網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

vision training in France lasted about three months. In general it included, successively, small unit instruction, service in the line in a quiet sector with British or French units, service at a training area to correct observed deficiencies, and open warfare training.

LAND CAMPAIGNS, 1917. The year that America entered the war was marked by near disaster for the Allies on all the European fronts. A French offensive in April, with which the British cooperated, was a failure, and was followed by widespread mutinies in the French armies. The British maintained strong pressure on their front throughout the year; but British attacks on the Messines Ridge (7 June), at Ypres (31 July), and at Cambrai (20 November) failed in their main objective-the capture of German submarine bases-and took a severe toll of British fighting strength. Three American engineer regiments the 11th, 12th, and 14th-were engaged in construction activity behind the British lines at Cambrai in November, when they were unexpectedly called upon to go into the front lines during an emergency. They thus became the first A.E.F. units to meet the enemy (Cambrai Campaign, 20 November-4 December 1917).

Meanwhile the Allied situation also deteriorated on the Eastern and Italian Fronts. In Russia, after the abdication of Czar Nicholas II in March, the moderate constitutional government continued the war, launching an offensive in Galicia in July. But the great success of the German offensive against the Russians at Riga in September 1917, in which the German commander, General Hutier, first used his new infiltration tactics, further undermined the tottering Kerensky regime. In November the Bolsheviks seized power. They immediately began negotiations to get Russia out of the war. An armistice between Russia and the Central Powers was signed on 15 December 1917, and the Treaty of Brest Litovsk on 3 March 1918 ended Russian participation in the conflict. Germany at once transferred most of her forces on the Eastern Front to the west in preparation for the great offensives of 1918.

In November 1917 the Allies suffered further reverses on the Italian Front

when an Austro-German force, using the new Hutier tactics, inflicted losses of nearly 300,000 on the Italians at Caporetto. Italy stayed in the war, but could contribute little to the Allied cause until late 1918.

GERMAN OFFENSIVES AND OTHER OPERATIONS, 21 MARCH-18 JULY 1918. After the collapse of Russia and the Italian debacle in late 1917, the German leaders decided that the time had come for Germany to make a supreme effort to end the war by a conclusive victory on the Western Front. Time was running out for Germany. The Allied convoy system had nullified the unrestricted submarine campaign, the blockade was slowly choking the economy of the Central Powers, and American soldiers were arriving in Europe in constantly increasing numbers. For the first time since 1914 Germany had a superiority in combat strength on the Western Front. General Erich von Ludendorff, now in virtual supreme authority in Germany, believed that he had sufficient forces to strike a decisive blow. Furthermore, he had reason to believe that the newly developed Hutier tactics, employed with success at Riga, Caporetto, and Cambrai, had been able to rectify the unbalance that had arisen between offense and defense because of the effectiveness of automatic weapons. These tactics were designed to achieve surprise with a short, intensive artillery barrage, followed up immediately by infiltration of enemy defenses with assault troops accompanied by light artillery. Strong points were bypassed as every effort was made to maintain the momentum of the attack. In early 1918 Ludendorff reshuffled his combat divisions to form elite battle groups, which were given the intensive training necessary for successful application of the new offensive tactics.

First German Offensive (Somme Defensive Campaign), 21 March-6 April 1918. After considerable study, the German high command decided to attack on the British-held Somme front in the direction of Amiens. A breakthrough at this point would separate the French from the British, push the latter into a pocket in Flanders, and open the way to the Channel ports.

The offensive began on 21 March 1918

with three German armies (about 62 divisions in all) in the assault. British defense lines were pierced in rapid succession. By 26 March Amiens was seriously threatened, and on the following day a gap was created between the French and British armies. But the Germans lacked reserves to exploit their initial phenomenal successes, and the Allies moved in enough reserves to bring the offensive to a halt by 6 April. The Germans had advanced up to 40 miles, had captured 1,500 square miles of ground and 70,000 prisoners, and had inflicted some 200,000 casualties. They had failed, however, to achieve any of their strategic objectives: destruction of the British army, disruption of Allied lateral communications, and capture of Amiens. Furthermore, they had suffered comparable casualties, many of them in the highly trained assault divisions that could not easily be replaced.

