by the theater Chief of Transportation, however, was hampered by G-4's exercise of important functions in this field, and by the limited recognition given by the territorial commands to the Chief's responsibility for technical supervision. These deficiencies were ultimately remedied, and beginning in early 1945 the Chief of Transportation made steady headway in planning and carrying out effective theater-wide personnel and supply movement programs. OTHER TRANSPORT MEDIA. Various other means of transportation, not within the scope of Transportation Corps responsibility, had vital roles in our war effort. Pipelines built and operated by the military authorities carried liquid fuels under the English Channel, and from the Normandy beachhead all the way up to the Rhine; made deliveries from Calcutta and Chittagong to Assam, Burma, and China; supplied inland airfields in North Africa and Italy; and provided local service at bases in the Pacific. Air transport was used on an unpre cedented scale. In addition to their primary task of effecting and supporting tactical movements, troop carrier and combat carrier squadrons of the Air Forces handled emergency and high priority movements and the evacuation of the wounded. Air dropping became increasingly important in Europe and the Southwest Pacific. In the north Burma campaigns it was the sole method of resupplying the combat forces. While the tonnage carried by air transport was extremely small compared with other modes, its potential for rendering large-scale support was vividly demonstrated in the Air Transport Command's "Hump" operations, during which up to 73,000 short tons a month were delivered over the Himalayas to air terminals in China. When other means failed, recourse was had to animal transport. In the rugged mountains of Sicily and Italy it was necessary hastily to improvise pack trains, to procure mules locally, and to import thousands of others from the United States. Mules also accompanied American combat forces into the jungles of north Burma, where they were indispensable in carrying light artillery and supplies. REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION. When hostilities ended in Europe, it was planned to move great numbers of troops from that theater to the Far East, where the fighting was still intense. Some were to be moved direct; the larger part were to be shipped first to the United States. The movement started; then, with the sudden collapse of Japan following our atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the redeployment machinery was abruptly shut off, and emphasis shifted to repatriation of troops from all fronts. To meet the needs, first of redeployment and then of repatriation, it was necessary greatly to augment the passenger-carrying fleet. Some 200 Liberty vessels, 97 Victories, and 2 former enemy-held liners (Europa and Vulcania) were converted to passenger service; maximum use was made of available passenger space on freighters and hospital ships; and, under a joint post-VJ Day repatriation program, space was allocated to the Army on a large number of Navy assault transports, combatant vessels, and hospital ships. In addition, the Queen Mary continued to carry troops in the postwar period. By such means, troop spaces available to the Army were increased from 464,138 in April 1945 to around 1,300,000 as of 30 November. Despite the heavy pressure on the railroads, particularly on the West Coast, troops were returned to and through U.S. ports with unprecedented speed. Debarkations reached a peak of 834,470 in December 1945, three times the number embarked in any threemonth period during the war. Altogether more than 6,376,000 passengers were de barked by the Army during the years 1945-46. New York and San Francisco were the principal receiving ports, handling 58.9 percent of the traffic. Other Army ports of debarkation included Boston, Hampton Roads, Seattle, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Portland (Oregon), Charleston, and Prince Rupert (British Columbia). Accompanying tables show rail movements of troops; tonnage movements on War Department bills of lading within the United States during the war period; and passengers embarked and cargo outloaded from various U.S. ports of embarkation. THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD From 1945 to 1950 there were various changes in Transportation Corps responsibilities. Its motor transport and air traffic control functions were broadened, including helicopter transport service and the logistic support of Army aviation. On the other hand, the ocean fleet was transferred to the Military Sea Transportation Service. Noteworthy, in these years, was the part played by Transportation Corps personnel in the Berlin Airlift. