Ocean Areas (USAFPOA) under which all U. S. Army forces previously assigned to the Central and South Pacific Areas were consolidated. General Richardson was retained as commander of the USAFPOA.

Central Pacific Offensive. The advance through the Central Pacific got under way in November 1943 with the seizure of two islands, Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. Marines landed on Tarawa on 21 November and took the island in a four-day fight at a cost to the Marines of some 3,000 casualties. Army troops overwhelmed the small Japanese garrison on Makin between 20 and 24 November 1943.

During January and February 1944, Admiral Nimitz proceeded to positions in the central and western Marshalls. The principal islands taken were Kwajalein, which was invaded by an Army force on 1 February, and the islands of Roi and Namur, which were invaded by Marines on 3 and 6 February. From Kwajalein a naval task force, moving west 340 miles with a regiment each of Marines and infantry, captured a Japanese air base on Engebi in the Eniwetok Atoll on 17-19 February 1944. Meanwhile, on 16 February, Nimitz had launched a massive carrier raid on Truk in the central Carolines, long considered Japan's key bastion in the central Pacific. This raid revealed that the Japanese had virtually abandoned Truk as a naval base, and a plan to assault that atoll in June was abandoned. Instead, Nimitz drew up plans for an invasion of the Marianas in June, to be followed in September by an advance into the western Carolines.

The Approach to the Philippines. The advance along the southern prong aimed at the Philippines got under way in April 1944. Having by then secured the Admiralties, MacArthur now made a long leap, bypassing Japanese concentrations at Wewak and Hansa Bay, and secured beachheads at points along 175 miles of the northern New Guinea coast. On 22 April Army forces landed at Tanahmerah Bay, Aitape, and Humboldt Bay. Within four days airfields at the three beachheads were in American hands. A large base was established at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea. Although fighting continued in some of

on

the captured areas for some time, MacArthur in April 1944 was already two months ahead of schedule. Australian forces eventually assumed a major part of the responsibility for reducing the bypassed areas. Covered by planes at Hollandia, Army forces next leaped 125 miles farther west to land, on 17 May, the New Guinea coast opposite Wakde Island, which they invaded the following day to secure the Japanese airfield on the island. On 27 May another amphibious force landed on Biak Island, about 900 miles southeast of the Philippines. The Japanese defenders of Biak fought desperately to retain the island, and General Krueger, the U. S. Sixth Army Commander, did not declare the operation over until 20 August 1944.

The Japanese made a determined effort to reinforce Biak Island. Early in June they assembled sufficient naval strength to destroy naval units under MacArthur's control and sent about half their land-based aircraft in the Carolines and the Marianas to airfields in western New Guinea, where they were within easy range of Biak. No sooner had this redeployment of naval and air forces been accomplished than the Japanese learned of the presence of the U. S. naval force in the Marianas.

Admiral Nimitz invaded the Marianas in June 1944. Amphibious assaults were made on Saipan on 15 June, on Guam on 20 July, and on Tinian on 23 July 1944. All three islands were strongly garrisoned by Japanese troops who contested every yard of ground. Loss of Saipan precipitated a political crisis in Tokyo and brought about the fall of the Tojo Cabinet. The Japanese sallied forth to offer battle to the U. S. Pacific Fleet. They hastily reassembled their fleet from Biak and the Philippines and sailed north to defend the Marianas area, but lack of land-based air support made it impossible to surprise the U. S. naval contingents under Admiral Spruance. In a massive air battle that took place on 19 June, 4 days after landings on Saipan, the Japanese lost more than 400 planes to an American loss of less than 30. Stripped of carrier planes, the Japanese fleet fled westward, but American planes in pursuit were able to sink several vessels, including three carriers.

During this engagement, known as the Battle of the Philippine Sea, only three American ships were damaged. This victory paved the way for eventual success in the Marianas, and provided a demonstration of the interdependence of operations in the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas.

MacArthur's and Nimitz' forces continued westward from Biak and the Marianas. On 2 July 1944 American troops had landed on Noemfoor Island, 90 miles beyond Biak, and near the end of the month other troops had pushed on to the western tip of New Guinea. With the capture of Morotai Island in mid-September, MacArthur was at last in position to make his return to the Philippines. Except for an abortive attack in mid-July on Aitape by Japanese troops that had been bypassed at Wewak, and mopping-up operations in other areas, troops of the Southwest Pacific Command spent the next weeks in preparation for reconquest of the Philippines.

In the Central Pacific, the Palaus were next to be attacked with a Marine landing on 15 September on Peleliu Island, where heavy fighting ensued and where organized resistance lasted until 26 November. Two days after the initial landings on Peleliu an Army division assaulted Angaur Island (17 September) where organized resistance lasted until 21 October.