On 25 March 1918, at the height of the German drive, Pershing placed the four American divisions at that time ready for combat at the disposal of the French.

But only a few American units were engaged in the "Somme Defensive" (the Army's name for this campaign). They included the 6th, 12th, and 14th Engineers and the 17th, 22d, and 148th Aero Squadrons, a total of about 2200 men.

For the Allies, perhaps the most significant result of the battle was the establishment of a unified command. The Italian defeat at Caporetto had led to the formation of a Supreme War Council in November 1917, composed of the heads of the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, each with a civilian assistant and a permanent military adviser (in the case of the United States, Gen. Tasker H. Bliss). Organization of the Council was a move in the direction of a unified command, but no substitute for it, since the Council could act only by unanimous decision.

In the March 1918 crisis Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the British Commander in Chief, had requested Petain, the French Commander in Chief, to provide the assistance which the French

[graphic]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

had earlier promised the British if they should need it. In response the French commander offered only a few units, contending that he needed every man available for the attack which he believed the Germans were about to launch against the French sector. The outraged Haig, who had long resisted any kind of unified command, now insisted that a supreme commander be appointed at once. An inter-Allied conference on 26 March made General Ferdinand Foch, hitherto Chief of the General Staff of the French armies, the coordinator of action of British and French forces in the vicinity of Amiens. Two days later Pershing placed all American forces under Foch's orders. On 3 April Foch's coordinating powers were extended to include all Allied forces on the Western Front, and on 14 April he was given the official title of General in Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

Lys Campaign, 9-27 April 1918. Ludendorff still hoped to destroy the hard-hit British Army before it had a chance to recover from the effects of the Somme drive. This was the purpose of a new German attack launched on 9 April 1918 on a narrow front along the Lys River in Flanders. The Germans committed 46 divisions to the assault, and, using Hutier attacks once again, quickly scored a breakthrough. The British situation was desperate for some days. Haig issued his famous "backs to the wall" order and appealed to Foch for reinforcements. But the Allied Supreme Commander, convinced that the British could hold their line, refused to commit reserves he was building up in anticipation of the day when the Allies would again be able to seize the initiative. Foch's judgment proved to be correct, and Ludendorff called off the offensive on 29 April.

Since 21 March the Germans had suffered some 350,000 casualties without having attained any vital objectives; in the same period British casualties numbered about 305,000. About 500 Americans participated in the Lys Campaign, including troops of the 16th Engineers, 28th Aero Squadron, and 1st Gas Regiment.

Aisne Campaign, 27 May-5 June 1918. The next major German attack fell on

27 May on the thinly held but formidable terrain along the Aisne River known as the Chemin des Dames. The original objective of this new offensive was to draw southward the Allied reserves accumulated back of the British sector, in preparation for a final German attempt to destroy the British Army in Flanders. The French and British defenders were taken completely by surprise, and their positions were overrun rapidly on a forty-mile front. German progress on the first day was so rapid (advances up to 13 miles were made at some points) that Ludendorff altered his plans and decided to make the diversionary attack a main effort. Most of the Aisne bridges were captured intact. The thrust toward Reims failed. but Soissons was taken, and by 31 May the Germans had reached the outskirts of Château-Thierry on the Marne, less than 40 miles from Paris.

In the next few days the Germans sought to exploit and expand the deep and exposed salient which they had established. But by 4 June they had been stopped everywhere. Some 27,500 American troops took part in the check of the German advance. The 3d Division foiled enemy attempts in the period 1-4 June to secure a firm bridgehead across the Marne at Château-Thierry. West of the town the 2d Division, which included a Marine brigade, defended the road to Paris, and on 6 June successfully

counterattacked in Belleau Wood.

Cantigny, 28-31 May 1918. Meanwhile, in an action at Cantigny in late May which coincided with the German drive on the Aisne, Americans had their first chance to demonstrate their offensive capabilities. The enemy offensive in March had exposed the left flank of the French First Army south of the Somme. The French began preparations for a counterattack to remedy this defect in their defenses, and called upon the A.E.F. for assistance. The 1st Division, which had been manning a quiet sector near Toul since 7 April, was brought west to a place in the line near Montdidier and the exposed French flank on 27 April.

In front of the 1st Division position was the village of Cantigny, located on high ground which the Germans were using to advantage for observing the

American defenses and for screening the activity behind their own front. As a preliminary to the start of the French counteroffensive, the 1st Division was ordered to seize this high ground. On 28 May the 28th Infantry, supported by , elements of the 18th Infantry and American and French artillery, drove the Germans out of Cantigny and then withstood severe enemy counterattacks for the next three days without giving up any of the ground gained. Because of the new German offensive on the Aisne, the proposed French counterattack in this area never took place.

Campaign, 9-13

Montdidier-Noyon June 1918. Ludendorff followed up his stalled Aisne offensive with a smallscale drive in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on 9 June 1918. Twenty-one German divisions attacked the French on a twenty-three mile front extending from Montdidier to the Oise River. The French anticipated the assault and contained it after a nine-mile penetration by the Germans, counterattacking strongly. The fighting was over by 12 June, and the enemy had little to show for the heavy losses incurred. No large American units were in the immediate vicinity of this action, although the 1st Division at Cantigny was subjected to artillery fire and diversionary raids.

Champagne-Marne Campaign, 15-18 July 1918. In the four great offensives from 21 March to 13 June 1918 the Germans gained considerable ground, but failed to achieve a decisive advantage at any point on the front. Furthermore, success was bought at a price in manpower and material which they could ill afford. Their more than 600,000 casualties were irreplaceable, whereas the Allied loss of some 800,000 men was soon more than compensated for by new American units arriving at the front in ever-mounting numbers. By July 1918 Allied troops outnumbered German on the Western Front. Other factors also contributed to the decline of German morale, notably the pinch of the blockade and the effectiveness of the Allied propaganda, which was distributed widely by air at the front and in German cities behind the lines. But Ludendorff refused to consider peace negotiations, and planned two more offensives for July which he hoped would

bring victory. The first of the new drives was designed to capture Reims, to make more secure the supply of the Marne salient, and to draw in Allied reserves. The second and larger offensive, destined never to be launched, would strike once again at the British in Flanders.

When the two-pronged German assault on either side of Reims began on 15 July the Allies were prepared for it. Plans for the attack had leaked out of Berlin, and Allied airplanes had detected the unusual activity behind the enemy front. Foch had time to draw up reserves, and Petain, the French commander, skillfully deployed his troops in defense-in-depth tactics. Consequently the German drive east of Reims fell far short of its objective. The attack west of the city succeeded in pushing across the Marne near ChâteauThierry, but was checked there by French and American units. Among the A.E.F. units involved in this action were the 3d, 26th, 28th, and 42d Divisions, the 369th Infantry, and supporting elements (in all about 85,000 Americans). It was here that the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division gained its motto, "the Rock of the Marne."

By 17 July the Champagne-Marne offensive had petered out and the initiative passed to the Allies. The German people had built up great hopes for the success of this Friedensturm (peace offensive); its failure was a tremendous psychological blow to the whole nation.

ALLIED OFFENSIVES, 18 JULY-11 NOVEMBER 1918. This period on the western front is marked by a crescendo of Allied offensives that ended with the final defeat of Germany.

