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Our system of military justice came into existence with the first Continental Armies during the Revolution, in 1775. At that time the British Army was regulated by the Mutiny Act and the British Articles of War, with which the colonists were familiar. When the need suddenly arose for raising and disciplining an army, the British articles were used as a guide in preparing the American Articles of War.

From the time when the initial Articles were drafted (by a committee under the chairmanship of General Washington) until after the cessation of hostilities in World War I, there were no fundamental changes in the Articles of War, although from time to time they were slightly modernized. In 1920, however, Congress enacted sweeping changes. The fundamental effect was to remove the operation of military justice from the control of line officers without legal training and to place its administration under the general supervision of The Judge Advocate General, by establishing an

automatic appellate review system and
other safeguards.

Following World War II the Secretary of War convened a special board, headed by Dean Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New York University Law School, to make a report on the administration of justice during the war. The committee, after a prolonged study, found that the overall administration of military justice had been excellent, but recommended, among other things, further safeguards of the rights of accused persons and an increase in the number of Judge Advocate personnel. Legislation to enact these recommendations was presented to the 80th Congress. Title II of the Selective Service Act of 1948 amended 43 of the existing 121 Articles of War.1

The Judge Advocate General at once took measures to implement the new Articles. They included the preparation of a revised Manual for Courts-Martial effective on 1 February 1949, measures for ascertaining and certifying to the qualifications of officers qualified to


1 Some of the salient features of this revision were

Enlisted personnel were authorized to sit as members of general and special courts-martial upon a written request of an accused enlisted person.

The authority of commanding officers to impose nonjudicial disciplinary punishment was extended as to officers and warrant officers, but not as to enlisted men,

Officers became subject to trial by special court-martial.
Qualified lawyers were required as law members of general courts-martial.

In all general court-martial cases the legally appointed defense counsel had to be a lawyer if the trial judge advocate was a lawyer.

An accused was entitled to counsel at the pretrial investigation.

A bad conduct discharge, considered less onerous than a dishonorable discharge could general and special courts-martial.

Automatic appellate review was redefined, and the power of confirmation involving the death sentence and cases involving general officers, was vested The Judge Advocate General, and a Judicial Council composed of three Advocate General's Corps.

Provision was made for granting new trials upon petition of a comer appellate action, or within one year after termination of World

A lesser sentence than death or life imprisonment was auth

Specific provisions were made to prevent coercion or und consideration of any case.


The Uniform Code of Military Justice (1) military offenses, such as absence is divided into 11 subchapters contain- without leave, desertion, willful dising 140 articles. These subchapters, or obedience of orders, misbehavior before basic groups, are: General Provisions, the enemy, and misbehavior of sentinel; Apprehension and Restraint, Nonjudi- (2) crimes common to both civil and cial Punishment, Court-Martial Jurisdic- military law, such as murder, rape, tion, Composition of Courts-Martial, arson, burglary, larceny, and forgery; Pre-trial Procedure, Trial Procedures, and (3) a general group of offenses, Sentences, Review of Courts-Martial, not otherwise specifically provided for, Punitive Articles, and Miscellaneous which may be described as "conduct Provisions.

unbecoming an officer and a gentleOf the 140 articles only 58 are puni- man," "all disorders and neglects to the tive articles, that is, provisions which prejudice of good order and discipline explain in detail the offenses that are in the armed forces," and "all conduct punishable by courts-martial. Although of a nature to bring discredit upon the these offenses run the gamut from a armed forces feigned illness calculated to TP To form 1, effective, ready to premeditated murder, the

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disappear with the return to peace. Between wars there were sporadic Army activities of an intelligence nature, such as exploring and mapping the West, and the occasional official publication of an Army officer's report on foreign armies.

