nese member. Its basic task is to consult regularly on questions affecting the status of our forces in Japan and their relation to the Japanese civil community. In addition, community relations advisory councils have been set up wherever our major troop concentrations are located. These unofficial bodies, composed of local Japanese officials or public figures and of key military personnel, provide for informal discussion of problems of mutual interest at the local level. They may also

make recommendations to the Joint Committee, and to higher commands, for new or revised policies for promoting better United States-Japanese relations.

CAMG staff sections (J5 or G5) exist in our major commands in Japan for the conduct of essential civil-military relationships and liaison duties. The CAMG organization is naturally much smaller than it was when Japan was under military occupation.

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In September of 1945 the U. S. Army became responsible for military government in Korea. On 9 September Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, commanding our troops in that country, established the U. S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), headed by military governor. USAMGIK had the following objectives: to establish a self-governing, sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations; to insure that this national government should be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and to assist in establishing a sound economic system and an adequate educational system, as essential bases of a democratic state.

Action was taken to repatriate Japanese nationals and eliminate Japanese influence from the Korean government, economy, and culture. This was not without consequence, as the loss of the Japanese technical and administrative skills created a grave economic and administrative problem; and it was complicated by the influx of Japanese from the Russian zone. Over two million Koreans were repatriated. Japanese-imposed restrictions on civil and political liberties were removed, dis

criminatory laws suspended, and Koreans encouraged in the exercise of their liberties.

All Japanese property in South Korea, except military booty of war, was vested in USAMGIK. While small holdings were sold, the disposition of large holdings was deferred in the belief that this should be reserved to the discretion of the Korean government

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CAMG ORGANIZATION. Except by Soviet Russia, no particular advance preparations had been made for CAMG postwar activities in Korea. As with Japan, there was actual combat phase. Our XXIV Corps was given less than a month to move from Okinawa. It had no CAMG plans or trained personnel, nor did it have personnel familiar with Korea and its problems. It did receive 20 CAMG officers from CONUS.

Several shifts in policy after arrival served to complicate further a situation which was complex enough. CAMG had to be established against the wishes of the people, who had expected immediate sovereignty. With the Japanese evacuated, and with the Koreans lacking the capacity to assume governmental responsibilities, American efforts were severely handicapped. The linguistic difficulties aggravated the problem. The socio-economic barrier interposed by the 38th parallel, plus the resentment of the Koreans, stimulated by Communist propaganda, created a very difficult situation. Moreover, our occupation was predicated on the hope of an early unification; accordingly, initial plans had but a short-term approach to the problem.

CAMG was established under the typical combat-type arrangement, and was not changed to the occupational type until eight months after the occupation, (April 1946).

With the establishment of USAMGIK, all legislative, executive, and judicial authority was vested in the Military Governor. With the removal of all Japanese from government posts, most key positions at the policy-making and top operational level were filled by Americans. USAMGIK continuingly fostered Korean participation in the major responsibilities of government.

KOREANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT. The judiciary was turned over to Korean administration in November 1945. In the executive departments and offices, Koreans were initially appointed as advisers to American directors; in August of 1946, however, the American directors were divested of their titles and assumed advisory roles. In February 1947 a leading Korean was appointed Civil Administrator. The Interim Legislative Assembly (half elected and half appointed by the CG, USAFIK) held its first session in December 1946.

Having thus laid the cornerstones, the Military Governor on 17 May 1947 established the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) embracing the legislative, executive, and judicial functions, and manned throughout with elected and appointed Korean nationals. Americans acted as advisers at all levels.

In September 1947 the United States presented the question of Korean independence to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which voted in November to establish a Republic of Korea. There were free elections in South Korea for a President and National Assembly, and for the adoption of a Constitution. On 15 August 1948, the third anniversary of the liberation of Korea, the democratic Republic of Korea was established in formal ceremonies held at Seoul, the national capital. With the establishment of this new government, formed by representatives of the Korean people chosen in a free and democratic election under the observation of United Nations' repre

2 For details of the Korean War as such.

sentatives, USAMGIK came to an end and the transfer of governmental functions to the new Korean government began. In a surprise move Russia withdrew her troops by December 1948. We followed suit shortly thereafter.

FIRST EFFECTS OF THE KOREAN WAR. The North Korean attack in 1950 threw South Korea into a panic. A struggling peaceful economy was completely disrupted; the country roads were clogged with fleeing refugees; and industry, such as it was, stopped. Over two and one-half million people were made homeless by the war, and became dependent upon the Republic of Korea (ROK) for their very existence. It was estimated that civilian casualties during the war totaled some 1,000,000 persons, including 359,000 dead, 380,000 missing and 256,000 injured. Some 60,000 children were orphaned; 40,000 of them are now under care in institutions. Estimates showed about 294,000 war widows with 516,000 children under 13, and there were probably many more widows who were not registered. Seventy percent of all medical facilities disappeared by destruction or theft. Medical personnel had been scattered and many killed or captured. The waves of war devastation swept up and down the peninsula several times, each time further aggravating conditions. With the beginning of 1951, major epidemics were raging all over Korea. Smallpox, typhus, typhoid-paratyphoid, and the dysenteries were the ones most conspicuous and deadly. The ROK Government lacked experience, personnel, and funds. With equipment, supplies, transportation, communications, and medical facilities destroyed, it was powerless. American and UN civil assistance on a massive scale was obviously called for.