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on 25 June 1950 resulted in a great increase in transportation requirements at home and abroad. There was an immediate need for men and materiel in the Far East Command, and despite the stabilization of fighting in 1951 there continued to be large demands for the support of that area. Moreover, in view of the possibility of the Korean conflict developing into a general war, it was necessary to build up our mobilization potential, to develop or expand our oversea bases, and to strengthen our Allies. Under the prevailing philosophy of a "limited emergency," these tasks had to be accomplished with minimum impact on the nation's economy. Within the United States, in the three years ending on 30 June 1953, a total of 4,359,000 Army passengers were moved in organized groups, and 41,557,000 short tons of Army freight were moved on Government bills of lading, plus a good deal of Air Force, foreign aid, and other material. Army water terminals outloaded or received 3,700,000 passengers and 48,000,000 measurement tons of cargo. The ports of embarkation in use were New York, Hampton Roads, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Seattle. Wartime controls on the transportation system were not needed, but to avert a crippling strike the Army seized the railroads and held them from 25 August 1950 to 23 May 1952. ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS. The troops and supplies immediately available for the Korean fighting were located in Japan. That country was also an important source of local procurement; and it was the logical place for receiving, processing, and transshipping men and supplies from the United States destined for the combat area, since facilities in Korea could not handle this load. Japan therefore became our principal base for the Korean War. The transport operations involved were on a large scale. Cargo through Army-operated ports (principally Yokohama, Kobe, and Moji) increased from about 125,000 measurement tons in May of 1950 to nearly 1,400,000 in September 1950, and averaged about 1,200,000 per month in the summer of 1951. Although increased shipments direct from the United States to Korea brought a drop in workloads thereafter, the Japanese ports continued to handle as much as 1,000,000 tons and 120,000 troops per month. During the war the 2d Transportation Major Port at Yokohama alone handled over 25,000,000 tons of cargo and almost 1,000,000 troops. The Japanese National Railway, first under direct MRS control and later under commercial arrangements, met our demands on it rapidly and efficiently. In addition, military air transport based in Japan provided invaluable support to the fighting forces, air-landing and air-dropping supplies, moving airborne forces, evacuating the wounded, and returning personnel for rest and recuperation. In the beginning the water movements from Japan to Korea were unregulated, resulting in sporadic arrivals at receiving ports and necessitating the use of emergency and express shipments. Beginning in the summer of 1951 a cargo movements program was instituted, and was subsequently expanded and strengthened. The resultant improvement in preplanning of requirements and in the utilization of shipping made possible the ultimate discontinuance of the expensive expedited railwater (Red Ball) service previously in effect. Concurrently efforts were made to ship at least fifty percent of the Korean requirements directly from the Zone of Interior, a goal that was realized in the latter phases of the war. and However, the worst transportation difficulties were in Korea. Port facilities were inadequate; means of interior transport were even more so; operations were further complicated by adverse climate, mountainous terrain, the alternate destruction and rehabilitation of port and rail facilities, the crowding of logistic installations in the Pusan area, and the lack of adequate intransit storage between Inchon and the forward areas. In the course of the conflict, over 13,000 Transportation Corps port, harbor craft, DUKW, railway, truck, transport helicopter, and traffic regulating troops were placed in service in Korea. Augmented by thousands of indigenous personnel, they succeeded in doing the job. During the war and its immediate aftermath, the Army-operated ports in Korea handled a tremendous volume of traffic. In the period July, 1950-December, 1953 they discharged more than 38,000,000 measurement tons and backloaded 9,369,000 measurement tons. The bulk of this traffic flowed through Pusan and Inchon. Other ports used included Kunsan, Masan, Sokcho-ri, Chumunjin, Koje-do, and Chogu-ri. Under the control and supervision of the 3d Transportation Military Railway Service, the battered lines of the Korean National Railways were converted into the principal means of inland transport between the ports and the fighting forces. Additional rolling stock and locomotives were placed in service, car utilization was intensified, and operational and maintenance procedures were improved. Ultimately the MRS operated more than 10,000 cars and 460 locomotives over 1989 kilometers of rail line. Indicative of its accomplishment