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by the Magyars. Their natural sympathies with the Slavs in Turkey 'have given them,' to use the language of Consul White, cohesion and a common bond of hope, making them view the cause of the Turkish rayahs as their own.' It has been the most deeplyrooted desire of their leading politicians to annex Bosnia and to make Servia the nucleus of a larger Slavonic state under the suzerainty of the Porte. The result has been that the Magyar party in Hungary, jealous of the growth of Slav influence, have shown the heartiest sympathy with the Turks.

necessary.

A careful and impartial examination of the facts, War unso far as they can be gathered from diplomatic communications and reports, points to the conclusion that there was no necessity for war with Turkey. The diplomacy of Russia has been so unconciliatory towards Turkey as to suggest the impression that there was a settled determination to pick a quarrel. Lord Derby, in his despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, dated May 1 of the present year, most truly said that reforms, peace with Montenegro, and disarmament, might have been obtained by patience and moderation. The presence of large Russian forces on the frontier of Turkey, menacing its safety, rendering disarmament impossible, and exciting a feeling of apprehension and fanaticism among the Mussulman population, constituted a natural obstacle to internal pacification and reform. The entrance of invading armies on Turkish soil could not alleviate the difficulty, or improve the condition of the population.'

Exaggerated fear of

Russia.

On

The slow progress of Russia in the Bulgarian campaign must have lessened that almost superstitious dread of her power, which does so little credit to English intelligence and common sense. People have been alarmed by gifted military writers, who have been prone to see danger in the advances of Russia in Asia, under the probably unconscious influence of a professional longing for another Crimean war. such a subject the views of Lords Derby and Salisbury are a safer guide. The greatest political mistake of our time was the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. It is said that Prince Bismark was opposed to the annexation, but that he was overruled by Count Moltke. The wisdom of the politician was higher than that of the soldier.

That Russia is formidable on the defensive was shown by the Moscow campaign. But the very extent of the empire, which makes invasion difficult, presents immense obstacles to the concentration of force for offensive war. There are other causes in operation, besides those arising from the geographical extent of the empire, which undermine the strength of Russia. The favouritsm of the Court deprives the country of the services of the ablest men, and, owing to the universal corruption of the officials, the public service is unduly costly, and often inefficient.

While the conduct of Russia deserves condemnation, for provoking a conflict which has wrought unspeakable misery upon the people on whose behalf it was alleged to be undertaken, nothing can excuse

the Turkish Government for their long neglect of the reasonable remonstrances of their Christian subjects. Unless there had been substantial and unredressed grievances to complain of, there would have been no insurrection. For the cruelties with which the outbreak was suppressed; above all, for giving rewards and promotions to the authors of the Bulgarian massacres, the Porte stands justly condemned by the public opinion of the whole civilised world.

our Go

The conduct of our own Government in the earlier Conduct of stages of the negociations was not sufficiently decided. vernment. Viewing the policy of Russia with suspicion, they were not sufficiently firm in insisting on reforms, which might reasonably have been demanded from Turkey. They were wrong in not joining promptly and heartily with France in endorsing the Andrassy note, wrong in sending the fleet a second time to Besika Bay, and strengthening the garrison at Malta. These proceedings only tended to encourage a hope of the intervention of England, and to suggest the idea that there were divided counsels in the cabinet. The vacillation of the English Government exercised an evil influence upon the Porte. By concerted action the Powers might have brought an irresistible pressure to bear upon the Turkish Government. The lot of the Christian population must have been sensibly ameliorated, and the miseries of war would have been averted. In all that Mr. Gladstone has said in this sense I most heartily concur.

The language of Lord Derby should have been

ville's de

spatch,

1870.

Lord Gran framed more in the spirit of Lord Granville's despatch, of October 1870, to Sir Henry Elliot. Referring to the universal wish in Russia to modify the treaty of 1856, he said: Although Russia is not now prepared for war, it is impossible to rely permanently on this state of things. It is the universal wish in Russia to abrogate the conditions of the Treaty of 1856. Russia believes she is as strong as she ever was. Her Majesty's Government desire carefully to consider what position it would behove this country to take. England made great sacrifices in blood and money, during the Crimean war, for an object which was deemed of great importance both to itself and to the rest of Europe. The nation would be loth to believe that these sacrifices had been made in vain; but would it be wise for Great Britain, single-handed, to throw itself into such another struggle? How far could Turkey defend itself, even with such assistance as England could afford? Is it fair to encourage Turkey in the belief that she may rely with confidence on the support of Europe, and with absolute certainty on that of Great Britain? Would it not be more friendly to say more, and to point out that there are contingencies in which Turkey must feel sure that she could not rely upon our aid, and to impress upon her that her real safety will depend upon the spirit and feelings of the populations over which she rules?'

Berlin

note.

The same regrettable hesitation was evinced by our Government in reference to the Berlin note. It was no doubt true that a want of consideration had been shown

by the chancellors of Russia, Germany, and Austria, in asking us to accept articles, without having had any opportunity for a preliminary consideration; but the recent massacres at Salonica showed the necessity for prompt and united action. For the moment, it is true, we appeared to have gained some distinction in Europe by the independent position we had assumed; but in separating ourselves from the European concert, we encouraged the Porte to believe that we cared far more to restrain the advances of Russia, than to secure the welfare of the Christians in Turkey.

massacres.

A time was, however, at hand, when the British Bulgarian public, aroused by the reports of the atrocities of their old but unworthy ally, were about to express their feelings of indignation in terms, which would not fail to produce an impression on the conduct of the Government. The reports of Mr. Baring and Consul Dupuis confirmed the earlier reports in the Daily News of the execrable atrocities that had been committed in Bulgaria. Henceforth the alliance of England was lost to Turkey for ever. Detesting the cruelties that had been perpetrated, not sanguine of the prospects of reform in Turkey, unable to accept the maintenance of the Ottoman empire in Europe as a final and complete solution, and yet distrusting Russia, the English people, although never indifferent to the cause of humanity, and although specially sympathising with the wrongs of Christian races under an alien domination, were compelled to keep in view those interests only which are strictly British. They have refused to expend their

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