vented-sensational stories of Spanish atrocities. Politicians who wished to court popular favor saw opportunities in this rising tide of public sentiment and began to demand intervention. The McKinley Administration, which at first had maintained a proper neutrality, gradually swung into line with popular opinion.

Two events early in 1898 greatly assisted the advocates of war in determining the course of events. The first was the publication of a confidential letter written by Dupuy de Lôme, the Spanish Minister to the United States, which contained unflattering reflections on President McKinley's character, and also indicated that Spain may not have been entirely sincere in her dealings with the United States on the Cuban question. Press and public were outraged and de Lôme was forced to resign. The second event was the sinking of the American battleship Maine in Havana Harbor on 15 February 1898 with a loss of 260 lives. The cause of the explosion which destroyed the Maine has never been determined, but at the time the American public, in its inflamed state, was convinced that Spain was responsible and loudly demanded revenge.

On 29 March 1898 the United States sent an ultimatum to Spain demanding abandonment of the concentration-camp system and the establishment of an armistice in Cuba preparatory to peace negotiations to be conducted through President McKinley. Spain seemed ready to agree to most of the terms, but was evasive on the matter of American mediation. Yielding to public pressure, McKinley sent a message to Congress on 11 April recommending intervention. Congress responded on 19 April 1898 with a joint resolution proclaiming Cuba free and independent, and authorizing the President to use land and naval forces to expel Spain from the island. Attached to the resolution was the "Teller Amendment," which altruistically disclaimed any intention on the part of the United States to retain Cuba following the elimination of Spanish authority.

FORCES INVOLVED. American Forces. At the beginning of the war the United States, with a population of more

than 70,000,000, had a Regular Army numbering about 28,000 men scattered throughout the country, in small units among many different posts. The men and units were individually well trained, but the Army as a whole was unprepared for a major oversea war. The National Guard numbered about 100,000 men, but in general it was poorly trained, its equipment was either scarce or obsolete, and its organization varied greatly from State to State.

Upon declaring war, Congress doubled the legal size of the Regular Army and authorized the President to accept 125,000 volunteers, a number that was soon raised, as a result of popular demand, to 267,000. National Guard units were permitted to serve as State volunteer units with the sanction of the respective governors. Peak strength of the Army during the war was reached in June 1898, when the total number on active duty was 209,714 (including 319 USMA Cadets and 1,158 Army nurses). The total number of individuals serving in the Armed Forces from 21 April to 13 August 1898 was 306,760 (Army, 280,564; Navy, 22,875; Marines, 3,321).

The Navy, thanks to a construction and modernization program undertaken in the preceding decade, was somewhat better prepared for hostilities than the Army. At the outbreak of war it had 69 warships of all types, including four 10,000-ton first-class battleships. In the three months following the declaration of war it acquired 67 more ships, making 136 in all; the increments were largely extemporized types such as hastily armed yachts and coasters.

The number of casualties suffered by American forces from 1 May to 31 August 1898 was: battle deaths, 385 (Army, 369; Navy, 10; Marines, 6); nonbattle deaths, 2,061 (Army only); battle wounds, 1,662 (Army, 1,594; Navy, 47; Marines, 21).

Spanish Forces. Spain, with a population of around 18,000,000, had sent large numbers of troops to Cuba to suppress the rebellion. At the time that the United States declared war, 155,302 Spanish Regular troops (including 2,895 Marines) and 41,518 Cuban irregulars were stationed in Cuba. These were predominantly infantry forces. The number of Cuban insurgents actively

in the field against Spain in 1898 was probably not more than 15,000.

As regards naval forces, the ratio was about three to two in favor of the United States. Spain had a total of 49 warships of all classes, the largest of which was 9,900 tons; but many of the ships were old and improperly equipped. The Spanish Government made practically no move to improve matters, even when it became obvious that war Iwith the United States was imminent.

OVERALL STRATEGY. Practically no strategic planning as such took place before or during the Spanish-American War on either side. The United States plunged enthusiastically into war with one announced objective-freeing Cuba of Spanish rule-but with no operational plan. The Army had no general staff to formulate strategic plans, and neither the Army nor the Navy had given thought to organizing for amphibious warfare. The result was great inefficiency and confusion.

With war imminent early in April 1898, the Secretary of War (Russell A. Alger) ordered practically all Regular Army cavalry and artillery units to Chickamaugua Park, and all infantry units to New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa. Presumably his purpose was to place the infantry in position for a quick descent on Cuba, but he instituted no planning program to that end. Alger ignored the recommendations of the Commanding General of the Army, Lt. Gen. Nelson Miles, who wanted to assemble all Regular Army units in one place where they could be organized into large units, equipped, and given combined-arms training. After war was declared, the volunteer units enthusiastically descended on the southern camps, clamoring to be sent to Cuba, though they were mostly untrained, often unarmed, and even without uniforms and field equipment. That the Army was eventually able to conduct a major oversea operation was due rather to the ability of Americans to improvise and take the initiative than to wise leadership backed by sound prior planning.

The Navy's strategic objective seems to have been simply the neutralization

of the Spanish fleet. In the Pacific Cmdr. George Dewey's small squadron was ordered to destroy Spanish naval units known to be in the Philippines. In the Atlantic the Navy blockaded northern Cuba and kept a lookout for a Spanish naval force under Adm. Pascual Cervera, who, so rumor had it, had left Spain to raid the Atlantic seaboard. The Navy was forced to provide the protection demanded by cities on the east coast. Cervera managed to slip his small, obsolete squadron unnoticed into Santiago Bay, where he was promptly blockaded, but where he was safe from attack because of powerful shore batteries and forts guarding the approaches. Thereupon our naval authorities appealed to the Army to take Santiago in a land attack, so that Cervera's fleet would be driven into the open sea where it could be destroyed. This situation precipitated the only planning of the war, and resulted in a hastily staged, much-bungled amphibious operation that succeeded only because the Spaniards were even more inept than the Americans. Other major developments-the Puerto Rico and Manila campaigns-were the result more of opportunism than of preconceived strategy and deliberate planning.

The Spaniards resigned themselves to fighting the war in an atmosphere of utter hopelessness. If they had a strategic plan it was not apparent.

MAJOR BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS. Hostilities during the war lasted only about 4 months. Unlike most of our previous wars, this was one in which the Navy played the paramount role, ground operations being subsidiary thereto. The Army conducted three campaigns, only one of which involved serious fighting.

As has been noted, Adm. Cervera's fleet had taken refuge (29 May 1898) in Santiago Bay, and the American Navy had asked the Army to reduce the defenses guarding the entrance. The War Department, eager to get the Army into action, directed Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter to embark his loosely organized V Corps, which had been assembled around Tampa, and sail for Cuba. After many delays, and in an

atmosphere of the utmost confusion, the embarkation of some 17,000 men began on 11 June 1898, lasting four days. On 20 June the convoy reached a point off Santiago, but it was two days before Shafter,could make up his mind where to land the troops. Rear Adm. William T. Sampson wanted them to land near the entrance of the bay, where a powerful fort dominated the area, and to storm the positions guarding the sea approaches. Shafter considered this plan too dangerous and followed the advice of Gen. Calixto García, a Cuban insurgent leader, who recommended Daiquirí, 18 miles east of Santiago Bay, as a landing site.

The Santiago Campaign (22 June-11 July 1898) got under way with a confused landing operation which, fortunately for the Americans, was unopposed. About 6,000 troops were landed on the first day, 22 June, and the march on Santiago began at once. On the following day Brig. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, commanding the forces ashore, easily captured the town of Siboney. As Lawton paused to reorganize, Brig. Gen. Joseph W. ("Fighting Joe") Wheeler stole a march on him by pushing ahead toward Santiago with his dismounted cavalry division. At Las Guási

mas Wheeler ran into a sharp fight with the rear guard of a retiring Spanish force. The Americans suffered a loss of 16 killed and 52 wounded, and the Spaniards lost 12 killed and 14 wounded. This action only slightly delayed the main advance, since the Spaniards had not planned to make a determined stand until the Americans reached Santiago's outer defenses.

The most important of those defenses were along a series of ridges known collectively as San Juan, and in the village of El Caney to the north. Shafter decided to attack El Caney first and then follow with a frontal assault on the San Juan positions. General Lawton was assigned to take El Caney, which was defended by about 500 Spaniards, and Maj. Ken. Jacob F. Kent was in charge of a larger force assigned to take the San Juan position, which was held by about 1,200 Spaniards. Lawton's and Kent's attacking forces totaled some 8,000 men.