STEPS TAKEN TO MEET THE EMERGENCY. In general terms, it may be said that the UN Civil Assistance Program of 1950 and thereafter fell into two parts. In the earlier period of hostilities it was perforce directed toward the quasi-military objective of preventing unrest, disease, and starvation among the civil population. Once the Communist attack was turned back, however, it was possible to approach

the longer-term problems involved. Great numbers of refugees were crowded into the southern cities, creating a critical relief and welfare problem. These people had to be returned home. On their return they had to be provided with the necessary means of reestablishing themselves. Involved were the provision of great quantities of farm equipment and fertilizer; the improvement of transportation equipment; and, in general, a series of programs for supporting production and rehabilitating war-damaged facilities.

Shortly after the North Korean attack in 1950 a United Nations Command was established, and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Tokyo was designated as the United Nations Commander. Throughout the military operations and postwar period several organizations, both military and civilian, were involved in the CAMG operation. Initially, health and welfare teams consisting of four officers each were organized under the direction of the Public Health and Welfare Officer of SCAP Headquarters in Tokyo and sent to Korea. In December 1950 the United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) was formed as a part of the Eighth United States Army, with the responsibility for field operations for civil assistance, including both a relief program and an economic aid program. Ten CAMG provincial field teams were organized to handle the work. Upon the activation of the Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) in July 1952, the responsibility for the civil assistance program in Korea, exclusive of the corps and division areas, was transferred thereto, and its Commanding General given control of UNCACK as the field operations unit. In June 1953 UNCACK became the Korea Civil As

sistance Command (KCAC) and was established as a lateral command under the theater command CINCUNC; all civil affairs responsibilities were transferred to it. It functioned in this capacity until September 1956.

The Eighth Army had CAMG responsibility for the area north of the corps rear boundaries. Civil Affairs were conducted south of the 38th parallel, and military government in the demilitarized zone north of the 38th parallel. This ceased in November 1954 when the area was turned over to the ROK Government for administration. Support and relief were provided in both areas by KCAC, but in the latter instance through the Eighth Army Civil Affairs Military Government Officers.

Among the agencies which aided in the civil assistance program was the United Nations Korea Rehabilitation Agency (UNKRA), formed in 1950 for the purpose of later assuming the responsibility for the long-range rehabilitation of Korea. Members worked closely with members of KCAC. A Combined Economics Board was established in July 1952, to serve as a coordinating and advisory agency for the UNC and ROK on economic affairs in connection with the civil assistance program. An Economic Coordinator was established on the staff of CINCUNC on 7 August 1953. Voluntary agencies such as the American Korea Foundation collected large amounts of food and sponsored rehabilitation projects.

Soon after the Armistice, in August 1953, the Eighth Army undertook the Armed Forces Aid to Korea Program (AFAK) in which troop units contributed to the rebuilding of bridges, schools, orphanages, and other welfare and cultural institutions.

In 1950 CAMG operational activities were taken over by the U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), functioning under the Governor, who was also Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE). Under Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty of 1952 the United States retained exclusive authority in the Ryukyus. The Anami

Oshima, the northern group of islands, reverted to Japanese control in 1953. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. The early phases of military government here were in several respects unique in American experience. The Ryukyus were considered a part of the Japanese home islands. During our attack on Okinawa a large part of the civilian population took refuge in caves or temporary shacks in the mountains, where they were living when our troops moved in. The Japanese used the former police force to organize and control these people, and there were extensive guerrilla activities, taking the form of unexpected harassing night attacks by machinegun, rifle, and mortar fire against the headquarters and bivouac areas of small American units. Many CAMG personnel were wounded in such attacks and a number killed. Guerrilla bands also endeavored to prevent CAMG control of the civilian population, using propaganda, threats, and punishment, and the kidnapping, trial, and execution by beheading or torture of civilian leaders who were collaborating with CAMG. They were especially active in rear areas from which our tactical units had been withdrawn. CAMG teams in such areas learned very early to set up local defenses and procure weapons.

In the rear areas the Japanese also conducted a very efficient psychological warfare campaign. Early in the occupation our CAMG units, through public address systems, notices, and meetings, began to fight the Japanese propaganda, a difficult task. At a later date, newspapers printed in Japanese in Hawaii were distributed to the civilians. Our psychological wafare service assisted through the use of public address systems in airplanes and through the printing and broadcasting of leaflets.