At the outset of the Civil War both intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities for the Union forces were entrusted chiefly to Allan Pinkerton, a famous detective of that period. He operated for most of the time under the cover of an Army major. Maj. Gen. McClellan, who for a while commanded the Army of the Potomac, was Pinkerton's principal sponsor; and McClellan's relief by Hooker, in the latter part of 1862, was followed by the withdrawal of Pinkerton from this field. A more effective intelligence effort than that of Pinkerton was made by the Bureau of Information, directed by Colonel George H. Sharpe, Assistant Provost Marshal of the Army of the Potomac, from early in 1863 to the close of the war. Sharpe-a New York lawyer, who had commanded a regiment of volunteers in combat-appreciated the necessity of efficient, systematic collection of information from all sources, and also the vital importance of bringing together the individual reports for evaluation and collation.

An interesting anticipation of modern aerial reconnaissance and photography was the Signal Corps' employment of balloons and cameras for observation purposes during the Civil War.

Military intelligence as a permanent and continuing activity in our Army began in 1885, when an intelligence unit of a few clerks was established in the office of The Adjutant General. In 1889 the Military Intelligence Division was enlarged to include a military attache system. By 1898, when the SpanishAmerican War broke out, there were 11 officers and 12 civilians in the Division in Washington and 16 attaches abroad.

With the creation of the War Department General Staff in 1903, intelligence was transferred to that agency and became its "Second Division," with 6 officers and a small civilian staff. However, it soon lost its identity as a separate division; and as the General

Staff suffered severe personnel cuts and passed through various reorganizations, intelligence was relegated to a place of minor importance. How minor may be judged by the fact that in May of 1917, a month after we entered World War I, the Military Intelligence Section (the only intelligence unit in the General Staff) consisted of 3 officers and 2 civilians.

With the progress of the war, intelligence activities expanded enormously. The General Staff intelligence agency was redesignated “Military Intelligence Division” in August of 1918. By the date of the Armistice it had a strength of 282 officers and 1159 civilians. Many of the officers were specialists in one or another field who had been commissioned directly from civil life. There were similar specialists among the civilian personnel, since by World War I the need for them had become plain. Even during the Civil War the influence of modern inventions and industry upon both warfare and intelligence had been evident in the military employment of railways, telegraph lines, and cameras; and World War I added improved weapons and means of transport and communication. The net effect of these developments in weapons and equipment was to complicate the problems of military intelligence, while simultaneously adding to the capacity of intelligence to solve them.

During the drastic reduction in the size of the Army which followed World War I, the strength of the War Department G2 (as it was then called) shrank to 20 officers and 48 civilians. The outbreak of World War II reversed the trend. At the peak of its strength in World War II, G2 numbered 622 officers and 921 civilians. There were also large Army intelligence and counterintelligence organizations elsewhere in the United States, and at various command levels overseas.

After the war, intelligence agencies suffered the inevitable reduction. However, it was by no means as drastic as that which followed World War I; nor has it resulted, as was repeatedly the case in the past, in crippling our defense effort in that field. Our Army as a whole is being maintained today at a greater strength, and a higher level of combat readiness, than was ever the case in peacetime before World War II. This necessitates, and

has resulted in, an efficient military intelligence organization and a strong and continuous intelligence effort.




The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force-while cooperating effectively among themselves, and with other agencies, in the intelligence field-each have their own intelligence agencies and activities. Army intelligence may be divided into three broad categories: strategic intelligence, combat intelligence, and counterintelligence.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. This deals with the manifold aspects of foreign war potentials. It is used by the Army in planning and executing national security measures in time of peace and military operations in time of war. It is ordinarily the product of large high-level staffs, which assemble and study enormous masses of detailed information, much of it of a fundamental and more or less unchanging character.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. This is used in planning and conducting tactical operations. It is concerned with the enemy, the terrain, and the weather in a relatively limited area and situation. It is largely produced by the lower command levels on the basis of up-todate data gathered locally. It is characterized in a high degree by rapid analysis of information received and prompt dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

RELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGIC AND COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. Broadly speaking, it may be said that strategic intelligence is typically of a "big picture" character, for the use of high commanders and staffs in preparing overall war plans and operational directives; and that tactical intelligence is typically of a more detailed nature, to be used by lower command agencies for their short-term plans and activities. But this is true only in a general way, and subject to many qualifications. No exact line can be drawn between the two, as regards either the data with which they deal or the agencies which use them.

