Managing Business TransactionsFree Press, 1993年8月23日 - 204 頁 Managing Business Transactions is the first book on the principles of a new managerial economics, based on transaction cost economics. The transaction, the basic unit of business has been studied by theoretical economists for decades. Rubin has translated their research into basic principles for managers at all levels to structure transactions to best achieve both individual and company goals. Rubin analyzes and offers strategies for transactions of all kinds. |
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第 22 頁
... The Economic Nature of the Firm : A Reader , edited by Louis Putterman . New York : Cambridge University Press , 1986 . Gilson , Ronald J. " Value Creation by Business Lawyers : Legal Skills and Asset Pricing . " Yale Law Journal 94 ...
... The Economic Nature of the Firm : A Reader , edited by Louis Putterman . New York : Cambridge University Press , 1986 . Gilson , Ronald J. " Value Creation by Business Lawyers : Legal Skills and Asset Pricing . " Yale Law Journal 94 ...
第 173 頁
... The Economic Nature of the Firm , edited by Louis Putterman . Becker , Gary S. , and Stigler , George J. " Law Enforcement , Malfeasance , and Compensa- tion of Enforcers . " Journal of Legal Studies , 3 ( 1974 ) : 1 . Coase , Ronald ...
... The Economic Nature of the Firm , edited by Louis Putterman . Becker , Gary S. , and Stigler , George J. " Law Enforcement , Malfeasance , and Compensa- tion of Enforcers . " Journal of Legal Studies , 3 ( 1974 ) : 1 . Coase , Ronald ...
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