was the doubling of the total tonnage forwarded from the port areas between July 1951 and November 1952. Despite rugged terrain and extremely poor roads, which made long hauls impracticable, motor transport played an important role in the support of operations. Transportation Corps trucking units were employed for port clearance and base hauling and, in the combat zone, for transport between forward railheads and Army supply points and for effecting tactical troop movements laterally across the front. In the single month of May 1953, Transportation Corps vehicles handled 9,708,000 cargo ton-miles and 4,530,000 passenger-miles. Many other forms of transport were used. In some areas Korean porters, carrying supplies on A-frames strapped to their backs, provided close support for the combat forces. A more modern means of overcoming terrain obstacles was provided late in the war with the arrival in Korea of two transport helicopter companies. In actual operations and in realistic field exercises the helicopter units demonstrated their ability to effect tactical moves, to provide logistical support, and to accomplish frontline evacuation of the wounded in areas inaccessible to other means of transport. Coastwise shipping was employed for the supply of Republic of Korea forces on the eastern front via Sokcho-ri. Air transport was utilized for intra-Korea movements and for movements between Korea and Japan. Pipelines were initially limited, but with new construction became increasingly important in the latter part of the Korean conflict. At the end of hostilities more than 400 miles had been placed in operation for the supply of airfields and other installations. During and after the Korean War the Transportation Corps continued its support of our oversea forces throughout the world, and undertook several new or expanded activties. In Europe, Corps personnel handled Army traffic via the Bremerhaven supply line, and helped to develop and maintain an alternate line of communications across France. They participated in continuing "over-thebeach" exercises held off the French coast. Progress was made in emergency planning for the coordinated use of transportation facilities at the NATO and SHAPE levels. Through the in THE CHALLENGE Continuing international tensions, and the revolutionary changes in weapons and tactics which are now going on, have imposed challenging tasks on the Transportation Corps and on all military transportation agencies and facilities. While adjusting to declining workloads and to money and manpower limitations, the Corps has sought to meet the Army's needs for far greater mobility and dispersion in any future war, whether limited or general, atomic or nonatomic. Much headway has been made in tailoring the Corps' operations, equipment, training, organization, and doctrine to these requirements. Emphasis has been placed on increased capabilities for strategic, tactical, and organic airlift; for dispersed port and beach operations; for diversified and flexible rail and motor transport; and for mass off-the-road hauling. The handling and movement of cargo is being facilitated through the large-scale use of containers and pallets, and through the development of roll-on, roll-off vessels. To permit greater flexi creased use of Transportation Corps officers with military advisory groups, valuable technical assistance has been rendered to our allies in many areas of the world. Under arrangements initiated in 1951 and formalized in 1954, the Corps undertook the worldwide operation of oversea water ports in support of the Air Force. Stevedore and lighterage troops were provided also for annual Alaskan resupply missions and, beginning in 1955, to support the construction of the Distant Early Warning net across the rim of the North American continent. Furthermore, mass off-the-road hauling tests and operations have been conducted on the Greenland ice cap since 1952, and more recently in the Antarctic. OF THE FUTURE bility in the management and use of CONUS ports, terminal command headquarters have been established on each of the three coasts. In addition, plans have been laid for the use of alternate ports and beaches in the event of the destruction of established terminals. Concurrently the Army as a whole has been coming to a fuller understanding of the vital importance of transportation, both for logistic support and to reduce vulnerability. In recent tactical reorganizations it has stressed air transportability and greater organic air and motor transport strength. For the first time a TC truck battalion has been made an integral part of the division. Concurrently a test, "Operation MASS" (see chapter 10), is being made of the feasibility of cutting down stocks held in forward areas by rapid transmission and processing of supply data and intensified use of fast transport. These are merely examples of the efforts being made, in many fields, to adopt our Army's transportation to the needs of the atomic age. |