EMERGENCY FEEDING AND MEDICAL CARE. Every city in Okinawa, and practically every village, had been destroyed and the people driven from their homes, either by the Japanese before our arrival or by our own operations. Space on the island was at a premium, on account of our military needs. It therefore became necessary, after the first three months, to concentrate civilians in restricted areas. As a result we had to provide for prac

tically all the needs of a large civilian population and to build temporary housing on a mass scale.

Medical care of the population assumed greater importance here than in any other area. In the period of preparatory naval gunfire and aerial bombardment of Okinawa, and in the subsequent fighting, there were very heavy casualties among civilians. We were forced to attach surgical teams to the CAMG units with the combat divisions, and to provide hospitals for the wounded. In addition, there was a heavy load on CAMG medical facilities caused by people suffering from exposure, malnutrition, starvation, and various insectborne diseases, due to the period they had spent as refugees under primitive conditions.

In this operation, units of other services were placed under the temporary command of military government. InIcluded at various times were Navy dispensaries and hospitals, Quartermaster truck units, a military police battalion, Marine military police, Naval construction battalions, landing ships, landing craft, and provisional infantry rifle battalions. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps authorities were sympathetic, and their tactical and service units lent valuable assistance on request.

ECONOMIC REHABILITATION. The Ryukyus were never self-sufficient in prewar times; two-thirds of the rice, one-quarter of the wheat and barley, and one-half of the soybean requirements had to be imported. Cane sugar, a subsidized crop (101,045 tons, annually, from 1930-39), exceeding consumption by 900 percent, was the principal industry. Textile manufacturing (household type and centered in the northern Ryukyus) was the second most important industry, and accounted for 61.8 percent of the value of exports.

Most industry withered as the war drew closer to Okinawa. Lack of shipping cut off coal and raw materials from Japan; the fighting obliterated 20 percent of the population and 95 percent of the housing, and destroyed industrial equipment. "Peace" found the natives a scattered and bewildered people, with neither a government nor a going economy.

Restoration of prewar agricultural

production was hampered chiefly by an arable land shortage on Okinawa, where military requirements took approximately 30,000 acres. To assist the people to get crops started, 15 mechanical teams were organized, each equipped with a tractor, plow, and disk harrow. These teams began operating during the summer of 1946, and contributed materially in placing some 5,000 acres of land under cultivation. Sea walls, flood gates, and drainage areas that had been destroyed during the war were rebuilt. Farm animals, seeds, and fertilizer were imported. Rebuilding of ports, factories, and private industry was made possible through government loans and grants. Fishing was encouraged through building of refrigerator plants, boat construction, and education; as a result there is now a surplus of fish for export.

The Ryukyus' economic recovery has been hampered by the lack of transportation facilities. To alleviate this, Army surplus vehicles and a limited number of small Navy vessels were given to local governments; coal was brought from Iriomote to Okinawa; other interisland trade and traffic was reestablished; and phosphate rock has been shipped to Japan and there traded for much-needed fertilizers. A small number of landing vessels have also been made available to the fishing industry.

POLITICAL REHABILITATION. Local government in Okinawa came into being on 22 April 1946, when a native government was established with certain limited powers, all under the supervision of the military governor. At the same time there was established an advisory board called the Okinawa Assembly and various other governmental departments. Democratic elections were held on 1 February 1948 for mayors and assemblymen of cities, towns, and villages. The laws of the city, town, village, and rural governments were revised so as to introduce the following: the principle of direct elections by universal suffrage in all local areas; the concept that local assemblies can be effective in controlling local areas; a new election system to prevent election manipulation; and the principle of recall

and initiative. Civilian courts were established in the three prefectures and at lower echelons, on the same basis as the military government courts.

The onetime powers of the policecensorship and supervision over all types of meetings and over virtually every phase of the Okinawan's lifewere greatly curtailed. The police officer was made a servant of the local administration.

EDUCATION. The operation of schools was suspended from the time of the invasion of Okinawa until May 1945, when elementary classes for children were authorized. In August a CAMG Education Section was established to develop and coordinate the educational program, determine policy, and furnish school materials. It was a difficult problem, there being a lack of school buildings, textbooks, and competent teachers.

A program of adult education, using educational films and information centers, has been undertaken throughout the Ryukyus. The Army supplies films and projectors; projectionists and other mechanics are being trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, an exchange of students and national leaders has been instituted. Each year selected candidates are given grants for study in the United States and Japan. They are urged to utilize their newly acquired skills in responsible positions in the islands.

THE SITUATION TODAY. USCAR, operating under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense, exercises its powers over the Ryukyu Islands in pursuance of Executive Order 10713, signed by the President on 5 June 1957. It is organized under the High Commissioner into departments and teams. These latter work in close liaison with their opposite number components in the native government. The maximum amount of autonomy is given to the native government consistent with its capabilities. The Executive Order sets forth U.S. objectives in the islands, including the development of an effective and responsible Ryukyuan Government, based on democratic principles and supported by a sound financial structure; the improvement of the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants;