level of combat readiness, than was ever the case in peacetime before World War II. This necessitates, and

has resulted in, an efficient military intelligence organization and a strong and continuous intelligence effort.

The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force-while cooperating effectively among themselves, and with other agencies, in the intelligence field-each have their own intelligence agencies and activities. Army intelligence may be divided into three broad categories: strategic intelligence, combat intelligence, and counterintelligence.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. This deals with the manifold aspects of foreign war potentials. It is used by the Army in planning and executing national security measures in time of peace and military operations in time of war. It is ordinarily the product of large high-level staffs, which assemble and study enormous masses of detailed information, much of it of a fundamental and more or less unchanging character.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. This is used in planning and conducting tactical operations. It is concerned with the enemy, the terrain, and the weather in a relatively limited area and situation. It is largely produced by the lower command levels on the basis of up-todate data gathered locally. It is characterized in a high degree by rapid analysis of information received and prompt dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

AND COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. Broadly speaking, it may be said that strategic intelligence is typically of a "big picture" character, for the use of high commanders and staffs in preparing overall war plans and operational directives; and that tactical intelligence is typically of a more detailed nature, to be used by lower command agencies for their short-term plans and activities. But this is true only in a general way, and subject to many qualifications. No exact line can be drawn between the two, as regards either the data with which they deal or the agencies which use them.

For example, strategic intelligence

includes, among other things, maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, and other terrain features; data on climate and hydrography; studies of governments, industries, cultures, transportation, and

telecommunications; and miscellaneous reports, manuals, and handbooks on the order of battle of the enemy army, navy, and air force. These are of course vital to a commander-in-chief when working up his overall plans. But also, many of them are of interest to a field commander in direct contact with the enemy in war. They supplement the combat intelligence which his staff gathers and digests from day to day; and at the outbreak of war, and in its early stages, they may be his only source of information in such fields.

On the other hand, data of an extremely local and restricted type, which would normally be classified as combat intelligence, may be needed for planning purposes at the highest levels. For instance a decision on whether to invade an enemy country at a certain time might turn on whether it was practicable to land and maintain a large force on his coast. A determination of this, in turn, might call for the study of extremely detailed and up-todate data on tides, currents, winds, weather, flying conditions, beaches, terrain, roads, bridges, and so on.

Again, captured documents and prisoners of war, both of which are characteristic sources of combat intelligence, will also furnish strategic intelligence with much valuable information on political and economic conditions inside the enemy country. Identifications of enemy units, and the characteristics of newly encountered weapons, are other examples of information which pertains to both strategic and combat intelligence.

The distinction between the two, in short, is essentially in scope and in point of view. Both are concerned with knowledge of foreign nations and of

areas of actual or possible military operations. Both are produced by application of the same fundamental techniques.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. This covers all those activities which are designed to prevent espionage, subversion, or sabotage in the Army establishment. It also includes the detection of treason, sedition, and disaffection among the military and civilian personnel of the Army. It is related to the other types of intelligence previously described, but is carried on largely as a separate activity under common staff supervision. Nevertheless the two operate in liaison and each provides support for the other.

OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE. With the growing complexity of war, many other categories of intelligence have come to be recognized and designated by specific names. They are not in addition to the main classifications of "strategic" and "tactical"; nor are they, in general, subclasses of those. Rather they deal with data in specialized fields, which may pertain to either or to both.

Some of these specialized designations relate to the conditions and activities

with which the intelligence deals, such as geographic, sociological, political, economic, scientific, transportation, and telecommunications intelligence. Others are derived from a very broad characteristic of the content, such as current and basic intelligence. The use for which the material is produced may also determine the name, as in staff, joint, and national intelligence.

Three of the best-known specialized categories are order-of-battle, technical, and communications intelligence. Orderof-battle intelligence is concerned with the strength, identification, dispositions, organization, equipment, tactics, combat effectiveness, history, and key personalities of enemy units. Technical intelligence (which, in an age of tremendous scientific advances, has tended to transcend all other forms of intelligence in importance) is concerned with foreign technological developments having a practical application to military weapons and equipment; and, specifically, with the principles of design and operation, physical characteristics, performance, and limitations of foreign materiel. Communications intelligence is derived from the study of enemy signal communications.