Aisne-Marne Campaign, 18 July-6 August 1918. Several days before the Germans launched their abortive Champagne-Marne drive, the French high command had made plans for a general converging offensive against the Marne salient. Petain issued orders on 12 July for the attack to begin on the 18th, with five French armies-the Tenth, Sixth, Ninth, Fifth, and Fourth, placed around the salient from left to righttaking part. Spearheading the attack were the five divisions of the French XX Corps (Tenth Army), including the American 1st and 2d Divisions. Early on 18 July the two American divisions

and a French Moroccan division, jumping off behind a heavy barrage, launched the main blow at the northwest base of the salient near Soissons. Enemy frontline troops, taken by surprise, initially gave ground, although resistance stiffened after an Allied penetration of some three miles. Before the 1st and 2d Divisions were relieved (on 19 and 22 July respectively) they had advanced 6 to 7 miles, made Soissons untenable for the enemy, and captured 6,500 prisoners at a cost of over 10,000 American casualties.

Meanwhile the other French armies in the offensive also made important gains, and the German commander ordered a general retreat from the Marne salient. The French Sixth Army, on the right of the Tenth, advanced steadily from the southwest, reaching the Vesle River on 3 August. By 28 July this army included the American 3d, 4th, 28th, and 42d Divisions. The 4th and 42d Divisions were under control of the I Corps, the first American corps headquarters to participate in combat. On 4 August the American III Corps headquarters entered combat, taking control of the 28th and 32d Divisions (the latter had relieved the 3d Division in the line on 29 July). By 5 August the entire Sixth Army front was held by the two American corps. East of the Sixth Army the French Ninth and Fifth Armies also advanced into the salient. The Germans retired across the Aisne and Vesle Rivers, resolutely defending each strong point as they went.

By 6 August the Aisne-Marne Offensive was over. The threat to Paris was ended by wiping out the Marne salient. The initiative now had definitely passed to the Allies, ending any possibility that Ludendorff could carry out his planned offensive in Flanders. Moreover, the success of the offensive revealed the advantages of Allied unity of command and the fighting qualities of American units. The eight A.E.F. divisions (1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, 42d) in the action had spearheaded much of the advance, demonstrating offensive capabilities that helped to inspire new confidence in the war-weary Allied armies. About 270,000 Americans took part in the battle.

On 24 July, while the Aisne-Marne drive was under way, Foch had outlined his plans for the remainder of 1918 at the only conference of Allied commanders that he called during the war. He proposed that the immediate objective of the Allied offensive should be the reduction of the three main German salients (Marne, Amiens, St. Mihiel), with the goal of improving lateral communications behind the front in preparation for a general offensive in the fall. Reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was assigned to Pershing at his own request.

The excellent showing made by American troops in the Aisne-Marne Offensive gave Pershing an opportunity to press again for the formation of an independent American army. Preliminary steps in the organization of the American First Army had been taken in early July 1918. On the 4th Lt. Col. Hugh A. Drum was selected as chief of staff and directed to begin establishment of army headquarters. After conferences on 10 and 21 July, Foch agreed on the 22d to the formal organization of the First Army, and to the formation of two American sectors-a temporary combat sector in the Château-Thierry region, where the already active I and III Corps could comprise the nucleus of the First Army, and a quiet sector farther east, extending from Nomeny (east of the Moselle) to a point north of St. Mihiel-which would become the actual theater of operations for the American Army as soon as circumstances permitted concentration of A.E.F. divisions there. Orders issued on 24 July announced formal organization of the First Army, effective on 10 August; designated Pershing as its commander; and located its headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, west of Château

Thierry.

Stabilization of the Vesle River front in early August led Pershing to alter his plans for forming the First Army. Instead of organizing it in the ChâteauThierry region and then moving it eastward for the St. Mihiel Offensive, he secured Foch's consent on 9 August to a build-up of First Army units in the vicinity of the St. Mihiel salient. Tentative plans for reduction of the salient called for the concentration of three

« 上一頁繼續 »