During this period a new army made its appearance in the Southwest Pacific and took over a share of the enormous operational, administrative, and logistic responsibilities which had been carried by Sixth Army alone. The U. S. Eighth Army, activated on 10 June 1944, arrived in New Guinea in August and set up headquarters in Hollandia where Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger assumed command on 7 September 1944.

Reconquest of the Philippines. In the Philippines, the principal objective had been Luzon, since it was on one of the corners of the so-called strategic triangle. Since it was presumed that the Japanese had massed their principal ground, air, and naval strength in Luzon, United States strategists had planned to gain a foothold first in southernmost Mindanao, then move to Leyte, and finally to Luzon after air suprem

acy had been gained over that area. But when naval reconnaissance in September 1944 revealed little Japanese activity in the Philippines, Admiral Halsey proposed landing directly on Leyte in October. This change of strategy was quickly approved by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, who were at that time attending the second Quebec Conference. Strategically the plan was brilliant, because it would force the Japanese to split their forces in the Philippines and practically force the Japanese Combined Fleet to come out in the open to meet the threat.

The amphibious assault on Leyte took place on 20 October 1944 with four divisions of the U. S. Sixth Army going in abreast. The invading force included the XXIV Corps from the Central Pacific. Initial opposition was light, but the Japanese, who had expected to make their main stand on Luzon, decided to shift their remaining air and naval might against the U. S. forces in Leyte. They were also successful for a time in sending large numbers of ground reinforcements to Leyte, and the Sixth Army found itself engaged in a major struggle.

As had been anticipated, the attack on Leyte presented the Japanese navy with a challenge it could not ignore. Gathering together its remaining strength, the Japanese Combined Fleet converged on Leyte Gulf in three columns, and for a time seriously threatened the success of the whole Leyte operation. Actually, the sea battle was a series of engagements lasting from 23 to 26 October. In the end, Japan's fleet was almost completely destroyed, and for the rest of the war Allied naval forces were in virtual control of the surface of the Pacific.

Two months of heavy ground fighting took place in Leyte before American troops had secured parts of the island necessary for air and logistical bases, before the Army Air Forces had gained air superiority, and before naval and air forces had stopped Japanese reinforcing operations. Late in December General MacArthur announced that thereafter the U. S. Eighth Army would assume combat responsibility for the Leyte-Samar area.

Long before invasion of the Philip

pines, the question had arisen among United States strategists as to what the next target would be. Originally the plan had been to bypass the Philippines and to conduct the B-29 strategic bombing program from bases in China. Subsequently, plans were made for the conquest of Taiwan, as an additional base for B-29's after a foothold had been gained in the Philippines. With the overrunning of airfields and planned sites for B-29's by the Japanese in China, and with the Marianas available as a base for strategic bombing operations, a change of plans was indicated. United States military strategists became embroiled in a behind-the-scenes debate as to what the next move should be. The outcome of this controversy was a decision on the part of the JCS to make Luzon the next target, discard the plan to bomb Japan from bases in China, and bypass Taiwan. Troops scheduled to take Taiwan were to be used to invade Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus beginning in March 1945.

In keeping with the plan, the U. S. Sixth Army made a massive amphibious assault on Luzon along the shores of the Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945. The Japanese commander, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, did not intend to defend the Central Plains-Manila Bay area, but sought only to pin down major elements of MacArthur's forces in order to delay Allied progress to Japan. Nevertheless, strong Japanese forces, primarily naval, disregarded Yamashita's plans and held out in Manila. A powerful American force drove down the central valley from the Gulf to Manila, which fell in March after a month of bitter fighting. Yamashita concentrated his forces in three mountainous strongholds where they could conduct a protracted defense. Except for one strong pocket in the mountains of north-central Luzon, where the Japanese were still fighting when the war ended, organized Japanese resistance in Luzon was overcome by the end of May. Meanwhile, the U. S. Eighth Army had completed the operation on Leyte, subdued the Japanese in the southern Philippines in a series of amphibious attacks, and conducted the mop-up phase of operations on Luzon.

The Strategic Bombing of Japan. Cap

ture of the Marianas had brought Japan within reach of the Army Air Forces' huge new bomber, the B-29, which was able to make a nonstop flight of the 1,400 miles to Tokyo and back. Construction of airfields to accommodate B-29's began in the Marianas before the shooting had stopped, and in late November 1944 the strategic bombing of Japan began. Destruction wrought on the cities of Japan was enormous. But, as in Germany, postwar surveys revealed that strategic bombing had not been of decisive effect in crippling industrial production. Much of Japan's industrial plant was intact, but was rendered idle by the serious shortage of raw materials which the Allied naval blockade had produced. Although thousands of Japanese civilians were killed and literally millions were made homeless by air bombing, only a relatively small percentage of Japan's industrial facilities was destroyed, not enough to affect seriously Japanese capacity to resist.

Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Iwo Jima, a barren volcanic island midway between Saipan and Japan, was considered desirable as an emergency base for B-29's flying to and from Japan. Cancellation of plans to take Taiwan provided an opportunity for the Central Pacific forces to undertake the hitherto unscheduled conquest of Iwo Jima, and the JCS directed Admiral Nimitz to take the island in February. Two Marine divisions made the assault on 19 February, touching off a month of as severe fighting as American forces experienced during World War II. A third Marine division eventually had to be thrown into the battle as 23,000 Japanese, firmly entrenched in terrain that gave every advantage to the defenders, exacted a price of some 20,000 American casualties for the tiny island. The campaign came to an official end on 16 March 1945.

The invasion of the Ryukyus was made by troops of the U. S. Tenth Army, which had been activated on 20 June 1944 with Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., as commanding general. The Ryukyus campaign began on 26 March 1945 with the capture of small islands near Okinawa, where forward naval bases were established. An amphibious as

sault on Okinawa took place on 1 April, and the fighting lasted until June. Here, for the first time, Americans were invading what the Japanese defenders considered their home soil, and the defense was fanatic in the extreme. American troops suffered heavy casualties, and the Navy, too, had heavy personnel losses as Japanese suicide flyers, the Kamikazes, sank some 25 American ships and damaged 165 others in a desperate attempt to save the Ryukyus. Among the nearly 35,000 American casualties was General Buckner, who was killed on 18 June. He was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Ray S. Geiger, who was in turn succeeded by General Joseph W. Stilwell, who arrived to assume command of the Tenth Army on 22 June 1945.

Capture of the Ryukyus gave Allied naval and air forces excellent bases within 700 miles of Japan proper. Throughout June and July, Japan was subjected to increasingly intensive air attack and even to naval bombardment.

Allied forces were now in position for the final assault. In preparation for the invasion of Japan, a reorganization of U. S. Pacific forces had been effected on 3 April 1945, in which General MacArthur was given command of all Army forces and Admiral Nimitz of all naval forces. MacArthur's new command was designated U. S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC). The war ended before the reorganization could have any effect on operations.

Plans to Invade Japan. As early as July 1944 the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had formulated a general program for the invasion of Japan. Their plan had assigned target dates in the spring of 1945 for invasion of the Bonins and Ryukyus, October for the invasion of Kyushu (the southernmost island of Japan), and late December 1945 for an assault on Honshu in the vicinity of Tokyo. Despite Stalin's promise to assist in the defeat of Japan, United States military planners made plans that were not contingent upon the active participation of Russia, in part because the Soviets refused until very late in the war to co-operate in planning activities. Tentative suggestions concerning the possibility of establishing American bomber bases in Siberia for the bombing of

Japan had met with cold rebuffs from the Soviets.

At the Quebec Conference in September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill endorsed the overall plan for approaching and invading Japan. At the same time the Combined Chiefs, for purposes of production scheduling and manpower allocations, set a planning date for the defeat of Japan at 18 months after the end of the war in Europe.

Allied planners did not foresee Japan's early capitulation until a matter of days, or at most weeks, before it actually came about. Consequently, the pattern of the Pacific War developed along the general lines approved at Quebec, and plans for the amphibious invasion of Japan were in an advanced stage when the war ended.

The Potsdam Conference. At the Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August 1945), where previously mentioned agreements were reached on matters pertaining to postwar Europe, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union also came to an agreement on measures to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan. This agreement was affected by previous understandings reached at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, as well as by certain developments that had taken place since that time.

At Yalta Premier Stalin had formally restated his intention to come into the war against Japan approximately three months after V-E Day, and substance was given to the promise by the fact that, for the first time, some progress was made in conferences between staff officers on the matter of coordinating with Soviet forces projected operations against Japan. In return, Churchill and Roosevelt (at Yalta) had agreed to Stalin's terms; preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia, restoration of the former rights of Russia in Manchuria, the internationalization of Dairen, the return of southern Sakhalin, and the annexation of the Kuriles.

The rapid progress of the war against Japan following Yalta was accompanied by signs of an imminent Japanese collapse. By the time the War ended in Europe, American military planners were beginning to prepare alternate plans based on the possibility that