Army intelligence activities are carried on at all levels, from the groups of skilled specialists on the Army General Staff who study the war potentials of foreign nations to the battalion commander on a maneuver who sends out a reconnaissance party to report on road conditions. Nevertheless, widely as they vary in scope and subject matter, they all involve the same fundamental process consisting of three phases: collection, production, and dissemination.

Although these procedures are different and successive with respect to any particular item of intelligence, they are all going on, continuously and concurrently, in every agency which has intelligence responsibilities. The reason is evident. While some of the facts and phenomena with which intelligence is concerned (for example. major topographical features) are unchanging in terms of human time, most of them do

change; some slowly, some rapidly. The nation which, a few years ago, could not have supplied and maintained an army of ten thousand men on a certain potential fighting front, may since then have built a strategic railway and road net that would permit it to support twenty divisions on the same front. The bridge that, a month ago, was strong enough to carry a convoy of heavy trucks, may have been weakened or destroyed by last week's flood. The enemy tank battalion that was observed in its bivouac at dawn may be fifty miles away by noon. These are random illustrations of the fundamental maxim that intelligence is useless, and even dangerous, unless it is kept up to date; and that, therefore, its production and revision must be continuous.

COLLECTION. As regards collecting the information on which Army intelligence is based, there are three points to

be considered

What kind of information is to be collected.

Where and how it can be collected.
Who is to collect it.

Kind of Information to be Collected. The very scope and diversity of the data that a modern army needs make it essential to specify clearly what its intelligence agencies are to look for, lest they be swamped by a mass of data which are not needed. Therefore, when a headquarters gives any such agency a collecting job, it lists as fully as possible what items of information are to be collected, on what subjects, within what territorial area, and so on. These are called "essential elements of information," commonly abbreviated to "EEI."

Just what data constitute EEI will depend entirely on who wants the information, and why. Suppose, for example, that an army is about to force a crossing over an unfordable river against enemy resistance, using assault boats and military bridging equipment. A number of items of information about the river at once become EEI to the army commander and his subordinates: for example, its width, depth, speed of current, and kind of bottom; how high, steep, and firm its banks are; whether it is subject to sudden flooding; whether there is floating ice; and so on. Suppose next that, a few months later, the fighting front has advanced a hundred miles, and that a military hospital is to be built near the same river. From the viewpoint of the builders most of the facts which were formerly EEI are of no interest; but data on the purity and dependability of the river as a source of water supply become EEI in their turn.

Sources of Information and Collecting Agencies. A great deal of information on nations all over the world is available to the Army in peacetime, in the form of books, magazines, newspapers, maps, census reports, trade reports, and scientific and technical reports in the fields of meteorology, geology, geography, oceanography, sociology, agriculture, mining, medicine, the various branches of engineering. and

so on. Extensive use is made of these by high-level intelligence agencies which have a large volume of heterogeneous demands to satisfy. Military attaches and oversea command headquarters are important collecting agencies for such data.

In wartime, collection activities are greatly expanded by the opening up of sources of information which exist to only a limited degree, or not at all, in peacetime. Examples are: censorship of mail; prisoners of war; civilians, including defectors, refugees, and the inhabitants of occupied territory; captured enemy weapons, equipment, and installations; and captured enemy documents of all sorts, such as military orders, personal diaries, and letters. Most important of all, perhaps, is battlefield surveillance, carried out by the interception of enemy communications, by radar, acoustic devices, ground observation and reconnaissance, and by air observation and photography. (The latter, of course, may under favorable conditions be carried into the enemy's country far behind the battlefield.)

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE. The second phase in the overall intelligence process is the conversion of the collected information into intelligencethe "production" of intelligence, as it is called in the Army. It involves receiving and recording the data, and then subjecting them to processes technically known as evaluation, collation, integration, and interpretation. "Evaluation" of an item of information is based on the known or estimated reliability of the source, and on the intrinsic probability of the item being true or the reverse. "Collation" is the critical comparison of the item with all previous reports on the same subject. "Integration" is the combining of selected data to form patterns or hypotheses which explain the data, and which also give a basis for further analysis. "Interpretation" is an assessment of the item's significance, against the background of other intelligence.

Collation and integration become increasingly difficult in the higher command echelons, as the volume of information grows larger. Elaborate cross

indexing of files is essential, and electrical and mechanical devices are used to extract important data from numerous reports and to combine related items.