For example, strategic intelligence

includes, among other things, maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, and other terrain features; data on climate and hydrography; studies of governments, industries, cultures, transportation, and telecommunications; and miscellaneous reports, manuals, and handbooks on the order of battle of the enemy army, navy, and air force. These are of course vital to a commander-in-chief when working up his overall plans. But also, many of them are of interest to a field commander in direct contact with the enemy in war. They supplement the combat intelligence which his staff gathers and digests from day to day; and at the outbreak of war, and in its early stages, they may be his only source of information in such fields.

On the other hand, data of an tremely local and restricted type, which would normally be classified as bat intelligence, may be needed for planning purposes at the highest levels. For instance a decision on whether to invade an enemy country at a certain time might turn on whether it was practicable to land and maintain large force on his coast. A determination of this, in turn, might call for the study of extremely detailed and up-todate data tides, currents, winds, weather, flying conditions, beaches, terrain, roads, bridges, and so on.

Again, captured documents and prisoners of war, both of which are characteristic sources of combat intelligence, will also furnish strategic intelligence with much valuable information on political and economic conditions inside


enemy country. Identifications of enemy units, and the characteristics of newly encountered weapons, are other examples of information which pertains to both strategic and combat intelligence.

The distinction between the two, in short, is essentially in scope and in point of view. Both are concerned with knowledge of foreign nations and of




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areas of actual or possible military operations. Both are produced by application of the same fundamental techniques.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. This covers all those activities which are designed to prevent espionage, subversion, or sabotage in the Army establishment. It also includes the detection of treason, sedition, and disaffection among the military and civilian personnel of the Army. It is related to the other types of intelligence previously described, but is carried on largely as a separate activity under common staff supervision. Nevertheless the two operate in liaison and each provides support for the other.

OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE. With the growing complexity of war, many other categories of intelligence have come to be recognized and designated by specific names. They are not in addition to the main classifications of "strategic" and "tactical"; nor are they, in general, subclasses of those. Rather they deal with data in specialized fields, which may pertain to either or to both.

Some of these specialized designations relate to the conditions and activities

with which the intelligence deals, such

geographic, sociological, political, economic, scientific, transportation, and telecommunications intelligence. Others are derived from a very broad characteristic of the content, such as current and basic intelligence. The use for which the material is produced may also determine the name, as in staff, joint, and national intelligence.

Three of the best-known specialized categories are order-of-battle, technical, and communications intelligence. Orderof-battle intelligence is concerned with the strength, identification, dispositions, organization, equipment, tactics, combat effectiveness, history, and key personalities of enemy units. Technical intelligence (which, in an age of tremendous scientific advances, has tended to transcend all other forms of intelligence in importance) is concerned with foreign technological developments having a practical application to military weapons and equipment; and, specifically, with the principles of design and operation, physical characteristics, performance, and limitations of foreign materiel. Communications intelligence is derived from the study of enemy signal communications.


Army intelligence activities are carried on at all levels, from the groups of skilled specialists on the Army General Staff who study the war potentials of foreign nations to the battalion commander on a maneuver who sends out a reconnaissance party to report on road conditions. Nevertheless, widely as they vary in scope and subject matter, they all involve the same fundamental process consisting of three phases: collection, production, and dissemination.

Although these procedures are different and successive with respect to any particular item of intelligence, they are all going on, continuously and concurrently, in every agency which has intelligence responsibilities. The reason is evident. While some of the facts and phenomena with which intelligence is concerned (for example, major topographical features) are unchanging in terms of human time, most of them do

change; some slowly, some rapidly. The nation which, a few years ago, could not have supplied and maintained an army of ten thousand men on a certain potential fighting front, may since then have built a strategic railway and road net that would permit it to support twenty divisions on the same front. The bridge that, a month ago, was strong enough to carry a convoy of heavy trucks, may have been weakened or destroyed by last week's flood. The enemy tank battalion that was observed in its bivouac at dawn may be fifty miles away by noon. These are random illustrations of the fundamental maxim that intelligence is useless, and even dangerous, unless it is kept up to date; and that, therefore, its production and revision must be continuous.

COLLECTION. As regards collecting the information on which Army intelligence is based, there are three points to

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