Shafter launched his attack on 1 July 1898. After considerable confusion and some temporary reverses, Kent's forces stormed and took the Spanish positions on the southern half of the ridge, while dismounted cavalry forces under General Wheeler took the northern end, in

AREA OF OPERATIONS, GREATER ANTILLES

HAITI

cluding Kettle Hill where Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt and his "Rough Riders" distinguished themselves. The attack on El Caney made little headway at first against determined Spanish resistance, but success was finally achieved after the supporting artillery was moved forward to positions where it could place effective fire on the enemy. The Spanish forces dropped back half a mile to a second line of defense, and except for a heavy exchange of artillery fire on 2 July there was no more fighting. In the engagements at San Juan and El Caney there were 1,475 American and more than 550 Spanish casualties.

On 3 July 1898 Admiral Cervera attempted to escape from Santiago Bay with his fleet. A dramatic running fight with the American fleet ensued. All the Spanish ships were destroyed, with a loss of about 600 men. The Americans lost only one man killed and one seriously wounded.

Following Cervera's disaster, Gen. José Toral, defender of Santiago, where near-famine conditions existed, entered into negotiations with General Shafter. On 16 July he signed terms of surrender, which provided for the unconditional surrender of 11,500 troops in the city and some 12,000 other troops stationed elsewhere in the province of Santiago.

After the fall of Santiago General Miles took personal charge of an expedition to Puerto Rico (25 July-13 August 1898). His force of about 3,000 men landed at Guánica on 25 July 1898, and an additional force under Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke landed at Guayama. Four columns of American troops quickly overran the island. There was some light skirmishing in which a few Americans were wounded, but the population as a whole received the Americans with enthusiasm.

The Manila Campaign (31 July-13 August 1898) was a sequel to the first naval engagement of the war. On 1 May 1898 a small American squadron under Comdr. George Dewey completely destroyed a Spanish naval force in Manila Bay. To take the city of Manila, Dewey needed ground forces; he therefore sent a request to Washington for 5,000 troops. Meanwhile he blockaded the port and encouraged Filipino insurgents, led by Emilio Aguinaldo,

whom Dewey had brought from exile in China, to besiege the city pending the arrival of American troops. Aguinaldo, who had previously led an insurrection against Spanish rule, hoped for recognition of his Philippine Republic. While waiting the arrival of ground forces, Dewey was faced with delicate diplomatic problems as English, German, and French naval forces arrived, ostensibly to protect their nationals in the islands, but also to be on hand to pick up any loose territory in case the United States decided against taking control after the collapse of Spanish power.

The War Department responded eagerly to the request for ground forces. and had sent about 11,000 troops to Manila under the command of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt by 25 July. The Spaniards in Manila indicated a willingness to surrender to the Americans, but not to the Filipinos, since they did not want the city exposed to undisciplined native insurgents after capitulation. Such an arrangement was agreeable to the Administration in Washington, which by this time was planning to take control of the Philippines. Dewey and Merritt accordingly persuaded the Filipinos to let only Americans make the final assault on Manila; at the same time they quietly made arrangements with the Spanish authorities for what was planned to be a noisy but bloodless capture of the city. The operation began as planned on 12 August 1898, but a few bands of Filipinos became mixed with the advancing troops, and some uncontemplated fighting took place in which 5 Americans were killed and 35 wounded. Eventually the firing and confusion were reduced sufficiently to permit the Spaniards to surrender to the Americans. Formal articles of capitulation were signed on 14 August 1898. Total American losses during the operations in the Philippines were 18 killed and 109 wounded. Filipino units that had entered Manila were persuaded to leave, but subsequently Aguinaldo led a rebellion against American rule. (See "Philippine Insurrection," chapter 29).

CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. The Spanish Government asked for an armistice, through the intermediary of the French Republic, shortly after the fall of Santiago. Armistice terms, dictated

by the United States, were signed on 12 August 1898. Subsequently a peace treaty was negotiated at Paris. Acting for the United States as peace commissioners were Cushman K. Davis, William R. Day, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid. According to the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed

on 10 December 1898, Spain relinquished all claims to sovereignty over Cuba, ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States, and agreed to accept $20,000,000 from the United States for the Philippine Islands. The Senate approved ratification of the treaty on 6 February 1899.