Stress is laid by the Army on the importance of the production phase of the intelligence effort. Without sound evaluation, collation, integration, and interpretation of information, the most effective collection activities can be wasted. Moreover, the ensuing dissemination of faulty intelligence would seriously handicap the Army's plans and operations.

DISSEMINATION. This is the final

phase of the intelligence process. It involves getting the finished intelligence to the agencies that need it, in time to be useful. There are various means of dissemination, including— Intelligence periodicals, compilations, and written staff estimates, studies, and reports.

Maps and map substitutes. Informal messages sent by letter, radio, telephone, or other means. Personal contacts, such as briefing and informal spot reports and confer

ences.

Displays and exhibits, as of captured enemy material.

Until World War II the only Federal intelligence organizations were those of the Army (which included Air Force intelligence) and the Navy. The creation of other major intelligence organizations reduced the volume of political, economic, and sociological intelligence which the Army had formerly had to produce for itself and other government agencies. However, the Army still shoulders a heavy burden for the Federal intelligence community, because of its preeminent intelligence capabilities in the fields of geography, transportation, telecommunications, electronics, radar, nuclear weapons, and guided missiles, as well as topics pertaining solely to ground forces.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. Army intelligence works closely with the other major Federal intelligence agencies by administrative, coordinating mechanisms which have been developed in Washington, since World War II, for reasons of efficiency and economy, and as one means of guarding against another Pearl Harbor disaster. One of these is the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), consisting of the heads of Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence and the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff. Another is the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), a working body staffed by the three Armed Services, from which the group obtains the intelligence needed for the formulation of the plans and policies of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. Army intelligence participates also in numerous committees and subcommittees, under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence (who is responsible by law for the coordination of all Federal intelligence activities). As a result it has constant liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, Defense, Navy. and Air Force.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AT DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY LEVEL. Army intelligence activities head up to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, a member of the Army General Staff reporting direct to the Chief of Staff. He is responsible for the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence required by the General Staff and the major field commands. He coordinates and supervises the intelligence activities of the technical services; establishes policies and formulates doctrine for intelligence and counterintelligence training and operations throughout the Army; and exercises General Staff supervision over the Army Intelligence Center and the Army Security Agency.

LOWER COMMAND LEVELS. Army doctrine regards intelligence as a function of command, and in the last analysis the commander at any level is himself responsible for the success of

Under him, intelligence is the function of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, a member of his general staff. In commands too small to have a general staff, the corresponding title is S2.

At all levels the organization of intelligence work under G2 is in principle substantially the same as that in the Department of the Army, described above. Ordinarily, the higher the level, the larger and more intricate are the intelligence staffs and the broader their responsibilities. The intelligence requirements of tactical commands are likely to vary greatly, according to their current situation and missions. The Army provides the necessary flexibility by units of combat intelligence specialists in such subjects as order-of-battle and photo-interpretation, which are transferred in and out of G2 offices as needed.

Although, as stated, the G2 at any headquarters is a direct subordinate of his commander, intelligence is regarded as an Army-wide network, under the overall general staff supervision of the A.C. of S., Intelligence, in Washington.

CONTROL OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. The Counterintelligence Corps is the investigative agency largely charged with executing the Army's counterintelligence mission. In addition there are Department of the Army

and Department of Defense programs for safeguarding classified information, and for checking the background of those persons, both in the Armed Forces and in defense industries, who need to have access to such information. The programs are designed to guard against unauthorized disclosure of any information which might be useful to a potential enemy. They are in force at nearly all command levels.

TRAINING. A major training program for intelligence and counterintelligence is maintained in both the Active Army and the reserve components. The school courses, which last from two weeks to nine months, cover the broad principles and techniques of intelligence and counterintelligence as well as the narrower specializations of both. The Commanding General of the Army Intelligence Center, located at Fort Holabird, Maryland, is responsible for the direction of such schools.

INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL. Military intelligence is not a service branch in the Active Army, as it is in the Army Reserve. Officers of the various arms and services may be assigned to tours of duty with intelligence or counterintelligence units, in accordance with their backgrounds and the needs of the Army. Regular officers thus assigned, and also MI reserve officers on extended active duty, are carried on the rolls of a basic branch.